Mr. Locke's Reply

To the Right Reverend the

Lord Bishop of Worcester's

Answer to his Second Letter:

Wherein, besides other incident Matters, what his Lordship has said

Certainty by Reason, Certainty by Ideas, and Certainty of Faith.

The Refurrection of the same Body.

The Immateriality of the Soul.

The Inconsistency of Mr. Locke's Notions with the Articles of the Christian Faith, and their Tendency to Sceptism, is examined.

LONDON:

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My Lord,

YOUR Lordship, in the beginning of the last Letter you honoured me with, feems fo uneafie and difpleased at my having said too much already in the Question between us, that I think I may conclude, you would be well enough pleas'd if I should say no more; and you would dispense with me for not keeping my Promise I made you * to answer * 2d Letthe other parts of your first Letter. If this ter, p. 167. proceeds from any tenderness in your Lordship for my Reputation, that you would not have me expose my self by an overslow of Words, in many places void of Clearness, Coherence and Argument, and that therefore might have been spared; I must acknowledge it is a piece of great Charity, and fuch wherein you will have a lasting Advantage over me, fince good Manners will not permit me to return you the like. Or should I in the Ebullition of Thoughts, which in me your Lordship finds as impetuous as the Springs of Modena mentioned by Ramazzini, be in danger to forget my felf, and to think, I had fome right to return the general Complaint of length and intricacy without Force, yet you have secured your self from the Suspition of any fuch Trash on your side, by mak* p 4.

making * Cobwebs the easie Product of those who write out of their own Thoughts, which it might be a Crime in me to impute to your

Lordship.

If this Complaint of yours be not a Charitable Warning to me, I cannot well guess at the design of it; for I would not think that in a Controversie, which you, my Lord, have dragg'd me into, you would assume it as a Priviledge due to your felf to be as copious as you please, and say what you think sit, and expect I should reply only so, and so much, as would just suit your good liking, and serve to set the Cause right on that side which

your Lordship contends for.

My Lord, I shall always acknowledge the great distance that is between your Lordship and my self, and pay that Deference that is due to your Dignity and Person. But Controversie, though it excludes not good Manners, will not be managed with all that Submission which one is ready to pay in other Cases. Truth, which is inslexible, has here its Interest, which must not be given up in a Complement. Plato and Aristotle, and other great Names must give way, rather than make us renounce Truth, or the Friendship we have for her.

This possibly your Lordship will allow, for it is not spun out of my own Thoughts; I have the Authority of others for it: And I think it was in Print before I was born. But you will say however, I am too long in my Replies. It is not impossible but it may be so. But with all due Respect to your Lordship's

Autho-

Authority (the greatness whereof I shall always readily acknowledge) I must crave leave to fay, That in this Case you are by no means a proper Judge. We are now, as well your Lordihip as my felf, before a Tribunal to which you have appealed, and before which you have brought me: 'Tis the Publick must be judge, whether your Lordship has enlarged too far in accusing me, or I in defending my felf. Common Justice makes great allowance to a Man pleading in his own Defence, and a little length (if he should be guilty of it) finds excuse in the Compassion of by-standers, when they see a Man causelesty attacked, after a new way, by a potent Adversary; and under various Pretences, Occasions fought, and Words wrested to his disadvantage.

This, my Lord, you must give me leave to think to be my Case, whilst this strange way your Lordship has brought me into this Controversie; your gradual Accusations of my Book, and the different Causes your Lordship has affigned of them; together with Quotations out of it, which I cannot find there, and other Things I have complained of (to some of which your Lordship has not vouchfafed any Answer) shall remain unaccounted for, as I humbly conceive

they do.

I confess my Answers are long, and I wish they could have been shorter. But the Difficulty I have to find out, and fet before others your Lordship's meaning, that they may fee what I am answering to; and so be able

B 2

able to judge of the Pertinency of what I fay, has unavoidably enlarged them. Whether this be wholly owing to my dulness, or whether a little perplexedness both as to Grammar and Coherence, caused by those numbers of Thoughts, whether of your own or others, that crowd from all parts to be set down, when you write, may not be allow'd to have some share in it, I shall not presume to say. I am at the Mercy of your Lordship and my other Readers in the Point, and know not how to avoid a Fault that has no Remedy.

Your Lordship says, * The World soon grows weary of Controversies, especially when they are about Personal Matters, which made your Lordship wonder that one who understands the World so well, should spend above 50 Pages in renewing and enlarging a Complaint wholly concerning

himself.

To which give me leave to fay, That if your Lordship had so much considered the World, and what it is not much pleased with, when you published your Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity, perhaps your Lordship had not so personally concerned me in that Controversie, as it appears now you have, and continue still to do.

* p. 4.

* p. 4.

Your Lordship wonders * that I spend above 50 Pages in renewing and enlarging my Complaint concerning my self. Your Wonder, I humbly conceive, will not be so great, when you recollect, That your Answer to my Complaint, and the Satisfa-Etion you proposed to give me and others in

that Personal Matter, began the first Letter you honoured me with, and ended in the 47th Page of it, where you faid, You suppose the Reason of your mentioning my Words so often was now no longer a Riddle to me; and fo you proceeded to other Particulars of my Vindication. If therefore I have Spent 50 Pages of my Anfwer in shewing that what you offered in 47 Pages for my Satisfaction was none, but that the Riddle was a Riddle still; the difproportion in the number of Pages is not so great as to be the Subject of much wonder; especially to those who consider that in what you call Personal Matter I was shewing, that my Esfay, having in it nothing contrary to the Doctrin of the Trinity, was yet brought into that Dispute; and that therefore I had reason to complain of it, and of the manner of its being brought in: And if you had pleas'd not to have moved other Questions, nor brought other Charges against my Book till this, which was the Occasion and Subject of my First Letter, had been cleared, by making out that the Passages, you had in your Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity quoted out of my Book, had fomething in them against the Dostrin of the Trinity, and fo were with just reason brought by you, as they were, into that Dispute; there had been no other but that Personal Matter, as you call it, between us.

In the Examination of those Pages meant, as you said, for my Satisfaction, and of other parts of your Letter, I found (contrary to what I expected) Matter of renewing and en-

B 3

larging my Complaint, and this I took notice of and fet down in my Reply, which it feems I should not have done; The knowledge of the World should have taught me better: And I should have taken that for Satisfaction, which you were pleased to give, in which I could not find any, nor, as I believe, any intelligent or impartial Reader. So that your Lordship's care of the World, that it should not grow weary of this Controversie, and the Fault you find of my mis-imploying Fifty Pages of my Letter, reduces it felf at last in effect to no more but this, That your Lordship should have a liberty to say what you please, pay me in what Coin you think fit; my part should be to be satisfied with it, rest content and say nothing. This indeed might be a way not to weary the World, and to fave so Pages of clean Paper; and put fuch an end to the Controversie, as your Lordship would not dislike.

first part of Wisdom, in some Mens Opinions, not to begin in such Disputes: What the know-ledge of the World (which is a sort of Wisdom) should in your Lordship's Opinion make a Man do, when one of your Lordship's Character begins with him, is very plain: He is not to reply, so far as he judges his Desence and the Matter requires, but as your Lordship is pleased to allow; which some may think no better than if one might not reply at all.

After having thus rebuked me for having been too copious in my Reply, in the next

Words

Words your Lordship instructs me what I should have answer'd, * That I should have * p. 4. clear'd my self by declaring to the World, that I owned the Dostrin of the Trinity as it has been

received in the Christian Church.

This, as I take it, is a meer Personal Matter of the same Woof with a Spanish Sant Benito, and, as it feems to me, designed to fit close to me. What must I do now, my Lord? Must I silently put on and wear this Badge of your Lordship's Favour, and as one well understanding the World say not a Word of it, because the World soon grows weary of Personal Matters? If in Gratitude for this Personal Favour I ought to be filent, yet I am forced to tell you, That in what you require of me here, you possibly have cut out too much Work for a poor ordinary Layman, for whom it is too hard to know, how a Doctrin so disputed has been received in the Christian Church, and who might have thought it enough to own it as delivered in the Scriptures. Your Lordship herein lays upon me what I cannot do, without owning to know what I am fure I do not know. For how the Doctrin of the Trinity has been always received in the Christian Church, I confess my self ignorant. I have not had time to examine the History of it, and to read those Controversies that have been writ about it: And to own a Doctrin as received by others, when I do not know how those others received it, is perhaps a short way to Orthodoxy, that may fatisfie some Men: But he that takes this way to give Satisfaction,

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ction, in my Opinion makes a little bold with Truth; and it may be questioned whether fuch a Profession be pleasing to that God who requires Truth in the inward Parts, however acceptable it may in any Man be to his Diocesan.

I presume your Lordship, in your Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity, intends to give it us as it has been received in the Christian Church. And Ithink your Words, * viz. It is the Sense of the Christian Church which you are bound to defend, and no particular Opinions of your own, authorize one to think fo. But if I am to own it as your Lordship has there delivered it, I must own what I do not understand: For I confess your Exposition of the Sense of the Church, wholly transcends my Capacity.

* p. 87.

If you require me to own it with an implicit Faith, I shall pay that Deference as foon to your Lordship's Exposition of the Doctrin of the Church, as any ones. if I must understand and know what I own, it is my Misfortune, and I cannot deny it, that I am as far from owning what you in that Discourse deliver, as I can be from profesfing the most unintelligible thing that ever I

read, to be the Doctrin that I own.

Whether I make more use of my poor Understanding in the Case, than you are willing to allow every one of your Readers, I cannot tell; but fuch an Understanding as God has given me is the best I have, and that which I must use in the apprehending what others fay, before I can own the Truth

of it; and for this there is no help that I know.

That which keeps me a little in countenance, is, That, if I mistake not, Men of no mean Parts, even Divines of the Church of England, and those of neither the lowest Reputation nor Rank, find their Understandings fail them on this occasion; and stick not to own, That they understand not your Lordship in that Discourse, and particularly that your 6th Chapter is unintelligible to them as well as me; whether the fault be in their and my Understandings, the World must be judge. But this is only by the by, for this is not the Answer I here

intend your Lordship.

Your Lordship tells me, That to clear my felf I should have owned to the World the Do-Etrin of the Trinity as it has been received, &c. Answer, I'know not whether in a Dispute managed after a new way, wherein one Man is argued against, and another Man's words all along quoted, it may not also be a good as well as a new Rule for the Answerer to reply to what was never objected, and clear himself from what was never laid to his Charge. If this be not fo, and that this new way of Attacking requires not this new way of Defence, your Lordship's Prescription to me here, what I should have done, will, amongst the most intelligent and impartial Readers, pass for a strange Rule in Controversie, and such as the learnedst of them will not be able to find in all Antiquity; and therefore must be imputed to something else than your Lordship's great Learn-

ing.

Did your Lordship in the Discourse of the Vindication of the Trinity, wherein you first fell upon my Book, or in your Letter; (my Answer to which, you are here Correcting) did your Lordship, I say, any where object to me, that I did not own the Doctrin of the Trinity, as it has been received in the Christian Church, &c? If you did, the Objection was so secret, so hidden, so artificial, that your words declared quite the contrary. In the Vindication of the Doctrin of the Tri-* Vindic. nity, your Lordship says, * That my No-P. 239. tions were borrowed to serve other purpoles [whereby, if I understand you right, you meant against the Doctrin of the Trinity] than I intended them; which you repeat again i for my Satisfaction, and infift

+ 1 Ans. P. 35.

* upon for my Vindication.

* Ib. p. 36, 37, 40, 42, 46.

+ I Anf.

p. 132, 133.

You having fo folemnly more than once professed to clear me and my Intentions from all suspition of having any part in that Controversie, as appears farther in the close of your first Letter, i where all you charge on me, is the ill use, that others had, or might make of my Notions, how could I suppose such an Objection made by your Lordship, which you declare against, without accusing your Lordship of manifest Pre-

varication? If your Lordship had any thing upon your Mind, any fecret Aims, which you did

not think fit to own, but yet would have me divine and answer to, as if I knew them, this

this I confess is too much for me, who look no farther into Mens Thoughts, than as they appear in their Books. Where you have given your Thoughts vent in your Words, I have not, I think, omitted to take notice of them, not wholly passing by those Infinuations, which have been drop'd from your Lordship's Pen; which from another, who had not professed so much personal Refpect, would have shewn no exceeding good

disposition of Mind towards me.

When your Lordship shall go on to accuse me of not believing the Doctrin of the Trinity, as received in the Christian Church, or any other Doctrin you shall think fit, I shall answer as I would to an Inquisitor. For tho your Lordship tells me, & That I need not + p. 5. be afraid of the Inquisition, or that you intended to charge me with Heresie in denying the Trinity; yet he that shall consider your Lordship's proceeding with me from the beginning, as far as it is hitherto gone, may have reason to think, that the Methods and Management of that Holy Office are not wholly unknown to your Lordship, nor have scaped your great reading. Proceedings with me have had these steps.

1. Several Passages of my Essay of Humane Understanding, and some of them relating barely to the Being of a God, and other Matters wholly remote from any Question about the Trinity, were brought into the Vindication of the Dostrin of the Trimiy, and there argued against as containing the Errors of Those and Them, which Those Those and Them are not known to this

day.

2. In your Lordship's Answer to my first Letter, when that was given as the great reason why my Essay was brought into that Controversie, (viz.) because in it Certainty was founded upon clear and distinct Ideas, was found to fail, and was only a supposition of your own; other Accusations were sought out against it in relation to the Doctrin of the Trinity. viz. That * it might be of dangerous consequence, to that Doctrin, to introduce the new term of Ideas, and to place Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our Ideas. What are become of these Charges, we shall see in the progress of this Letter, when we come to consider what your Lordship has reply'd to my Answer upon these Points.

3. These Accusations not having, it seems, weight enough to effect what you intended, my Book has been rumaged again to find new and more important Faults in it; and now at last at the third Effort if my Notions of Ideas are found inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith. This indeed, carries fome found in it, and may be thought worthy the Name and Pains of fo great a Man and zealous a Father of the Church

as your Lordship.

That I may not be too bold in affirming a thing I was not privy to, give me leave, my Lord, to tell your Lordship why I presume my Book has upon this occasion been look'd over again, to fee what could be found in

+ 2 Anf. Titlepage.

* I Ans.

p. 133.

it capable to bear a deeper Accusation, that might look like something in a Title-Page. Your Lordship, by your Station in the Church, and the Zeal you have shewn in defending its Articles, could not be supposed, when you first brought my Book into this Controversie, to have omitted these great Enormities, that it now stands accused of, and to have cited it for smaller Mistakes, some whereof were not found, but only imagin'd to be, in it; if you had then known these great Faults, which you now charge it with, to have been in it. If your Lordship had been apprifed of its being guilty of fuch dangerous Errors, you would not certainly have pass'd them by: And therefore I think one may reasonably conclude, that my Essay was new looked into on purpose.

Your Lordship says, * That what you have * p. 177.

done herein you thought it your Duty to do, not with respect to your Self, but to some of the My-steries of our Faith, which you do not charge me with opposing, but by laying such Foundations as do tend to the overthrow of them. It cannot be doubted but your Duty would have made you at the first warn the World, that my Notions were inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith, if your Lordship had then known it. Though the excessive Respect and Tenderness you express towards me Personally in the immediately preceding Words, would be enough utterly to consound me, were I not a little acquainted with your Lordship's Civilities in this kind. For you tell me,

* That these things laid together made your * p. 177.

Lordship

Lordship think it necessary to do that which you was unwilling to do till I had driven you to it, which was to shew the Reasons you had, why you looked on my Notion of Ideas and of Certainty by them, as inconsistent with it self, and with some important Articles of the Chri-

Stian Faith.

What must I think now, my Lord, of these Words? Must I take them as a meer Complement, which is never to be interpreted rigorously, according to the precise meaning of the Words? Or must I believe that your unwillingness, to do so hard a thing to me, restrained your Duty, and you could not prevail on your self (how much soever the Mysteries of Faith were in danger to be overthrown) to get out these harsh Words, viz. That my Notions were inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith, till your third Onset, after I had forced you to your Duty by two Replies of mine?

It will not become me, my Lord, to make my felf a Complement from your Words, which you did not intend me in them. But on the other side, I would not willingly neglect to acknowledge any Civility from your Lordship in the sull extent of it. The Business is a little nice, because what is contain'd in those two Passages, * cannot by a less skilful Hand than yours be well put together, though they immediately follow one another. This, I am sure, falls out very untowardly, that your Lordship should drive me, (who had much

* p. 177.

much rather have been otherwise imployed) to drive your Lordship to do that which you were unwilling to do. The World fees how much I was driven: For what Censures, what Imputations must my Book have lain under, if I had not cleared it from those Accusations your Lordship brought against it; when I am charged now with Evasions, for not clearing my self from an Accusation which you never brought against me? But if it be an Evasion, not to answer to an Objection that has not been made, what is it I befeech you, my Lord, to make no reply to Objections that have been made? Of which I promise to give your Lordship a Lift, whenever you shall please to call for it.

I forbear it now for fear that if I should say all that I might upon this new Accusation, it would be more than would suit with your Lordship's liking; and you should complain again that you have opened a Passage which brings to your mind Ramazzini and his Springs of Modena. But your Lordship need not be afraid of being overwhelmed with the Ebullition of my Thoughts, nor much trouble your self to find a way to give check to it: Meer Ebullition of Thoughts never overwhelms or sinks any one but the Author himself; but if it carries Truth with it, that I confess has force, and it may be troublesome to those that stand in its way.

Your Lordship says, You see how dange- p. 3. rous it is to give occasion to one of such a fruit-

ful Invention as I am, to write.

I am obliged to your Lordship, that you think my Invention worth concerning your felf about, though it be fo unlucky as to have your Lordship and me always differ about the measure of its Fertility. In your first Answer * you thought I too much extended the Fertility of my Invention, and ascribed to it what it had no Title to: And here I think you make the Fertility of my Invention greater than it is. For in what I have answered to your Lordship, there seems to me no need at all of a Fertil Invention. 'Tis true it has been hard for me to find out whom you writ against, or what you meant in many places. As foon as that was found the Answer lay always fo obvious, and fo easie, that there needed no labour of Invention to discover what one should reply. The Things themfelves (where there were any) strip'd of the Ornaments of Scholastick Language, and the less obvious ways of learned Writings, seemed to me to carry their Answers visibly with them. This permit me, my Lord, to fay, That however fertil my Invention is, it has not in all this Controversie produced one Fiction or wrong Quotation.

oft Answ. p. 8.

* p. 80.

But before I leave the Answer you dictate, permit me to observe that I am so unfortunate to be blamed * for owning what I was not accused to disown; and here for not owning what I was never charged to disown. The like Missortune have my poor Writings. They offend your Lordship ship in some places, because they are new, and in others, because they are not new.

Your next Words which are a new Charge, I shall pass over till I come to your Proof of them, and proceed to the next Paragraph. Your Lordship tells me, ** F.;. You shall wave all unnecessary Repetitions, and come immediately to the matter of my Complaint, as it is renewed in my Second Letter.

What your Lordship means by unnecesfary Repetitions here, feems to be of a piece with your blaming me in the foregoing Page, for having said too much in my own defence; and this taken altogether, confirms my Opinion, That, in your Thoughts, it would have been better I should have replyed nothing at all. For you having fet down here near twenty Lines as a necessary Repetition out of your former Letter, your Lordship omits my answer to them as wholly unnecessary to be seen; and consequently you must think was at first unnecessary to have been faid. For when the same Words are necessary to be repeated again, if the same reply which was made to them be not thought fit to be repeated too, it is plainly judged to be nothing to the purpose, and should have been spared at first.

'Tis true, your Lordship has set down some sew Expressions taken out of several parts of my Reply; but in what manner the Reader cannot clearly see, without going back to the Original of this Matter. He must therefore pardon me the trouble of a deduction, which cannot be avoided,

C where

where Controversie is managed at this rate; which necessitates, and so excuses length of the Answer.

My Book was brought into the Trinitarian Controversie by these steps. Your Lordship says, That

Vindic. 1. The Unitarians have not explained the

P. 231. Nature and Bounds of Reason.

2. The Author Of Christianity not Mysterious, to make amends for this, has offer'd an account of Reason.

ib. p. 232. 3. His Doctrin concerning Reason, supposes that we must have clear and distinct Ideas of whatever we pretend to any Certainty of in our Mind.

ib. p 233. 4. Your Lordship calls this a new way

of Reasoning.

5. This Gentleman of this new way of Reaforing in his First Chapter says something, which has a conformity with some of the Notions in my Book. But it is to be observed he speaks them as his own Thoughts and not upon my Authority, nor with taking any notice of me.

Vindic. p. 234.

ibid.

6. By vertue of this he is presently entituled to I know not how much of my Book; and divers Passages of my Essay are quoted, and attributed to him under the Title of The Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, (for he is by this time turned into a Troop) and certain unknown (if they are not all contained in this one Author's Doublet) They and These are made by your Lordship to lay about them shrewdly for several Pages together in your Lords-

Lordship's Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity, &c. with Passages taken out of my Book, which your Lordship was at the pains to quote as Theirs, i. e. certain unknown Anti-trinitarians.

Of this your Lordship's way, strange and new to me, of dealing with my Bock I took notice. *

* I Letter To which your Lordship tells me here p. 59. + you replyed in these following words + p. 5. which your Lordship has set down as no unnecessary Repetition. Your Words are: It was because the Person who opposed the Mysteries of Christianity went upon my Grounds, and made use of my Words; although your Lordship declared withal, That they were used to other purposes than I intended them; and your Lordship confessed that the Reason why you quoted my Words so much, was, because your Lordship found my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation on which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went; and that he had nothing that looked like Reason if that Principle were removed, which made your Lordship so much endeavour to shew, that it would not hold; and so you supposed the Reason why your Lordship so often mentioned my Words, was no longer a Riddle to me. And to this Repetition your Lordship Subjoins, of That I fet down these Passages in my + p. 6. Second Letter, but with these Words annexed, "That all this feems to me to do no-" thing to the clearing of this Matter.

Answer. I say so indeed in the place quoted by your Lordship, and if I had said no C 2 more,

more, your Lordship had done me Justice in setting down barely these Words as my Reply, which being set down when your Lordship was in the way of Repeating your own Words with no sparing Hand, as we shall see by and by, these sew of mine set down thus without the least intimation, that I had said any thing more, cannot but leave the Reader under an Opinion, that this was my whole Reply.

But if your Lordship will please to turn *2 Letter to that place of my Second Letter, * out p. 48. &c. of which you take these Words, I prefume you will find that I not only said,
but proved, "That what you had said
"in the Words above repeated, to clear
"the Riddle in your Lordship's way of
"writing, did nothing towards it.

That which was the Riddle to me, was, That your Lordship writ against others, and yet quoted only my Words, and that you pinn'd my Words, which you argued against, upon a certain fort of These and Them that no where appeared or were to be found; and by this way brought my Book into the Controversie.

To this your Lordship says, You told me it was because the Person who opposed the Mysteries of Christianity, went upon my Grounds and made use of my Words.

Answer. He that will be at the pains to compare this, which you call a Repetition here, with the place you quote for it, viz.

I Answ.

i Answ. p. 46. will, I humbly conceive, find it a new fort of Repetition; unless the fetting down of Words and Expressions not to be found in it, be the Repetition of any Passage. But for a Repetition, let us take it of what

your Lordship had said before.

The Reason, and the only Reason there * given why you quoted my Words after * 1 Answ. the manner you did, was, Because you found P. 46. my Notions as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon. These are the Words in your Lordship's first Letter, and this the only Reason there given, though it hath grown a little by Repetition. to this my Reply f was. " That I thought + 2 Let. your Lordship had found, that that which p. 49. " the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went upon, and for which he was made one of the Gentlemen of the new way of Rea-" foning, opposite to the Doctrin of the Trinity was, that he made or supposed " clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certain-" ty: But that was not my Notion as to Certainty by Ideas, &c. Which Reply, my Lord, did not barely fay, but shew'd the Reason why I said, That what your Lordship had offered as the Reason of your manner of Proceeding, did nothing towards the clearing of it: Unless it could clear the Matter to fay you joined me with the Anthor of Christianity not Mysterious, who goes upon a different Notion of Certainty from mine; because he goes upon the same with me. For he (as your Lordship supposes)

making

making Certainty to confift in the perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of clear and distinct Ideas; and I on the contrary making it confift in the perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of such Ideas as we have, whether they be perfectly in all their Parts clear and distinct or no. is impossible he should go upon my Grounds, whilst they are so different, or that his going upon my Grounds should be the Reason of your Lordship's joining me with him. And now I leave your Lordship to Judge, how you had cleared this Matter, and whether, what I had answer'd did not prove. that what you faid did nothing towards the clearing of it?

This one Thing methinks your Lordship has made very clear, that you Thought it necessary to find some way to bring in my Book, where you were arguing against that Author, that he might be the Person, and mine the Words you would Argue against together. But 'tisas clear that the particular matter which your Lordship made use of to this purpose, happen'd to be somewhat unluckily chosen. For your Lordship having faccused him of supposing clear and distinst Ideas necessary to Certainty, which you declared * to be the Opinion you opposed, and

for that Opinion having made him a Gentleman of a new way of Reasoning, your Lordship imagined that was the Notion of Certainty I went on. But it falling out otherwise, and I denying it to be mine, the ima-

† Vindic. P. 232.

* 1 Answ.

p. 14.

ginary tie between that Author and me, was

unexpectedly dissolved; and there was no appearance of Reason for bringing Passages out of my Book, and arguing against them as your Lordship did, as if they were that Anthor's.

To justifie this, (fince my Notion of Certainty could not be brought to agree with what he was charged with, as opposite to the Doctrin of the Trinity) he at any rate must be brought to agree with me, and to go upon my Notion of Certainty. Pardon me my Lord, that I fay at any rate. Reason I have to think so, is this. Either that Author does make clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty, and so does not go upon my Notion of Certainty: And then your assigning his going upon my Notion of Certainty, as the Reason for your joyning us as you did, shews no more but a willingness in your Lordship to have us joyn'd. Or he does not lay all Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas, and so possibly for ought I know may go upon my Notion of Certainty. But then my Lord, the Reason of your first bringing him and me into this Dispute, will appear to have been none. All your arguing against the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, will be found to be against no Body, since there is no Body to be found that lays all Foundation of Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas; no Body to be found that holds the Opinion that your Lordship opposes.

Having thus given you an Account of some part of my Reply (to what your Lordship C 4 really

really answer'd in that 46th Page of your first Letter) to shew that my Reply contained fomething more than these Words here * fet down by your Lordship. viz. " That all this feems to me to do nothing to the clearing this Matter. I come now to those parts of your Repetition, as your Lordship is pleased to call it, wherein there is

nothing Repeated.

* .p 6.

* p. s.

Your Lordship fays, * That you told me the Reason why I was brought into the Controversie after the manner I had complained of, was because the Person who opposed the Mysteries of Christianity, went upon my Grounds; and for this you quote the 46th Page of your But having turned to that first Letter. place, and finding there these Words. That you found my Notious as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation which that Author went upon: Which are far from being repeated in the Words fet down here, unless Grounds in general be the same with Notions as 10 Certainty by Ideas. I beg leave to confider what you here fay as new to me, and not Repeated.

Your Lordship fays, That you brought me into the Controversie as you did, because that Author went upon my Grounds. 'Tis possible he did, or did not : But it cannot appear that he did go upon my Grounds, till those Grounds are affigued, and the places both out of him and me produced to shew, that we agree in the same Grounds and go both upon them; when this is done there will be room to consider whether it be so or no.

In the mean time you having brought me into the Controversie, for his going upon this particular Ground, supposed to be mine, That clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty. It can do nothing towards the clearing this, to fay in general, as your Lordship does, * That he went upon my * pag. 6. Grounds, because though he should agree with me in feveral other Things, but differ from me in this one Notion of Certainty. there could be no reason for your dealing with me as you have done. That Notion of Certainty, being your very exception against his Account of Reason; and the sole occafion you took of bringing in Passages out of my Book; and the very Foundation of arguing against them.

Your Lordship farther says here, in this pag 6. Repetition which you did not say before in the place refer'd to as Repeated, That he made use of my Words. I think he did of Words something like mine. But as I humbly conceive also, he made use of them, as his own, and not as my Words; for I do not remember that he quotes me for them. This I am sure, That in the Words quoted out of him by your Lordship, upon which my Book is brought in, there is not one Syllable

of Certainty by Ideas.

No doubt whatever he or I or any one have faid, if your Lordship disapproves of it, you have a right to Question him that said it. But I do not see how this gives your Lordship any Right to entitle any Body to what he does not say, whoever else says it.

The Author of Christianity not Mysterious. fays in his Book fornething fuitable to what I had faid in mine; borrowed or not borrowed from mine, I leave your Lordship to determine for him. But I doe not fee what ground that gives your Lordship to concern me in the Controversie you have with him, for things I fay which he does not: and which I fay to a different purpose from his. Let that Author and I agree in this one Notion of Certainty as much as you please, what Reason I beseech your Lordship could this be, to quote my Words as his, who never used them; and to purposes, as you say more than once, to which I never intended them? This was that which I complained was a Riddle to me. fince your Lordship can give no other Reafon for it, than those we have hitherto seen. I think it is fufficiently unridled, and you are in the right when you fay, you think it is no longer a Riddle to me.

I easily grant my little Reading may not have instructed me, what has been, or what may be done, in the several ways of writing and managing of Controversie, which like War always produces new Stratagems: Only I beg my Ignorance may be my Apology, for saying, that this appears a new way of writing to me, and this is the first

time I ever met with it.

* Vindic. ship has set down out of him * be if you p. 234. please, supposed to be precisely my Words, and that he quoted my Book for them. I

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not fee how even this entitles him to any more of my Book than he has quoted. how any Words of mine in other parts of my Book, can be afcribed to him, or argued against as his, or rather, as I know not whose, which was the Thing I complained of ; for the Thele and Thep, those Passages of my Book were ascribed to, could not be that Author, for he used them not: Nor the Author of The Essay of Humane Understanding for he was not argued against, but was difcharged from the Controversie under Debate. So that neither he nor I being the They and Those, that to often occur, and deserved so much Pains from your Lordship, I could not but complain of this to me incomprehensible way of bringing my Book into that Controversie.

Another part of your Lordship's Repetition, † which I humbly conceive, is no Repetition; because this also I find not in that Passage quoted for it, is this, That your Lordship confessed that the Reason why you

quoted my Words so much.

My Lord, I do not remember any need your Lordship had to give a Reason why you quoted my Words so much, because I do not remember, that I made that the matter of my Complaint. That which I complained of, was not the quantity of what was quoted out of my Book, but the manner of quoting it, * viz. "That I was so * 2 Let." every where joined with others, under P. 49. "the comprehensive words They and Them, though my Book alone were every where quoted,

quoted, that the World would be apt to think, I was the Person who argued " against the Trinity: And again, it "That + ib. p. 51. which I complained of, was, That I was made one of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, without being guilty of what made them fo, and fo was brought into a Chapter wherein I thought my felf not concerned; which was managed fo, that my Book was all along quot-" ed, and others argued against; others were entitled to what I faid, and I to what others faid, without knowing why or how: Nay, I told your Lordship * 2 Let. in that very Reply, * " That if your p. 50 " Lordship had directly questioned any of my Opinions, I should not have complained. Thus your Lordship sees my Complaint was not of the largeness, but of the manner of your Quotations. of that in all these many Pages imployed by your Lordship for my Satisfaction, you, as I remember, have not been pleased to offer any reason, nor can I hitherto find it

any way cleared:

In this as in all other ways of writing.

I have in the foregoing Pages, for the clearing this Matter, been obliged to take notice of Them and Those, as directly signifying no body. Whether your Lordship will excuse me for so doing I know not, since I perceive such slight words as Them and Those are not to be minded in your Lordship's Writings: Your Lordship has a pri-

readily acknowledge your great Miftery

When I do, I shall

a priviledge to use such trifling Particles without taking any great care what or whom

they refer to.

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To shew the Reader that I do not talk without Book in the Cafe, I shall fet down your Lordship's own Words, * What a * p. 90. hard fate doth that Man lie under, that falls into the Hands of a severe Critick! He must have a care of his But, and for, and Them, and It. For the least ambiguity in any of these, will fill up Pages in an Answer, and make a Book look considerable for the bulk of it. And what must a Man do, who is to answer all such Objections about the use of Particles? I humbly conceive 'tis not without reason, that your Lordship here claims an exemption from having a care of your But, and your For, and your Them, and other Particles. The sequel of your Letter will shew, That 'tis a priviledge your Lordship makes great use of, and therefore have reason to be tender of it, and to cry out against those unmannerly Criticks, who question it. Upon this consideration, I cannot but look on it as a misfortune to me, that it should fall in my way to difplease your Lordship, by disturbing you in the quiet, and perhaps antient Possefsion of so convenient a Priviledge. how great foever the advantages of it may be to a Writer, I upon experience find it is very troublesome and perplexing to a Reader, who is concern'd to understand what is written, that he may answer to it. to return to the place we were upon.

Your

p. 6.

Your Lordship goes on and says, * Whether it doth or no, i. e. Whether what your Lordship had said does clear this Matter or no, you are content to leave it to any indifferent Reader; and there it must rest at last although I should write Volumes about it.

Upon the reading of these last Words of your Lordship's, I thought you had quite done with this personal Matter, so apt, as you fay, to weary the World. But whether it be that your Lordship is not much satisfied in the handling of it, or in the letting it alone; whether your Lordship meant by these last words, that what I write about it is Volumes, i. e. too much, as your Lordship has told me in the first Page; but what your Lordinip fays about it is but necessary; whether these or any other be the cause of it, Personal Matter, as it feems, is very importunate, troublesome to your Lordship, as it is to the World: You turn it going in the end of one Paragraph, and personal Matter thrusts it self in again in the beginning of the next, whether of it felf, without your Lordship's notice or consent, I examine not. But thus stand the immediate following words wherein your Lordship asks me, * But for what cause do I continue so unsatisfied? To which you make me give this answer, That the cause why I continue fo unsatisfied, is, That the Author mentioned, went upon this Ground, That clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty, but that is not my Potion as to Tertainty

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tainty by Ideas; which is, That Certainty tonkiks in the perception of the agreement of deas, such as we have, whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and dikting of no; and that I have no Potions of Certainty more than this one.

These Words which your Lordship has fet down for mine, I have printed in a distinct Character, that the Reader may take particular notice of them; not that there is any thing very remarkable in this Passage it self, but because it makes the business of the Fourscore following Pages. For the three several Answers that your Lordship says you have given to it, and that which you call your Defence of them, reach, as I take it, to the 87 Page. But another particular Reason why this Answer which your Lordship has made for me to a Question of your own putting, is distinguished by a particular Character, is to fave frequent Repetitions of it, that the Reader by having recourse to it, may see whether those things, which your Lordship says of it, be fo or no, and judge whether I am in the wrong, when I affure him, that I cannot find them to be as you fay.

Only before I come to what your Lordfhip positively says of this which you call my Answer, I crave leave to observe that it supposes I continue unsatisfied: To which I reply, That I no where say that I continue unsatisfied: I may say, That what is offer'd for Satisfaction, gives none to me or any body else; and yet I as well as other People, may be satisfied concerning the matter.

I now come to what your Lordship fays

politively of it.

1. You say that I tell you, That the cause why I continued unsatisfied, is, That the Author mentioned, went upon this Ground, That clear and diffinit Ideas are necessary to Certainty; but that is not my Potion

of Certainty by Ideas, &c.

To which I crave leave to reply, That neither in the 50th Page of my Second Letter which your Lordship quotes for it, nor any where else did I tell your Lordship any fuch thing. Neither could I affign, That Authors going upon that Ground, there mentioned as any cause of diffatisfaction to me, because I know not that he went upon this Ground, That clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty; for I have met with nothing produced by your Lordship out of him, to prove that he did And if it be true, that he goes upon Grounds of Certainty that are not mine, I know no Body that ought to be diffatisfied with it but your Lordship, who have taken fo much pains to make his Grounds mine, and my Grounds his, and to entitle us both to what each has faid apart.

2. Your Lordship says, This is no more than what I had said before in my former Letter. Answ. For this I appeal to the 57th, or rather (as I think you writ) 87th page quoted for it by your Lordship; where any one

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must have very good Eyes, to find all that is fet down here in this Antwer, (as you a little lower call it) which you have been pleased to put into my Mouth. For neither in the one nor the other of those Pages, is there any fuch Answer of mine. Indeed, in the 87th Page there are these Words, "That Certainty, in my Opinion, lies in " the perception of the agreement or dif-" agreement of Ideas, such as they are, " and not always in having perfectly clear " and distinct Ideas. But these Words there, are not given as Answer to this Question, Why do I continue so unsatisfied? And the remarkable Answer above set down, is, as I take it, more than these Words, as much more in proportion asyour Lordship's whole Letter is, more than the half of it.

3. Your Lordship says of the remarkable Answer above set down, That you took par-

ticular notice of it.

To which I crave leave to reply, That your Lordship no where before took notice of this Answer, as you call it: For it was no where before extant, though it be true, some part of the Words of it were. But some part of the Words of this Answer (which too were never given as an Answer to the Question propos'd) can never be this Answer, it self.

4. Your Lordship farther fays, That you

gave three feveral Answers to it.

To which I must crave leavefurther to reply, That never an one of the three Anfwers which you here fay you gave to this my Answer, were given to this Answer which in the Words above fet down, you made me give to your Question. Why I continued so unsatisfied?

To justifie this my Reply, there needs no more but to set down these your Lordship's three Answers, and to turn to the

places where you fay you gave them.

The first of your three Answers is this, * That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than 1 do, (according to this Answer) and speak more agreeably to my original Grounds of Certainty. The place you quote for this, is I Ans. p. 80. but in that place it is not given as an Answer to my faying. That the cause why I continue unlatisfied, is. That the Author mentioned, went upon this Ground, That clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty, but, &c. And if it be given for Answer to it here, it feems a very strange one. For I am supposed to fay, That the taule why I continue unlatistied, is, That the Author mentioned, went upon a Ground different from mine; and to satisfie me I am told, his way is better than mine, which cannot but be thought an Answer very likely to fatisfie me.

Your fecond Answer, which you say you gave to that remarkable Passage above set down is this, * That it is very possible the Author of Christianity not Mysterious, might mist ake

* p. 7.

mistake or misapply my Notions; but there is too much reason to believe he thought them the same, and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given me this occasion for the explaining my meaning, and for the Vindication of my self in the matters I apprehend he had charged me with; and for this you quote your first Letter, p. 36. But neither are these Words in that place an Answer to my saying, That the cause why I continued distatisfied, is, That that Author went upon this Ground, That clear and distinct I deas are necessary to Tertainty, but, &c.

Your third Answer, which you say you gave to that Passage above fet down, is, * That my own Grounds of Certainty tend to * p. 20: Scepticism; and that in an Age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are too much exposed by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before: For this you refer the Reader to your first Letter. † But I must crave leave also to ob- + p. 36: ferve, That these Words are not all to be found in that place; and those of them which are there, are by no means an Anfwer to my faying, That the cause why 3 tontinue unlatisfied, is, &c.

What the Words which your Lordship, has here set down as your three Answers, are brought in for in those three places quoted by your Lordship, any one that will consult them may see, it would hold me too long in Personal Matter to explain that

D'z here;

here; and therefore for your Lordship's fatisfaction I pass by those particulars. But this I crave leave to be positive in, That in neither of them, they are given in reply to that, which is above fet down, as my Answer to your Lordship's Question, For what canse do I continue so unsatisfied? Tho' your Lordship here fays, & That to This Answer they were given as a Reply, and it was it you had taken notice of, and given these three several Replies to. As Answers therefore to what you make me fay here, viz. That the cause of my continuing unsatisfied, is, That the Author mentioned, went upon a Ground of Certainty that is none of mine; I cannot consider them. For to this neither of them is given as an Answer, tho' this and it in ordinary construction, make them have that reference. But these are fome of your priviledged Particles, and may be applied how and to what you pleafe.

But though neither of these Passages be any manner of Answer to what your Lordship calls them Answers to, yet your laying such stress on them, that well nigh half your Letter, as I take it, is spent in the desence of them; 'tis sit I consider

what you fay under each of them.

I say, as I take it, near half your Letter is in defence of these three Passages.

One reason why I speak so doubtfully, is, that though you say here, *That you will lay them together and defend them, and that in effect all that is said to the 87th Page

* P. 7.

+ p. 7.

Page is ranged under these three Heads; yet they being brought in as Answers to what I am made to say is the cause why I continued unsatisfied; I should scarce think your Lordship should spend so many Pages in this Personal Matter, after you had but two or three Pages before so openly blamed me for spending a less number of Pages in my Answer concerning Personal Matters, what your Lordship had in your Letter concerning them.

Another reason why I speak so doubtfully, is because I do not see how these three Passages need so long or any Defences where they are not attacked; or if they be attacked, methinks the Defences of them should have been applied to the Answers I had made to them; or if I have made none, and they be of fuch moment that they require Answers, your Lordship's minding me that they did fo, would either by my continued silence have left to your Lordship all that you can pretend to for my granting them, or else my Answers to them have given your Lordship an occasion to defend them, and perhaps to have defended them otherwise than you have done. This is certain, that these defences had come time enough when they had been attack'd, and then it would have been feen whether what was faid, did defend them or no. The truth is, my Lord, if you will give me leave to speak my Thoughts freely, when I consider these three, as you call them, Answers, how they themselves D 3 are are brought in, and what Relation that which is brought under each of them has to them, and to the Matter in Question; methinks they look rather like Texts chosen to be discoursed on, than as Answers to be defended in a Controversie. For the connection of that which in Train is tacked on to them, is fuch that makes me fee I am wholly mistaken in what I thought the established rule of Controversie. This was also another Reason why I said you spent, as I take it, near half of your Letter in defence of them. For when I consider how one thing hangs on to another, under the 3d Answer, from Page 20, where it is brought in to p. 87. where I think that which you call your defending it ends, 'tis a hard matter by the relation and dependency of the parts of that Discourse (contained in those Pages) one on another, to tell where it ends.

But to consider the Passages themselves,

and the Defense of them.

That which you call your first Answer, and which you say you will defend, is in these Words, is Those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do, (according to this Answer) and speak more agreeably to my original Grounds of Certainty. These Words being brought in at first as a reply to what was called my Answer, but was not my Answer, as may be seen, Lett. 1. p. 87. I took no notice of them in my second Letter, as being nothing at all to the Point in Hand, and therefore what need they have of a farther desence, when nothing

4 P. 7.

is objected to them, I do not fee. To what purpose is it to spend seven or eight Pages to shew, that anothers Notion about Certainty, is better than mine; when that tends not to snew how your saying, That the Certainty of my proof of a God, is not placed upon any clear and distinct Ideas, but upon the force of Reason distinct from it, concerns me, which was the thing there to be shewn; as is visible to any one who will vouchfafe to look into that 87th Page of my first Letter. And indeed, why should your Lordship trouble your felf to prove, which of Two different ways of Certainty by Ideas is the best, when you have so ill an Opinion of the whole way of Certainty by Ideas, that you accuse it of tendency to Scepticism? But it feems your Lordship is resolved to have all the Faults in my Book clear'd or corrected, and fo you go on to defend these Words. That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do. I could have wished that your Lordship had pleased a little to explain them, before you had defended them; for they are not, to me, without some Obfcurity. However, to guess as well as I can, I think the Proposition that you intend here, is this, That those who place Certainty in the perception of the agreement or Disagreement of only clear and distinct Ideas, are more in the right than I am, who place it in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, fuch as we have though they be not in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct.

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Whether your Lordship has proved this, or no, will be seen when we come to consider what you have said in the defence of it. In the mean time, I have no reason to be sorry, to hear your Lordship say so; because this supposes, That Certainty can be attained by the perception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct Ideas. For if Certainty cannot be attained by the perception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct Ideas: How can they be more in the right, who place Certainty in one fort of Ideas, that it cannot be had in; than those who place it in another sort of Ideas, that it cannot be had in?

I shall proceed now to examine what your Lordship has said in defence of the Propofition you have here fet down, to defend: which, you may be fure I shall do, with all the favourableness that Truth will allow, fince if your Lordship makes it out to be true, it puts an end to the Dispute you have had with me. For it confutes that main Proposition, which you have so much contended for, That to lay all Foundation of Certainty, as to matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, does certainly overthrow all Mysteries of Faith: Unless you will fay, that Mysteries of Faith cannot confift with what you have proved to be true.

To prove that they are more in the right than I, who place Certainty in the Perception of the agreement or disagreement of clear and distinct Ideas only, your Lord-

thip fays, * That it is a wonderful thing, in * p. 7. point of Reason, for me to pretend to Certainty by Ideas, and not allow these Ideas to be clear and This my Lord looks as if I placed Certainty only in obscure and confused Ideas. and did not allow it might be had by clear and distinct ones. But I have declared my felf fo clearly and fo fully to the contrary, that I doubt not, but your Lordship would think I deserved to be ask'd, whether this were fair and ingenuous dealing, to represent this matter, as this Expression does: But the instances are so many, how apt my unlearned way of Writing is to millead your Lordship, and that always on the side least favourable to my Sense, that if I should cry out as often as I think I meet with occasion for it; your Lordship would have reason to be uneasie at the Ebullition and Inlarging of my Complaints.

Your Lordship farther asks, if How can if p 7 and I clearly perceive the agreement or disagreement 8. of Ideas, if I have not clear and distinct Ideas? For how is it possible for a Mans Mind to know whether they agree or disagree, if there be some parts of those Ideas, we have only general and confused Ideas of. I would rather Read these later Words, if your Lordship please if there be some parts of those Ideas that are only general and confused, for parts of Ideas that we have only general and confused Ideas of, is not

very clear and intelligible to me.

Taking then your Lordship's Question as cleared of this Obscurity, it will stand thus. How is it possible for a Man's Mind

to know, whether Ideas agree or disagree, if there be some parts of those Ideas obscure and confused? In answer to which, I crave leave to ask. Is it possible for a Man's Mind to perceive, whether Ideas agree or disagree, if no parts of those Ideas be obscure and confused, and by that Perception to attain Certainty? If your Lordship fays, No. How do you hereby prove, that they who place Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of only clear and distinct Ideas, are more in the right than 1? For they who place Certainty, where it is impossible to be had, can in that be no more in the right, than he who places it in any other impossibility. If you say, Yes, Certainty may be attained by the perception of the agreement or difagreement of clear and distinct Ideas, you give up the main Queftion: You grant the Proposition, which you declare you chiefly oppose; and so all this great Dispute with me is at an end. Your Lordship may take which of these Two you please, if the former, the Proposition here to be proved, is given up, if the latter, the whole Controversie is given up, one of them 'tis plain you must say.

This and what your Lordship says farther on this Point, seems to me, to prove nothing, but that you suppose, that either there are no such thing as obscure and confused Ideas; and then, with submission, the distinction between clear and obscure, distinct and confused is useless, and 'tis in vain to talk of clear and obscure, distinct

and confused Ideas, in opposition to one another: Or else your Lordship supposes, that an obscure and confused Idea, is wholly undistinguishable from all other Ideas, and fo in effect is all other Ideas: For if an obscure and confused Idea, be not one and the fame with all other Ideas, as it is impossible for it to be, then the obscure and confused Idea may and will be fo far different from fome other Ideas, that it may be perceived whether it agrees or disagrees with them or no. For every Idea in the Mind, clear or obscure, distinct or confused, is but that one Idea, that it is, and not another Idea, that it is not; and the Mind perceives it to be the Idea, that it is, and not another Idea that it is different from.

What therefore I mean by obscure and confused Ideas, I have at large shewn * * Essay B. and shall not trouble your Lordship with a 2. C. 29. Repetition of here. For that there are fuch obscure and confused Ideas, I suppose the instances your Lordship gives here † + p. 24. Evince; to which I shall add this one more. Suppose you should in the Twilight, or in a thick Mift, fee two Things standing npright, near the fize and shape of an ordinary Man; but in fo dim a Light, or at fuch a distance, that they appeared very much alike, and you could not perceive them to be what they really were, the one a Statue, the other a Man, would not these Two be obscure and confused ideas? And yet could not your Lordship be certain of the Truth of this Proposition concerning either

either of them, that it was fomething, or did exist, and that by perceiving the agreement of that Idea (as obscure and confused as it was) with that of Existence as exprest

in that Proposition?

This my Lord, is just the case of Subflance, upon which you raised this Argument, concerning obscure and confused Ideas; which this instance shews may have Propositions made about them, of whose

Truth we may be certain.

Hence I crave liberty to conclude, That I am nearer the Truth than those who say, That Certainty is founded only in clear and distinct Ideas, if any Body does say so. no fuch Saying of any one of those, with whom your Lordship joined me, for so saying, is, that I remember, yet produced; though this be that for which They and Those, whoever they be, had from your + Vindic. Lordship i the Title of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning: And this be the Opinion which your Lordship declares * you Oppose, as certainly overthrowing all Mysteries of Faith, and excluding the Notion of Substance out of rational Discourse; which terrible Tarmagant Proposition, viz. That Certainty is founded only in clear and distinst Ideas. has made fuch a Noise, and been the cause of the spending above Ten times Fifty Pages, and given occasion to very large Ebullition of Thoughts; appears not by any thing that has been yet produced, to be any where in their Writings, with whom upon this Score you have had so warm a Controversie, but only

p. 233. 234. * I Anfw.

p. 14.

only in your Lordship's Imagination, and what you have at least for this once, writ

out of your own Thoughts.

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But if this Paragraph contain so little in defence of the Proposition, which your Lordship in the beginning of it, fet down on purpose to defend; what follows is visibly more re-But fince your Lordship mote from it. has been pleased to tack it on here, though without applying of it any way, that I fee, to the defence of the Proposition to be defended, which is already got clean out of Sight, I am taught, that 'tis fit I consider it here in this, which your Lordship has

thought the proper place for it.

In the next Paragraph, * your Lord * p. 9. ship is pleased to take notice of this part of my Complaint, viz. That I say more than twice or ten times, " That you blame those " who place Certainty in clear and distinct " Ideas; but I do not, and yet you bring " me in amongst them. And for this, your Lordship quotes Seventeen several Pages of my fecond Letter. Whoever will give himself the trouble to turn to those Pages, will fee how far I am in those places, from barely faying, That you blame those who place Certainty, &c. And what reason you had to point to fo many Places for my fo faying, as a repetition of my Complaint. And I believe they will find the Proposition about placing Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas, is mentioned in them upon feveral occasions, and to different purposes as the Argument required. Be

Be that as it will, this is a part of my Complaint, and you do me a Favour, that after having, as you say, met with it in so many Places, you are pleased at last to take notice of it, and promise me a full answer to it. The first part of which full answer, is in these Words * That you do not deny but the first occasion of your Lordship's Charge, was in the Supposition, that clear and distinct Ideas were necessary, in order to any Certainty in our Minds. And that the only way "to attain this Certainty, was by comparing these

" Ideas together.

† p. 9.

* pag. 9.

My Lord, though I have faithfully fet down these Words out of your 2d Answer, f yet I must own I have Printed them in something a different Character from that which they stand in your Letter. For your Lordship has published this Sentence fo. as if the supposition that clear and distinct Ideas, were necessary in order to any Certainty in our Minds, were my Supposition; whereas I must crave Leave to let my Reader know, That that Supposition is purely your Lordship's, for you neither in your Defence of the Trinity, nor in your first Answer, produce any thing to prove, That that was either an Affertion or Supposition of mine: But your Lordship was pleased to suppose it for me. As to the latter Words, " and that the only way to attain this Certainty, was by comparing these Ideas together. If your Lordship means by these Ideas, Ideas in general; then I acknowledge these to be my Words, or to my Sense; but then they are not any Supposition

position in my Book, though they are made part of the Supposition here; but their Sense is expressed in my Essay at large in more places than one. But if by these Ideas, your Lordship means only clear and distinct Ideas, I crave leave to deny, that to be my Sense or any Supposition of mine.

Your Lordship goes on, † But to prove † p. 9. this. Prove what, I beseech you my Lord? That Certainty was to be attained by comparing Ideas, was a Supposition of mine? To prove that there needed no Words or Principles of mine to be produced, unless your Lordship would prove that which was never denied.

But if it were to prove this, viz. That it was a Supposition of mine, That clear and distinct Ideas were necessary to Certainty, and that to prove this to be a Supposition of mine, * My Words were produced, and my Principles * P. 9. of Certainty laid down and none else; I anfwer, I do not remember any Words or Principles of mine produced to shew any ground for fuch a Supposition, that I placed Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas; and if there had been any fuch produced, your Lordship would have done Me and the Reader a favour, to have marked the Pages wherein one might have found them produced, unless your Lordship thinks you make amends for quoting fo many Pages of my fecond Letter, which might have been spared, by neglecting wholly to quote any of your own where it needed. When your Lordship shall please to direct me to those

those places where such Words and Principles of mine were produced to prove fuch a Supposition, I shall readily turn to them, to fee how far they do really give ground for it. But my bad Memory not fuggesting to me any thing like it, your Lordship, I hope, will pardon me if I do not turn over your Defence of the Trinity and your First Letter, to fee whether you have any fuch Proofs which you your felf feem fo much to doubt or think fo meanly of, that you do not so much as point out the places where they are to be found; though we have in this very Page so eminent an Example, that you are not sparing of your Pains in this kind, where you have the least thought that it might serve your Lordship to the meanest purpose.

But though you produced no Words or Principles of mine to prove this a Supposition of mine, yet in your next Words, here your Lordship produces a Reason why you your felf supposed it. For you say, * You could not imagine that I could place Certainty in the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, and not suppose those Ideas to be clear and difind; so that at last the Satisfaction you give me, why my Book was brought into a Controversie, wherein it was not concerned, is that your Lordship imagined I supposed in it, what I did not suppose in it. And here I crave leave to ask, Whether the Reader may not well suppose that you had a great mind to bring my Book into that Controversie, when the only handle vou

* p. 9.

you could find for it, was an imagination of a Supposition to be in it, which in truth was not there.

Your Lordship adds, if That I finding my + p. 9. felf joined in such Company which I did not desire to be seen in, I rather chose to distinguish my self from them, by denying clear and distinct Ideas to be necessary to Certain-

ty.

If it might be permitted to another to guess at your Thoughts, as well as you do at mine, he perhaps would turn it thus. That your Lordship finding no readier way, as you thought, to fet a mark upon my Book, than by bringing several Passages of it into a Controversie concerning the Trinity, wherein they had nothing to do; and speaking of them under the name of Those and Them, as if your Adversaries in that Dispute had made use of those Passages against the Trinity, when no one Opposer of the Doctrin of the Trinity, that I know, or that you have produced, ever made use of one of them; you thought fit to jumble my Book with other Peoples Opinions after a new way never used by any other writer that I ever heard of. If any one will consider what your Lordship has said for my Satisfaction, (wherein you have, as I humbly conceive I have shewn, produced nothing but Imaginations of Imaginations, and Suppositions of Suppositions) he will, I conclude, without straining of his Thoughts, be carried to this Conjecture.

* p.9.

But Conjectures apart, your Lordship fays, * That I finding my self joined in such Company which I did not desire to be seen in, I rather chose to distinguish my self. If keeping to my Book can be called distinguishing You fay, I rather chose. my self. Rather! than what, my Lord, I befeech you? Your learned way of Writing, I find is every where beyond my Capacity; and unless I will guess at your meaning (which is not very fafe) beyond what I can certainly understand by your Words, I often how not what to answer to. 'Tis certain, you mean here, that I prefer'd distinguishing my self from them I found my self joined with to fomething; but to what you do not fay. If you mean to owning that for my Notion of Certainty, which is not my Notion of Certainty; this is true, I did and shall always rather choose to distinguish my self from any them, than own that for my Notion which is not my Notion: If you mean that I prefer'd my distinguishing my self from them to my being joined with them, you make me choose where there neither is nor can be any Choice. For what is wholly out of one's Power, leaves no room for Choice: And I think, I should be laughed at, if I should fay, I rather choose to distinguish my self from the Papists, than that it should Rain. it is no more in my Choice not to be joined, as your Lordship has been pleased to join me, with the unknown They and Them, than it is in my Power that it should not Rain.

'Tis like you will fay here again, this is a nice Criticism; I grant, my Lord, it is about Words and Expressions: But since I cannot know your meaning but by your Words and Expressions, if this defect in my Understanding very frequently overtake me in your Writings to and concerning me, 'tis troublesome, I confess; but what must I do? Must I play at blind Man's-buff? Catch at what I do not see? Answer to I know not what; to no meaning, i. e. to nothing? Or must I presume to know your meaning when I do not?

For Example, suppose I should presume it to be your meaning here, That I found my self joined in Company by your Lordthip, with the Author of Christianity not Mysterious, by your Lordship's imputing the fame Notions of Certainty to us both; That I did not desire to be seen in his Company, i. e. to be thought to be of his Opinion in other things: And therefore I choose rather to distinguish my self from him, by denying clear and distinct Ideas to be necessary to Certainty, than to be so joined with him. If I should presume this to be the Sense of these your Words here, and that by the doubtful fignification of the Expressions of being joined in Company and seen in Company, used equivocally, your Lordship should mean, that because I was faid to be of his Opinion in one thing, I was to be thought to be of his Opinion in all things, and therefore disowned to be of his Opinion in that, wherein I was of his Opinion; because I would E 2

I would not be thought of his Opinion all through, would not your Lordship be displeased with me for supposing you to have such a meaning as this, and ask me again, Whether I could think you a Man of so little Sense to talk thus? And yet my Lord, this is the best I can make of these Words, which seem to me rather to discover a secret in your way of dealing with me, than any

thing in me, that I am ashamed of.

For I am not, nor ever shall be ashamed to own any Opinion I have, because another Man holds the fame; and fo far as that brings me into his Company, I shall not be troubled to be feen in it. But I shall never think. That that entitles me to any other of his Opinions, or makes me of his Company in any other fense, how much soever that be the defign: For your Lordship has used no finall Art and Pains to make me of his and the Unitarians Company in all that they fay, only because that Author has ten lines in the beginning of his Book, which agrees with something I have faid in mine, from whence we become Companions, fo universally united in Opinion, that They must be entitled to all that I say, and I to all that They fay.

My Lord, when I writ my Book, I could not design to distinguish my self from the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, who were not then in being, nor are, that I see, yet: Since I find nothing produced out of the Unitarians, nor the Author of Christianity not Mysterious, to shew, That they

they make clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty. And all that I have done since, has been to shew, That you had no Reason to join my Book with Men (let them be what they or those you please) who sounded Certainty only upon clear and distinct Ideas, when my Book did not sound it only upon clear and distinct Ideas. And I cannot tell why the appealing to my Book now should be called a choosing rather to distinct Ideas.

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My Reader must pardon me here for this uncouth Phrase of joining my Book with Men. For as your Lordship order'd the matter (pardon me if I fay in your new way of writing) fo it was, if your own word may be taken in the Case: For, to give me Satisfaction, you infift upon this, That you did not join me with those Gentlemen in their Opinions, but tell me they used my Notions to other purposes than I intended them; and so there was no need for me to distinguish my self from them, when your Lordship had done it for me, as you plead all along. Though here you are pleased to tell me, That I was joined with them, and That I found my felf joined in such Company as I did not desire to be seen in.

My Lord, I could find my felf joined in no Company upon this occasion, but what you joined me in. And therefore I beg leave to ask your Lordship, Did you join me in Company with those, in whose Company you here say, I do not desire to be seen? If you own that you did, how must I E 3 under

* Vindic understand that Passage where you say, *
P. 239. That you must do that Right to the ingenious
Author of the Essay of Humane Understanding,
from whence these Notions were borrowed, to
serve other Purpoles than he intended them;

+ 1 Ans. P. 35. which you repeat again f as matter of Satisfaction to me, and as a Proof of the care you took not to be misunderstood. If you did join me with them, what is become of all the Satisfaction in the Point, which your Lordship has been at so much Pains about? And if you did not join me with them, you could not think I found my self joined with them, or chose to distinguish my self from Men I was never joined with. For my Book was innocent of what made them Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning.

There seems to me something very delicate in this matter. I should be supposed joined to them, and your Lordship should not be supposed to have joined me to them, upon so slight or no occasion; and yet all this comes solely from your Lordship. How to do this to your satisfaction, I confess my self to be too dull: And therefore I have been at the Pains to examine how far I have this Obligation to your Lordship; and how far you would be pleased to own it, that the World might understand your Lordship's, to me, incomprehensible way of writing on

this occasion.

For if you had a Mind by a new and very dexterous way, becoming the learning and caution of a great Man, to bring me into such Company, which you think I did not de-

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fire to be feen in: I thought fuch a Pattern fet by fuch an Hand as your Lordship's, ought not to be loft by being passed over too Besides, I hope, that you will not take it amiss, that I was willing to see, what Obligation I had to your Lordship in the favour you defigned me. But I crave leave to affure your Lordship, I shall never be ashamed to own any Opinion I have, because another Man (of whom perhaps your Lordship or others have no very good Thoughts) is of it, nor be unwilling to be fo far seen in his Company: Though I shall always think I have a right to demand, and shall desire to be satisfied, why any one makes to himself, or takes an occasion from thence, in manner that favours not too much of Charity to extend this Society to those Opinions of that Man, with which I have nothing to do, That the World may fee the Justice and good Will of such endeavours, and judge whether fuch arts favour not a little of the Spirit of the Inquifition.

For if I mistake not, 'tis the method of that holy Office, and the way of those rever'd Guardians of what they call the Christian Faith, to raise Reports or start occasions of Suspition concerning the Orthodoxy of any one they have no very good Will towards; and require him to clear himself, guilding all this with the care of Religion, and the Profession of respect and tenderness to the Person himself, even when they deliver him up to be Burnt by the secular Power.

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I shall not my Lord say, That you have had any ill Will to me, for I never deserved But I shall be better able any from you. to answer those, who are apt to think the Method you have taken, has some Conformitie, fo far as it has gon; with what Protestants complain of in the Inquisition, when you shall have cleared this matter a little otherwise, and assigned a more sufficient Reason, for bringing me into the Party of those that oppose the Doctrin of the Trinity, than only because, The Author of Christianity not Mysterious, has in the beginning of his Book, half a Score Lines which you guess he borrowed out of mine. that in Truth is all the matter of fact, upon which all this Dust is raised; and the matter so advanced by degrees, that now I am told. I should have cleared my self, by owning the Doctrin of the Trinity: As if I had been ever accused of disowning it. But that which shews no small skill in this management, is, That I am called upon to clear my felf, by the very same Person who raising the whole Dispute, has himself over and over again cleared me; and upon that grounds the Satisfaction he pretends to give to me and others, in answer to my Complaint of his having without any Reason at all, brought my Book into the Controversie concerning the Trinity. But to go on.

If the preceding part of this Paragraph, had nothing in it of Defence of this Proposition, That those who offer at clear and distinst Ideas.

Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do, &c. It is certain, That what follows, is altogether as remote from any fuch Defence.

Your Lordship says, * That Certainty by * p. 10. Sense, Certainty by Reason, and Certainty by Remembrance, are to be distinguished from the Certainty under debate, and to be shut out from it: And upon this you spend the 11th, 12th and 13th Pages. Supposing it so, how does this at all tend to the defence of this Proposition, That those who offer at clear and distintt Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do? For whether Certainty by Sense, by Reason and by Remembrance, be or be not comprehended in the Certainty under debate, this Proposition, That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do, will not at all be confirmed, or invalidated thereby.

The proving therefore, That Certainty by Sense, by Reason, and by Remembrance, is to be excluded from the Certainty under debate, ferving nothing to the defence of the Proposition to be defended, and so having nothing to do here, let us now consider it as a Proposition, that your Lordship has a Mind to prove, as serving to some other great purpose of your own, or perhaps, in some other View against my Book; for you seem to say no small stress upon it, by your way of introducing it. For you very solemnly set your self to prove, * That * p. 9. & the Certainty under debate, is the Certainty of 10.

Knowledge, and that a Proposition whose Ideas

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11, 12.

greement, is the proper object of this Certainty. † p: 10. From whence your Lordship infers, † That therefore this Certainty is to be distinguished from a Certainty by Sense, by Reason and by Remembrance. But by what Logick this is infer'd, is not easy to me to discover. if a Proposition, whose Ideas are to be compared as to their agreement or disagreement, be the proper object of the Certainty under debate : If Propositions whose Certainty we arrive at by Sense, Reason or Remembrance be of Ideas, which may be compared, as to their agreement or disagreement, then they cannot be excluded from that Certainty, which is to be had by fo comparing those Ideas: Unless they must be shut out for the very fame Reason, that others are taken in.

1. Then as to Certainty by Sense or Pro-

positions of that kind.

The Object of the Certainty under debate. your Lordship owns, is a Proposition whose Ideas are to be compared as to their agreement or disagreement. The agreement or difagreement of the Ideas of a Proposition to be compared, may be examined and perceived by Sense, and is Certainty by Sense: And therefore how this Certainty is to be distinguished and shut out from that, which consists in the perceiving the agreement or difagreement of the Ideas of any Proposition, will not be easy to shew; unless one Certainty is distinguished from another, by having that, which makes the other to be Certainty, viz. The perception of the agreement

or disagreement of two Ideas, as expressed in that Proposition. v.g. May I not be certain, that a Ball of Ivory that lies before my Eyes is not fquare? And is it not my Sense of Seeing, that makes me perceive the difagreement of that square Figure, to that round Matter, which are the Ideas expressed in that Proposition? How then is Certainty by Sense excluded or distinguished from, that knowledge which consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas?

2. Your Lordship distinguishes the Certainty which consists in the perceiving the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition from Certainty by Reason. * * p. 11. To have made good this distinction, I humbly conceive, you would have done well to have shewed that the agreement or disagreement of two Ideas could not be perceived by the intervention of a third, which I, and as I guess other People call Reasoning, knowing by Reason. As for example, cannot the sides of a given Triangle, be known to be equal by the Intervention of two Circles, whereof one of these sides is a common Radius?

To which 'tis like your Lordship will answer, what I find you do here, f about + p. 12. the knowledge of the existence of Substance, by the intervention of the existence of Modes, That you grant one may come to Certainty of Knowledge in the case; but not a Certainty by Ideas, but by a Consequence of Reason deduced from the Ideas we have by our Senses. This, my Lord, you have faid, and thus you have more

more than once opposed Reason and Ideas as inconfiftent, which I should be very glad to fee proved once, after these several occasions I have given your Lordship, by excepting against that Supposition. fince the word Idea has the ill luck to be fo constantly opposed by your Lordship to Reason, Permit me if you please instead of it, to put what I mean by it, viz. the immediate objects of the Mind in thinking (for that is it which I would fignifie by the word Ideas) and then let us fee how your answer will run. You grant that from the sensible Modes of Bodies, we may come to a certain Knowledge, that there are Bodily Substances; but this you say is not a Certainty by the immediate objects of the Mind in thinking, but by a consequence of Reason deduced from the immediate objects of the Mind in thinking, which we have by our Senses. When you can prove that we can have a Certainty, by a consequence of Reason; which Certainty shall not also be by the immediate objects of the Mind in using its Reason, you may fay fuch Certainty is not by Ideas but by Consequence of Reason. But that I believe will not be, till you can shew, That the Mind can think, or reason, or know, without immediate objects of thinking, reasoning, or knowing, all which Objects, as your Lordship knows, I call Ideas.
You subjoin, * And this can never prove

* p. 12. You subjoin, * And this can never prove that we have Certainty by Ideas, where the Ideas themselves are not clear and distinct. The Question is not, whether we can have Cer-

tainty

tainty by Ideas that are not clear and distinct? Or whether my Words (if by the Particle This, you mean my Words fet down in the foregoing Page) prove any fuch thing, which I humbly conceive they do not. But whether Certainty by Reason, be excluded from the Certainty under debate, which I humbly conceive you have not from my

Words or any other way proved.

3. The third fort of Propositions that p. 12. your Lordship excludes, are those whose Certainty we know by Remembrance, but in these two the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas contained in them is perceived; not always indeed, as it was at first by an actual view of the Connection of all the intermediate Ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of those in the Proposition was at first perceived, but by other intermediate Ideas, that shew the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas contained in the Proposition, whose Certainty we remember.

As in the instance you here make use of, viz. That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The Certainty of which Proposition we know by Remembrance, though the Demonstration hath sliped out of our Minds; but we know it in a different way from what your Lordship sup-The agreement of the two Ideas, as joined in that Proposition is perceived, but it is by the intervention of other Ideas than those which at first produced that Perception. I remember, i.e. I know (for Re-

Remembrance is but the reviving of some past Knowledge) that I was once certain of the truth of this Proposition, That the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability of the fame Relations between the same immutable things, is now the Idea that shews me, that if the three Angles of a Triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones; hence I come to be certain, that what was once true in the Case is always true; what Ideas once agreed, will always agree; and confequently what I once knew to be true, I shall always know to be true as long as I can remember that I once knew it.

* p. 9.

Your Lordship says, * That the Debate between us is about Certainty of Knowledge, with regard to some Proposition whose Ideas are to be compared as to their agreement or disagreement: Out of this Debate you say, Certainty by Sense, by Reason and by Remembrance, is to be excluded. I desire you then, my Lord, to tell what sort of Propositions will be within the Debate, and to name me one of them; if Propositions, whose Certainty we know by Sense, Reason, or Remembrance, are excluded?

However, from what you have faid concerning them, your Lordship in the next Paragraph concludes them out of the Question; your Words are, These things then have out of the Question

being out of the Question.

Out of what Question, I beseech you, my Lord? The Question here, and that of your own proposing to be defended in the Affirmative is this, Whether those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much fairer for Certainty than I do? And how Certainty by Sense, by Reason, and by Remembrance comes to have any particular Exception in reference to this Question, 'tis my misfortune not to be able to find.

But your Lordship leaving the examination of the Question under debate, by a new state of the Question, would pin upon me what I never faid. Your Words are, * These things then being put out of the * p. 13. Question which belong not to it. The Question truly stated is, Whether we can attain to any Certainty of Knowledge as to the truth of a Proposition in the way of Ideas, where the Ideas themselves, by which we came to that Certainty, be not clear and distinct? With Submission, my Lord, that which I say in the Point, is, That we may be certain of the truth of a Proposition concerning an Idea which is not in all its parts clear and distinct; and therefore if your Lordship will have any Question with me concerning this matter, the Question truly stated is, Whether we can frame any Proposition concerning a thing whereof we have but an obscure and confused Idea, of whose Truth we can be certain?

That this is the Question, you will easily agree, when you will give your felf the trouble to look back to the Rise of it.

Your

Your Lordship having found out a strange fort of Men i who had broached a Doctrin + Vindic. which supposed that we must have clear and P. 232. distinct Ideas of what ever we pretend to a Certainty of in our Minds, was pleased for this to call them the Gentlemen of a new way of Reasoning, and to make me one of them. I answer'd, that I placed not Certainty only in clear and diffinct Ideas, and so ought not to have been made one of them, being not guilty of what made a Gentleman of this new way of Reasoning. 'Tis pretended still, that I am guilty; and indeavour'd to be prov'd. To know now whether I am or no, it must be consider'd what you lay to their Charge, as the consequence of that Opinion; and that is, That upon this Ground we cannot come to any Certainty that there is such a thing This appears by more places as Substance. * Vindic. Your Lordship asks, * How is than one. it possible that we may be certain that there are both bodily and spiritual Substances, if our Reason depend upon clear and distinct Ideas? And again, i How come we to be certain that there are spiritual Substances in the World, since we can have no clear and distinct Ideas concerning them? And your Lordship having fet down some Words out of my Book, as if they were inconsistent with my Principle of Certainty founded only in clear and distinct Ideas, You say, * From whence * Vindic. it follows that we may be certain of the Being of a spiritual Substance, though we have no clear

P. 240.

+ ib.

P. 244.

and distinct Ideas of it.

Other

Other places might be produced, but these are enough to shew, That those who held clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty, were accused to extend it thus far, that where any Idea was obscure and confused, there no Proposition could be made concerning it, of whose truth we could be certain, v. g. we could not be certain that there was in the World such a thing as Substance, because we had but an obscure and confus'd Idea of it.

In this sense therefore I denyed that clear and distinct Ideas were necessary to Certainty, v. g. I denyed it to be my Doctrin, That where an Idea was obscure and confus'd, there no Proposition could be made concerning it, of whose Truth we could be certain. For I held we might be certain of the truth of this Proposition, That there was Substance in the World, though we have but an obscure and confus'd Idea of Substance: And your Lordship endeavoured to prove we could not, as may be seen at large in that 10th Chapter of your Vindication, &c.

From all which it is evident, that the Question between us truly stated is this, Whether we can attain Certainty of the truth of a Proposition concerning any thing whereof we have but an obscure and con-

fus'd Idea?

This being the Question, the first thing you say, * is, That Des Cartes was of your * p. 13. Opinion against me. Answ. If the Question were to be decided by Authority, I

had rather it should be by your Lordship's than Des Cartes's: And therefore I should excuse my self to you, as not having needed, that you should have added his Authority to yours, to shame me into a Submission; or that you should have been at the Pains to have transcribed fo much out of him, for my fake, were it fit for me to hinder the display of the Riches of your Lordship's universal reading; wherein, I doubt not, but I should take pleasure my felf, if I had it to shew.

I come therefore to what I think your Lordship principally aimed at; which, as I humbly conceive, was to shew out of my Book. That I founded Certainty only on clear and distinct Ideas. And yet, as you fay, * 1 have complained of your Lordship in near twenty places of my Second Letter, for charging this upon me. By this the World will judge of the Justice of my Complaints, and the Con-

aftency of my Notion of Ideas.

Answ. What Consistency of my Notion of Ideas has to do here, I know not; for I do not remember, that I made any Complaint concerning that. But supposing my Complaints were ill grounded in this one case concerning Certainty; yet, they might be reasonable in other Points; and therefore, with Submission, I humbly conceive the inference was a little too large, to conclude from this particular against my Complaints in general.

* p. 15.

In the next place I answer, That suppoling the places which your Lordship brings out of my Book did prove what they do not, viz. That I founded Certainty only in clear and diftinct Ideas, yet my Complaints in the Case are very just. For your Lordship at first brought me into the Controversie, and made me one of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning, for founding all Certainty on clear and distinct Ideas, only upon a bare Supposition that I did so, which I think your Lordship confesses in these Words; † where you say, That you + p. 9. do not deny but the first occasion of your Charge, was the Supposition that clear and distinct Ideas were necessary in order to any Certainty in our Minds; and that the only way to attain this Certainty, was the comparing thefe, i. e. clear and distinct Ideas together; but to prove this, my Words, your Lordship says, were produced, and my Principles of Certainty laid down and none elfe. Answer. 'Tis strange, that when my Principles of Certainty were laid down, this (if I held it) was not found amongst them: Having looked therefore, I do not find in that place, that any Words or Principles of mine were produced to prove that I held, That the only way to attain Certainty, was by comparing only clear and distinct Ideas; so that all that then made me one of the Gentlemen of the new way of Keasoning, was only your supposing that I supposed that clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty. And therefore I had then and have still, reason to com-F 2 plain,

plain, That your Lordship brought me into this Controversie upon so slight Grounds, which I humbly conceive will always shew it to have proceeded not so much from any thing you had then found in my Book, as from a great willingness in your Lordship at any rate to do it; and of this the Passages which you have here now produced out of my Essay are an evident Proof.

For if your Lordship had then known any thing that feemed fo much to your purpose, when you produced, as you fay, my Words and my Principles to prove, That I held clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty, it cannot be believed that you would have omitted these Passages, either then or in your Answer to my first Letter, and defer'd them to this your Answer to my fe-These Passages therefore now quoted here by your Lordship, give me leave, my Lord, to suppose have been by a new and diligent fearch found out, and are now at last brought post factum to give some colour to your way of proceeding with me, though these Passages being, as I suppose, then unknown to you; they could not be the Ground of making me one of those who place Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas.

Let us come to the Passages themselves,

and fee what help they afford you.

The first Words you set down out of my † B. 4. C. Fsay † are these, "The Mind not being 18. §. 8. "certain of the truth of that it doth not evidently know. From these Words, that which I inser in that place, is, that "There-

"Therefore the Mind is bound in fuch " Cases, to give up its Assent to an un-" erring Testimony. But your Lordship from them infers here, * Therefore I make * p. 15. clear Ideas necessary to Certainty; or therefore by confidering the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinking, we cannot be certain that Substance (whereof we have an obfcure and confus'd Idea) doth exist. leave your Lordship to make good this Confequence when you think fit, and proceed to the next Passage you alledge, which you say * proves it more plainly. I believe it will * p. 15. be thought it should be proved more plain-

ly, or else it will not be proved at all.

This plainer Proof is out of B. 4. Ch. 4. Sect. 8. in these words, " That which " is requisite to make our Knowledge cer-" tain, is the clearness of our Ideas. Ans. The Certainty here spoken of, is the Certainty of general Propositions in Morality, and not of the particular Existence of any thing; and therefore tends not at all to any fuch Polition as this, That we cannot be certain of the existence of any particular fort of Being, though we have but an obscure and confus'd Idea of it. Though it does affirm, That we cannot have any certain Perception of the Relations of general Moral Ideas (wherein consists the Certainty of general Moral Propositions) any farther than those Ideas are clear in our Minds. And that this is fo, I refer my Reader to that Chapter for Satisfaction.

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* p. 15.

The third place produced * by your Lordship, out of B. 4. Ch. 12. Sett. 14. is, " For " it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas, where they are on-" ly imperfect, confused or obscure; we " cannot expect to have certain perfect or " clear Knowledge. To understand these Words aright, we must see in what place they stand, and that is in a Chapter of the improvement of our Knowledge, and therein are brought as a reason to shew how necessary it is " for the enlarging of our Knowledge, to get and fetle in our Minds " as far as we can, clear distinct and confrant Ideas of those things we would con-" fider and know. The Reason whereof there given, is this, That as far as they are only imperfect, confused and obscure; we cannot expect to have certain, perfect or clear Knowledge, i. e. that our Knowledge will not be clear and certain fo far as the Idea is imperfect and obscure. Which will not at reach your Lordship's purpose, who would argue, that because I say our Idea of Substance is obscure and confused, therefore upon my Grounds, we cannot know that fuch a thing as Substance exists; because I placed Certainty only in clear and distinct Now to this I answer'd, that I did not place all Certainty only on clear and distinct Ideas, in such a Sense as that, and therefore to avoid being mistaken, I said,

†2 Answ. † "That my Notion of Certainty by Ideas, p. 50. "is, that Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement

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"of Ideas; fuch as we have, whether they
"be in all their parts perfectly clear and
"distinct or no", viz. if they are clear and
distinct enough to be capable of having their
agreement or disagreement with any other
Idea perceived, so far they are capable of
affording us Knowledge, though at the same
time they are so obscure and confused, as that
there are other Ideas, with which we can
by no means so compare them, as to perceive their agreement or disagreement with
them. This was the clearness and distinctness which I denyed to be necessary to Certainty.

If your Lordship would have done me the honour to have consider'd what I understood by obscure and confused Ideas, and what every one must understand by them, who thinks clearly and distinctly concerning them, I am apt to imagine you would have spared your self the trouble of raising this Question, and omitted these Quotations out of my Book, as not serving to your Lord-

ship's purpose.

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The fourth Passage which you seem to lay most stress on, proves as little to your purpose as either of the former Three.

The Words * are these. "But obscure and * Essay B. "confused Ideas, can never produce any 4. C. 2: "clear and certain Knowledge. Be- \$. 15. "cause as far as any Ideas are confused "to the former the first are never process."

or obscure, the Mind can never perceive clearly whether they agree or no. The latter part of these Words, are a plain interpretation of the former, and shew

their meaning to be this, viz. Our obscure and confused Ideas, as they stand in contra-distinction to clear and distinct, have all of them fomething in them, whereby they are kept from being wholly imperceptible and perfectly confounded with all other Ideas, and fo their agreement or difagreement with at least some other Ideas, may be perceived, and thereby produce Certainty, though they are obscure and confused Ideas. But so far as they are obscure and confused, so that their agreement or disagreement cannot be perceived, so far they cannot produce Certainty, v. g. the Idea of Substance is clear and distinct enough to have its agreement with that of actual Existence perceived: But yet it is so far obscure and confused, that there be a great many other Ideas, with which, by reason of its obscurity and confusedness, we cannot compare it fo, as to produce fuch a Perception: And in all those Cases we necessarily come short of Certainty. And that this was fo, and that I meant fo, I humbly conceive, you could not but have feen, if you had given your felf the trouble to reflect on that Passage which you quoted, viz. * " That Certainty confifts in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, fuch as we have, whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and " distinct or no. To which, what your Lordship has here brought out of the second Book of my Esfay, is no manner of Contradiction; unless it be a Contradiction to fav.

* p. 7.

that an Idea which cannot be well compared with fome Ideas, from which it is not clearly and fufficiently diftinguishable, is yet capable of having its agreement or disagreement perceived with some other Idea, with which it is not so confounded, but that it may be compared. And therefore I had, and have still reason to complain of your Lordship, for charging that upon me, which I never said nor meant.

To make this yet more visible, give me leave to make use of an Instance in the object of the Eyes in Seeing, from whence the Metaphor of obscure and confused is transfer'd to Ideas the objects of the Mind in Thinking. There is no object which the Eye fees, that can be faid to be perfectly obscure, for then it would not be seen at all; nor perfectly confused; for then it could not be diffinguished from any other, no not from a clearer. For Example, one fees in the Dusk fomething of that shape and fize, that a Man in that degree of Light and distance would appear. This is not so obscure that he sees nothing, nor so confused that he cannot distinguish it from a Steeple or a Star; But is so obscure, that he cannot though it be a Statue distinguish it from a Man, and therefore in regard of a Man, it can produce no clear and distinct Knowledge; But yet as obscure and confused an Idea as it is, this hinders not, but there may many propositions be made concerning it, as particularly that it exists, of the Truth of which we may be certain. And that

that without any Contradiction to what I fay in my Esfay, viz. " That obscure and confused Ideas can never produce any " clear and certain Knowledge. as far as they are confused or obscure. the Mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or no. This reason that I there give, plainly limiting it only to Knowledge, where the obscurity and confusion is such, that it hinders the perception of agreement or disagreement, which is not fo great in any obscure and confused Idea, but that there is some other Ideas, with which it may be perceived to agree or disagree, and there 'tis capable to produce Certainty in us.

And thus I am come to the end of your Defence of your first Answer, as you call it, and desire the Reader to consider, how much in the eight Pages imploy'd in it, is said to defend this Proposition, that Those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas, bid much

fairer for Certainty than I do?

But your Lordship having under this Head taken occasion to examine my making clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty; I crave leave to consider here, what you say of it in another place. I find one Argument more to prove, That I place Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas. Your Lordship tells me, if and bids me observe my own Words, that I positively say, "That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know. So that, says your Lordship, it is plain here, that

7 p. 63.

I place Certainty in evident Knowledge, pl in clear and distinct Iveas, and yet my great complaint of your Lordship was, that you charged this apon me, and now you find it in my own Words. Answer, I do observe my own Words, but do not find in them, or in clear and distinct Ideas, though your Lordship has set these down as my Words. I there indeed fay, " The Mind is not certain of what "it does not evidently know. Whereby I place Certainty, as your Lordship says, only in evident Knowledge, but evident Knowledge may be had in the clear and evident perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas; though fome of them should not be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct, as is evident in this Proposition, that Substance does Exist.

But you give not off this Matter fo. For these Words of mine above quoted * by * p. 15. your Lordship, viz. " It being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas, " where they are imperfect, confused or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, " perfect or clear Knowledge" your Lordship has here † up again: And there- † p. 63. upon charge it on me as a contradiction, that confessing our Ideas to be imperfect, confused and obscure, I say, I do not yet place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas. Answer, The Reason is plain, for I do not fay that all our Ideas are imperfect, confused and obscure; nor that obscure and confused Ideas are in all their parts so obfcure and confused, that no agreement or difdisagreement between them and any other Idea can be perceived, and therefore my confession of imperfect, obscure and confused Ideas, takes not away all Knowledge,

even concerning those very Ideas.

But, fays your Lordship, Can Certainty be had with imperfect and obscure Ideas, and yet no Certainty be had by them? Add if you please, my Lord, [by those parts of them which are obscure and confused.] And then the Question will be right put, and have this Yes, my Lord, and that easie Answer. without any contradiction, because an Idea that is not in all its parts perfectly clear and distinct, and is therefore an obscure and confused Idea; may yet with those Ideas, with which, by any obscurity it has, it is not confounded, be capable to produce Knowledge by the perception of its agreement or disagreement with them. yet it will hold true, that in that part wherein it is imperfect, obscure and confused, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect or clear Knowledge.

For Example, he that has the Idea of a Leopard, as only of a spotted Animal, must be confessed to have but a very impersect, obscure and confused Idea of that Species of Animals; and yet this obscure and confused Idea, is capable by a perception of the agreement or disagreement of the clear part of it, viz. that of Animal, with several other Ideas to produce Certainty: Though as far as the obscure part of it consounds it with the Idea of a Lynx, or other spotted Animal

Animal it can, joyn'd with them, in many

Propositions, produce no Knowledge.

This might eafily be understood to be my meaning by these Words, which your Lordship quotes * out of my Essay, viz. * p. 122, "That our Knowledge confilling in the " perception of the agreement or difagree-" ment of any two Ideas, its clearness or " obscurity consists in the clearness or ob-" fcurity of that Perception, and not in " the clearness or obscurity of the Ideas themselves. Upon which your Lordthip asks, * How is it possible for the Mind * p. 122, to have a clear perception of the agreement of Ideas, if the Ideas themselves be not clear and distinct? Answer, Just as the Eyes can have a clear perception of the agreement or difagreement of the clear and distinct parts of a Writing, with the clear parts of another; though one, or both of them, be so obscure and blur'd in other parts, that the Eye cannot perceive any agreement or difagreement they have one with another. And I am forry that these Words of mine + " My + 2 Let. " Notion of Certainty by Ideas, is, that P. 50. " Certainty confifts in the perception of "the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, " fuch as we have, whether they be in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct " or no, were not plain enough to make your Lordship understand my meaning, and fave you all this new, and as it feems to me,

needless trouble.

In your 15th Page, your Lordship comes to your second of the three Answers which you say * you had given and would lay to-

gether and defend.

+ p. 15.

* p. 7.

You fay † (2) you answer'd, That it is very possible the Author of Christianity not Mysterious, might mistake or misapply my Notions; but there is too much reason to believe, be thought them the same; and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given me this occasion for the explaining my meaning, and for the Vindication of my self in the matters I apprehend he had charged me with. words your Lordship quotes out of the 36th Page of your first Letter. But as I have already observed they are not there given as an answer to this that you make me here fay; and therefore to what purpose you repeat them here is not easie to difcern, unless it can be thought that an unfatisfactory answer in one place can become fatisfactory by being repeated in another, where it is, as I humbly conceive, less to the purpose, and no answer at all. It was there indeed given 'as an answer to my faying, That I did not place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas, which I faid to shew that you had no reason to bring me into the Controversie, because the Author of Christianity not Mysterious placed Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas. To satisfie me for your doing so, your Lordship answers, That it was very possible that Author might mistake or misapply my Notions. A reason indeed, that will equally justifie your bringing my Book into any

any Controversie: For there is no Author so infallible, write he in what Controversie he pleases, but tis possible he may

mistake, or misapply my Notions.

That was the force of this your Lordship's Answer in that place of your first
Letter, but what it serves for in this place
of your second Letter I have not Wit enough to see. The remainder of it I have
answer'd in the 37th and 38th Pages of my
second Letter, and therefore cannot but
wonder to see it repeated here again without any notice taken of what I said in answer to it, though you set it down here
again, as you say, p. 7. on purpose to defend.

But all the defence made, is only to that part of my Reply which you fet down * as * p. 16. a fresh Complaint that I make in these Words, "This can be no reason why I " should be joined with a Man that had " misapplied my Notions, and that no " Man hath so much mistaken and misapof plied my Notions as your Lordship; and therefore I ought rather to be joined with " your Lordship. And then you, with some warmth, subjoin; But is this fair and ingenuous dealing, to represent this Matter so, as if your Lordship had joined us together, because he had misunderstood and misapplied my Notions? Can I think your Lordship a Man of so little Sense to make that the reason of it? No; Sir, says your Lordship, it was because be assigned no other Grounds but mine, and that in my own Words; however, now I would

would divert the meaning of them another

way.

* p. 133.

My Lord, I did fet down your Words at large in my fecond Letter, and therefore do not fee how I could be liable to any Charge of unfair or disingenuous dealing in representing the Matter; which I am sure you will allow as a Proof of my not misrepresenting, since I find you use it your felf * as a sure Fence against any such Accusation; where you tell me, That you have set down my own Words at large, that I may not complain that your Lordship misrepresents my Sense. The same Answer I must desire my Reader to apply for me to your 73d and 90th Pages, where your Lordship makes Complaints of

the like kind with this here.

The Reasons you give for joining me with the Author of Christianity not Mysterious, are put down verbatim as you gave them; and if they did not give me that Satisfaction they were designed for, am I to be blamed that I did not find them better than they were? You joined me with that Author because he placed Certainty only in clear and distinct Ideas. I told your Lordship I did not do so, and therefore that could be no reason for your joining me with You answer, 'Twas possible he might mistake or misapply my Notions. So that our agreeing in the Notion of Certainty (the pretended Reason for which we were joined) failing, all the reason which is left and which you offer in this Answer for your joining of us, is the possibility of his mistaking

my Notions. And I think it a very natural Inference, that if the meer possibility of any ones mistaking me, be a reason for my being joined with him: Any ones actual mistaking me, is a stronger reason why I should be joined with him. But if such an Inference shews (more than you would have it) the satisfactoriness and force of your Answer, I hope you will not be angry with me, if I cannot change the Nature of things.

Your Lordship indeed adds in that place,

* That there is too much reason to believe that * 1 Answ.

the Author thought his Notions and mine the p- 36.

Same.

Answ. When your Lordship shall produce that Reason, it will be seen whether it were too much or too little. Till it is produced, there appears no Reason at all; and such concealed Reason, though it may be too much, can be supposed, I think, to give very little Satisfaction to me or any body else in the Case.

But to make good what you have said in your Answer, your Lordship here is re- + p. 16. plies, That you did not join us together, because he had misunderstood and misapplied my Notions. Answ. Neither did I say, That therefore you did join us. But this I crave leave to say, That all the reason you there gave for your joining us together, was the possibility of his mistaking and misapplying my Notions.

But your Lordship now tells * me, No, * p. 16. Sir, this was not the reason of your join-

ing us; but it was because he assigned no other Grounds but mine, and in my own Words. Answ. My Lord, I do not remember that in that place you give this as a reason for your joining of us; and I could not answer in that place to what you did not there say, but to what you there did say. Now your Lordship does say it it here, here I shall

take the liberty to answer it.

The Reason you now give for your joining me with that Author, is because he assigned no other Grounds but mine, which however tenderly expressed, is to be understood, I suppose, that he did assign my Grounds. what, I beseech your Lordship, did he afsign my Grounds and in my Words? If it were not my Grounds of Certainty, it could be no manner of reason for your joining me with him; because the only reason why at first you made him (and me with him) a Gentleman of the new way of Reasoning, was his supposing clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty, which was the Opinion that you declared you opposed. Now my Lord, if you can shew where that Author has in my Words assigned my Grounds of Certainty, there will be some Grounds for what you fay here. But till your Lordship does that, it will be pretty hard to believe that to be the ground of your joining us together; which being no where to be found can scarce be thought the true reason of your doing it.

Your Lordship adds, * However, now I * p. 16. would divert the meaning of Them [i. e. those

my Words] an other way.

Answ. When ever you are pleased to set down those Words of mine wherein that Author assigns my Grounds of Certainty, it will be seen how I now divert their meaning another way; till then they must remain with several other of your Lordship's invisible Them, which are no where to be found.

But to your asking me, + Whether I can + p 17. think your Lordship a Man of that little Sense? I crave leave to reply, That I hope it must not be concluded, that as often as in your way of writing I meet with any thing that does not feem to me fatisfactory, and I endeavour to shew that it does not prove, what it is made use of for, that I presently think your Lordship a Man of little Sense. This would be a very hard Rule in defending ones felf; especially for me against so great and learned a Man, whose reasons and meaning it is not, I find, always easie for fo mean a Capacity as mine to reach; and therefore I have taken great care to fet down your Words in most places, to secure my felf from the imputation of misrepresenting your Sense, and to leave it fairly before the Reader to judge, whether I mistake it, and how far I am to be blamed if I do. And I would have fet down your whole Letter page by page as I anfwered it, would not that have made my Book too big.

If I must write under this fear, that you apprehend I think meanly of you, as often as I think any reason you make use of is not satisfactory in the Point it is brought for, the causes of uneasiness would return too often; and it would be better once for all, to conclude your Lordship infallible, and acquiesce in whatever you say, than in every page to be so rude as to tell your Lordship, I think you have little Sense, if that be the interpretation of my endeavouring to shew, that your reasons

come short any where.

My Lord, when you did me the honour to answer my first Letter (which I thought might have passed for a submissive Complaint of what I did not well understand, rather than a Dispute with your Lordship) you were pleased to insert into it direct Accusations against my Book, which looked as if you had a mind to enter into a direct Controversie with me. This condescention in your Lordship, has made me think my felf under the protection of the Laws of Controversie, which allow a free examining and fhewing the weakness of the Reasons brought by the other side, without any offence. If this be not permitted me, I must confess, I have been mistaken, and have been guilty in answering you any thing at all: how to answer without answering, I confess, I do not know.

I wish you had never writ any thing that I was particularly concerned to examine; And what I have been concerned to exa-

mine

mine, I wish it had given me no occasion for any other answer, but an admiration of the manner and justness of your Corrections, and an acknowledgment of an increase of that great Opinion, which I had of your Lordship before. But I hope it is not expected from me in this Debate, that I should admit as good and conclusive all that drops from your Pen, for fear of causing so much displeasure as you feem here to have upon this occasion, or for fear you should object to me the presumption of thinking you had but little Sense, as often as I endeavoured to shew, that what

you fay is of little force.

When those Words and Grounds of mine are produced, that the Author of Christianity not Mysterious, assigned, which your Lordship thinks a fufficient reason for your joining me with him, in oppoling the Doctrin of the Trinity; I shall consider them, and endeavour to give you Satisfaction about them as well I have already concerning those ten Lines, which you have more than once quoted out of him, as taken out of my Book, and which is all that your Lordship has produced out of him of that kind; in all which there is not one Syllable of clear and distinct Ideas, or of Certainty founded in them. In the mean time, in answer to your other Question, * But is this fair and ingenuous * P. 16. dealing? I refer my Reader to p. 35-38 of my fecond Letter, where he may fee at large all this whole matter, and all the unfairness and disingenuity of it, which I sub-G 3

mit to him, to judge whether for any fault of that kind, it ought to have drawn on me the marks of so much displeasure.

* p. 16.

Your Lordship goes on here, * and tells me, That although you were willing to allow me all reasonable occasions for my own Vindication, as appears by your Words; yet you were sensible enough that I had given too just an occasion to apply them in that manner as appears by the west Property of the sensitive the sensit

pears by the next Page.

What was it, I beseech you my Lord, that I was to bindicate my felf from, and what was those Them I had given too just an occasion to apply in that manner, and what was that manner they were applied in, and what was the occasion they were so applied? For I can find none of all these in that next page to which your Lordship refers me; when those are set down, the World will be the better able to judge of the Reason you had to join me after the manner you did: However, faying, my Lord, without proveing, I humbly conceive, is but faying, and in fuch Personal Matter so turned, shews more the disposition of the speaker, than any ground for what is faid. Your Lordship as a proof of your great care of me, tells me fat the top of that Page, That you had faid fo much that nothing could be Said more for my Vindication: And before you come to the bottom of it, you labour to perfuade the World, That I have need to vindicate my felf. Another possibly, who could find in his Heart to fay two fuch things, would have taken care they fhould

† 1 Ans. p. 36. should not have stood in the same Page, where the Juxta-position might enlighten them too much, and surprize the Sight. But possibly your Lordship is so well satisfied of the Worlds readiness to believe your Professions of good Will to me, as a mark whereof you tell me here of your willingness to allow me all reasonable occasions to vindicate my self, that no body can see any thing but Kindness in whatever you say, though it appears in so different Shapes.

In the following Words, your Lordship p. 16. accuses me of too nice a piece of Criticism; and tells me it looks like Chicaning. Answ. I did not expect in a Controversie begun and managed as this which your Lordship has been pleased to have with me, to be accused of Chicaning without great provocation; because the mentioning that Word might perhaps raise in the Reader's Minds some odd Thoughts which were better spared. But this Accusation made me look back into the places you quoted in the Margent, and there find the Matter to stand thus:

To a pretty large quotation fet down out of the Postscript to my first Letter, you subjoin, * Which Words seem to express so * 1 Ans. much of a Christian Spirit and Temper, that P. 37. your Lordship cannot believe I intended to give any advantage to the Enemies of the Christian Faith; but whether there hath not been too just occasion for them to apply them in that manner, is a thing very sit for me to consider.

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1. 2 Let. In my answer is I take notice that the P. 45. Term Them, in this Passage of your Lordship's can in the ordinary construction of our Language be applied to nothing but which Illiness in the beginning of that Passage, i. e. to my Words immediately presented.

This your Lordship calls Chicanceding. * pag. 17. ing; and gives this reason for it, * viz. Because any one that reads without a design to Cavil, would easily interpret Them of my Words and Notions about which the Debate was. Answ. That any one that reads that Paffage with or without design to Cavil, could hardly make it intelligible without interpreting Them fo, I readily grant; but that it is easie for me or any body, to interpret any ones meaning contrary to the necessary construction and plain import of the Words, that I crave leave to deny. I am fure it is not Chicaning to presume, that so great an Author as your Lordship, writes according to the Rules of Grammar, and as an other Man writes, who understands our Language and would be understood; to do the contrary, would be a presumption liable to blame, and might deserve the name of Chicaning and Cavil. And that in this case it was not easie to avoid the interpreting the term Them as I did; the reason you give why I should have done it, is a farther Proof. Your Lordship, to shew it was easie, says the Postscript, comes in but as a Parenthesis: Now I challenge any one living, to shew me

where in that place the Parenthesis must be-

gin,

gin, and where end, which can make Them applicable to any thing, but the words of my Postscript. I have tried with more care and pains than is usually required of a Reader in fuch cases, and cannot I must own find where to make a breach in the Thread of your Discourse, with the imaginary Parenthesis, which your Lordship mentions, and was not I suppose omitted by the Printer for want of Marks to Print it. And if this, which you give as the Key, that opens to the interpretation that I should have made, be so hard to be found, the interpretation it felf could not be fo very easie as you speak of.

But to avoid all blame for understanding that Passage as I did, and to secure my self from being suspected to seek a subter-suge in the natural import of your Words, against what might be conjectured to be your Sense, I added. It "But if by any new + Letter 2" way of Construction, unintelligible to p. 45. "me, the word Them here shall be applied to any Passages of my Essay of Humane "Onderstanding; I must humbly crave leave to observe this one Thing, in the whole "course of what your Lordship has design-

Complaint be of your Lordship's manner of applying, what I had publish'd in my Essay, so as to interest me in a Controversie, wherein I medled not; yet your Lordship all along tells me of others,

" ed for my Satisfaction, That tho' my

that have misapplied I know not what Words in my Book, after I know not

what manner. Now as to this Matter, 1 beseech your Lordship to believe that when any one, in fuch a manner applies e my Words contrary to what I intended them, fo as to make them opposite to the " Doctrin of the Trinity; and me a Party in that Controversie against the Tri-" nity, as your Lordship knows I complain your Lordship has done, I shall complain of them too; and consider, as well as I can, what Satisfaction they give me and others in it. This Passage of mine your Lordship here * represents thus, viz. That I fay, That if by an unintelligible new way of Construction, the word Them be applied to any Passages in my Book : What then? Why then, whoever they are, I intend to Com-But, fays your Lordplain of them too. ship, the Words just before tell me who they are, viz. The Enemies of the Christian Faith. then your Lordship Asks, whether this be all that I intend, viz. only to Complain of them for making me a Party in the Controversie against the Trinity?

My Lord, were I given to Chicaning, as you call my being stop'd by Faults of Grammar that disturb the Sense, and make the Discourse incoherent and unintelligible, if we are to take it from the Words as they are, I should not want Matter enough for such an Exercise of my Pen: As for Example here again *, where your Lordship makes me say, That if the word Them be applied to any Passages in my Book, then whoever They are, I intend to Complain, &c.

The fe

* p. 17.

These being set down for my Words, I would be very glad to be able to put them into a Grammatical construction, and make to my felf an intelligible Sense of them. But They being not a Word that I have an abfolute Power over, to place where and for what I will, I confess I cannot do it. the term They in the Words here, as your Lordship has fet them down, having nothing that it can refer to but Passages, or them which stands for Words, it must be a very suddain metamorphosis that must change them into Persons, for 'tis for Perfons that the word They stands here; and yet I crave leave to fay, that as far as I understand English, They is a Word cannot be used without reference to something mentioned before. Your Lordship tells me the Words just before tell me who they are. Words just mentioned before are these, if by an unintelligible new way of Construction the word Them be applied to any Passage of my Book, for 'tis to some words before indeed, but before in the same contexture of Discourse. that the word They must refer to make it any where intelligible. But here are no Persons mentioned in the Words just before, though your Lordship tells me the Words just before shew who they are, but this just before, where the Persons are mentioned whom your Lordship intends by They here, is fo far off that 16 Pages of your Lordships second Letter, 174 Pages of my second Letter, and above 100 Pages of your Lordships first Letter come between: So that

that one must read above 280 Pages from the Enemies of the Christian Faith, in the 37th Page of your first Letter, before one can come to the They which refers to them here in the 17th Page of your Lordship's second Letter.

My Lord, 'tis my misfortune that I cannot pretend to any Figure amongst the Men of Learning; but I would not for that reason be render'd so despicable, that I could not write ordinary Sense in my own Language: I must beg leave therefore to inform my Reader, that what your Lordship has set down here as mine, is neither

my Words, nor my Senfe. For,

I. I say not, if by any unintelligible new way of Construction; But I say, " If by any " new way of Construction unintelligible " to me : Which are far different Expresfions. For that may be very intelligible to others, which may be unintelligible to me. And indeed my Lord, there are so many Passages in your Writings in this Controversie with me, which for their Construction, as well as otherwise, are so unintelligible to me, that if I should be so unmannerly, as to measure your Understanding by mine, I should not know what to think of them. In those cases therefore, I presume not to go beyond my own Capacity: I tell your Lordship often (which I hope Modesty will permit) what my weak Understanding will not reach; but I am far from faying it is therefore absolutely unintelligible. to others the benefit of their better Judgments,

ments, to be enlightened by your Lordship, where I am not.

2. The use your Lordship here makes of these Words, " But if by any new way " of Construction unintelligible to me, " the word Them be applied to any Passages " in my Book: Is not the principal nor the only (as your Lordship makes it) use for which I faid them. But this; That if your Lordship by Them in that place, were to be understood to mean, that there were others that misapplied Passages of my Book; this was no fatisfaction for what your Lordship had done in that kind. Though this I observed was your way of defence; That when I complained of what your Lordship had done, you told me, that others had done fo too: As if that could be any manner of Satisfaction. I added in the close, * " That when any one, in such a * 2 Letter " manner applies my Words contrary to p. 46. what I intended them, so as to make them " opposite to the Doctrin of the Trinity, " and me a Party in that Controversie " against the Trinity, as your Lordship " knows I complain your Lordship has " done, I shall complain of them too; and consider as well as I can, what Satisfaction " they give me and others in it. Of this

any one of mine, your Lordship makes your forementioned They, whether with any advantage of Sense or clearness to my Words, the Reader must judge. However this latter part of that Passage, with the particular turn your Lordship gives to it, is what

your

your Words would perswade your Reader is all that I say here: Would not your Lordship upon such an occasion from me, cry out again, Is this fair and ingenuous Dealing? And would not you think you had reason to do so? But let us see what we must guess your Lordship makes me say, and your

exceptions to it.

Your Lordship makes me fay, whoever they are, who misapply my Words, as I complain your Lordship has done (for these Words must be supplied to make the Sentence to me intelligible) I intend to complain of them too: And then you find fault with me for using the indefinite word whoever, and as a Reproof for the unreasonableness of it, you say; But the Words just before tell me who they are. But my Words are not whoever they are. But my Words are, "When any one in fuch a manner applies my Words contrary to what I intended " them, &c. Your Lordship would here have me understand, that there are those that have done it, and Rebukes me that I fpeak as if I knew not any one, that had done it, and that I may not plead Ignorance, you say your Words just before, told me who they were, viz. The Enemies of the Christian Faith.

What must I do now, to keep my Word and satisfie your Lordship? Must I complain of the Enemies of the Christian Faith in general, that they have applied my Words as aforesaid, and then consider as well as I can, what Satisfaction they give me and others

in it? For that was all I promised to do. But this would be strange to complain of the Enemies of the Christian Faith, for doing, what 'tis very likely they never all did, and what I do not know that any one of them has done. Or must I to content your Lordship, read over all the writings of the Enemies of the Christian Faith, to see whether any one of them has applied my Words, i. e. in fuch a manner as I complained your Lordship has done, that if they have, I may complain of them too? This truly my Lord, is more than I have time for; and if it were worth while, when it is done, I perceive I should not content your Lordship in it. For you ask me here, Is this all I intend, only to complain of them for making me a Party in the Controversie against the Trinity? No my Lord, this is not all. I promised too, To consider as well as I can what Satis-" faction (if they offer any) they give me " and others for fo doing." And why should not this content your Lordship in reference to others as well as it does in reference to your felf? I have but one measure for your Lordship and others. When others treat me after the manner you have done, why should it not be enough to answer them after the fame manner I have done your Lordship? But perhaps your Lordship has some dextrous meaning under this, which I am not quick fighted enough to perceive, and fo do not reply right, as you would have me.

I must beg my Readers Pardon as well as your Lordships, for using so many Words about Passages, that seem not in themselves of that importance. I confess, that in themselves they are not: But yet 'tis my misfortune, that in this Controverse, your way of writing and representing my Sense forces me to it.

Your Lordship's name in writing is established above controle, and therefore 'twould be ill breeding in one, who barely reads what you write, not to take every thing for perfect in its kind, which your Lordship fays. Clearness and Force and Confistence are to be presumed always, whatever your Lordship's Words be: And there is no other Remedy for an Answerer, who finds it difficult any where to come at your Meaning or Argument, but to make his Excuse for it, in laying the particulars before the Reader, that he may be Judge where the Fault lies; especially where any matter of Fact is contested, deductions from the first rise, are often necessary, which cannot be made in few Words, nor without feveral Repetitions: An inconvenience possibly fitter to be endured, than that your Lordship, in the run of your Learned Notions, should be Shackled with the ordinary and strict Rules of Language, and in the delivery of your sublimer Speculations, be tied down to the mean and contemptible rudiments of Grammar: Though your being above these and freed from a servile obfervance in the use of trivial Particles, whereon the connection of Discourse chiefly depends, cannot but cause great difficulties to the Reader. And however it may be an ease to any great Man, to find himself above the ordinary rules of Writing, he who is bound to follow the connection and find out his Meaning, will have his Task much encreased by it.

I am very fensible how much this has swelled these Papers already, and yet I do not see, how any thing less than what I have said could clear those Passages, which we have hitherto examined; and set them in

their due Light.

Your next Words are thefe, * But whether * p. 17. I have not made my self too much a Party in it, [i. e. the Controversie against the Trinity] will appear before we have done. This is an Item for me, which your Lordship seems fo very fond of, and fo careful to inculcate, wherever you bring in any Words it can be tacked to, that if one can avoid thinking it to be the main end of your writing, one cannot yet but fee, that it could not be fo much in the Thoughts and Words of a great Man, who is above fuch personal Matters, and which he knows the World foon grows weary of, unless it had some very particular business there. Whether it be the Author that has prejudiced you against his Book, or the Book prejudiced you against the Author, fo it is I perceive, that both I, and my Essay are fallen under your displeasure.

I am not unacquainted what great stress is often laid upon invidious Names by skilful Disputants to supply the want of better Arguments. But give me leave, my Lord, to say, That 'tis too late for me now to begin to value those marks of good Will, or a good Cause; and therefore I shall say nothing more to them, as sitter to be left to the examination of the Thoughts within your own breast, from what sourse such as such as such as the same and t

whither they tend.

I am going, my Lord, to a Tribunal that has a right to judge of Thoughts, and being fecure that I there shall be found of no Party but that of Truth (for which there is required nothing but the receiving Truth in the Love of it) I matter not much of what Party any one shall, as may best serve his turn, denominate me here. Your Lordship's is not the first Pen from which I have receiv'd fuch strokes as these without any great harm: I never found freedom of Stile did me any hurt with those who knew me, and if those who know me not will take up borrowed Prejudices, it will be more to their own harm than mine: So that in this, I shall give your Lordship little other Trouble, but my Thanks fometimes, where I find you skilfully and industriously recommending me to the World under the Character you have chosen for me. Only give me leave to fay, That if the Effay I shall leave behind me hath no other fault to fink it but Heresie and inconsistency with the Articles ticles of the Christian Faith, I am apt to think it will last in the World, and do fervice to Truth, even the Truths of Religion, notwithstanding that imputation laid on it by fo mighty a hand as your Lordships's.

In your two next Paragraphs * your * p. 18, Lordship accuses me of Cavilling in the 43d 19, and 44th Pages of my second Letter, whither for shortness I refer my Reader. I shall only add, That though in the Debate about Mysteries of Faith, your Adversaries as you say are not Heathens; yet any one among us, whom your Lordship should speak of as not owning the Scripture to be the Foundation and Rule of Faith, would I presume be thought to receive from you a Character very little different from that of a Heathen. Which being a part of your Complement to me, will I humbly conceive excuse what I there said, from being a Cavilling exception.

Hitherto your Lordship, notwithstanding that you understood the World so well, has imploied your Pen in Personal Matters, how unacceptable foever to the World you declare it to be; How must I behave my self in the Case? If I answer nothing, my silence is so apt to be interpreted guilt or concession, that even the deferring my anfwer to some Points, or not giving it in the proper place is reflected on as no small Trangression; whereof there are two Examples in the two following Pages. * And * 20, 210 if I do answer so at large, as your way of writing requires, and as the matter de-

ferves

ferves, I recall to your memory the Springs of Modena, by the Ebullition of my Thoughts. 'Tis hard, my Lord, between these two to manage ones felf to your good likeing: However, I shall endeavour to collect the force of your reasonings, where-ever I can find it, as short as I can, and apply my anfwers to that, though with the omission of a great many incidents deserving to be taken notice of: If my flowness, not able to keep pace every where with your uncommon Flights, shall have missed any Argument, whereon you lay any stress; if you please to point it out to me, I shall not fail to endeavour to give you satisfaction therein.

* p. 19.

In the next Paragraph * your Lordship says, Those who are not sparing of writing about Articles of Faith, and among them take great care to avoid some which have been always esteemed Fundamental, &c. This seems also to contain something Personal in it. But how far I am concerned in it I shall know, when you shall be pleased to tell me who those are, and then it will be time enough for me to answer.

This is what your Lordship has brought in under your second Answer in these four Pages as a defence of it, and how much of it is a defence of that second Answer, let

the Reader judge.

Answers, which you faid, p. 7. you would lay together and defend. And it is this:

That my Grounds of Certainty tend to Scepticism, and that in an Age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are too much exposed by the promoters of Scepticism and Insidelity; it is a thing of dangerous consequence to start such new methods of Certainty as are apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before.

This is what you fet down here to be defended, the defence follows, wherein your Lordship tells me that I say, "These Words " contain a farther Accusation of my Book, "which shall be consider'd in its due of place. " But this is the proper place of considering it: How your Lordship said, That hereby I have given too just occasion to the Enemies of the Christian Faith, to make use of my Words and Notions, as was evidently proved from my own Concessions. And if this be so, however you were willing to have had me explained my self to the general Satisfaction; yet, since I decline it, you do insist upon it, That I cannot clear my self from laying that Foundation, which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious built upon.

In which I crave leave to acquaint your Lordship with what I do not understand.

First, I do not understand what is meant by this is the proper place; for in ordinary construction, these Words seem to denote this 20th Page of your Lordship's second Letter, which you were then writing, tho' the sense would make me think the 46th Page of my second Letter which you were then answering should be meant. This perhaps your Lordship may think a nice Piece

piece of Criticism; but till it be cleared, I cannot tell what to fay in my excuse. For 'tis likely your Lordship would again ask me, whether I could think you a Man of so little Sense, If I should understand these Words to mean the 20th Page of your fecond Letter, which no body can conceive your Lordship should think a proper place for me to consider and answer what you had writ in your first? 'Twould be as hard to understand this is, to mean a place in my former Letter, which was past and done; but 'tis no wonder for me to be mistaken in your priviledge word this. Befides, there is this farther difficulty to understand this is the proper place, of the 46th Page of my former Letter, because I do not fee why the 82d Page of that Letter, where I did consider and answer it, was not as proper place of considering it as the 46th, where I give a reason why I defend it. Farther, if I understood what von meant here by this is the proper place, I should possibly apprehend better the force of your Argument subjoined to prove this whatever it be, to be the proper place; the causal Particle for, which introduces the following Words, making them a reason of those preceding. But in the present obscurity of this matter, I confess I do not see how your having said that I gave occasion to the Enemies of the Christian Faith, &c. proves any thing concerning the proper place at all.

Another thing that I do not understand in this Defence, is your inference in the next Period, where you tell me, If this be so, you insist upon it that I should clear my self. For I do not see how your having said what you there said (for that is it which this here, if it be not within Priviledge, must signifie) can be a reason for your insisting on my clearing my self of any thing, though I allow this to be your Lordship's ordinary way of proceeding to insist upon your suggestions and suppositions in one place, as if they were Foundations to build what you pleased on in another.

Thus then stands your defence, My Grounds of Certainty tend to Scepticism, and to start new Methods of Certainty is of dangerous consequence. Because I did not consider this your Accusation in the proper place of considering it. This is the proper place of considering it. Because your Lordship said I had given too just occasion to the Enemies of the Christian Faith to make use of my Words and Notions; and because your Lordship said so, therefore you insist upon it that I clear my felf, &c. This appears to me, to be the connection and force of your defence hitherto. If I am mistaken in it, your Lordship's Words are set down, the Reader must judge whether the construction of the Words do not make it fo.

But before I leave them, there are some things that I crave permission to represent to your Lordship more particularly. I. That to the Accusation of Scepticism, I have answer'd in another, and as I think,

a proper place.

2. That the Accusation of dangerous confequence I have consider'd and answer'd in *2 Let.p. my former Letter *; but that being it seems 82-95. not the proper place of considering it, you have not in this your Desence thought sit to take any notice of it.

3. That your Lordship has not any where proved, That my placing of Certainty in the perception of the Agreement or disagreement of Ideas is apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than they were before, which is what your Accusation supposes.

4. That you fet down those Words of mine, "These Words contain a farther "Accusation of my Book, which shall be "consider'd in its due place," as all the answer which I gave to that new Accusation, except what you take notice of out of my 95th Page; and take no notice of what I say from Page 82 to 95. where I consider'd it as I promised, and as I thought fully answer'd it.

5. That the too just occasion, you say, I have given to the Enemies of the Christian Faith to make use of my Words and Notions,

wants to be proved.

6. That what use the Enemies of the Christian Faith have made of my Words and Notions, is no where shewn though often talked of.

7. That if the Enemies of the Christian
Faith have made use of my Words and Notions, yet that, as I have shewn †, is no † 2d Letproof, That they are of dangerous consector p. 69 quence. Much less is it a proof, that this 8 85.
Proposition, "Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas," is of dangerous consequence. For some Words or Notions in a Book, that are of dangerous consequence, do not make all the Propositions of that Book to be of

dangerous consequence.

8. That your Lordship tells me, You were willing to have had me explained my felf to the general satisfaction, which is what in the place * from which the former words are * 1ft Anf. taken, you expressed thus, That my An- p. 37. swer did not come fully up in all things to that which you could wish. To which I have given an answer; if and methinks your defence + 2d Let. here should have been applied to that, and P. 38not the same thing (which has been an- 41. fwer'd) fet down again as part of your Defence. But pray, my Lord, give me leave to ask, is not this meant for a Perfonal Matter, which though the World, as you fay, is foon weary of, your Lordship, it feems is not?

9. That you say, You insist upon it that I cannot clear my self from laying that Foundation which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious built upon. Certainly this Personal Matter is of some very great consequence, that your Lordship, who understands the World so well, insists so much up-

on it. But if it be true, That he built upon my Foundation; and it be of fuch moment to your Lordships business in the present Controversie, methinks without so much intricacy it should not be hard to shew it: It is but proving what Foundation of Certainty (for 'tis of that all this dispute is) he went upon, which, as I humbly conceive, your Lordship has not done; and then shewing that to be my Foundation of Certainty, and the business is ended. But instead of this your Lordship says, That his account of Keason supposes clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty; That he imaained he built upon my Grounds; That he thought his and my Notions of Certainty to be the same; That there has been too full occasion given, for the Enemies of the Chriib. p. 37. stian Faith to apply my Words in I know not These and the like Arguwhat manner. ments to prove that he goes upon my Grounds your Lordship has used; but they are, I confess, too subtile and too fine for me to feel the force of them, in a Matter of Fact wherein it was fo easie to produce both his and my Grounds out of our Books (without all this talk about Suppositions and Imaginations, and Occasions so far remote from any direct Proof) if it were a matter of that

> Your Lordship has spent a great many Pages to tie me to that Author; and you still insist upon it, that I cannot clear my self from laying that Foundation which the Author

> consequence to be so insisted upon as your

Lerdship professedly does.

Vindic. p. 232.

1 Answ. p. 36.

of Christianity not Mysterious built upon. What this great concern in a matter of fo little moment means, I leave the Reader to guess: For, I beseech your Lordship, of what great confequence is it to the World? What great interest has any Truth of Religion in this, That I and another Man (be he who he will) make use of the same Grounds to different purposes? This I am fure, it tends not to the clearing, or confirming any one material Truth in the World. If the Foundation I have laid be true, I shall neither disown nor dislike it, whatever this or any other Author shall build upon it; because, as your Lordship knows, ill things may be built upon a good Foundation, and yet the Foundation never the worse for it. And therefore if that, or any other Author hath built upon my Foundation, I fee nothing in it, that I ought to be concerned to clear my self from.

If you can shew that my Foundation is false, or shew me a better Foundation of Certainty than mine, I promise you immediately to renounce and relinquish mine with thanks to your Lordship: But till you can prove, That he that first invented Syllogisme as a Rule of right Reasoning, or first laid down this Principle, That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, is answerable for all those Opinions, which have been endeavoured to be proved by Mode and Figure; or have been built upon that Maxim, I shall not think

think my self concerned, whatever any one shall build upon this Foundation of mine, That Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two Ideas as they are expressed in any Proposition; much less shall I think my self concerned, for what you shall please to suppose (for that, with submission, is all you have done hitherto) any one has built upon it, though he were never so opposite to your Lordship in any of the Opinions he should build on it.

In that case, if he should prove troublefome to your Lordship with any Argument pretended to be built upon my Foundation, I humbly conceive you have no other Remedy, but to shew either the Foundation false, and in that case I confess my self concerned; or his deduction from it wrong, and that I shall not be at all concerned in. But if instead of this, your Lordship shall find no other way to subvert this Foundation of Certainty, but by faying, The Enemies of the Christian Faith build on it, because you suppose one Author builds on it; this I fear, my Lord, will very little advantage the Cause you defend, whilst it so visibly strengthens, and gives credit to your Adversaries, rather than weakens any Foundation they go upon. For the Unitarians I imagine, will be apt to fmile, at fuch a way of arguing, viz. That they go on this Ground, because the Author of Christianity not Mysterious goes upon it, or is supposed by your Lordship to go upon it; and By-**Standers**

standers will do little less than Smile, to find my Book brought into the Socinian Controversie, and the ground of Certainty laid down in my Essay condemned, only because that Author is supposed by your Lordship to build upon it. For this in short is the Case, and this the way your Lordship has used in answering Objections against the Trinity in point of Reason. I know your Lordship cannot be suspected of writing booty: But I fear, fuch a way of arguing in fo great a Man as your Lordship, will in an Age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are too much exposed, give too just an occasion to the Enemies, and also to the Friends of the Christian Faith, to fuspect that there is a great failure some where.

But to pass by that. This I am sure is personal Matter, which the World perhaps will think it need not have been troubled with.

Your Defence of your third Answer goes on, and to prove, that the Author of Christianity not Mysterious built upon my Foundation, you tell me, * That my ground of Certainty * p. 20. is the agreement or disagreement of the 21. Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition. Which are my own Words. From hence you urged, That let the Proposition come to us any way, either by humane or divine Authority, if our Certainty depend upon this, we can be no more certain, than we have clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas contained in it. And from hence the Author of Christianity not Mysterious, thought he had Rea-

fon to reject all Mysteries of Faith, which are contained in Propositions, upon my grounds of

Certainty.

Since this personal Matter appears of such weight to your Lordship, that it needs to be farther Prosecuted; and you think this your Argument to prove, That that Author built upon my Foundation, worth the repeating here again; I am obligged to enter again, so far into this personal Matter, as to examine this Passage which I formerly passed by as of no Moment. For it is easy to shew, that what you say, visibly proves not, that he built upon my Foundation; and next 'tis evident, that if it were proved, that he did so, yet this is no Proof, that my Method of Certainty is of dangerous Consequence, which is what was to be defended.

As to the first of these, your Lordship would prove, that the Author of Christianity not Mysterious built upon my Ground, and how do you prove it? viz. because he thought he had Reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith, which are contained in Propositions upon my Ground. How does it appear, that he rejected them upon my Grounds? Does he any where fay fo? No! That is not offered. there is no need of such an Evidence of matter of Fact, in a case which is only of matter of Fact. But he thought he had Reason to reject them upon my Grounds of Certainty. How does it appear that he thought fo? Very plainly. Because, let the Proposition come to us by humane or Divine Authority, if our Certainty depend upon the perception of the agreement

ment or disagreement of the Ideas contained in it, we can be no more certain than we have clear perception of that agreement. The consequence I grant is good, that if Certainty, i. e. Knowledge, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, then we can certainly know the Truth of no Proposition further than we perceive that agreement or disagreement. But how does it follow from thence, that he Thought he had Reason upon my Grounds to reject any Proposition, that contained a Mystery of Faith: Or, as your Lordship expresses it, all Mysteries of Faith which are contained in Propositions?

Whether your Lordship by the word Rejecting accuses him of not knowing, or of not believing some Proposition, that contains an Article of Faith; or what he has done or not done I concern not my felf; that which I deny is the confequence above mentioned, which I fubmit to your Lordship to be prov-And when you have proved it, and shewn your felf to be so familiar with the Thoughts of that Author, as to be able to be positive, what he Thought, without his telling you, it will remain farther to be proved, that because he thought so, therefore he built right upon my Foundation, for otherwise no prejudice will come to my Foundation by any ill use he made of it; nor will it be made good, that my method or way of Certainty, is of dangerous Confequence, which is what your Lordship is here to defend, Methinks your Lordship's Argument

ment here is all one with this. Aristotle's ground of Certainty (except of first Principles) lies in this, That those things which agree in a Third agree themselves. We can be certain of no Proposition (excepting first Principles) coming to us either by divine or humane Authority, if our Certainty depend upon this, farther than there is fuch an agreement. Therefore the Author of Christianity not Mysterious thought he had reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith, which are contained in Propositions upon Aristotle's Grounds. This confequence as strange as it is, is just the same with what is in your Lordship's repeated Argument against me. For let Aristotle's ground of Certainty be this, that I have named, or what it will, How does it follow, that because my ground of Certainty is placed in the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, therefore the Author of Christianity not Mysterious rejected any Proposition more upon my Grounds than Aristotle's? And will not Aristotle by your Lordship's way of Arguing here, from the use any one may make or think he makes of it, be guilty also of starting a method of Certainty of dangerous consequence, whether his method be True or False, if that or any other Author whose writings you dislike, thought he built upon it, or be supposed by your Lordship to think so. But, as I humbly conceive, Propositions, speculative Propositions such as mine is, about which all this stir is made, are to be judg'd of by their Truth or Falshood, and not by the

the use any one shall make of them; much less by the Persons who are supposed to build on them. And therefore it may be justly wonder'd, fince you say it is dangerous, why you never proved or attempted to

prove it to be false.

But you complain here again, that I answer'd not a Word to this in the proper Place. My Lord, if I offended your Lordship, by passing it by, because I thought there was no Argument in it: I hope I have now given you some fort of Satisfaction, by shewing there is no Argument in it; and letting you fee, that your consequence here could not be infer'd from your antecedent. you think it may, I desire you to try it in a Syllogism. For whatever you are pleafed to fay in another place † my way of † P. 120. Certainty by Ideas will admit of Antecedents and Consequents and of Syllogism as the proper form to try whether the Inference be right or no. I shall set down your following Words, that the Reader may fee your Lordship's manner of Reasoning concerning this matter in its full force and confiftency, and try it in a Syllogism if he pleases. Your Words are *.

By this it evidently appears, that although your Lordship was willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own Sense; yet you by no means Thought, that my Words were wholy misunderstood or misapplied by that Author : But rather that he faw into the true consequence of them, as they lie in my Book. And what an-

Twet

fwer do I give to this? Not a Word in the pro-

per place for it.

You tell me, you were willing to allow me all fair ways of interpreting my own Sense. If your Lordship had been conscious to your felf, that you had herein meant me any kindness, I think I may presume, you would not have minded me here again of a Favour, which you had told me of but in the preceding Page, and to make it an Obligation, need not have been more than once talked of; unless your Lordship thought the Obligation was fuch, that it would hardly be ieen, unless I were told of it in words at length, and in more places than one. what Favour I befeech you, my Lord, is it, to allow me to do that, which needed not your allowance to be done, and I could have done (if it had been necessary) of my felf without being blamed for taking that liberty? Whatsoever therefore your meaning was in these Words, I cannot think you took this way to make me fensible of your Kindness.

Your Lordship says, you were willing to allow me to interpret my own Sense. What you were willing to allow me to do, I have done. My Sense is, that Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas; and my Sense therein I have interpreted to be the agreement or disagreement, not only of persectly clear and distinct Ideas, but such Ideas, as we have, whether they be in all their parts persectly clear and distinct or no. Farther in answer

to your Objection, that it might be of dangerous Consequence: I so explained my Sense, as to shew, that Certainty in that Sense was not, nor could be of dangerous Consequence. This, which was the Point in question between us, your Lordship might have found at large explain'd in 82d and ten or twelve following Pages of my second Letter, if you had been pleased to have taken notice of them.

But it feems you were more willing to tell me, That though you were willing to allow me all ways of interpreting my own Sense, yet you by no means thought, that my Words were wholy misunderstood or misapply'd by that Author, but rather that he faw into the true confequence of them as they lie in my Book. here set down your Lordship's Words * * 1 Answ. where to give me and others Satisfaction) you P. 35. fay, you took care to prevent being mi funder food, which will best appear by your own Words, viz. That you must doe that right to the ingenious Author of the Essay of Humane Understanding, from whom these Notions are borrowed to serve other purposes than he intended them. It was too plain, that the bold Writer against the Mysteries of our Faith took his Notions and Expressions from thence, and what could be said more for my Vindication, than that he turned them to other purposes than the Author intended This you endeavour to prove, p. 43 -46 and then conclude if By which it is + I Answ: Sufficiently proved, that you had Reason to say, p. 46. that my Notion was carried beyond my Intention. These Words out of your first Letter, I

shall

shall leave here, set by those out of your Second, that you may at your leisure, if you think fit (for it will not become me to tell your Lordship that I am willing to allow it) explain your self to the general Satisfaction, that it may be known which of them is now your Sense; for they are, I suppose, too much to be together any ones Sense at the same time.

* 1 Ans. P. 36.

My Intention being thus fo well vindicated by your Lordship, that you think * nothing could be said more for my Vindication, the misunderstanding or not misunderstanding of my Book, by that or any other Author, is what I shall not wast my time about. your Lordship thinks he saw into the true Consequence of this Polition of mine, that Certainty confifts in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas (for 'tis from the inference, that you suppose he makes from that my definition of Knowledge, that you are here proving it to be of dangerous Consequence) he is beholding to your Lordship for your good Opinion of his quick Sight: I take no part in that, one What consequences your way or other. Lordship's quick Sight (which must be allowed to have out done, what you suppose of that Gentleman's) has found and charged on that Notion as dangerous, I shall endeavour to give you Satisfaction in.

† P 21. to give you Satisfaction in.
You farther add, † that though I answer'd
not a Word in the proper Place, yet afterwards,
Let. 2. p. 95. (for you would omit nothing,
that may seem to help my Cause) I offer some-

thing towards an Answer.

I shall be at a loss hereafter, what to do with the 82d and following Pages to the 95th, since what is said in those Pages of my second Letter, goes for nothing, because it is not in its proper Place. Though if any one will give himself the trouble to look into my second Letter, he will find, that the Argument I was upon in the 46th Page, obliged me to defer, what I had farther to say to your new Accusation. But that I re-assumed it in the 82d, and answer'd

it in that and the following Pages.

But supposing every Writer had not that exactness of Method, which shew'd, by the natural and visible connection of the parts of his Discourse, that every thing was laid in its proper place, is it a sufficient Answer not to take any notice of it? The Reason why I put this Question is, because if this be a Rule in Controversie, I humbly conceive, I might have passed over the greatest part of what your Lordship has said to me, because the Disposition it has under numerical Figures, is so far from giving me a view of the orderly connection of the parts of your Discourse, that I have often been tempted to suspect the negligence of the Printer for misplacing your Lordship's Numbers, fince so ranked as they are, they do to me, who am confounded by them, lofe all Order and Connection quite.

The next thing in the Defence, which you go on with, is an exception to my use of the word Certainty. In the close of the Answer I had made in the Pages you

I 3 pass

*2 Letter pass over * I add, that, " Though the Laws of Disputation allow bare denial, P. 95. as a fufficient Answer to Sayings without any offer of a Proof; yet my Lord, to " fhew how willing I am to give your Lord-" ship all Satisfaction, in what you apprehend may be of dangerous Consequence in " my Book, as to that Article, I shall not " ftand ftill fullenly, and put your Lord-" ship upon the difficulty of shewing wherein that Danger lies; but shall on the other " fide endeavour to shew your Lordship, " That that Definition of mine, whether True or False, Right or Wrong, can be of no dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith. The Reason which I shall offer " for it is this; because it can be of no "Consequence to it at all ". And the Reafon of it was clear from what I had faid be-+2 Letter fore + That Knowing and Believing were Two different Acts of the Mind. And that p. 90. my placing of Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, i. e. that my Definition of Knowledge, one of those Acts of the Mind, would not at all alter or shake the Definition of Faith, which was another Act of the Mind distinct from * 2 Letter it. And therefore 1 added, * " That the P. 95. " Certainty of Faith (if your Lordship thinks " fit to call it fo) has nothing to do with " the Certainty of Knowledge. And to talk " of the Certainty of Fanh, feems all one to me, as to talk of the Knowledge of Be-" lieving; a way of Speaking not easy to " me to understand ".

Thefe

These and other Words to this purpose in the following Paragraphs, your Lordship lays hold on, and sets down, as liable to no small exception: Though as you tell † † p. 23. me the main strength of my Defence lies in it.

Let what Strength you please lie in it, my Defence was strong enough without it. For to your bare Saying, my method of Certainty might be of dangerous Consequence to any Article of the Christian Faith, without proving it, it was a defence strong enough barely to deny, and put you upon shewing wherein that danger lies, which therefore, this main strength of my Defence, as you call it, apart, I insist on.

But as to your exception to what I faid on this occasion, it consists in this, that there is a Certainty of Faith, and therefore you fet down my faying. " That to talk of " the Certainty of Faith, feems all one as " to talk of the Knowledge of believing ". As that which shews the inconsistency of my Notion of Ideas, with the Articles of the Christian Faith. These are your Words here, * * p. 23. and yet you tell me, + That it is not my way + p. 74. of Ideas, but my way of Certainty by Ideas, that your Lordship is unsatisfied about. What must I do now in the Case, when your Words are expresly, that my Notion of Ideas have an inconfiftency with the Articles of the Christian Faith: Must I presume that your Lordship means my Notion of Certain: tp? All that I can do, is to fearch out your meaning the best I can, and then shew where I apprehend it not conclusive. But this un-14 certainty

certainty in most places, what you mean, makes me so much work, that a great deal is omitted, and yet my Answer is too

long.

Your Lordship asks in the next Paragraph, * How comes the Certainty of Faith * p. 23. so hard a Point with me? Answ. I suppose you ask this Question more to give others hard thoughts of my Opinion of Faith, than to be informed your felf. For you cannot be ignorant that all along in my Essay I use Certainty for Knowledge; so that for you to ask me, How comes the Certainty of Faith to become so hard a Point with me? is the same thing, as for you to ask, How comes the knowledge of Faith, or if you please, the knowledge of Believing to be so hard a Point with me? A Question which I suppose you will think needs no Answer, let your meaning in that doubtful Phrase be what it will.

I used in my Book the term Certainty for Knowledge so generally, that no body that has read my Book, though much less attentively than your Lordship, can doubt of it. That I used it in that sense there, I shall refer my Reader but to two places *

*L4.C.1. shall refer my Reader but to two places *

§ 1. & C. amongst many to convince him. This I

am sure, your Lordship could not be ignorant, that by Certainty I mean Knowledge,

† 1 Let p. since I have so used it in my Letters to 81,82, you, Instances whereof are not a few; 107,111, some of them may be found in the places 115, 118, marked in the Margent †: And in my se-131, 138, cond Letter, what I say in the leaf immediately

diately preceding that which you quote upon this occasion, would have put it past a possibility for any one to make shew of a doubt of it, had not that been amongst those Pages of my Answer, which for its being out of its proper place, it seems you were resolved not to take notice of; and therefore I hope it will not be besides my purpose here to mind you of it again.

After having faid something to shew why
I used Certainty and Knowledge for the same
thing, I added, * that "Your Lordship * 2d Let."

could not but take notice of this in the p. 93.
18th S. of Ch. 4. of my 4th Book, it
being a Passage you had quoted, and runs
thus; Where-ever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our Idaas, there is certain Knowledge; And
where-ever we are sure those Ideas agree
with the reality of things, there is certain real Knowledge; of which having

"tain real Knowledge; of which having
given the marks, I think I have shewn
wherein Certainty, real Certainty confists." And I farther add in the immediately following Words, † "That my † p. 94.

"definition of Knowledge in the begin"ning of the 4th Book of my Essay stands
thus, Knowledge seems to be nothing

" but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas." Which is the very definition of Certainty, that your Lordship is here contesting.

Since then you could not but know that in this discourse, Certainty with me stood for, or was the same thing with Knowledge, may not one justly wonder how you come to ask me such a Question as this, How comes the Knowledge of Believing to become so hard a Point with me? For that was in effect the Question that you asked, when you put in the term Certainty, fince you knew as undoubtedly, that I meant Knowledge by Certainty, as that I meant Believing by Faith, i. e. you could doubt of neither. And that you did not doubt of it, is plain from what you fay in the next Page, where you endeavour to prove this an improper way of speaking.

Whether it be a proper way of speaking, I allow to be a fair Question. But when you knew what I meant, though I expressed it improperly, to put Questions in a Word of mine, used in a sense different from mine, which could not but be apt to infinuate to the Reader, that my Notion of Certainty derogated from the manageroesia or full assurance of Faith, as the Scripture calls it, is what I guess in another, would make your Lordship ask again, Is this fair and ingenuous

dealing?

*Heb. 10. My Lord, my Bible expresses * the highest degree of Faith, which the Apostle recommended to Believers in his time by full
assurance. But assurance of Faith, though it
be what assurance soever, will by no means
down with your Lordship in my writing.

* p. 26. You say * I allow assurance of Faith, God for-

bid I should do otherwise; but then you ask. Why not Certainty as well as Assurance? My Lord, I think it may be a Reason not misbecoming a poor Lay-man, and fuch as he might presume would satisfie a Bishop of the Church of England, that he found his Bible to speak so. I find my Bible speaks of the Assurance of Faith, but no where, that I can remember, of the Certainty of Faith, though in many places it speaks of the Certainty of Knowledge, and therefore I speak so too; and shall not I think be condemned for keeping close to the Expressions of our Bible, though the Scripture Language, as it is, does not fo well ferve your Lordship's turn in the present Case. When I shall see in an authentick Translation of our Bible, the Phrase chang'd, it will then be time enough for me to change it too, and call it not the Assurance but Certainty of Faith: But till then I shall not be ashamed of it, notwithstanding you reproach me with it, by terming it if The Assurance of Faith as 1+ p. 31. call it; when you might as well have term'd it The Assurance of Faith, as our Bibles call it.

It being plain, that by Certainty I meant Knowledge, and by Faith the act of Believing, that these Words * where you ask, How *p. 23. comes the Certainty of Faith so hard a Point with me? And where you tell me, † I will † p. 26. allow no Certainty of Faith, may make no wrong impression in Mens Minds, who may be apt to understand them of the Object, and not meerly of the act of Believing. I

That this Assurance of Faith may ap-

crave leave to fay with Mr. Chillingworth, NC. 653. " That I do heartily acknowledge and be-" lieve the Articles of our Faith to be in themselves Truths as certain and infalli-" ble as the very common Principles of "Geometry or Metaphysicks. But that there is not required of us a Knowledge of them and an adherence to them as certain, as that of Senfe or Science; " and that for this Reason, (amongst others given both by Mr. Chillingworth and Mr. Hooker) viz. " That Faith is not Knowledge, no more than three is four, but eminently contained in it: So that he that knows, " believes and fomething more; but he that " believes many times does not; nay, if " he doth barely and meerly believe, he doth never know." Thefe are Mr. Chil-

* C. 6. 6 lingworth's own Words. *

proach very near to Certainty, and not come short of it in a sure and steady influence on the Mind, I have fo plainly declar'd, * Effay B. * that no body, I think, can question it. 4. C. 17. In my Chapter of Reason, which has re-\$ 16. ceiv'd the honour of your Lordship's Animadversions, I say of some Propositions wherein Knowledge [i. e. in my Sense] Certainty fails us, "That their probability is " fo clear and strong, that Assent as neces-" farily follows it, as Knowledge does De-" monstration." Does your Lordship ascribe any greater Certainty than this to an Article of meer Faith? if you do not? we are it feems agreed in the thing; and fo all,

all, that you have so emphatically said about it, is but to correct a mistake of mine in the English Tongue, if it prove to be one: A weighty Point, and well worth your Lordship's bestowing so many Pages upon. I say meer Faith, because though a Man may be a Christian, who meerly believes that there is a God, yet that is not an Article of meer Faith, because it may be demonstrated that there is a God, and so may certainly be known.

Your Lordship goes on to ask, if Have + p. 23. not all Mankind who have talked of Matters of Faith, allowed a Certainty of Faith as well as a Certainty of Knowledge? To answer a question concerning what all Mankind who have talked of Faith have done, may be within the reach of your great Learning: As for me, my reading reaches not fo far. Apostles and the Evangelists, I can answer, have talked of Matters of Faith, but I do not find in my Bible, that they have any where spoke (for 'tis of speaking here the Queftion is) of the Certainty of Faith; and what they allow, which they do not speak of, I cannot tell. I fay in my Bible, meaning the English Translation used in our Church; though what all Mankind, who speak not of Faith in English, can do towards the deciding of this Question I do not see, it being about the fignification of an English word. And whether in propriety of speech it can be applied to Faith, can only be decided by those who understand English, which all Mankind who have talked of Matof Matters of Faith, I humbly conceive did not.

* p. 24.

To prove that Certainty in English, may be applied to Faith, you fay, * That among the Romans it was opposed to doubting, and for that you bring this Latin Sentence, Nil tam certum est quam quod de dubio certum. Answ. Certum, among the Romans, might be opposed to doubting, and yet not be applied to Faith, because Knowledge, as well as Believing, is opposed to doubting; and therefore unless it had pleased your Lordship to have quoted the Author out of which this Latin Sentence is taken, one cannot tell whether Certum be not in it spoken of a thing known, and not of a thing believed; though if it were fo, I humbly conceive it would not prove what you fay, viz. That it, i. e. the word Certainty (for to that it must refer here, or to nothing that I understand) was among the Romans applied to Faith; for as . I take it, they never used the English word Certainty; and though it be true, that the English word Certainty be taken from the Latin word Certus, yet that therefore Certainty in English is used exactly in the same sense, that Certus is in Latin, that I think you will not fay; for then Certainty in English must signifie Purpose and Resolution of Mind, for to that Certus is applied in Latin.

† p. 24.

You are pleased here if to tell me, That in my former Letter I said, "That if we knew the Original of Words, we should be much helped to the Ideas they were first

" first applied to, and made to stand for." I grant it true, nor shall I unsay it here. For I faid not, that a Word, that had its Original in one Language, kept always exactly the same Signification in another Language, into which it was from thence transplanted. But if you will give me leave to remind you of it, I remember that you, my Lord, fay * in the same place, That lit- * Vindie. tle weight is to be laid upon a bare Gramma- p. 237. tical Etymology, when a Word is used in another sense by the best Authors. And I think you could not have brought a more proper instance to verifie that faying, than that which you produce here.

But pray, my Lord, why fo far about? Why are we fent to the antient Romans? Why must we consult (which is no easie task) all Mankind, who have talked of Faith, to know whether Certainty be properly used for Faith or no, when to determine it between your Lordship and Me, there is so fure a Remedy, and fo near at hand? It is but for you to fay wherein Certainty confifts. This, when I gently offer'd to your Lordship in my first Letter, you interpreted it it to be a design to draw you out of + 1ft Ans.

your way.

I am forry, my Lord, you should think it out of your way to put an end, a short end to a Controversie, which you think of fuch moment: Methinks it should not be out of your way, with one blow, finally to overthrow an Affertion, which you think to be of dangerous consequence to that Article of Faith,

p. 69.

* 2d Let. defend. p. 94.

Faith, which your Lordship has endeavoured to I proposed the same again * where I fay, " For this there is a very easie Re-" medy: It is but for your Lordship to " fet aside this Definition of Knowledge, by giving us a better, and this danger is " over. But you choose rather to have a " Controversie with my Book, for having " it in it, and to put me upon the De-" fence of it." This is so express, that your taking no notice of it, puts me at a loss what to think. To fay that a Man so great in Letters, does not know wherein Certainty consists, is a greater presumption than I will be guilty of; and yet to think that you do know and will not tell, is yet harder. Who can think, or will dare to fay, That your Lordship so much concerned for the Articles of Faith, and engaged in this dispute with me, by your duty, for the prefervation of them, should choose to keep up a Controversie with me rather than remove. that danger, which my wrong Notion of Certainty threatens to the Articles of Faith? For, my Lord, fince the Question is moved, and it is brought by your Lordship to a publick Dispute, wherein Certainty consists, a great, many knowing no better, may take up with what I have faid; and rather than have no Notion of Certainty at all, will flick by mine, till a better be shew'd them. And if mine tends to Scepticism, as you say, and you will not furnish them with one that does not, what is it but to give way to Scepticism, and let it quietly prevail on Men

as either having my Notion of Certainty, or none at all? Your Lordship indeed says something in excuse in your 75th Page, which that my Answer may be in the proper place, shall be consider'd when we come there.

Your Lordship declares, * That you are ut- * p. 25. terly against any private Mints of Words. I know not what the Publick may do for your particular Satisfaction in the Cafe: but till publick Mints of Words are erected, I know no Remedy for it, but that you must patiently suffer this matter to go on in the same course, that I think it has gone in ever fince Language has been in use. Here in this Island, as far as my knowledge reaches, I do not find, that ever fince the Saxons time, in all the alterations that have been made in our Language, that any one Word or Phrase has had its Authority from the Great Seal, or passed by Act of Parliament.

When the dazling Metaphor of the Mine and new mill'd Words, &c. (which mightily, as it feems, delighted your Lordship when you were writing that Paragraph) will give you leave to consider this matter plainly as it is, you will find, that the Coining of Mony in publickly authoriz'd Mints, affords no manner of Argument against private Mens medling in the introducing new, or changing the signification of old Words; every one of which alterations always has its rise from some private Mint. The Case in short is this, Mony by vertue of the K

Stamp, received in the publick Mint, which vouches its intrinsick Worth, has authority to pass. This use of the publick Stamp would be lost, if private Men were suffer'd to offer Mony stamp'd by themselves: On the contrary, Words are offer'd to the Publick by every private Man, Coined in his private Mint, as he pleases; but 'tis the receiving of them by others, their very passing, that gives them their Authority and Currancy, and not the Mint they come out of. Horace, I think, has given a true + de Arte account of this matter, + in a Country very jealous of any Usurpation upon the publick Authority.

Multa renascentur qua jam cecidere ca-

Qua nunc sunt in bonore vocabula, si vo-

let usus,

Poet.

Quem penes arbitrium & jus & norma loquendi.

But yet whatever change is made in the fignification or credit of any word by publick use, this change has always its beginning in some private Mint; so Horace tells us it was in the Roman Language quite down to his time.

Ego cur acquirere pauca

Si possum invideor? quum lingua Catonis & Enni

Sermonem patrium ditaverit, & nova re-

Nomina protulerit? Licuit semperq; licebit

Signatum prasente nota procudere nomen.

Here we see Horace expressly says, That private Mints of Words were always Licensed, and, with Horace I humbly conceive so they will always continue, how utterly soever your Lordship may be against them. And therefore he that offers to the Publick new mill'd Words from his own private Mint, is not always in that so bold an Invader of the publick Authority, as you would make him.

This I say not to excuse my self in the present Case, for I deny, that I have at all changed the signification of the word Certainty. And therefore if you had pleased you might, my Lord, have spared your saying on this Occasion, * That it seems our * p. 24, old Words must not now pass in the current & 25. Sense. And those Persons assume too much Authority to themselves, who will not suffer common Words to pass in their general acceptation, and other things to the same purpose in this Paragraph, till you had proved, that in strict propriety of speech it could be said, That a Man was certain of that which he did not know but only believed.

If

If you had had time in the heat of Difpute to have made a little Reflection on the use of the English word Certainty in strict Speaking, perhaps your Lordship would not have been so forward to have made my using it, only for precise Knowledge, so enormous an impropriety; at least you would not have accused it of weakening the Credibi-

lity of any Article of Faith.

Tis true indeed, People commonly fay, they are certain of what they barely Believe, without doubting. But 'tis as true, that they as commonly fay, that they Know it too. But no Body from thence concludes. that Believing is Knowing. As little can they conclude from the like vulgar way of Speaking, that Believing is Certainty. All that is meant thereby is no more but this, that the full affurance of their Faith, as steadily determins their affent to the imbracing of that Truth, as if they actually knew it.

But however, fuch Phrases as these are used to shew the steadiness and assurance of their Faith, who thus Speak; yet they alter not the propriety of our Language, which I think appropriates Certainty only to Knowledge, when in strict and philosophical Discourse it is, upon that account, contradistinguished to Faith, as in this case here your Lordship knows it is, whereof there + p. 115. is an express Evidence in my first Letter, + where I fay, " That I speak of Belief, and your Lordship of Certainty, and that I meant Belief and not Certainty.

Your Lordship says, Certainty is common p. 25. to both Knowledge and Faith, unless I think it impossible to be certain upon any Testimony what soever. I think it is possible to be certain upon the Testimony of God (for that I suppose you mean) where I know that it is the Testimony of God, because in such a Case, that Testimony is capable not only to make me believe, but if I consider it right, to make me know the thing to be fo; and fo I may be certain. For the veracity of God is as capable of making me know a Proposition to be true, as any other way of Proof can be, and therefore I do not in fuch a case, barely Believe, but know such a Proposition to be true, and attain Certainty.

The fum of your Accusation is drawn up * thus, That I have appropriated Certainty * p. 26. to the perception of the agreement or difagreement of Ideas in any Proposition; and now I find this will not hold as to Articles of Faith; and therefore I will allow no Certainty of Faith; which you think is not for the advantage of my Cause. The truth of matter of That I have placed Fact is in short this. Knowledge in the perception of the agree-This definiment or disagreement of Ideas. tion of Knowledge your Lordship said might be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of Faith, which you have endeavoured to defend. This I denied, and gave this Reason for it, + viz. That a Definition of Knowledge, + 2 Let. whether a good or bad, true or false De- P. 94-98. finition, could not be of ill or any Consequence to an Article of Faith. Because a K 3 dedefinition of Knowledge, which was one Act of the Mind, did not at all concern Faith, which was another Act of the Mind quite distinct from it. To this then, which was the Proposition in Question between us, your Lordship, I humbly conceive should have answered. But instead of that, your Lordship by the use of the word Certainty in a Sense, that I used it not (for you knew I used it only for Knowledge) would represent me as having strange Notions of Faith. Whether this be for the Advantage of your Cause, your Lordship will do well to consider.

P. 27.

Upon such a use of the word Certainty in a different Sense from what I use it in, the force of all your Lordship says, i under your first Head contained in the two or three next Paragraphs, depends, as I think, for I must own (Pardon my Dulness) that I do not clearly comprehend the force of what your Lordship there says: And it will take up too many Pages, to examin it Period by Period. In short therefore, I take your Lordship's meaning * to be this,

* p. 27,

That there are some Articles of Faith, viz. the fundamental Principles of natural Religion, which Mankind may attain to a Certainty in by Reason without Revelation; which because a Man that proceeds upon my Grounds, cannot attain to Certainty in by Reason, their credibility to him, when they are considered as purely matters of Faith will be weakened. Those which your Lordship instances in are the

Being of a God, Providence, and the Rewards

and Punishments of a future State.

This is the way, as I humbly conceive, your Lordship takes here to prove my Grounds of Certainty (for so you call my definition of Knowledge) to be of dangerous Conse-

quence to the Articles of Faith.

To avoid Ambiguity and Confusion in the examining this Argument of your Lordship's, the best way, I humbly conceive will be, to lay by the term Certainty, which your Lordship and I using in different Senses, is the less sit to make what we say to one another clearly understood; and instead thereof, to use the term Knowledge, which with me, your Lordship knows, is equivalent.

Your Lordship's Proposition then as far as it has any opposition to me, is this, That if Knowledge be supposed to consist in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, a Man cannot attain to the Knowledge, that these Propositions, viz. That there is a God, a Providence, and Rewards and Punishments in a future State, are true; and therefore the credibility of these Articles, consider'd purely as matters of Faith, will be weakened to him. Wherein there are these Things to be proved by your Lordship.

i. e. upon a supposition, that Knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, we cannot attain to the Knowledge of the Truth of either of those Propositions, viz. That there is a God, K. A. Pro-

Providence, and Rewards and Punishments in

a future State.

2. Your Lordship is to prove, That the not knowing the Truth of any Proposition, lessens the credibility of it; which in short, amounts to this, that want of Knowledge lessens Faith in any Proposition proposed. This is the Proposition to be proved, if your Lordship uses Certainty in the Sense I use it, i. e. for Knowledge, in which only use of it will it here bear upon me.

But fince I find your Lordship in these two or three Paragraphs, to use the word Certainty in so uncertain a Sense, as sometimes to fignifie Knowledge by it, and fometimes Believing in general, i. e. any degree of believing, give me leave to add that if your Lordship means by these Words, * Let us suppose a Person by natural Reason to attain to a Certainty as to the being of a God, &c. i. e. attain to a belief that there is a God, &c. or the Souls Immortality. I fay if you take Certainty in such a Sense, then it will be incumbent upon your Lordship to prove, That if a Man finds the natural Reason whereupon he entertained the belief of a God or of the immortality of the Soul uncertain, that will weaken the credibility of those fundamental Arsicles, as matters of Faith, or which is in effect the same. That the weakness of the credibility of any article of Faith from Reason, weakens the credibility of it from Revelation. For tis this which these following Words of yours import. For before there was a natural credibility in them on the account of Rea-

* p. 27.

f p. 28.

son, but by going on wrong grounds of Certainty

all that is loft.

To prove the first of these Propositions, viz. That upon the supposition that Knowledge confifts in the perception of the agreement of Ideas, we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of this Proposition. Your Lordship urges, that there is a God. that I have faid, That no Idea proves the existence of the Thing without it self, which Argument reduced to form, will stand thus. If it be true, as I fay, that no idea proves the existence of the thing without it self, then upon the supposition that Knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, we cannot attain to the knowledge of the truth of this Proposition, that there is a God: Which Argument fo manifestly proves not, that there needs no more to be faid to it, than to desire, that consequence to be proved.

Again, as to the immortality of the Soul your Lordship urges *, that I have said, that * p. 28. I cannot know but that matter may think; therefore upon my ground of Knowledge, i. e. upon a supposition that Knowledge consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, there is an end of the Souls Immortality. This consequence I must also desire your Lordship to prove. Only I crave leave by the by to point out some things in these Paragraphs too remarkable to be passed over without any Notice.

One is, That you suppose of a Man is made + p. 28. certain upon my general grounds of Certainty, i. e.

knows

knows by the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, that there is a God, and yet upon a farther examination of my method he finds that the way of Ideas will not do. Here my Lord, if by my grounds of Certainty, my Method, and my way of Ideas. you mean one and the fame thing, then your Words will have a confiftency and tend to the same point. But then I must beg your Lordship to consider, that your Supposition carries a Contradiction in it, viz. That your Lordship supposes, that by my Grounds, my Method, and my way of Certainty, a Man is made Certain and not made Certain, that there is a God. If your Lordship means here by my grounds of Certainty, my Method, and my way of Ideas different things (as it feems to me you do) then, whatever your Lordship may suppose here, it makes nothing to the Point in Hand, which is to shew, that by this my ground of Certainty, viz. That Knowledge confifts in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, a Man first attains to a Knowledge, that there is a God, and afterwards by the fame grounds of Certainty he comes to lose the Knowledge, that there is a God; which to me seems little less than a Contradiction.

'Tis likely your Lordship will say you mean no such thing, for you alledge this Proposition, that no Idea proves the existence of any thing without it self, and give that as an Instance, that my way of Ideas will not do, i.e. will not prove the being of a God. 'Tis true

true your Lordship does so. But withal my Lord, 'tis as true, that this Proposition, supposing it to be mine (for it is not here set down in my Words) contains not my method, or way, or notion of Certainty; though 'tis in that Sense alone, that it can here be useful to your Lordship to call it my method,

or the way by Ideas.

Your Lordship undertakes to shew, That my defining Knowledge to confift in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, weakens the credibility of this fundamental Article of Faith, that there is a God, what is your Lordship's Proof of it? Just this. The faying that no Idea proves the existence of the thing without it self, will not do: Ergo, the faying, that Knowledge confifts in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of Ideas, weakens the credibility of this fundamental Article. This my Lord, feems to me no Proof, and all that I can find, that is offered to make it a Proof, is only your calling these Propositions my general grounds of Certainty, my method of Proceeding, the way of Ideas, and my own Principles in point of Reason, as if that made these two Propositions the same thing, and whatfoever were a consequence of one, may be charged as a consequence of the other; though it be visible, that though the latter of these be never so false, or never so far from being a Proof of a God, yet it will by no means thence follow, that the former of them, viz. That Knowledge confifts in the perception of the agreement or difagreement greement of Ideas, weakens the credibility of that fundamental Article. But 'tis but for your Lordship to call them both the way

of Ideas, and that is enough.

That I may not be accused by your Lord-Thip for unfair or disingenuous dealing for representing this Matter so, I shall here set down your Lordship's Words at large. Let us now suppose a Person by natural Reason to attain to a Certainty, as to the Being of God, and Immortality of the Soul; and he proceeds upon J. L's general grounds of Certainty, from the agreement or disagreement of Ideas; and so from the Ideas of God and the Soul, he is made certain of these two Points before mention'd. But let us again suppose that such a Person upon a farther Examination of I. L's method of proceeding finds, that the way of Ideas in thefe Cases will not do; for no Idea proves the existence of the thing without it self, no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being, or the Visions of a Dream make a true History, (which are J. L's. own Expressions) And for the Soul he cannot be certain. but that Matter may think, (as J. L. affirms) and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality (and consequently Immortality) from its Operations? But for all this, says J. L. his assurance of Faith remains firm on its own Basis. Now you appeal to any Man of Sense. whether the finding of Uncertainty of his own Principles, which he went upon in point of Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles when they are consider'd purely as matters of Faith? For before there

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was a natural Credibility in them on the account of Reason; but by going on wrong grounds of Certainty, all that is lost; and instead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever. These are your Lordship's own Words; and now I appeal to any Man of Sense, whether they contain any other Argument against my placing of Certainty as I do, but this, viz. A Man mistakes and thinks that this Proposition, no Idea, proves the existence of the thing without it self, shews, That in the way of Ideas one cannot prove a God, Ergo, this Proposition, Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, weakens the credibility of this fundament Article, that there is a God. And fo of the immortality of the Soul, because I fay, I know not but Matter may think: Your Lordship would infer, Ergo, my definition of Certainty weakens the credibility of the Revelation of the Souls immortality.

Your Lordship is pleased here, to call this Proposition, "That Knowledge or "Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas," My general grounds of Certainty, as if I had some more particular grounds of Certainty. Whereas I have no other Ground or Notion of Certainty, but this one alone; all my Notion of Certainty is contained in that one particular Proposition; but perhaps your Lordship did it, that you might make the Proposition, above quoted, viz. "No "Idea proves the existence of the thing "with

greement of Ideas, weakens the credibility of that fundamental Article. But 'tis but for your Lordship to call them both the way

of Ideas, and that is enough.

That I may not be accused by your Lord-Thip for unfair or disingenuous dealing for representing this Matter so, I shall here set down your Lordship's Words at large. Let us now suppose a Person by natural Reason to attain to a Certainty, as to the Being of God, and Immortality of the Soul; and he proceeds upon J. L's general grounds of Certainty, from the agreement or disagreement of Ideas; and so from the Ideas of God and the Soul, he is made certain of these two Points before mention'd. But let us again suppose that such a Person upon a farther Examination of J. L's method of proceeding finds, that the way of Ideas in these Cases will not do; for no Idea proves the existence of the thing without it self, no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being, or the Visions of a Dream make a true History, (which are J. L's. own Expressions) And for the Soul he cannot be certain. but that Matter may think, (as J. L. affirms) and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality. (and consequently Immortality) from its Operations? But for all this, says J. L. his assurance of Faith remains firm on its own Basis. Now you appeal to any Man of Sense, whether the finding of Uncertainty of his own Principles, which he went upon in point of Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles when they are consider'd purely as matters of Faith? For before there was

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was a natural Credibility in them on the account of Reason; but by going on wrong grounds of Certainty, all that is lost; and instead of being certain, he is more doubtful than ever. These are your Lordship's own Words; and now I appeal to any Man of Sense, whether they contain any other Argument against my placing of Certainty as I do, but this, viz. A Man mistakes and thinks that this Proposition, no Idea, proves the existence of the thing without it felf, shews, That in the way of Ideas one cannot prove a God, Ergo, this Proposition, Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, weakens the credibility of this fundament Article, that there is a God. And fo of the immortality of the Soul, because I fay, I know not but Matter may think: Your Lordship would infer, Ergo, my definition of Certainty weakens the credibility of the Revelation of the Souls immortality.

Your Lordship is pleased here, to call this Proposition, "That Knowledge or "Certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas," My general grounds of Certainty, as if I had some more particular grounds of Certainty. Whereas I have no other Ground or Notion of Certainty, but this one alone; all my Notion of Certainty is contained in that one particular Proposition; but perhaps your Lordship did it, that you might make the Proposition, above quoted, viz. "No "Idea proves the existence of the thing "with

without it felf under the Title you give it of the way of Ideas, pass for one of my particular Grounds of Certainty; whereas it is no more any Ground of Certainty of mine, or definition of Knowledge, than any other Proposition in my Book.

Another thing very remarkable in what your Lordship here fays, is, That you make the failing to attain Knowledge by any way of Certainty in some particular Instances, to be the finding the uncertainty of the way it felf, which is all one as to fay, That if a Man misses by Algebra, the certain Knowledge of some Propositions in Mathematicks, therefore he finds the way or principles of Algebra to be uncertain or false. This is your Lordship's way of reasoning here: Your Lordship quotes out of me, "That I say no Idea proves the exi-" stence of the thing without it felf." And that I fay, " That one cannot be certain "that Matter cannot think;" whence your Lordship argues, That he who favs fo, cannot attain to Certainty that there is a God, or that the Soul is immortal; and thereupon your Lordship concludes, * he finds the uncertainty of the Principles he went upon, in Point of Reason, i. e. that he finds this Principle or Ground of Certainty he went upon in reasoning, viz. That Certainty or Knowledge confifts in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of Ideas, to be uncertain. your Lordship means here by Principles he went upon in Point of Reason any thing else, but

* p. 28.

but that definition of Knowledge, which your Lordship calls my Way, Method, Grounds, &c. of Certainty, which I and others, to the endangering some Articles of Faith, go upon; I crave leave to say, it concerns nothing at all the Argument your Lordship is upon, which is to prove, That the placing of Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas may be of dangerous consequence to any Article of Faith.

Your Lordship in the next place of fays, + p: 29, Before we can believe any thing upon the ac 30. count of Revelation, we must suppose there is a God. What use does your Lordship make of this? Your Lordship thus argues; But by my way of Certainty, a Man is made uncertain whether there be a God or no. For that to me is the meaning of those Words, * How can his Faith stand firm as * p. 29. to Divine Revelation, when he is made uncertain by his own way, whether there be a God or no? Or they can to me mean nothing to the Question in hand. What is the conclusion from hence? This it must be, or nothing to the purpose, Ergo, my defininition of Knowledge, or which is the same thing, my placing of Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, leaves not the Articles of Faith the same credibility they had before.

To excuse my dulness in not being able to comprehend this consequence, pray, my Lord, consider, that your Lordship says, if Before we can believe any thing upon the ac- + ibid.

count

count of Revelation, it must be supposed that there is a God. But cannot he who places Certainty in the perception of the agreement and disagreement of Ideas, supposes there is a God?

But your Lordship means by suppose, that one must be certain that there is a God. Let it be fo, and let it be your Lordship's priviledge in Controversie to use one word for another, though of a different fignification, as I think to suppose and be certain Cannot one that places Certainty in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of Ideas, be certain there is a God? I can assure you, my Lord, I am certain there is a God; and yet I own, That I place Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas: Nay, I dare venture to fay to your Lordship, That I have proved there is a God, and fee no inconfistency at all between these two Propositions, That Certainty consists. in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of Ideas; and that it is certain there is a God. So that this my Notion of Certainty, this definition of Knowledge, for any thing your Lordship has said to the contrary, leaves to this Fundamental Article the same Credibility, and the same Certainty it had before.

Your Lordship says farther, * To suppose Divine Revelation, we must be certain that there is a principle above Matter and Motion in the World. Here again, my Lord, your way of writing makes work for my Ignorance,

P. 29.

and

and before I can either admit or deny this Proposition, or judge what force it has to prove the Proposition in question, I must distinguish it into these different Senses, which I think your Lordship's way of speaking may comprehend. For your Lordship may mean it thus; To suppose Divine Revelation, we must be certain, i. e. we must believe that there is a principle above Matter and Motion in the World. Or your Lordthip may mean thus; We must be certain. i. e. we must know that there is something above Matter or Motion in the World. In the next place your Lordship may mean by fomething above Matter and Motion, either fimply an intelligent Being; for Knowledge, without determining what Being it is in, is a principle above Matter and Motion. Or your Lordship may mean an immaterial intelligent Being; fo that this undetermined way of expressing, includes at least four distinct Propositions, whereof some are true, and others not fo. For

I. My Lord, if your Lordship means, That to suppose a Divine Revelation, a Man must be certain, i. e. must certainly know that there is an intelligent Being in the World, and that that intelligent Being is immaterial from whence that Revelation comes; I deny it. For a Man may suppose Revelation upon the belief of an intelligent Being, from whence it comes, without being able to make out to himself, by a Scientifical Reasoning, that there is such a Being. A proof whereof I humbly conceive

ceive are the Anthropomorphites among the Christians heretofore, who nevertheless rejected not the Revelation of the New Testament; and he that will talk with illiterate People in this Age, will, I doubt not, find many who believe the Bible to be the Word of God, though they imagine God himself in the shape of an Old Man sitting in Heaven, which they could not do, if they knew, i. e. had examined and understood any demonstration whereby he is proved to be immaterial, without which

they cannot know it.

2. If your Lordship means, That to suppose a Divine Revelation, it is necessary to know, that there is simply an intelligent Being; this also I deny. For to suppose a Divine Revelation, is not necessary that a Man should know that there is such an intelligent Being in the World: I fay, know, i. e. from things, that he does know, demonstratively deduce the proof of such a Being; it is enough for the receiving Divine Revelation to believe, that there is fuch a Being, without having by demonstration attained to the Knowledge, that there is a God. Every one that believes right, does not always reason exactly, especially in abstract Metaphysical Speculations; and if no body can believe the Bible to be of Divine Revelation, but he that clearly comprehends the whole deduction, and fees the evidence of the demonstration wherein the existence of an intelligent Being, on whose Will all other Beings depend, is Scientifically

entifically proved, there are I fear but few Christians among illiterate People, to look no farther. He that believes there is a God, though he does no more than believe it, and has not attained to the Certainty of Knowledge, i. e. does not see the evident demonstration of it, has Ground enough to admit of Divine Revelation. The Apostle tells us, That he that will come to God, must believe that he is; But I do not remember the Scripture any where says, That he must know that he is.

3. In the next place, if your Lordship means, That to suppose Divine Revelation, a Man must be certain, i. e. explicitly believe, that there is a perfectly immaterial Being, I shall leave it to your Lordship's confideration, whether it may not be Ground enough for the Supposition of a Revelation to believe, that there is an all-knowing, unerring Being, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, without a Man's precifely determining in his Thoughts, whether that unerring, omniscient Being be immaterial or 'Tis past all doubt, that every one that examins and reasons right, may come to a Certainty, that God is perfectly immaterial. But it may be a question, whether every one who believes a Revelation to be from God, may have enter'd into the disquisition of the immateriality of his Being? Whether, I fay, every ignorant day Labourer, who believes the Bible to be the Word of God, has in his mind confider'd materiality and immateriality, and L 2 does

does explicitly believe God to be immaterial, I shall leave to your Lordship to determine, if you think sit more expressy than

your Words do here.

4. If your Lordship means, That to suppose a Divine Revelation, a Man must be certain, i.e. believe that there is a supreme intelligent Being, from whom it comes, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. I grant it to be true.

These being the several Propositions, either of which may be meant in your Lordship's so general, and to me doubtful, way of expressing your felf to avoid the length, which a particular Answer to each of them would run me into, I will venture (and it is a venture to answer to an ambiguous Proposition in one Sense, when the Author has the liberty of faying he meant it in another, a great convenience of general loofe and doubtful Expressions) I will, I say, venture to answer to it in the Sense I guess most fuited to your Lordship's purpose; and fee what your Lordship proves by it. I will therefore suppose your Lordship's Reasoning to be this; That

To suppose Divine Revelation, a Man must be certain, i. e. believe that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion, i. e. an immaterial intelligent Being in the World. Let it be so; what does your Lordship infer? Therefore upon the Principles of Certainty by Ideas, he [i. e. he that places Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas,] cannot be certain of [i. e. believe] this]. This consequence seems a

little

p. 29.

little strange, but your Lordship proves it thus; Because he may not know but Matter may think: Which Argument put into form, will stand thus;

If one who places Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, note not know but Matter may think; then whoever places Certainty so, cannot believe there is an immaterial intelligent Being in the World.

But there is one who placing Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, bors not know but Matter

may think:

Ergo, whoever places Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, cannot believe that there is

an intelligent immaterial Being.

This Argumentation is so defective in every part of it, that for fear I should be thought to make an Argument for your Lordship in requital for the Answer your Lordship made for me, I must desire the Reader to consider; your Lordship says, Whe must be certain: He cannot be certain, because he both not know, which in short, is p. 29. We cannot because he both not. This consider d, will justifie the Syllogism I have made to contain your Lordship's Argument in its full force.

I come therefore to the Syllogism it felf, and there first I deny the Minor which is this:

There is one who placing Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, both not know but Matter may think.

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I begin with this, because this is the Foundation of all your Lordship's Argument; and therefore I defire your Lordship would produce any one who placing Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, does not

The Reason why I press this, is because I suppose your Lordship means me here,

know but Matter may think.

and would have it thought that I fay, I do not know but that Matter may think: But that I do not fay fo; nor any thing elfe from whence may be infer'd what your Lordship adds in the annexed Words, if if they can be infer'd from it, And confequently all Revelation may be nothing but the effects of an exalted Fancy, or the heats of a disorder'd Imagination, as Spinosa affirm'd.

*B. 4. C. On the contrary, I do fay, * " It is im-10. 910. " possible to conceive that matter, either. " with or without motion, could have " originally in and from it felf Percep-"tion and Knowledge." And having in that Chapter establish'd this Truth, That there is an eternal immaterial knowing Being, I think no body but your Lordship could have imputed to me the doubting, that there was fuch a Being, because I say in another place, + and to another pur-+ B. 4. C. pose, "It is impossible for us by the con-3.56. templation of our own Ideas, without

" Rebelation, to discover, whether Omniopotency has not given to some Systems " of Matter fitly disposed, a power to " perceive and think, or else joined and

" fixed

+ p. 29.

" fixed to Matter fo disposed, a thinking " immaterial Substance: It being in re-" fpect of our Notions, not much more remote from our Comprehensions to con-" ceive, that God can, if he pleases, su-" peradd to our Idea of Matter a Facul-" ty of Thinking, than that he should " fuperadd to it another Substance, with " a faculty of Thinking." From my faying thus, That God (whom I have proved to be an immaterial Being) by his Omnipotency, may, for ought we know, superadd to some parts of Matter a faculty of Thinking, it requires some skill for any one to represent me as your Lordship does here, as one ignorant or doubtful whether Matter may not think; to that degree, that I am not certain, or I do not believe that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World, and confequently all Revelation may be nothing but the effects of an exalted Fancy, or the heats of a disordered Imagination, as Spinosa affirm'd. For thus I, or fome Body else (whom I desire your Lordship to produce) stands painted in this your Lordship's Argument from the Supposition of a Divine Revelation, which your Lordship brings here to prove, That the defining of Knowledge, as I do, to confift in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, weakens the Credibility of the Articles of the Christian Faith.

But if your Lordship thinks it so dangerous a Position to say, "It is not much "harder for us to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to Matter " a faculty of Thinking, than that he " should superadd to it another Substance " with a faculty of Thinking." (which is the utmost I have said concerning the faculty of Thinking in Matter.) I humbly conceive it would be more to your purpose to prove, That the infinite, omnipotent Creator of all Things, out of nothing, cannot, if he pleases, superadd to some parcels of Matter, disposed as he sees fit, a faculty of Thinking, which the rest of Matter has not; rather than to represent me, with that Candour your Lordship does, as one, who so far makes Matter a Thinking thing, as thereby to question the being of a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World, and consequently to take away all Revelation, which how natural and genuine a Representation it is of my Sense, expressed in the Passages of my Esfay, which I have above fet down, I humbly fubmit to the Reader's Judgment and your Lordship's Zeal for Truth to determine; and shall not stay to examin whether Man may not have an exalted Phancy; and the heats of a disorder'd Imagination, equally overthrowing Divine Revelation, tho? the power of Thinking be placed only in an immaterial Substance:

I come now to the sequel of your Major, which is this:

If one who places Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, does not know but Matter may Think; then whoever places

places Certainty so, cannot believe there is an immaterial intelligent Being in the World.

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The consequence here, is from does not to cannot, which I cannot but wonder to find in an Argument of your Lordships. For he that does not to Day believe or know, that Matter cannot be fo ordered by God's Omnipotency as to think (if that subverts the belief of an immaterial intelligent Being in the World) may know or believe it to Morrow, or if he should never know or believe it, yet others who define Knowledge as he does, may know or believe it. Unless your Lordship can prove, that it is impossible for any one, who defines Knowledge, to confift in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, to know or believe, that Matter cannot Think. But this, as I remember, your Lordship has not any where attempted to prove. yet without this, your Lordship's way of Reasoning is no more, than to argue, that one cannot do a thing because another does not do it. And yet upon this strange consequence is built all that your Lordship brings here to prove, that my definition of Knowledge, weakens the credibility of Articles of Faith, V. g.

It weakens the credibility of this fundamental Article of Faith, that there is a God!
How so? Because I who have so defined
Knowledge, say in my Essay, * "That * B. 4. C.
"the Knowledge of the Existence of any 11. § 1.

"other thing [but of God] we can have only by Sensation. For there being no

" necessary connexion of real Existence with " any Idea a Man hath in his Memory, nor of any other Existence but that of God, with the Existence of any particular Man; " no particular Man can know the Existence " of any other Being, but only when by " actual operating upon him, it makes it " felf perceived by him. For the having " the Idea of any thing in our Mind, no " more proves the Existence of that thing, than the Picture of a Man evidences his "Being in the World, or the Visions of " a Dream, make thereby a true History." For so are the Words of my Book, and not as your Lordship has been pleased to set them down here; † and they were well chosen by your Lordship, to shew, that the way of Ideas would not do. i. e. In my way by Ideas, I cannot prove there is a God.

But supposing I had said in that place, or any other, that which would hinder the proof of a God, as I have not, might I not see my Error, and alter or renounce that Opinion without changing my definition of Knowledge? Or could not another Man who defined Knowledge, as I do, avoid Thinking as your Lordship says, I say, That no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self, and so be able, notwithstanding my saying so, to prove that there is a God?

Again, your Lordship argues that my definition of Knowledge, weakens the credibility of the Articles of Faith: Because it takes

† P. 28.

takes away Revelation; and your Proof of that is, because I do not know whether Mat-

ter may not Think.

The same fort of Argumentation your Lordship goes on with in the next Page, * * p. 30. where you say, Again, before there can be any such thing as assurance of Faith upon divine Revelation, there must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition; for there can be no Revelation pretended now, without immediate Inspiration; and the Basis of our Faith is a Revelation contained in an antient Book, whereof the parts were delivered at distant times, but conveyed down to us by an universal Tradition. But now, what if my grounds of Certainty can give us no assurance as to these Things? Your Lordship says you do not mean, That they cannot demonstrate matters of Fact, which it were most unreasonable to expect, but that these Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain; for your Lordship thinks you have proved, That this way of Ideas cannot give a satisfactory Account, as to the Existence of the plainest Objests of the Sense; because Reason cannot perceive the connection between the Objects and How then can we arrive to any the Ideas. Certainty in perceiving those Objects by their Ideas?

All the force of which Argument lies in this, that I have faid (or am supposed to have faid, or to hold, for that I ever faid fo, I do not remember) That Reason cannot perceive the connection between the Objects and the Ideas: Ergo, whoever holds that Knowledge confifts in the perception of the agreement

ment or disagreement of Ideas, cannot have any assurance of Faith upon divine Revelation.

My Lord, let that Proposition, viz. That Reason cannot perceive the connection between the Objects and the Ideas, be mine as much as your Lordship pleases, and let it be as inconsistent as you please, with the assurance of Faith upon divine Revelation; How will it follow from thence, that the placing of Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, is the Cause, that there cannot be any such thing as the assurance of Faith upon divine Revelation to any Body? Though I who hold Knowledge to confift in the perception of the agreement and disagreement of Ideas, have the Misfortune to run into this Error, viz. That Reason cannot perceive the connection between the Objects and the Ideas, which is inconsistent with the assurance of Faith upon divine Revelation, yet it is not necessary that all others who with me hold, that Certainty confifts in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of Ideas, should also hold, That Reason cannot perceive the connection between the Objects and the Ideas, or that I my self should always hold it: Unless your Lordship will say, that whoever places Certainty, as I do, in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, must necessarily hold all the Errors that I do, which are inconfistent with or weaken the belief of any Article of Faith; and hold them incorrigibly. Which has as much confequence

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quence as if I should argue, that because your Lordship who lives at Worcester does sometime mistake in quoting me, therefore no Body who lives at Worcester can quote my Words right, or your Lordship can never mend your wrong Quotations. For, my Lord, the holding Certainty to confift in the perception of the agreement or difagreement of Ideas, is no more a necessary cause of holding those erroneous Propositions. which your Lordship imputes to me, as weakening the credibility of the mentioned Articles of Faith, than the place of your Lordship's dwelling is a necessary cause of wrong Quoting.

I shall not here go about to trouble your Lordship with Divining again, what may be your Lordship's precise Meaning in several of the Propositions contained in the Passage above set down, especially that remarkably ambiguous and to me obscure one, viz. There must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition. I fear I have wasted too much of your Lordship's, and my Reader's time in that imployment already, and there would be no end, if I should endeavour to explain whatever I am at a loss about, the determined Sense of, in any of your

Lordship's Expressions. Only I will crave leave to beg my Reader to observe, That in this first Head, * * p. 27which we are upon, your Lordship has used 31. the Terms Certain and Certainty near Twenty times, but without determining in any of them, whether you mean Knowledge, or

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the full assurance of Faith, or any degree of Believing; though it be evident, that in these Pages your Lordship uses Certainty for all these Three. Which ambiguous use of the main Word in that Discourse, cannot but render your Lordship's Sense clear and perspicuous, and your Argument very cogent; and no doubt will do so to any one, who will be but at the pains to reduce that one Word to a clear determined Sense all through these sew Paragraphs.

+ p. 23.

Your Lordship fays, & Have not all Mankind who have talked of matters of Faith allowed a Certainty of Faith, as well as a Certainty of Knowledge? Answ. But did ever any one of all that Mankind allow it as a tolerable way of speaking, that believing in general (for which your Lordship has used it) which contains in it the lowest degree of Faith, should be called Certainty? Could he who faid, I Believe Lord, help my Unbelief, or any one who is weak in Faith, or of little Faith, be properly be faid to be certain, or de dubio certus of what he believes, with a weak degree of Affent? I shall not question what your Lordship's great Learning may Authorize: But I imagine every one hath not skill, or will not assume the liberty to speak fo.

If a Witness before a Judge asked upon his Oath, whether he were certain of such a thing, should answer yes, he was certain; and upon farther demand, should give this account of his Certainty, That he believed it; would he not make the Court

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and Auditors believe strangely of him? For to fay that a Man is certain, when he barely believes, and that perhaps with no great Assurance of Faith, is to say that he is certain, where he owns an Uncertainty. For he that fays he barely believes, acknowledges that he Assents to a Proposition as true, upon bare probability. where any one Assents thus to any Propofition, his Assent excludes not a possibility that it may be otherwise; and wherein any one's Judgment there is a possibility to be otherwise, there one cannot deny but there is some Uncertainty; and the less cogent the Probabilities appear, upon which he Assents, the greater the Uncertainty. So that all barely probable Proofs, which procure Affent, always containing some visible possibility that it may be otherwise (or else it would be demonstration) and confequently the weaker the Probability appears, the weaker the Assent, and the more the Uncertainty: It thence follows, that where there is such a mixture of Uncertainty, there a Man is fo far uncertain; and therefore to fay, That a Man is certain where he barely believes or affents but weakly, though he does believe, feems to me to fay, That he is certain and uncertain together. But though bare Belief always include some degrees of Uncertainty, yet it does not therefore necesfarily include any degree of wavering, the evidently strong probability may as steadily determine the Man to Assent to the Truth.

Truth, or make him take the Proposition for true, and act accordingly, as Knowledge makes him see or be certain that it is true. And he that doth so, as to Truths reveal'd in the Scripture, will shew his Faith by his Works; and has, for ought I can see, all the Faith necessary to a Chri-

stian, and requir'd to Salvation.

My Lord, when I consider the length of my Answer here, to these few Pages of your Lordship's, I cannot but bemoan my own dulness, and own my unfitness to deal with fo learned an Adversary as your Lordship in Controversie: For I know not how to answer but to a Proposition of a determin'd Sense. Whilst it is vague and uncertain in a general or equivocal use of any of the Terms, I cannot tell what to fay to it. I know not but such comprehenfive ways of expressing ones felf, may do well enough in declamation; but in reasoning, there can be no judgment made till one can get to some positive determined Sense of the Speaker. If your Lordship had pleased to have condescended so far to my low Capacity, as to have delivered your meaning, here determined, to any one of the Senses above set down, or any other, that you may have in these Words, I gather'd them from; it would have faved me a great deal of writing, and your Lordship loss of time in reading. I should not fay this here to your Lordship, were it only in this one place that I find this inconvenience. It is every where in all your Lordship's

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Lordship's Reasonings, that my want of Understanding causes me this difficulty, and against my Will multiplies the words of my Answer. For notwithstanding all that great deal that I have already said to these sew Pages of your Lordship's; yet my defence is not clear, and set in its due light, unless I shew in particular of every one of those Propositions (some whereof I admit as true, others I deny as not so) that it will not prove what is to be proved, viz. That my placing of Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, lessens the credibility of any Article of Faith, which it had before.

Your Lordship having done with the Fundamental Articles of Natural Religion, you come in the next place to those of Revelation, to enquire, as your Lordship fays, + Whether those who embrace the Articles of + p. 31. Faith, in the way of Ideas, can retain their Certainty of those Articles, when these Ideas are quitted. What this Enquiry is I know not very well, because I neither understand what it is to imbrace Articles of Faith in the way of Ideas, nor know what your Lordship means by retaining their Certainty of those Articles, when these Ideas are quitted. But 'tis no strange thing for my short Sight, not always distinctly to discern your Lordship's meaning: Yet here I prefume to know that this is the thing to be proved, viz. That my definition of Knowledge does not leave to the Articles of the Christian Faith, the same credibility they had M

before. The Articles your Lordship in-

stances in are.

1. The Resurrection of the dead. And here your Lordship proceeds just in the same method of arguing, as you did in the former; your Lordship brings several Passages concerning Identity out of my Esfay, which you suppose inconsistent with the belief of the Resurrection of the same Body; and this is your Argument to prove that my defining of Knowledge to confift in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, " alters the Foundations of this Article of Faith, and leaves it not " the same credibility it had before." Now, my Lord, granting all that your Lordship has here * quoted out of my Chapter of Identity and diversity, to be as false as your Lordship pleases, and as inconsistent as your Lordship would have it, with the Article of the Resurrection from the dead; nay, granting all the rest of my whole Essay to be false, how will it follow from thence, that the placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, weakens the credibility of this Article of Faith, That the dead shall rise? Let it be, that I who place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas am guilty of Errors, that weaken the credibility of this Article of Faith, others who place Certainty in the fame Perception, may not run into those Errors, and fo not have their belief of this Article at all shaken.

* p. 32.

Your Lordship therefore, by all the long discourse you have made here against my Notion of Personal Identity, to prove that it weakens the credibility of the Resurrection of the dead; should you have proved it never so clearly, has not, I humbly conceive, faid therein any one word towards the proving, That my definition of Knowledge weakens the credibility of this Article of Faith. For this, my Lord, is the Proposition to be proved, as your Lordship cannot but remember, if you please to recollect, what is faid in your 21st and following Pages, and what in the 95th Page of my second Letter, quoted by your Lordship, it was defigned as an answer to. And fo I proceed to the next Articles of Faith your Lordship instances in. Your Lordship fays, *

2. The next Articles of Faith which my No- * P. 44. tion of Ideas is inconsistent with, are no less than those of the Trinity and the Incarnation of our Saviour. Where I must humbly crave leave to observe to your Lordship, that in this fecond Head here, your Lordship has changed the Question from my Notion of Certainty, to my Notion of Ideas. For the Question, as I have often had occasion to observe to your Lordship, is, Whether my Notion of Certainty, i. e. my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, alters the Foundation, and lessens the credibility of any Article of Faith? This being the Question between your Lordship and me, ought

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I humbly conceive, most especially to have been kept close to in this Article of the Trinity; because 'twas upon the account of my Notion of Certainty as prejudicial to the Doctrine of the Trinity, that my Book was first brought into this Dispute. your Lordship offers nothing, that I can find, to prove, That my definition of Knowledge or Certainty, does any way lessen the credibility of either of the Articles here mentioned, unless your infifting upon some supposed Errors of mine about Nature and Person, must be taken for proofs of this Proposition, That my definition of Certainty lessens the credibility of the Articles of the Trinity, and our Saviour's Incarnation. And then the Answer I have already given to the same way of Argumentation used by your Lordship, concerning the Articles of a God, Revelation, and the Resurre-Etion, I think may fuffice.

Having, as I beg leave to think, shewn that your Lordship has not in the least proved this Proposition, That the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, weakens the credibility of any one Article of Faith, which was your former Accusation against this (as your Lordship is pleased to call it) new Method of Certainty, of so dangerous consequence to that Article of Faith which your Lordship has endeavoured to defend; and all that your terrible Representation of it being, as I humbly conceive, come to just nothing. I come now to vindicate my Book from

from your new Accusation in your last Letter, and to shew that you no more prove the Passages you alledge out of my Essay to have any inconsistency with the Articles of Christian Faith you oppose them to, than you have proved by them, That my definition of Knowledge weakens the credibility of any of those Articles.

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1. The Article of Christian Faith your Lordship begins with, is that of the Resurrection of the dead; and concerning that you say, The Reason of believing the Re- + P. 32. surrection of the same Body upon my Grounds, is from the Idea of Identity. Answ. Give me leave, my Lord, to fay that the Reason of believing any Article of the Christian Faith (fuch as your Lordship is here speaking of) to me and upon my Grounds, is its being a part of Divine Revelation: Upon this Ground I believed it before I either writ that Chapter of Identity and Diversity, and before I ever thought of those Propositions which your Lordship quotes out of that Chapter, and upon the same Ground I believe it still; and not from my Idea of Iden-This faying of your Lordship's therefore, being a Proposition neither self-evident, nor allowed by me to be true, remains to be proved. So that your Foundation failing all your large Superstructure built thereon, comes to nothing.

But my Lord, before we go any farther, I crave leave humbly to represent to your Lordship, That I thought you undertook to make out that my Notion of Ideas was

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inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith. But that which your Lordship instances in here is not, that I yet know, an Article of the Christian Faith. The Resurrection of the dead, I acknowledge to be an Article of the Christian Faith: But that the Resurrection of the same Body, in your Lordship's Sense of the same Body, is an Article of the Christian Faith, is what I conticle of the Christian Faith, is what I con-

fess, I do not yet know.

In the New Testament (wherein, I think, are contained all the Articles of the Christian Faith) I find our Saviour and the Apostles to preach the Resurrestion of the Dead, and the Resurrestion from the dead in many places: But I do not remember any place, where the Resurrestion of the same Body, is so much as mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable in the Case, I do not remember in any place of the New Testament (where the general Resurrection at the last Day is spoken of) any such Expression as the Resurrestion of the Body, much less of the same Body.

I say the general Resurrection at the last Day: Because where the Resurrection of some particular Persons presently upon our Saviour's Resurrection is mentioned, the Words are, * The Graves were opened and many Bodies of Saints, which slept, arose and came out of the Graves after his Resurrection, and went into the Holy City, and appeared to many: Of which peculiar way of speaking of this Resurrection, the Passage it self gives a Reason in these Words, appeared to many,

* 27 Mat. 52, 53.

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i.e. Those who slept, appeared, so as to be known to be rifen. But this could not be known, unless they brought with them the Evidence, that they were those who had been dead, whereof there were these two Proofs, their Graves were opened, and their Bodies not only gone out of them, but appeared to be the same to those who had known them formerly alive, and knew them to be dead and buried. For if they had been those who had been dead so long, that all who knew them once alive, were now gone, those to whom they appeared might have known them to be Men; but could not have known they were risen from the dead: Because they never knew they had been dead. All that by their appearing they could have known, was that they were fo many living Strangers, of whose Resurrection they knew nothing. 'Twas necessary therefore, that they should come in fuch Bodies, as might in make and fize, &c. appear to be the same they had before, that they might be known to those of their Acquaintance, whom they appeared to. it is probable they were fuch as were newly dead, whose Bodies were not yet dissolved and diffipated, and therefore 'tis particularly faid here (differently from what is faid of the general Refurrection) that their Bodies arose: Because they were the same, that were then lying in their Graves, the Moment before they rose.

But your Lordship endeavours to prove it must be the same Body: And let us grant,

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that your Lordship, nay and others too, think you have proved it must be the same Body, will you therefore fay, that he holds what is inconfiftent with an Article of Faith. who having never feen this your Lordship's interpretation of the Scripture, nor your Reasons for the same Body, in your fense of same Body; or, if he has feen them, vet not understanding them, or not perceiving the force of them, believes what the Scripture proposes to him, viz. That at the last Day, the dead shall be raised, without determining whether it shall be with the very fame Bodies or no?

I know your Lordship pretends not to erect your particular interpretations of Scripture, into Articles of Faith; and if you do not, He that believes the dead fh all be raised, believes that Article of Faith, which the Scripture propofes: And cannot be accused of holding any thing inconsistent with it, if it should happen, that what he holds is inconsistent with another Proposition, viz. That the dead shall be raised with the same Bodies, in your Lordship's Sense, which I do not find proposed in Holy Writ as an Article of Faith.

+ P. 34. 35.

But your Lordship argues, it must be the Same Body which as you explain Same Body f is not the same individual particles of Matter, which were united at the point of Death. the same particles of Matter, that the Sinner had at the time of the Commission of his Sins. But that it must be the same material Substance which was vitally united to the Soul here, i. e.

as I understand it, the same individual particles of Matter, which were, sometime or other during his Life here, vitally united to his Soul.

Your first Argument to prove, that it must be the same Body in this Sense of the same Body, is taken i from these Words + p. 37. * All that are in the Graves * 5 John of our Saviour. shall hear his Voice, and shall come forth. From 28. 29. whence your Lordship argues, That these Words, all that are in their Graves, relates to no other Substance, than what was united to the Soul in Life; because a different Substance cannot be said to be in the Graves, and to come out of them. Which Words of your Lordships, if they prove any thing, prove, that the Soul too is lodg'd in the Grave, and raised out of it at the last Day. For your Lordship says, Can a different Substance be said to be in their Graves and come out of them? So that according to this interpretation of these Words of our Saviour; No other Substance being raised, but what hears his Voice, and no other Substance hearing his Voice, but what being called comes out of the Grave, and no other Substance coming out of the Grave, but what was in the Grave, any one must conclude, that the Soul, unless it be in the Grave, will make no part of the Person that is raised, unless, as your Lordship argues against me, i You can make + p. 37. it out, that a Substance which never was in the Grave may come out of it, or that the Soul is no Substance.

But setting aside the Substance of the Soul. another thing that will make any one doubt. whether this your Interpretation of our Saviour's Words be necessarily to be received as their true Sense, is, That it will not be very eafily reconciled to your faying, * you do not mean by the same Body, The same individual Particles which were united at the point of Death. And yet by this Interpretation of our Saviour's Words, you can mean no other Particles, but such as were united at the Point of Death: Because you mean no other Substance, but what comes out of the Grave, and no Substance, no particles come out you fay, but what were in the Grave. and I think your Lordship will not say that the Particles that were seperate from the Body by perspiration, before the point of Death, were laid up in the Grave.

+ P. 37.

* p. 34.

But your Lordship, I find, has an Answer to this, it viz. That by comparing this with other places you find, that the Words, Tof our Saviour above quoted | are to be understood of the Substance of the Body, to which the Soul was united, and not to (I suppose your Lordship writ of) those individual Particles, i.e. those individual Particles that are in the Grave, at the Resurrection. For fo they must be read to make your Lordship's Sense entire, and to the purpose of your Answer here: And then methinks this last Sense of our Saviour's Words given by your Lordship, wholly overturns the Sense which you have given of them above, where from those Words you press the belief of the Resurrection

rection of the same Body, by this strong Argument, that a Substance could not upon hearing the Voice of Christ, come out of the Grave, which was never in the Grave. There (as far as I can understand your Words) your Lordship argues, that our Saviour's Words must be understood of the Particles in the Grave, unless, as your Lordship fays, one can make it out that a Substance which never was in the Grave, may come out of it. here your Lordship expresly says, That our Saviour's Words are to be understood of the Substance of that Body, to which the Soul was Tat any time united, and not to those individual Particles that are in the Grave. Which put together feems to me to fay, That our Saviour's Words are to be understood of those Particles only that are in the Grave, and not of those Particles only which are in the Grave, but of others also which have at any time been vitally united to the Soul, but never were in the Grave.

The next Text your Lordship brings to make the Resurrection of the same Body, in *2 Cor. your Sense, an Article of Faith, are these 5. 10. Words of St. Paul, * For we must all appear before the Judgment Seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his Body, according to that he hath done, whether it be † p. 38. good or bad. To which your Lordship subjoins of this Question. Can these Words be understood of any other material Substance, but that Body in which these things were done?

Answ. A Man may suspend his determining the meaning of the Apostle to be, that a

Sinner shall suffer for his Sins in the very Same Body, wherein he committed them: Because St. Paul does not say he shall have the very same Body, when he suffers, that he had when he finn'd. The Apostle fays, indeed done in his Body. The Body he had, and did things in at Five or Fifteen, was no doubt his Body, as much as that, which he did things in at Fifty was his Body, though his Body were not the very same Body at those different Ages: And so will the Body, · which he shall have after the Resurrection, be his Body, though it be not the very same with that, which he had at Five or Fifteen or Fifty. He that at Threescore is broke on the Wheel, for a Murder he committed at Twenty, is punished for what he did in his Body, though the Body he has, i.e. his Body at Threescore, be not the same, i.e. made up of the fame individual Particles of Matter, that that Body was, which he had Forty Years before. When your Lordship has resolved with your self, what that same immutable he is, which at the last Judgment shall receive the things done in his Body, your Lordship will easily see, that the Body he had, when an Embryo in the Womb, when a Child playing in Coats, when a Man marrying a Wife, and when Bed-rid dying of a Confumption, and at last, which he shall have after the Resurrection, are each of them his Body, though neither of them be the same Body, the one with the other.

But farther to your Lordship's Question, Can these Words be understood of any other ma-

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terial Substance, but that Body in which these things were done? I Answer, these Words of St. Paul may be understood of another material Substance, than that Body in which these things were done, because your Lordship teaches me, and gives me a strong Reason so to un-Your Lordship says, it P. 34. derstand them. That you do not say the same Particles of Matter, which the Sinner had at the very time of the Commission of his Sins, shall be raised at the last Day. And your Lordship gives this Reason for it. * For then along Sinner must * P. 35. have a vast Body, considering the continual spending of Particles by Perspiration. my Lord, if the Apostle's Words, as your Lordship would argue, cannot be understood of any other material Substance, but that Body, in which these things were done, and no Body upon the removal or change of some of the Particles, that at any time makes it up is the same material Substance, or the same Body; it will, I think, thence follow, that either the Sinner must have all the same individual Particles vitally united to his Soul, when he is raised, that he had vitally united to his Soul, when he sin'd: Or else St. Paul's Words here cannot be understood to mean the same Body in which the things were done. For if there were other Particles of Matter in the Body, wherein the thing was done, than in that which is raised, that which is raised cannot be the same Body in which they were done: Unless that alone, which has just all the same individual Particles when any action is done, being the fame Body

Body wherein it was done, that also, which has not the same individual Particles wherein that Action was done, can be the same Body wherein it was done, which is in effect to make the same Body sometimes to be the same, and sometimes not the same. Your Lordship thinks it suffices to make

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the same Body to have not all; but no other Particles of Matter, but fuch as were fometime or other vitally united to the Soul before: But fuch a Body made up of part of the Particles fometime or other vitally united to the Soul, is no more the fame Body wherein the Actions were done in the distant parts of the long Sinner's life, than that is the same Body in which a quarter or half or three quarters, of the same Particles, that made it up, are wanting. example, A Sinner has acted here in his Body an hundred Years; he is raised at the last day, but with what Body? The same fays your Lordship, That he acted in, because St. Paul says he must receive the things done in his Body? What therefore must his Body at the Refurrection confift of? Must it confift of all the Particles of Matter, that have ever been vitally united to his Soul? For they, in Succession, have all of them made up his Body, wherein he did these things: No, says your Lordship, f That would make his Body too vast; it fuffices to make the same Body in which the things were done, that it consists of some of the Particles, and no other but fuch as were sometime during his life, vitally united

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But according to this aced to his Soul. count, his Body at the Refurrection, being, as your Lordship seems to limit it, near the fame fize it was in some part of his life, it will be no more the same Body in which the things were done in the distant parts of his life, than that is the same Body, in which half or three quarters or more of the individual Matter that made it then up, now wanting. For example, let his Body at 50 Years old confift of a Million of parts; five hundred thousand at least of those parts will be different from those which made up his Body at 10 Years, and at an hundred. So that to take the numerical Particles, that made up his Body at 50, or any other feafon of his life, or to gather them promiscuously out of those which at different times have fuccessively been vitally united to his Soul, they will no more make the fame Body, which was his, wherein some of his Actions were done, than that is the same Body, which has but half the same Particles: And yet all your Lordship's Argument here for the same Body, is because St. Paul says it must be his Body in which these things were done; which it could not be, if any other Substance were joined to it, i. e. if any other Particles of Matter made up the Body, which were not vitally united to the Soul, when the Action was done.

Again, your Lordship says, * That you * p. 34. do not say the same individual Particles [shall make up the Body at the Resurrection] which

were united at the point of death, for there must be a great alteration in them of a lingring Disease, as if a fat Man falls into a Con-Sumption. Because tis likely your Lordship thinks these Particles of a decrepit, wasted, withered Body would be too few, or unfit to make fuch a plump, strong, vigorous, well-fiz'd Body, as it has pleafed your Lordship to proportion out in your Thoughts to Men at the Resurrection; and therefore some small portion of the Particles formerly united vitally to that Man's Soul, shall be re-assumed to make up his Body to the bulk your Lordship judges convenient; but the greatest part of them shall be left out to avoid the making his Body more vast than your Lordship thinks will be fit, as appears by these your Lordship's words immediately following, viz. That you do not say the same Particles the Sinner had at the very time of Commission of his Sins, for then a long Sinner must have a vaft Body.

But then pray, my Lord, what must an Embryo do, who dying within a few hours after his Body was vitally united to his Soul, has no Particles of Matter, which were formerly vitally united to it, to make up his Body of that size and proportion which your Lordship seems to require in Bodies at the Resurrection? Or must we believe he shall remain content with that small Pittance of Matter, and that yet imperfect Body to Eternity; because it is an Article of Faith to believe the Resurrection

† P. 35.

of the very same Body? i. e. made up of only fuch Particles, as have been vitally united to the Soul. For if it be fo, as your Lordship says, * That life is the result of * p. 43. the Union of Soul and Body, it will follow That the Body of an Embryo dying in the Womb may be very little, not the thousandth part of any ordinary Man. For fince from the first conception and beginning of formation it has life, and life is the refult of the Union of the Soul with the Body; an Embryo, that shall die either by the untimely death of the Mother, or by any other accident presently after it has Life, must according to your Lordship's Doctrin remain a Man not an inch long to Eternity; because there are not Particles of Matter. formerly united to his Soul, to make him bigger; and no other can be made use of to that purpose: Though what greater congruity the Soul hath with any Particles of Matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer; than it hath with Particles of Matter, which it was never united to, would be hard to determine, if that should be demanded.

By these, and not a few other the like consequences, one may see what service they do to Religion, and the Christian Dottrin, who raise Questions, and make Articles of Faith about the Resurrestion of the same Body, where the Scripture says nothing of the same Body; or if it does, it is with no small reprimand to those who to cormake such an enquiry. But some Man will 15, 35

fay, How are the dead raised up? And with what Body do they come? Thou Fool, that which thou fowest is not quickned except it die And that which thou fowest, thou sowest not that Body that shall be, but bare Grain, it may chance of Wheat or of some other Grain. But God giveth it a Body as it hath pleased him. Words I should think sufficient to deterr us from determining any thing for or against the same Body being raised at the It suffices, that all the dead shall last day. be raised, and every one appear and answer for the things done in this life, and receive according to the things he hath done in his Body, whether good or bad. He that believes this, and has faid nothing inconsistent herewith, I presume may, and must be acquitted from being guilty of any thing inconsistent with the Article of the Resurrection of the dead.

But your Lordship to prove the Resurre-Etion of the same Body to be an Article of Faith, farther asks, * How could it be said, if any other Substance be joined to the Soul at the Resurrection, as its Body, that they were the things done in or by the Body? Answ. Just as it may be said of a Man at an hundred Years old, that hath then an other Substance joined to his Soul, than he had at twenty, that the Murder or Drunkenness he was guilty of at twenty, were things done in the Body: How

Your Lordship adds, And St. Paul's dispute about the manner of raising the Body might soon have ended, if there were no necessity of

* p. 38.

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what Argument there is in these Words to prove the Resurrection of the same Body, without the mixture of one new Atom of Matter, I shall know what to say to it. In the mean time this I understand, That St. Paul would have put as short an end to all disputes about this Matter, if he had said, That there was a necessity of the same Body, or that it should be the same Body.

The next Text of Scripture you bring for the same Body, is, * If there be no Re- * 2 Cor. surrection of the dead, then is not Christ raised. 15. 16. From which your Lordship argues, & It + p. 38. seems then other Bodies are to be raised as his was. I grant other dead, as certainly raifed as Christ was; for else his Resurrection would be of no use to Mankind. But I do not fee how it follows, that they shall be raised with the same Body, as Christ was raised with the same Body, as your Lordship infers in these Words annexed; And can there be any doubt, whether his Body was the same material Substance, which was united to his Soul before? I answer, none at all; nor that it had just the same undistinguish'd Lineaments and Marks, yea, and the fame Wounds that it had at the time of his death. If therefore your Lordship will argue from others Bodies being raised as his was, That they must keep proportion with his in sameness; then we must believe, that every Man shall be raised with the same Lineaments and other Notes of diffinction he had at the time of his death, even with his Wounds yet N 2 open

open, if he had any, because our Saviour was so raised, which seems to me scarce reconcilable with what your Lordship says * of a fat Man falling into a Consumption, and

dying.

But whether it will confift or no with your Lordship's meaning in that Place, this to me feems a consequence that will need to be better proved, viz. That our Bodies must be raised the same just as our Saviours was: Because St. Paul says, If there be no Resurrection of the dead, then is not Christ risen. For it may be a good confequence Christ is risen, and therefore there shall be a Refurrection of the dead, and yet this may not be a good consequence, Christ was raised with the same Body he had at his Death, therefore all Men shall be raised with the fame Body they had at their Death, contrary to what your Lordship fays concerning a fat Man dying of a Consumption. Case I think far different betwixt our Saviour, and those to be raised at the last Day.

I. His Body faw not Corruption, and therefore to give him another Body, new molded mixed with other Particles, which were not contained in it as it lay in the Grave, whole and entire as it was laid there, had been to destroy his Body to frame him a new one without any need. But why with the remaining Particles of a Man's Body long since dissolved and molder'd into Dust and Atoms (whereof possibly a great part may have undergone variety of changes, and en-

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tred into other concretions even in the Bodies of other Men) other new Particles of Matter mixed with them, may not ferve to make his Body again, as well as the mixture of new and different Particles of Matter with the Old, did in the compass of his Life make his Body, I think no Reason can

be given.

This may ferve to shew, why though the Materials of our Saviour's Body, were not changed at his Resurrection: Yet it does not follow, but that the Body of a Man dead and rotten in his Grave, or burnt, may at the last Day have several new Particles in it, and that without any inconvenience. Since whatever Matter is vitally united to his Soul, is his Body, as much as is that, which was united to it when he was born, or in any

other part of his Life.

2. In the next place, the fize, shape, figure and lineaments of our Saviour's Body, even to his Wounds into which doubting Thomas put his Fingers and his Hand, were to be kept in the raised Body of our Saviour, the same they were at his Death, to be a conviction to his Disciples, to whom he shew'd himself, and who were to be Witnesses of his Resurrection, that their Master, the very same Man, was crucified, dead and buried, and raised again; and therefore he was handled by them, and Eat before them after he was risen, to give them in all points full Satisfaction, that it was really he, the fame, and not another, nor a Specter or Apparition of him: Though I do not think your

Lordship will thence argue, that because others are to be raised as he was, therefore it is necessary to believe, that because he Eat after his Resurrection, others at the last Day, shall Eat and Drink after they are raised from the dead, which feems to me as good an Argument, as because his undissolved Body was raised out of the Grave, just as it there lay intire, without the mixture of any new Particles; therefore the corrupted and confumed Bodies of the dead at the Refurrection, shall be new framed only out of those scatter'd Particles, which were once vitally united to their Souls, without the least mixture of any one single Atom of new Matter. But at the last Day, when all Men are raised, there will be no need to be affured of any one particular Man's Refurrection. 'Tis enough that every one shall appear before the Judgement-seat of Christ, to receive according to what he had done in his former Life; but in what fort of Body he shall appear, or of what Particles made up the Scripture, having faid nothing, but that it shall be a spiritual Body raised in incorruption, it is not for me to determine.

* P. 39.

Your Lordship asks, * were they [who saw our Saviour after his Resurrection] witnesses only of some material Substance then united to his Soul? In Answer, I beg your Lordship to consider, whether you suppose our Saviour was to be known to be the same Man (to the Witnesses that were to see him, and testifie his Resurrection) by his Soul, that could neither be seen, nor known to be the same;

fame; or by his Body, that could be feen, and by the difcernible structure and marks of it, be known to be the same? When your Lordship has resolved that; all that you fay in that Page, will answer it felf. But because one Man cannot know another to be the same, but by the outward visible lineaments, and fensible marks he has been wont to be known and distinguished by; will your Lordship therefore argue, That the great Judge, at the last Day, who gives to each Man, whom he raises, his new Body, shall not be able to know, who is who, unless he give to every one of them a Body, just of the same figure, fize and features, and made up of the very fame individual Particles he had in his former Life? Whether fuch a way of arguing for the Refurrettion of the same Body, to be an Article of Faith, contributes much to the strengthening the credibility of the Article of the Resurrection of the dead, I shall leave to the Judgment of others.

Farther, for the proving the Resurrection of the same Body, to be an Article of Faith, your Lordship says, & But the Apostle insits & P. 40. upon the Resurrection of Christ, not meerly as an Argument of the possibility of ours, but of the Certainty of it; * because he rose, as * 1 Cor: the First-fruits; Christ the First fruits, af-15.20,23. terwards they that are Christs at his coming. Answ. No doubt the Resurrection of Christ, is a Proof of the certainty of our Resurrection. But is it therefore a Proof of the Resurrection. But is it therefore a Proof of the Resurrection of the same Body, consisting of the same

individual Particles which concurr'd to the making up of our Body here, without the mixture of any one other Particle of Matter?

I confess I see no such consequence.

† P. 40.

But your Lordship goes on, i St. Paul was aware of the Objections in Mens Minds, about the Resurrection of the same Body; and it is of great consequence as to this Article, to thew upon what Grounds he proceeds. But some Man will fay, How are the beat raised up, and with what Body do they come? Furst he shews, That the seminal parts of Plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their Vegetation. Answ. I do not perfectly understand, what it is for the seminal parts of Plants to be wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God, in the manner of their Vegetation: Or else perhaps I should better see, how this here tends to the proof of the Resurrection of the same Body, in your Lordship's Sense.

7 p. 40.

It continues, † They Sow bare Grain of Wheat, or of some other Grain, but God giveth it a Body, as it hath pleased him, and to every Seed his own Body. Here, says your Lordship, is an Identity of the material Substance supposed. It may be so. But to me a diversity of the material Substance, i. e. of the component Particles is here supposed, or in direct Words said. For the Words of St. Paul taken all together, run thus, * That which thou sowest, thou sowest not that Body which shall be, but bare Grain, and so on, as your Lordship has set down the

* v. 37.

remainder of them. From which Words of St. Paul, the natural Argument feems to me to stand thus. If the Body that is put in the Earth in sowing, is not that Body which shall be, then the Body that is put in the Grave, is not that, i. e. the same, Body

that Shall be.

But your Lordship proves it to be the Same Body, by these three Greek Words of the Text, To they ow was which your Lordship interprets thus, That proper Body which + p. 49. belongs to it. Answ. Indeed by those Greek Words, 70 ifor ou wa, whether our Translators have rightly render'd them his own Body, or your Lordship more rightly, that proper Body which belongs to it, I formerly understood no more but this, that in the production of Wheat and other Grain from Seed, God continued every Species distinct, fo that from Grains of Wheat fown, root, stalk, blade, ear and grains of Wheat were produced, and not those of Barly; and so of the rest, which I took to be the meaning of to every Seed his own Body. No favs your Lordship, these Words prove, That to every Plant of Wheat, and to every Grain of Wheat produced in it is given, the proper Body that belongs to it, is the same Body, with the Grain that was fown. Answ. This, I confess, I do not understand: Because I do not understand how one individual Grain can be the same, with Twenty, Fifty, or an Hundred individual Grains, for fuch fometimes is the increase.

* P. 40.

But your Lordship proves it. For fays your Lordship, * Every Seed having that Body in little, which is afterwards so much inlarged; and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination; but it hath its proper organical Parts, which make it the same Body, with that which it grows up to. For although Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are, yet it hath been found, by the most accurate Observations, that upon separating the membranes these seminal parts are discerned in them; which afterwards grow up to that Body which In which Words I crave we call Corn. leave to observe, that your Lordship supposes, that a Body may be enlarged by the addition of a Hundred or a Thousand times as much in bulk as its own matter, and yet continue the same Body, which I confess, I cannot understand.

But in the next place, if that could be fo; and that the Plant in its full growth at Harvest, increased by a Thousand or a Million of times as much new Matter added to it, as it had, when it lay in little concealed in the Grain that was fown, was the very fame Body: Yet I do not think, that your Lordship will fay, that every minute infenfible and inconceivably small Grain of the hundred Grains, contained in that little organized fenimal Plant, is every one of them the very same, with that Grain which contains that whole little fenimal Plant, and all those invisible Grains in it. then it will follow, that One Grain is the fame with an Hundred, and an Hundred

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stinct Grains the same with one: Which I shall be able to assent to, when I can conceive, that all the Wheat in the World is but one Grain.

For I befeech you, my Lord, confider what it is St. Paul here speaks of! It is plain he speaks of that which is sown and dies, i.e. the Grain, that the Husbandman takes out of his Barn to fow in his Field. And of this Grain, St. Paul fays, that it is not that Body that shall be. These Two, viz. That which is fown, and that Body that shall be, are all the Bodies that St. Paul here speaks of, to represent the agreement or difference of Mens Bodies after the Refurrection, with those they had before they died. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordship, which of these Two is that little invisible seminal Plant, which your Lordship here speaks of? Does your Lordship mean by it the Grain that is fown? But that is not what St. Paul speaks of, he could not mean this embryonated little Plant, for he could not denote it by these Words, that which thou sowest, for that he fays must die: But this little embryonated Plant, contained in the Seed that is fown, dies not: Or does your Lordship mean by it, the Body that shall be? But neither by these Words, the Body that shall be, can St. Paul be supposed to denote this insensible little embryonated Plant; for that is already in being contained in the Seed that is fown, and therefore could not be spoke of, under the name of the Body that shall be, And therefore, I confess, I cannot

fee of what use it is to your Lordship to introduce here this third Body, which St. Paul mentions not; and to make that the fame or not the same with any other, when those which St. Paul speaks of, are, as I humbly conceive, these two visible sensible Bodies, the Grain fown, and the Corn grown up to Ear, with neither of which this insensible embryonated Plant can be the same Body. unless an insensible Body can be the same Body with a fensible Body, and a little Body can be the fame Body with one ten thousand or an hundred thousand times as big as its felf. So that yet I confess I fee not the Resurrection of the same Body proved from these words of St. Paul, to be an Article of Faith.

* p. 41.

Your Lordship goes on, * St. Paul indeed faith, That we fow not that Body that shall be; but he speaks not of the Identity but the Perfection of it. Here my Understanding fails me again. For I cannot understand St. Paul to fay, That the same Identical fensible grain of Wheat, which was fown at feed-time, is the very fame with every grain of Wheat in the Ear at Harvest, that sprang from it: Yet so I must understand it to make it prove, That the same fensible Body, that is laid in the Grave, shall be the very same with that, which shall be raised at the Resurrection. For I do not know of any seminal Body in little, contained in the dead Carcass of any Man or Woman, which, as your Lordship fays, in Seeds, having its proper Organical parts,

shall afterwards be enlarged, and at the Refurrection grow up into the same Man. For I never thought of any Seed or Seminal parts, either of Plant or Animal so wonderfully improved by the Providence of God, whereby the same Plant or Animal should beget it felf; nor ever heard, that it was by Divine Providence designed to produce the fame individual, but for the producing of future and distinct individuals, for the

continuation of the same Species.

Your Lordship's next Words are, * And * p. 41. although there be such a difference from the Grain it self, when it comes up to be perfect Corn, with Root, Stalk, Blade, and Ear, that it may be said to outward appearance not to be the same Body; yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical parts, it is as much the same as a Man grown up, is the same with the Embryo in the Womb. Answ. It does not appear by any thing I can find in the Text, That St. Paul here compared the Body, produced with the Seminal and Organical parts, contained in the Grain it sprang from, but with the whole fensible Grain that was fown. Microscopes had not then discovered the little Embryo plant in the Seed, and fupposing it should have been reavealed to St. Paul (though in the Scripture we find little Revelation of natural Philosophy) yet an Argument taken from a thing perfectly unknown to the Corinthians, whom he writ to, could be of no manner of use to them; nor ferve at all either to instruct or convince them. But granting that those St. Paul writ to, knew

knew it as well as Mr. Lewenbooke; yet your Lordship thereby proves not the raising of the same Body: Your Lordship says it is as much the same [I crave leave to add Body] as a Man grown up is the fame, (Same, what I befeech your Lordship?) with the Embryo in the Womb. For that the Body of the Embryo in the Womb, and Body of the Man grown up, is the same Body, I think no one will fay; unless he can perswade himself that a Body that is not the hundredth part of an other, is the same with that other, which I think no one will do, till having renounced this dangerous way by Ideas of Thinking and Reasoning, he has learnt to fay that a part and the whole are the same.

* P. 41.

Your Lordship goes on, * And although many Arguments may be used to prove, that a Man is not the same, because Life which depends upon the course of the Blood, and the manner of Respiration, and Nutrition is so different in both States; yet that Man would be thought ridiculous that should seriously affirm, That it was not the same Man. And your Lordship says, I grant that the variation of great Parcels of Matter in Plants, alters not the Identity: And that the Organization of the parts in one coherent Body, partaking of one common Life, makes the Identity of a Plant. Answ. My Lord, I think the Question is not about the same Man but the same Body. For tho' I do say, * (somewhat differently from

* Effay B. I do fay, * (somewhat differently from 2. C. 27. what your Lordship sets down as my words here) "That that which has such an Orgation, as is sit to receive and distri-

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"bute Nourishment, so as to continue and frame the Wood, Bark and Leaves, &c. of a Plant, in which consists the vegetable Life, continues to be the same Plant, as long as it partakes of the same Life, though that Life be communicated to

"new Particles of Matter, vitally united to the living Plant." Yet I do not remember, that I any where fay, That a Plant, which was once no bigger than an Oaten straw, and afterwards grows to be

above a Fathom about, is the fame Body, though it be still the fame Plant.

The well known Tree in Epping Forest called the King's Oak, which, from not weighing an Ounce at first, grew to have many Tuns of Timber in it, was all along the same Oak, the very same Plant; but no body, I think, will fay it was the same Body when it weighed a Tun, as it was when it weighed but an Ounce, unless he has a mind to fignalize himself by faying, That that is the same Body, which has a thousand Particles of different Matter in it. for one Particle that is the same; which is no better than to fay, That a thousand different Particles are but one and the same Particle, and one and the same Particle is a thousand different Particles; a thousand times a greater absurdity, than to say half is the whole, or the whole is the same with the half, which will be improved ten thoufand times yet farther, if a Man shall say (as your Lordship seems to me to argue here)

here) That that great Oak is the very fame Body, with the Acorn it sprang from, because there was in that Acorn an Oak in little, which was afterwards (as your Lordship expresses it) so much enlarged, as to make that mighty Tree. For this Embryo, if I may so call it, or Oak in little, being not the hundredth, or perhaps the thousandth part of the Acorn, and the Acorn being not the thousandth part of the grown Oak, 'twill be very extraordinary to prove the Acorn and the grown Oak to be the same Body, by a way wherein it cannot be pretended, that above one Particle of an hundred Thousand or a Million, is the same in the one Body, that was in the other. From which way of Reasoning, it will follow that a Nurse and her Sucking-child have the fame Body; and be past doubt, that a Mother and her Infant have the fame Body. But this is a way of Certainty found out to establish the Articles of Faith, and to overturn the new Method of Certainty that your Lordship fays I have farted, which is apt to leave Mens Minds more doubtful than before.

And now I desire your Lordship to consider of what use it is to you in the present Case to quote out of my Essay these Words, "That partaking of one common "Life, makes the Identity of a Plant," since the Question is not about the Identity of a Body. It being a very different thing to be the same Plant, and to be the same Body. For that which makes the same Plant, does not make

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the same Body; the one being the partaking in the same continued vegetable life, the other the confisting of the same numerical Particles of Matter. And therefore your Lordship's inference from my Words above quoted, in these which you subjoin, * feems to me a very strange one, viz. So * p. 42. that in things capable of any fort of Life, the Identity is consistent with a continued succession of Parts; and so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown. For I believe if my Words, from which you infer, and so the Wheat grown up is the came Body with the Grain that was fown, were put into a Syllogism, this would hardly be brought to be the Conclusion.

But your Lordship goes on with confequence upon consequence, though I have not Eyes acute enough every where to fee the connection, till you bring it to the Refurrection of the same Body. The connection of your Lordship's Words * are as fol- * 13 41. loweth; And thus the alteration of the parts of the Body at the Resurrection is consistent with its Identity, if its Organization and Life be the same; and this is a real Identity of the Body which depends not upon consciousness. whence it follows, that to make the lame Body. no more is frequir'd but restoring life to the organiz'd parts of it. If the Question were about raising the same Plant, I do not say but there might be some appearance for making fuch inference from my Words as this, Whence it follows, that to make the same Plant, no more is required, but to restore life

to the organized parts of it. But this deduction wherein from those Words of mine that speak only of the Identity of a Plant, your Lordship infers there is no more required to make the same Body than to make the same Plant, being too subtle for me, I leave to my Reader to find out.

* p. 42.

Your Lordship goes on and says, * That I grant likewise, "That the Identity of the fame Man consists in a participation of the same Man consists in a participation of the same continued life, by constantly setting particles of Matter in succession, vitally united to the same organized Body." Answ. I speak in these Words of the Identity of the same Man, and your Lordship thence roundly concludes; so that there is no difficulty of the sameness of the Body. But your Lordship knows that I do not take these two sounds Man and Body, to stand for the same thing; nor the Identity of the Man to be the same with the Identity of the Body.

+ p. 42.

But let us read out your Lordship's Words, i So that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the Body, if life were continued; and if by divine Power life be restored to that material Substance which was before united by a Re-union of the Soul to it, there is no Reason to deny the Identity of the Body. Not from the Consciousness of the Soul, but from that Life which is the Result of the V-nion of the Soul and Body.

If I understand your Lordship right, you in these Words from the Passages above quoted out of my Book argue, that from

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those Words of mine it will follow, That it is or may be the same Body, that is raised at the Resurrection. If so, my Lord, your Lordship has then proved, That my Book is not inconsistent with, but conformable to this Article of the Resurrection of the same Body, which your Lordship contends for, and will have to be an Article of Faith: For though I do by no means deny that the same Bodies shall be raised at the last day, yet I see nothing your Lordship has said to prove it to be an Article of Faith.

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But your Lordship goes on with your Proofs and fays, * But St. Paul still supposes * p. 43. that it must be that material Substance to which the Soul was before united. For faith he, It is fown in Corruption, it is raised in Incorruption; It is fown in Dishonour, it is raised in Glory; It is sown in Weakness, it is raised in Power; It is sown a Natural Body, it is raised a Spiritual Body. Can such a material Substance which was never united to the Body, be said to be town in Corruption, and Weakness, and Dishonour? Either therefore he must speak of the same Body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended. I answer, Can such a material Substance which was never laid in the Grave, be faid to be fown, &c? For your Lordship fays, & You + p. 34. do not say the same individual Particles, which were united at the point of death, shall be raised at the last day; and no other Particles are laid in the Grave, but such as are united at the point of death, either therefore your Lordship must speak of an other Body difdifferent from that which was fown, which shall be raised, or eise your meaning, I think,

cannot be comprehended.

But whatever be your meaning, your Lordship proves it to be St. Paul's meaning. That the same Body shall be raised which was fown, in these following Words, * For what does all this relate to a conscious Principle? Anfw. The Scripture being express, That the same Persons should be raised and appear before the Judgment Seat of Christ, that every one may receive according to what he had done in his Body; it was very well fuited to common Apprehensions, (which refined not about Particles that had been vitally united to the Soul) to speak of the Body which each one was to have after the Resurrection, as he would be apt to speak of it himself. For it being his Body both before and after the Resurrection, every one ordinarily speaks of his Body as the same, though in a strict and philosophical Sense, as your Lordship speaks, it be not the very same. Thus it is no impropriety of Speech to fay, This Body of mine, which was formerly strong and plump, is now weak and wasted, though in fuch a Sense as you are speaking in here, it be not the same Body. Revelation declares nothing any where concerning the same Body, in your Lordship's Sense of the fame Body, which appears not to have been then thought of. The Apostle directly proposes nothing for or against the same Body, as necessary to be believed: That which he

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is plain and direct in, is his opposing and condemning fuch curious Questions about the Body, which could ferve only to perplex, not to confirm what was material and necessary for them to believe, viz. a Day of Judgment and Retribution to Men in a future state, and therefore 'tis no wonder that mentioning their Bodies he should use a way of speaking suited to vulgar Notions, from which it would be hard politively to conclude any thing for the determining of this Question (especially against Expressions in the same Discourse that plainly incline to the other side) in a matter, which as it appears, the Apostle thought not necessary to determin. And the Spirit of God thought not fit to gratifie any ones curiofity in.

But your Lordship fays, The Apostle + p. 43. speaks plainly of that Body which was once quickened, and afterwards falls to Corruption, and is to be restor'd with more noble Qualities. wish your Lordship had quoted the Words of St. Paul, wherein he speaks plainly of that numerical Body that was once quickened, they would presently decide this Question. your Lordship proves it by these following Words of St. Paul. For this Corruption must put on Incorruption, and this Mortal must put on Immortality, to which your Lordship adds, That you do not see how he could more expresly affirm the identity of this corruptible Body, with that after the Resurrection. How expresly it is affirmed by the Apostle, shall be confider'd by and by. In the mean time it is past doubt that your Lordship best knows

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what you do or do not see. But this I will be bold to say, that if St. Paul had any where in this Chapter (where there are so many occasions for it, if it had been necessary to have been believed) but said in express Words, that the same Bodies should be raised, every one else who thinks of it, will see he had more expressly affirmed the Identity of the Bodies which Men now have, with those they shall have after the Resurrection.

* p. 44.

The remainder of your Lordship's Period * is. And that without any respect to the principle of Self-consciousness. Answ. These Words, I doubt not, have some meaning, but I must own, I know not what; either towards the Proof of the Resurrection of the same Body, or to shew, that any thing I have said concerning Self-consciousness, is inconsistent: For I do not remember that I have any where said, That the Identity of Body consisted in Self-consciousness.

4 D. 44

From your preceding Words, your Lordship concludes thus. † And so if the Scripture be the sole Foundation of our Faith, this is an Article of it. My Lord, to make the conclusion unquestionable, I humbly conceive, the Words must run thus. And so if the Scripture and your Lordship's interpretation of it, be the sole Foundation of our Faith; the Resurrection of the same Body is an Article of it. For with submission, your Lordship has neither produced express Words of Scripture for it, nor so proved, that to be the meaning of any of those Words

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Words of Scripture which you have produced for it, that a Man who reads and fincerely endeavours to understand the Scripture, cannot but find himself obliged to believe, as expresly that the same Bodies of the dead, in your Lordship's Sense, shall be raised. And I crave leave to give your Lordship this one Reason for it.

He who reads with attention this Difcourfe of St. Paul, * where he discourses of * 1 Cor. the Refurrection, will fee, that he plainly 15. distinguishes between the dead that shall be raised, and the Bodies of the dead. For it is νεκεδι, πάντες, δι are the nominative Cales to 1 22,23,29. εγείεντω, ζωοποιηθήσονται, έχερθήσοι ται, all along, 32,35,52. vened, navres, & are the nominative Cases to + + v. 15. and not σώματα Bodies, which one may with Reason think would somewhere or other have been expressed, if all this had been faid, to propose it as an Article of Faith, that the very same Bodies should be raised. The same manner of speaking the Spirit of God observes all through the New Testa-ment, where it is said, * raise the dead, * Mat. 22. quicken or make alive the dead, the Resurre Mark 12. ction of the dead- Nay, these very Words of our Saviour f, urged by your Lordship, John 5. for the Resurrection of the same Body, run 2: thus. Havres of en mis pungelots ansoch mi mis Acts 26. owing के एक स्थे देश मान्ड विषया के एक के के के मा कि का मान का का कि का क eis dyagasiv Cons, oi de ra dauna maggarres eie 2 Cor. 1. Would a well-meaning 9 avasatio neiteus. Searcher of the Scriptures be apt to think, 14, 16. that if the thing here intended by our Sa- + John 5. viour were to teach, and propose it as an 28, 29. 04 Article

Article of Faith, necessary to be believed by every one, that the very same Bodies of the dead should be raised, would not, I say, any one be apt to think, that if our Saviour meant so, the Words should rather have been, πάντα τα σώματα ά εν τοίς μνημείοις, i. e. all the Bodies that are in the Graves, rather than all who are in the Graves; which must denote Persons, and not precisely Bodies?

Another Evidence, that St. Paul makes a distinction between the dead and the Bodies of the dead, so that the dead cannot be taken in this, 1 Cor. Ch. 15. to stand precisely for the Bodies of the dead, are these Words of the Apostle, & But some Men will say, How are the dead raised, and with what Bodies do they come? Which words dead and they, if supposed to stand precisely for the Bodies of the dead, the Question will run thus. How are the dead Bodies raised, and with what Bodies do the dead Bodies come? Which seems to have no very agreeable Sense.

This therefore being so, that the Spirit of God keeps so expresly to this Phrase, or form of Speaking in the New Testament, of raising, quickening, rising, resurrection, &c. of the dead, where the Resurrection at the last Day is spoken of; and that the Body is not mentioned, but in Answer to this Question, with what Bodies shall those dead, who are raised come? so that by the dead cannot precisely be meant the dead Bodies: I do not see but a good Christian, who reads the Scripture, with an intention to believe

+ V. 35.

believe all, that is there revealed to him concerning the Refurrection, may acquit himfelf of his Duty therein, without entring into the enquiry whether the dead shall have the very same Bodies or no, which fort of enquiry the Apostle, by the Appellation he bestows here on him that makes it, seems not much to incourage. Nor, if he shall think himself bound to determine concerning the Identity of the Bodies of the dead raised at the last Day, will he, by the remainder of St. Paul's Answer, find the determination of the Apostle, to be much in favour of the very same Body, unless the being told, that the Body fown is not that Body that (hall be? That the Body raised is as different from that which was laid down, as the Flesh of Man is from the Flesh of Beasts, Fishes and Birds, or as the Sun, Moon and Stars are different one from another, or as different as a corruptible, weak, natural, mortal Body, is from an incorruptible, powerful, spiritual, immortal Body; and lastly, as different as a Body, that is Flesh and Blood is from a Body, that is not Flesh and Blood. For Flesh and Blood cannot, says St. Paul, in this very place * inherit the Kingdom of God; * v. 50. unless, I say, all this, which is contained in St. Paul's Words, can be supposed to be the way to deliver this as an Article of Faith, which is required to be believed by every one, viz. That the dead (hould be raised with the very same Bodies, that they had before in this Life; which Article proposed in these or the like plain and express Words could

could have left no room for doubt, in the meanest Capacities; nor for contest in the

most perverse Minds.

† P. 44.

Your Lordship adds, in the next Words. And so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church, viz. That the Resurrection of the same Body, in your Lordship's Sense of same Body, is an Article of Faith. What the Christian Church has always underfood is beyond my Knowledge. those who coming short of your Lordship's great Learning, cannot gather their Articles of Faith from the understanding of all the whole Christian Church, ever fince the Preaching of the Gospel (who make the far greater part of Christians, I think I may say, Nine hundred ninety and nine of a Thoufand) but are forced to have recourse to the Scripture to find them there, I do not fee, that they will eafily find there this proposed as an Article of Faith, that there shall be a Resurrection of the same Body; but that there shall be a Resurrection of the dead, without explicitly determining, That they shall be raised with Bodies made up wholly of the same Particles which were once vitally united to their Souls, in their former Life; without the mixture of any one other Particle of Matter, which is that which your Lordship means by the same Body.

But supposing your Lordship to have demonstrated this to be an Article of Faith, though I crave leave to own, that I do not see, that all that your Lordship has said here, makes it so much as probable; What is all this to me? Yes says your Lordship in the following Words, * My Idea of per-*p. 44. Sonal Identity is inconsistent with it, for it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be necessary to the Dostrin of the Resurrection. But any material Substance united to the same Principle of consciousness makes the

Same Body.

This is an Argument of your Lordship's, which I am obliged to Answer to. But is it not sit I should first understand it, before I Answer it? Now here I do not well know, what it is to make a thing not to be necessary to the Dostrin of the Resurrection. But to help my self out the best I can, with a guess, I will conjecture (which in disputing with learned Men, is not very safe) your Lordship's meaning is, That my Idea of perpersonal Identity makes it not necessary, that for the raising the same Person the Body should be the same.

Your Lordship's next Word is But, to which I am ready to reply, But what? What does my Idea of personal Identity do? For something of that kind the adversative Particle But should in the ordinary construction of our Language, introduce to make the Proposition clear and intelligible: But here is no such thing, But is one of your Lordship's priviledged Particles, which I must not medle with, for fear your Lordship complain of me again, as so servere a Critick, that for the least Ambiguity in any Particle, fill up Pages in my Answer, to make my Book look considerable for the bulk

of it. But fince this Proposition here, my Idea of personal Identity makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul, not necessary to the Doctrin of the Resurrection. material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness makes the same Body, is brought to prove my Idea of personal Identity inconsistent with the Article of the Refurrection; I must make it out in some direct Sense or other, that I may see whether it be both true and conclusive. I therefore venture to read it thus, my Idea of perfonal Identity makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul, not to be necessary at the Resurrection; but allows, That any material Substance being united to the same principle of Consciousness, makes the same Body, Ergo, my Idea of personal Identity, is inconfiftent with the Article of the Resurrection of the Same Body.

If this be your Lordship's Sense in this Passage, as I here have guessed it to be, or else I know not what it is. I an-

fwer,

I. That my Idea of Personal Identity does not allow that any material Substance being united to the same Principle of consciousness makes the same Body. I say no such thing in my Book, nor any thing from whence it may be infer'd; and your Lordship would have done me a favour to have set down the Words where I say so, or those from which you infer so, and shew'd how it sollows from any thing I have said.

2. Granting that it were a confequence from my Idea of Personal Identity, that any material Substance being united to the same Principle of consciousness makes the same Body; this would not prove that my Idea of Personal Identity was inconsistent with this Proposition, That the same Body shall be raised; but on the contrary, affirms it: Since if I affirm, as I do, That the same Persons shall be raised, and it be a consequence of my Idea of Personal Identity, that any material Substance being united to the same Principle of consciousness makes the same Body; it follows, that if the same Person be raised. the same Body must be raised; and so I have herein not only faid nothing inconsistent with the Resurrection of the same Body, but have faid more for it than your Lordship. For there can be nothing plainer, than that in the Scripture it is reaveled, That the same Persons shall be raised, and appear before the Judgment Seat of Christ, to answer for what they have done in their If therefore whatever Matter be joined to the same Principle of Consciousness make the same Body; it is demonstration. That if the same Persons are raised, they have the fame Bodies.

How then your Lordship makes this an inconsistency with the Resurrection, is beyond my conception. Yes, says your Lordship, it is inconsistent with it, for it makes the p. 44. Same Body which was here united to the Soul,

not to be necessary.

3. I answer therefore Thirdly, That this is the first time I ever learnt, That not necessary was the same with inconsistent. fay that a Body made up of the same numerical parts of Matter, is not necessary to the making of the same Person; from whence it will indeed follow, that to the Resurrection of the same Person, the same numerical Particles of Matter are not required. What does your Lordship infer from hence? to wit. this. Therefore he who thinks that the same Particles of Matter are not necessary to the making of the fame Person, cannot believe, that the same Persons shall be raised with Bodies made of the very fame Particles of Matter, if God should reveal, that it shall be so, viz. That the same Persons shall be raised with the fame Bodies they had before. Which is all one as to fay, That he who thought the blowing of Rams Horns, was not neceffary in it felf to the falling down of the Walls of Jericho, could not believe, that they should fall upon the blowing of Rams Horns, when God had declared it should be fo.

Your Lordship says, My Idea of Personal Identity, is inconsistent with the Article of the Resurrection; the Reason you ground it on is this, because it makes not the same Body necessary to the making the same Person. Let us grant your Lordship's consequence to be good, what will follow from it? No less than this, That your Lordship's Notion (for I dare not say your Lordship's

ship has any so dangerous things as Ideas) of Personal Identity, is inconsistent with the Article of the Resurrection. The demonstration of it is thus; your Lordship fays, * It is not necessary that the Body, to be * p. 34raised at the last day, should consist of the 35. same Particles of Matter, which were united at the point of death; for there must be a great alteration in them in a lingring Disease, as if a fat Man falls into a Consumption: You do not say the same Particles which the Sinner had at the very time of Commission of his Sins; for then a long Sinner must have a vast Body, considering the continual spending of Particles by Perspiration. And again, here your Lordship fays, * You allow the Notion * p. 444 of Personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several changes of Matter. From which words it is evident, That your Lordship supposes a Person in this World may be continued and preserved the same in a Body not confifting of the same individual Particles of Matter; and hence it demonstratively follows, That let your Lordship's Notion of Personal Identity be what it will, it makes the same Body not to be necessary to the same Person; and therefore it is by your Lordship's Rule inconsistent with the Article of the Resurrection. When your Lordship shall think fit to clear your own Notion of Personal Identity from this inconsistency with the Article of the Resurrection, I do not doubt but my Idea of Personal Identity, will be thereby cleared too. Till then, all inconsistency with that Article which your LordLordship has here charged on mine, will unavoidably fall upon your Lordship's too.

But for the clearing of both, give me leave to fay, my Lord, That whatfoever is not necessary, does not thereby become inconfistent. It is not necessary to the same Perfon, that his Body should always consist of the same numerical Particles; this is demonstration, because the Particles of the Bodies of the same Persons in this life change every moment, and your Lordship cannot deny it; and yet this makes it not inconsistent with God's preserving, if he thinks fit, to the same Persons, Bodies confifting of the same numerical Particles always from the Resurrection to Eternity. And so likewise though I say any thing that supposes it not necessary, that the same numerical Particles, which were vitally united to the Soul in this life, should be reunited to it at the Resurrection, and constitute the Body it shall then have; yet it is not inconsistent with this, That God may, if he pleases, give to every one a Body confifting only of fuch Particles as were before vitally united to his Soul. And thus I think, I have cleared my Book from all that inconsistency which your Lordship charges on it, and would perswade the World it has with the Article of the Resurrection of the dead.

Only before I leave it, I will fet down the remainder of what your Lordship says upon this Head, that though I see not the

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coherence nor tendency of it, nor the force of any Argument in it against me; yet nothing may be omitted that your Lordship has thought fit to entertain your Reader with on this new Point, nor any one have Reason to suspect, that I have passed by any word of your Lordship's (on this now first introduced Subject) wherein he might find your Lordship had proved what you had promised in your Title-page. Your remaining Words are these; The Dispute is † p 44. not how far Personal Identity in it self may consist in the very same material Substance; for we allow the Notion of Personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several changes of Matter; but whether it doth not depend upon a vital Union between the Soul and Body and the Life which is consequent upon it; and therefore in the Resurrection, the same material Substance must be re-united, or else it cannot be called a Resurrection, but a Renovation, i. e. it may be a new Life, but not a raising the Body from the dead. I confess, I do not see how what is here ushered in by the words and therefore, is a consequence from the preceding words; but as to the propriety of the Name, I think it will not be much questioned, that if the same Man rise who was dead, it may very properly be called the Resurrection of the dead; which is the Language of the Scripture.

I must not part with this Article of the Resurrection, without returning my thanks to your Lordship for making me * take * p. 62. notice of a Fault in my Essay. When I

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writ that Book, I took it for granted, as I doubt not but many others have done, that the Scripture had mention'd in express terms, the Resurrestion of the Body. But upon the Occasion your Lordship has given me in your last Letter to look a little more narrowly into what Revelation has declar'd concerning the Resurrestion, and finding no such express words in the Scripture, as that the Body shall rise or be raised, or the Resurrestion of the Body. I shall in the next Edition of it change these words of my Book,

† Essay B. † The dead Bodies of Men shall rise, into these
4. C. 18. of the Scripture, The dead shall rise. Not
that I question, that the dead shall be raised with Bodies: But in Matters of Reve-

ed with Bodies: But in Matters of Revelation, I think it not only fafest, but our Duty, as far as any one delivers it for Revelation, to keep close to the words of the Scripture; unless he will assume to himself the Authority of one inspired, or make himself wifer than the holy Spirit himself. If I had spoke of the Resurrection in precisely Scripture terms, I had avoided giving your Lordship the occasion of making here

† p. 63. † such a verbal Reflection on my Words; What not if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Body?

I come now to your Lordship's second * p. 44. Head of Accusation; your Lordship says, *

2. The next Articles of Faith which my Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with, are no less than those of the Trinity and the Incarnation of our Saviour. But all the proof of inconsistency your Lordship here brings, being drawn

drawn from my Notions of Nature and Perfon, whereof so much has been said already, the swelling my Answer into too great a Volume, will excuse me from setting down at large all that you have said hereupon, so particularly, as I have done in the precedent Article of the Resurrestion which is

wholly new.

Your Lordship's way of proving, & That & p. 45, my Ideas of Nature and Person cannot consist, 46. with the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation, is, as far as I can understand it, this, That, I fay, we have no simple Ideas, but by Sensation and Reflection. But, Says your Lordship, * we cannot have any simple Ideas * p. 45. of Nature and Person, by Sensation and Reflection, Ergo, we can come to no Certainty about the distinction of Nature and Person in my way of Ideas. Answ. If your Lordship had concluded from thence, That therefore in my way of Ideas, we can have no Ideas at all of Nature and Person, it would have had fome appearance of a Consequence: But as it is, it feems to me fuch an Argument as this; No simple Colours in Sir Godfry Kneller's way of Painting come into his exact and lively Pictures but by his Pencil, but no fimple Colours of a Ship and a Man come into his Pictures by his Pencil, Ergo, we can come to no Certainty about the distinction of a Ship and a Man in Sir Godfry Kneller's way of Painting.

Your Lordship says, I it is not possible for + p. 45. us to have any simple Ideas of Nature and Person by Sensation and Restection, and I say

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fo too; as impossible as it is to have a true Picture of a Rainbow in one simple Colour, which confifts in the arangement of many Colours. The Ideas fignified by the founds Nature and Person, are each of them complex Ideas; and therefore it is as impossible to have a simple Idea of either of them, as to have a multitude in one, or a Composition in a Simple. But if your Lordship means, that by Sensation and Reflection we cannot have the simple Ideas of which the complex ones of Nature and Person are compounded; that I must crave leave to dissent from, till your Lordship can produce a definition (in intelligible Words) of either of Nature or Person, in which all that is contained cannot ultimately be resolved into simple Ideas of Senfation and Reflection.

* Vindic. p. 261.

+ P. 59.

Your Lordhip's definition of Person, * is, That it is a compleat intelligent Substance with a peculiar manner of Subsistence. And my definition of Person, which your Lordship + quotes out of my Essay, is, That " Per-" fon stands for a thinking intelligent Be-" ing, that has Reason and Resection, and " can consider it self as it felf, the same " thinking thing in different times and " places. When your Lordship shall shew any repugnancy in this my Idea (which I denote by the found Person) to the Incarnation of our Saviour, with which your Lordship's Notion of Person may not be equally charged; I shall give your Lordship an answer to it. This I say in answer to these Words, * Which

* Which is repugnant to the Article of the In- * p. 46. carnation of our Saviour: For the preceding reasoning to which they refer, I must own I do not understand.

The word Person naturally signifies nothing, that you allow; your Lordship, in your definition of it, makes it stand for a General abstract Idea. Person then in your Lordship, is liable to the same default which you lay on it in me, + viz. That it is no more + P. 52. than a Notion in the Mind. The same will be fo of the word Nature, whenever your Lordship pleases to define it; without which you can have no Notion of it. And then the Consequence which you there * draw from * ibid. their being no more than Notions of the Mind, will hold as much in respect of your Lordship's Notion of Nature and Person as of mine, viz. That one Nature and three Persons can be no more. This I crave leave to fay in answer to all that your Lordship has been pleased to urge from Page 46 to these Words of your Lordship's, p. 52.

General terms (as Nature and Person are in their ordinary use in our Language) are the signs of general Ideas, and general Ideas exist only in the Mind; but particular Things (which are the Foundations of these general Ideas, if they are abstracted as they should be) do, or may exist conformable to those general Ideas, and so fall under those general Names; as he that writes this Paper is a Person to him, i.e. may be denominated a Person by him to whose abstract Idea of Person he bears a conformity; just as what

I here write, is to him a Book or a Letter. to whose abstract Idea of a Book or a Letter This is what I have faid conit agrees. cerning this Matter all along, and what, I humbly conceive, will ferve for an answer to those Words of your Lordship, where you fay, Tou affirm that those who make Nature and Person to be only abstract and complex Ideas, can neither defend nor reasonably believe the Doctrin of the Trinity, and to all that you fay, p. 52-58. Only give me leave to wish, that what your Lordship, out of a mistake of what I say concerning the Ideas of Nature and Person, has urged, as you pretend, against them, do not furnish your Adversaries in that dispute, with such Arguments against you as your Lordship will not easily answer.

* p. 58.

+ p. 54.

Your Lordship * fets down these Words of mine, " Person in it self signifies no-" thing; but as foon as the common use of " any Language has appropriated it to any " Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Per-" fon;" which Words your Lordship interprets thus: i.e. Men may call a Person what they please, for there is nothing but common use required to it : They may call a Horse or a Tree, or a Stone, a Person if they think sit. Answ. Men, before common use had appropriated this name to that complex Idea which they now fignifie by the found Person, might have denoted it by the found Stone, and Vice versa: But can your Lordship thence argue, as you do here, Men are at the same liberty in a Country where those words

are already in common use? There he that will speak properly, and so as to be understood, must appropriate each sound used in that Language to an Idea in his mind (which to himself is defining the Word) which is in some degree conformable to the Idea that

others apply it to.

Your Lordship in the next Paragraph + P. 59. fets down my definition of the word Person, viz. " That Person stands for a thinking " intelligent Being that hath Reason and "Reflection, and can consider it self as it " felf, the same thinking Being in different "times and places;" and then asks many Questions upon it. I shall set down your Lordship's definition of Person; which is this, * A Person is a compleat intelligent Sub- * Vindic. stance with a peculiar manner of Subsistence, and p. 261. then crave leave to ask your Lordship the fame Questions concerning it, which your Lordship here asks me of concerning mine; + p. 59. How comes Person to stand for this and nothing else? From whence comes compleat Substance, or peculiar manner of Subliftence to make up the Idea of a Person? Whether it be true or false, I am not now to enquire; but how it comes into this Idea of a Person? Has common use of our Language appropriated it to this Sense? If not, this seems to be a meer Arbitrary Idea; and may as well be denied as affirmed. what a fine pass are we come to, in your Lordship's way, if a meer Arbitrary Idea must be taken into the only true Method of Certainty? -But if this be the true Idea of a Person, then there can be no Union of two Natures in

P 4

one Person. For if a compleat intelligent Substance be the Idea of a Person; and the divine and humane Natures be compleat intelligent Substances, then the Doctrin of the Union of two Natures and one Person is quite funk; for here must be two Persons in this way of your Lordship's. Again, if this be the Idea of a Person, then where there are three Persons there must be three distinct compleat intelligent Substances; and so there cannot be three Persons in the same individual Essence. And thus both these Doctrins of the Trinity and Incarnation are past recovery gon, if this way of your Lordship's hold. These, my Lord, are your Lordship's very Words; what force there is in them I will not enquire, but I must beseech your Lordship to take them as Objections I make against your Notion of Person, to shew the danger of it, and the inconfistency it has with the Doctrin of the Trinity and Incarnation of our Saviour; and when your Lordship has removed the Objections that are in them, against your own definition of Person, mine also by the very fame Answers will be cleared.

* p. 61 -- 65.

+ p.61.

Your Lordship's Argument in the following Words * to page 65. seems to me (as far as I can collect) to lie thus: Your Lordship tells me, † that I say, "That in Propositions whose Certainty is built on clear and perfect Ideas and evident deductions of Reason, there no Proposition can be received for divine Revelation which contradicts them." This Proposition not ferving your Lordship's turn so well, for the

the conclusion you designed to draw from it, your Lordship is pleased to enlarge it. For you ask, * But suppose I have Ideas suf- * p. 62. ficient for Certainty, what is to be done then? From which Words and your following Difcourse, if I can understand it, it seems to me, that your Lordship supposes it reasonable for me to hold, That where-ever we are any how certain of any Propositions, whether their Certainty be built on clear and perfect Ideas or no, there no Proposition can be received for divine Revelation, which contradicts them. And thence your Lordfhip concludes, * That because I say we may * p. 64. make some Propositions, of whose Truth we may be certain concerning things, whereof we have not Ideas in all their parts perfeetly clear and distinct; therefore my Notion of Certainty by Ideas must overthrow the credibility of a Matter of Faith in all such Propositions, which are offered to be believed on the account of divine Revelation. A Conclusion which I am so unfortunate as not to find how it follows from your Lordship's Premisses, because I cannot any way bring them into Mode and Figure with fuch a Conclusion. But this being no strange thing to me in my want of skill in your Lordship's way of writing, I in the mean time crave leave to ask, Whether there be any Propositions your Lordship can be certain of, that are not divinely revealed? And here I will presume that your Lordship is not fo Sceptical, but that you can allow Certainty attainable in many things by your natural

natural Faculties. Give me leave then to ask your Lordship, Whether, where there be Propositions of whose Truth you have certain Knowledge, you can receive any Proposition for divine Revelation which contradicts that Certainty? Whether that Certainty be built upon the Agreement of Ideas, fuch as we have, or on whatever else your Lordship builds it? If you cannot, as I presume your Lordship will say you cannot. I make bold to return you your Lordship's Questions here to me, in your own Words; Let us now suppose that you are to judge of a Proposition delivered as a Matter of Faith, where you have a Certainty by Reason from your Grounds such as they are? Can you, my Lord, affent to this as a Matter of Faith, when you are already certain of the contrary by your way? How is this possible? Can you believe that to be true, which you are certain is not true? Suppose it be, That there are two Natures in one Person, the Question is, Whether you can affent to this as a Matter of Faith? bf you should say, where there are only Probabilities on the other side, I grant that you then allow Revelation is to prevail. But when you fay you have Certainty by Ideas, or without Ideas to the contrary, I do not see how it is possible for you to assent to a Matter of Faith as true, when you are certain from your method that it is not true. For how can you believe against Certainty—because the Mind is actually determined by Certainty. And so your Lordship's Notion of Certainty by Ideas, or without Ideas, be it what it will,

p. 64.

will, must overthrow the credibility of a matter of Faith in all such Propositions, which are offered to be believed on the account of Divine Revelation. This Argumentation and Conclusion is good against your Lordship, if it be good against me. For Certainty is Certainty. and he that is certain is certain, and cannot affent to that as true, which he is certain is not true, whether he supposes Certainty to confift in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, such as a Man has, or in any thing elfe. For whether those who have attained Certainty, not by the way of Ideas, can believe against Certainty any more than those who have attained Certainty by Ideas, we shall then see, when your Lordship shall be pleased to shew the World your way to Certainty without Ideas.

Indeed if what your Lordship infinuates in the beginning of this Passage, which we are now upon be true, your Lordship is safer (in your way without Ideas, i. e. without immediate objects of the Mind in Thinking, if there be any such way) as to the understanding divine Revelation right. than those who make use of Ideas: But yet you are still as far as they, from affenting to that as true, which you are certain is not Your Lordship's Words are: * So * p. 60. great a difference is there between forming Ideas first, and then judging of Revelation by them, and the believing of Revelation on its proper Grounds, and the interpreting the Senfe of it by the due measures of Reason. If it be the

the priviledge of those alone who renounce Ideas, i. e. the immediate objects of the Mind in Thinking, to believe Revelation on its proper Grounds, and the interpreting the Sense of it, by the due measures of Reason; I shall not think it strange, that any one who undertakes to interpret the Sense of Revelation, should renounce Ideas, i.e. That he who would think right of the meaning of any Text of Scripture should renounce, and lay by all immediate objects of the Mind

in Thinking.

But perhaps your Lordship does not here extend this difference of believing Revelation on its proper Grounds, and not on its proper Grounds to all those, who are not, and all those who are for Ideas. But your Lordship makes this comparison here, only between your Lordship and me, who you think am guilty of forming Ideas first, and then judging of Revelation by them. so, then this lays the blame not on my Doctrin of Ideas, but on my particular ill use of them. That then which your Lordship would infinuate of me here, as a dangerous way to mistaking the Sense of the Scripture, is, That I form Ideas first, and then judge of Revelation by them, i. e. In plain English, that I get to my felf, the best I can, the fignification of the Words, wherein the Revelation is delivered; and fo endeavour to understand the Sense of the Revelation delivered in them. And pray, my Lord, does your Lordship do otherwise? Does the believing of Revelation upon its proper

per Grounds, and the due measures of Reason, teach you to judge of Revelation, before you understand the Words it is deliver'd in? i. e. before you have formed the Ideas in your Mind, as well as you can, which those Words stand for? If the due measures of Reason teach your Lordship this, I beg the favour of your Lordship to tell me those due measures of Reason, that I may leave those undue measures of Reason, which I have hitherto followed in the interpreting the Sense of the Scripture, whose Sense it seems I should have interpreted first, and understood the signification of the Words afterwards.

My Lord, I read the Revelation of the Holy Scripture with a full assurance, that all it delivers is true: And though this be a submission to the Writings of those Infpired Authors, which I neither have, nor can have, for those of any other Men: Yet I use (and know not how to help it, till your Lordship shew me a better method in those due measures of Reason, which you mention) the same way to interpret to my self the Sense of that Book, that I do of any other. First I endeavour to understand the Words and Phrases of the Language I read it in, i.e. to form Ideas they stand for. If your Lordship means any thing else by forming Ideas first, I confess, I understand it not. And if there be any Word or Expression, which in that Author, or in that place of that Author, feems to have a peculiar meaning, i. e. to stand for an Idea, which is different

ferent from that, which the common use of that Language has made it a Sign of, that Idea also, I endeavour to form in my Mind. by comparing this Author with himself. and observing the design of his Discourse. that fo, as far as I can, by a fincere endeayour, I may have the same Ideas, in every place when I read the Words, which the Author had when he writ them. But here, my Lord, I take care not to take those for Words of Divine Revelation, which are not the Words of Inspired Writers: Nor think my felf concerned with that Submission to receive the Expressions of Fallible Men. and to Labour to find out their Meaning, or as your Lordship Phrases it, interpret their Sense, as if they were the Expressions of the Spirit of God, by the Mouths or Pens of Men Inspired and Guided by that infallible Spirit. This, my Lord, is the method I use in interpreting the Sense of the Revelation of the Scriptures; if your Lordship knows that I do otherwise, I defire you to convince me of it: And if your Lordship does otherwise . I desire you to fhew me wherein your method differs from mine, that I may reform upon fo good a Pattern: For as for what you accuse me of. in the following Words, it is that, which either has no Fault in it, or if it have, your Lordship, I humbly conceive, is as guilty as I. Your Words + are,

I may pretend what I please, That I hold the + p. 60. assurance of Faith, and the Certainty by Ideas,

to go upon very different Grounds; but when a Proposition is offered me out of Scripture to be believed, and I doubt about the Sense of it, is not Recourse to be made to my Ideas? Give me leave my Lord, with all submission, to return your Lordship the same Words. Your Lordship may pretend what you please, that you hold the affurance of Faith, and the Certainty of Knowledge to stand upon different Grounds (for I presume your Lordship will not fay, that Believing and Knowing stand upon the same Grounds, for that would I think be to fay, That probability and demonstration are the same thing) But when a Proposition is offered you out of Scripture, to be believed, and you doubt about the Sense of it, is not recourse to be made to your Notions? What, my Lord, is the difference here between your Lordship's and my way in the Case? I must have recourse to my Ideas, and your Lordship must have recourse to your Notions. For I think you cannot believe a Proposition contrary to your own Notions; for then you would have the same and different Notions, at the same time. So that all the difference between your Lordship and me, is, That we do both the fame thing, only your Lordship shews a great dislike to my using the term Idea.

But the instance your Lordship here gives, is beyond my comprehension. You say, * a Proposition is offered me out of * P 60. Scripture to be believed, and I doubt about the Sense of it — As in the present Case, whether

ther there can be three Persons in one Nature, or two Natures and one Person. My Lord. my Bible is faulty again, for I do not remember, that I ever read in it either of these Propositions, in these precise Words, There are three Persons in one Nature, or. There are two Natures and one Person. your Lordship shall shew me a Bible wherein they are so set down, I shall then think them a good instance of Propositions offered me out of Scripture, till then, whoever shall fay, that they are Propositions in the Scripture, when there are no fuch Words fo put together, to be found in Holy Writ, feems to me to make a new Scripture in Words and Propositions, that the Holy Ghost dictated not. I do not here question their Truth, nor deny that they may be drawn from the Scripture: But I deny, that these very Propositions are in express Words in my Bible. For that is the only thing I deny here, if your Lordship can shew them me in yours, I beg you to do it.

In the mean time, taking them to be as true as if they were the very Words of Divine Revelation; the Question then is, how must we interpret the Sense of them? For supposing them to be Divine Revelation, to ask as your Lordship here does, what Resolution I, or any one can come to about their possibility, seems to me to involve a Contradiction in it. For, whoever admits a Proposition to be of Divine Revelation, supposes it not only to be possible, but true. Your Lordship's Question then can mean

mean only this; What Sense can I upon my Principles, come to of either of these Propositions, but in the way of Ideas? And I crave leave to ask your Lordship, what Sense of them can your Lordship upon your Principles come to, but in the way of Notions? Which in plain English, amounts to no more than this, That your Lordship must understand them according to the Sense you have of those Terms they are made up of; and I according to the Sense I have of those Terms. Nor can it be otherwise, unless your Lorship can take a Term in any Proposition to have one Sense, and yet understand it in another: And thus we see, that in effect, Men have differently understood and interpreted the Sense of these Propositions. Whether they used the way of Ideas or not, i.e. whether they called what any Word stood for Notion, or Sense, or Meaning, or Idea.

I think my self obliged to return your Lordship my Thanks, for the News you write me here, † of one who has † p. 61. found a secret way how the same Body may be in distant Places at once. It making no part, that I can see, of the Reasoning your Lordship was then upon, I can take it only for a piece of News: And the Favour was the greater, that your Lordship was pleased to stop your self in the midst of so serious an Argument as the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation, to tell it me. And methinks 'tis pity, that that Author had not used some of the Words of my Book, which

might

might have ferved to have tied him and me together. For his Secret about a Body in two Places at once, which he does keep up; and my Secret about Certainty, which your Lordship thinks had been better kept up too, being all your Words, bring me into his Company but very untowardly. If your Lordship would be pleased to shew, That my Secret about Certainty (as you think fit to call it) is false or erroneous, the World would fee a good Reason, why you should think it better kept up; till then perhaps they may be apt to suspect, that the Fault is not so much in my published Secret about Certainty, as fomewhere elfe. But fince your Lordship thinks it had been better kept up; I promise that as soon as you shall do me the Favour to make publick a better Notion of Certainty than mine, I will by a publick Retractation call in mine: Which I hope your Lordship will do, for I dare fay, no Body will think it good or Friendly Advice to your Lordship, if you have such a Secret, that you should keep it up.

* p. 63.

Your Lordship with some Emphasis, *
bids me observe my own Words, that I here positively say, "That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know: "So that it is plain here, that
I place Certainty only in evident Knowledge,
or in clear and distinct Ideas; and yet my great
Complaint of your Lordship, was, That you
charged this upon me, and now your Lordship
sinds it in my own Words. Answ. My own
Words in that place, are, The Mind is not
certain

certain of what it doth not evidently know; but in them or that Passage as set down by your Lordship, there is not the least mention of clear and distinct Ideas, and therefore I should wonder to hear your Lordship so solemnly call them my own Words, when they are but what your Lordship would have to be a Confequence of my Words, were it not, as I humbly conceive, a way not unfrequent with your Lordship to speak of that, which you think a Consequence from any thing faid, as if it were the very thing faid. rests therefore upon your Lordship to prove that evident Knowledge can be only where the Ideas concerning which it is, are perfectly clear and distinct. I am certain, that I have evident Knowledge, that the Substance of my Body and Soul exifts, though I am as certain that I have but a very obscure and confused Idea of any Substance at all: So that my Complaint of your Lordship upon that Account, remains very well Founded, notwithstanding any thing you alledge here.

Your Lordship summing up the force of what you have said add * That you have pleaded (1.) * P. 65. That my method of Certainty shakes the belief of Revelation in General (2.) That it shakes the belief of particular Propositions or Articles of Faith, which depend upon the Sense of Words contained in Scripture.

That your Lordship has pleaded, I grant, but with Submission I deny, that you have

proved.

(1.) That my definition of Knowledge. which is that which your Lordship calls my method of Certainty, hakes the belief of Revelation in general. For all that your Lordthip offers for Proof of it, is only the alledging some other Passages out of my Book quite different from that my definition of Knowledge, which you endeavour to shew do shake the belief of Revelation in General. But indeed have not, nor, I humbly conceive, cannot shew, that they do any ways shake the belief of Revelation in general. But if they did, it does not at all follow from thence, that my definition of Knowledge, i. e. my method of Certainty at all shakes the belief of Revelation in general, which was what your Lordship undertook to prove. 2 od 02

(2.) As to the shaking the belief of particular Propositions or Articles of Faith, which depend, as you here say, † upon the Sense of Words; I think I have sufficiently cleared my self from that Charge, as will yet be more evident from what your Lordship here

farther urges.

Your Lordship says, my placing Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, shakes the Foundations of the Articles of Faith [above mentioned] which depend upon the Sense of Words contained in the Scripture: And the Reason your Lordship gives for it, is this; Because I do not say we are to believe all that we find there expressed. My Lord, upon reading these Words, I consulted the Erraia, to see whether the Printer had injured you: For I could not easily

+ p. 65.

eafily believe that your Lordship should Reafon after a Fashon, that would justifie such a conclusion as this, viz. Your Lordship in your Letter to me, does not fay that we are to believe all that we find expressed in Scripture, therefore your Notion of Certainty shakes the belief of this Article of Faith, that lefus Christ descended into Hell. This I think will scarce hold for a good Consequence, till the not faying any Truth, be the denying of it, and then if my not saying in my Book, That we are to believe all there expressed, be to deny, That we are to believe all that we find there expressed; I fear many of your Lordship's Books will be found to Chake the belief of several or all the Articles of our Faith. But supposing this Consequence to be good, viz. I do not say therefore I deny, and thereby I shake the belief of some Articles of Faith; how does this prove, That my placing of Certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, shakes any Article of Faith, unless my faying, that Certainty confifts in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, in the 301 Page of my Esfay, be a Proof, that I do not fay in any other part of that Book, That we are to believe all that we find expressed in Scripture?

But perhaps the remaining Words of the Period will help us out in your Lordship's Argument, which all together stands thus, * * p. 65. Because I do not say we are to believe all that we find there expressed; but [I do fay] in case we have any clear and distinct Ideas, which li-

to carry it, we are to judge that to be the true My Lord, I do not remember where I fay, what in the latter part of this Period your Lordship makes me fay: And your Lordship would have done me a Favour to have quoted the place. Indeed I do fay in the Chapter your Lordship seems to be upon, "That no Proposition can be received for divine Revelation, or obtain the affent due to all fuch, if it be contra-" dictory to our clear intuitive Know-" ledge ". This is what I there fay, and all that I there fay: Which in effect is this, That no Proposition can be received for divine Revelation, which is contradictory to a self-evident Proposition, and if that be it, which your Lordship makes me say here in the foregoing Words, I agree to it, and would be glad to know whether your Lordship differs in Opinion from me in But this not answering your purit. pose, your Lordship would in the following Words of this Paragraph, + change felfevident Proposition into a Proposition we have attained Certainty of, though by imperfect Ideas: In which Sense the Proposition your Lordship argues from as mine, will stand thus, That no Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation, or obtain the affent due to all fuch, if it be contradictory to any Proposition, of whose Truth we are by any way certain. And then I defire your Lordship to name the Two contradictory Propositions, the one of Divine Revelation,

+ p. 65.

I do not affent to; the other, That I have attained to a Certainty of by my imperfect Ideas, which makes me reject or not affent to that of Divine Revelation. The very fetting down of these Two contradictory Propofitions, will be demonstration against me, and if your Lordship cannot (as I humbly conceive you cannot) name any Two fuch Propositions, 'tis an evidence, that all this Dust, that is raised, is only a great deal of Talk about what your Lordship cannot prove. For that your Lordship has not yet proved any fuch thing, I am humbly

of Opinion, I have already shewn.

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Your Lordship's Discourse of Des Cartes in the following Pages, * is, I think, as * p. 66far as I am concerned in it, to shew, that 69. Certainty cannot be had by Ideas: Because Des Cartes using the term Idea missed of it. Answ. The Question between your Lordship and me, not being about Des Cartes's but my Notion of Certainty, your Lordship will put an end to my Notion of Certainty by Ideas, whenever your Lordship shall prove, That Certainty cannot be attained any way by the immediate Objects of the Mind in Thinking, i. e. by Ideas; or that Certainty does not confift in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of Ideas; or lastly, when your Lordship shall shew us, what else Certainty does consist in. When your Lordship shall do either of these Three, I promise your Lordship to renounce my notion, or way, or method, or grounds (or Q 4

whatever else your Lordship has been pleaf-

The three or four following Pages * are

ed to call it) of Certainty by Ideas.

The next Paragraph + is to flew the in-+ p. 60 clination your Lordship has to favour me 70. in the Words it may be. I shall be always forry to have miltaken any ones, especially your Lordship's Inclination to favour me: But fince the Press has published this to the World, the World must now be Judge of your Lordship's Inclination to favour me.

* p. 70-74. to shew, That your Lordship's exception

against Ideas was not against the term Ideas, and that I mistook you in it. Answ. My Lord, I must own that there are very few Pages of your Letters, when I come to examine what is the precise meaning of your Words, either as making distinct Propositions, or a continued Discourse, wherein I do not think my felf in danger to be mistaken; but whether in the present Case, one much more learned than I, would not have understood your Lordship as I did, must be left to those who will be at the pains to consider your Words i and my Reply to them. Your Lordship faying, As I have stated my Notion of Ideas, it may be of dangerous consequence; seemed to me to say no more, but that my Book in general might be of dangerous consequence. This seeming too general an Accusation, I endeavoured to find what it was more particularly in it, which your Lordship thought might be of dan-

gerous consequence: And the first thing I

thought

+ I Anfw. P. 133.

thought you excepted against, was the nse of the term Idea. But your Lordship tells me here, * I was miltaken, it was not the * p. 72. serm Idea you excepted against, but the way of Certainty by Ideas. To excuse my mistake. I have this to fay for my felf, That reading in your first Letter of these express + 1 Answ. Words; When new Terms are made use of P. 23. by ill Men to promote Scepticism and Infidelity. and to overthrow the Mysteries of our Faith, we have then Reason to enquire into them, and to examine the Foundation and Tendency of them; it could not be very strange, if I understood them to refer to Terms; but it feems I was mistaken, and should have understood by them my way of Certainty by Ideas, and thould have read your Lordship's Words thus; When new Terms are made use of by ill Men to promote Scepticism and Infidelity and to overthrow the Mysteries of Faith, we have then Reason to enquire into them, i. e. Mr. L.'s definition of Knowledge (for that is my way of Certainty by Ideas) and then to examine the Foundation and Tendency of them, i. e. this Proposition, viz. That Knowledge or Certainty confifts in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas. Them, in your Lordship's Words, as I thought (for I am scarce ever sure, what your Lordship means by them) necessarily referring to what ill Men made use of for the promoting of Scepticism and Infidelity, I thought it had referred to Terms. Why fo? fays your Lordship. your Quarrel, you fay, was not with the term Ideas. But that which you insifted upon was the

the way of Certainty by Ideas, and the new Terms as imploied to that purpose; and therefore 'tis that which your Lordship must be understood to mean by what ill Men make nfe of, &c. Now I appeal to my Reader, whether I may not be excused, if I took Them rather to refer to Terms, a word in the Plural Number preceding in the same Period, than to way of Certainty by Ideas, which is of the Singular Number, and neither preceding, no nor fo much as expressed in the same Sentence? And if by my Ignorance in the use of the Pronoun Them, tis my misfortune to be often at a loss in the understanding of your Lordship's Writings, I hope I shall be excused.

Another excuse for my understanding, that one of the things in my Book which your Lordship thought might be of dangerous consequence, was the term Idea, may be found in these Words of your Lordship. * But

* I Answ. in these Words of your Lordship, * But P.92,93. what need all this great noise about Ideas and Certainty, true and real Certainty by Ideas: If after all, it comes only to this, That our Ideas only present to us such things from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of things? But the World hath been strangely amuzed with Ideas of late; and we have been told, That strange things might be done by the help of Ideas, and yet these Ideas at last come to be common Notions of things, which we must make use of in our Reasoning. I shall offer one † Answ. Passage more † for my excuse, out of the

P. 93. Same Page. I had faid in my Chapter about the Existence of God, I thought it most pro-

proper to express my felf in the most usual and familiar way, by common Words and Expressions. Your Lordship wishes I had done fo quite through my Book; for then I had never given that occasion to the Enemies of our Faith, to take up my new way of Ideas, as an effectual Battery (as they imagin'd) against the Mysteries of the Christian Faith. might have enjoyed the Satisfaction of my Ideas long enough, before your Lordship had taken notice of them, unless you had found them employ'd in doing Mischief. Thus this Passage stands in your Lordship's former Letter, though here i your Lordship gives us but + p. 72, a part off it, and that part your Lordship 73. breaks of into two, and gives us inverted and in other words. Perhaps those who observe this, and better understand the Arts of Controversie than I do, may find some skill in it. But your Lordship * breaks off * p. 72. the former Passage at these Words, strange things might be done by the belp of Ideas; and then adding these new ones, i. e. as to matter of Certainty, leaves out those which contain your wish, That I had expressed my self in the most usual way by common Words and Expressions quite through my Book, as I had done in my Chapter of the Existence of a God; for then, says your Lordship, * I had not * 1 Answ. given that occasion to the Enemies of our Faith P. 93. to take up my new way of Ideas as an effectual Battery, &c. which wish of your Lordship's is, That I had all along left out the term Idea, as is plain from my Words, which you refer to in your wish, as they stand in my

1 Let. my first Letter, † viz. " I thought it P. 127. " most proper to express my self in the

most usual and familiar way-by come mon Words, and known ways of Ex-" pression; and therefore, as I think, I have " fcarce used the word I dea in that whole "Chapter." Now I must again appeal to my Reader, Whether your Lordship having fo plainly wished that I had used common Words and Expressions in opposition to the term Idea, I am not excusable if I took you to mean that Term? Though your Lordship leaves out the wish, and instead of it puts in, i.e. as a matter of Certainty; Words which were not in your former Letter, though it be for mistaking you in my Answer to that Letter, that you here blame me. I must own, my Lord, my dulness will be very apt to mistake you in Expresfions feemingly fo plain as thefe, till I can presume my self quick-sighted enough to understand Mens meaning in their Writings

† p. 73. fhip

now to learn.

But bare mistake is not all; your Lord-ship is accused me also of Unfairness and Disingenuity in understanding these Words of yours, The World has been strangely amuzed with Ideas, and yet these Ideas at last come to be only common Notions of things, as if in them your Lordship owned Ideas to be only common Notions of things. To this, my Lord, I must humbly crave leave to answer, That there was no Unfairness or Disingenuity in my saying

not by their Expressions; which I confess I am not, and is an Art I find my self too old

faying your Lordship owned Ideas for such, because I understood you to speak in that place in your own Sense; and thereby to shew that the new term Idea need not be introduced, when it fignified only the common Notions of things, i. e. signified no more than Notion doth, which is a more usual Word. This I took to be your meaning in that place; and whether I or any one might not so understand it, without deserving to be told, * That this is a way of turning * p. 73. things upon your Lordship which you did not expett from me, or fuch a folemn appeal as this, Judge now how fair and ingenuous this Answer is, I leave to any one, who will but do me the favour to cast his Eye on the Passage above quoted, as it stands in your Lordship's own Words in your first Letter *. For I humbly beg leave to fay, * 1 Anfw. That I cannot but wonder to find, that P. 92, 93. when your Lordship is charging me with want of Fairness and Ingenuity, you should leave out in the quoting of your own Words, those which served most to justifie the Sense I had taken them in, and put others in the stead of them. In your first Letter of they stand thus: But the World hath + 1 Answ. been strangely amuzed with Ideas of late, and P. 93. we have been told that strange things might be done by the help of Ideas; and yet these Ideas at last come to be only common Notions of things which we must make use of in our Reafoning, and fo on to the end of what is above fet down; all which I quoted * to fe- * , Let. cure my felf from being suspected to turn p. 62. things

* p. 73.

things upon your Lordship in a Sense which your Words (that the Reader had before him) would not bear: And in your second Letter, * in the place now under consideration, they stand thus: But the World hath been strangely amuzed with Ideas of late, and we have been told that strange things may be done with Ideas, i. e. as to matter of Certainty, and there your Lordship ends. Will your Lordship give me leave now to use your own Words, Judge now how fair and ingenuous this is: Words which I should not use, but that I find them used by your Lordship in this very Passage, and upon this very Occasion.

I grant my felf a mortal Man very liable to Mistakes, especially in your Writings: But that in my Mistakes, I am guilty of any Unfairness or Disingenuity, Lordship will, I humbly conceive, pardon me, if I think it will pass for want of Fairness and Ingenuity in any one, without clear Evidence to accuse me: To avoid any fuch Suspicion in my first Letter, I fet down every Word contained in those Pages of your Book which I was concerned in; and in my fecond, I fet down most of the Passages of your Lordship's first Anfwer that I replied to. But because the deing it all along in this, would, I find, too much increase the bulk of my Book; I earnestly beg every one, who will think this my Reply worth his Perusal, to lay your Lordship's Letter before him, that he may see whether in these Pages, I direct my

Answer to, without setting them down at large, there be any thing material unanswered, or Unfairly or Disingenuously represented.

Your Lordship, in the next Words, * gives * p. 73. a Reason why I ought to have understood your Words, as a consequence of my Assertion, and not as your own Sense, viz. Because you all along distinguish the way of Reason, by deducing one thing from another, from my way of Certainty in the Agreement or Disagreement of Answer. I know your Lordship does all along talk of Reason, and my way by Ideas, as distinct or opposite: But this is the thing I have and do complain of, That your Lordship does speak of them as distinct, without shewing wherein they are different, fince the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas, which is my way of Certainty, is also the way of Reason: For the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas, is either by an immediate Comparison of two Ideas, as in felf-evident Propositions; which way of Knowledge of Truth, is the way of Reason, or by the Intervention of intermediate Ideas, i e. by the Deduction of one thing from another, which is also the way of Reason, as I have shewn *; * 1 Let. where I answer to your speaking of Certainty P. 128. placed in good and found Reason, and not in Ideas; in which place, as in feveral others, your Lordship opposes Ideas and Reason. which your Lordship calls here distinguishing them: But to continue to speak frequently of two things as different, or of two ways as opposite, without ever shewing any Difference

ference or Opposition in them, after it has been pressed for, is a way of Ingenuity which your Lordship will pardon to my Ignorance, if I have not formerly been acquainted with; and therefore, when you shall have shewn, that Reasoning about Ideas or by Ideas, is not the same way of Reasoning, as that about or by Notions or Conceptions, and that what I mean by Ideas is not the same that your Lordship means by Notions, you will have some reason to blame me for mistaking you in the Passages above quoted. *

For if your Lordship, in those Words, does not except against the Term Ideas, but allows it to have the same Signification with Notions, or Conceptions, or Apprehensions; then your Lordship's Words will run thus, But what need all this great noise about Notions or Conceptions, or Apprehensions? And the World has been strangely amuzed with Notions, or Conceptions, or Apprehensions of late; which, whether it be that which your Lordship will own to be your meaning, I must leave to

your Consideration.

*p. 74. Your Lordship proceeds * to examine my
new method of Certainty, as you are pleased
to call it.

To my asking whether there be any other, or older Method of Certainty, your Lordship answers, † That is not the point; but whether mine be any at all? Which your Lordship denies. Answer. I grant, to him that barely denies it to be any at all, it is not the point, whether there be any older; but to him that calls it a new

+ p. 75.

* P. 73.

a new method, I humbly conceive it will not be thought wholly besides the point, to shew an older, at least, that it ought to have prevented these following Words of your Lordship's, viz. That your Lordship did never pretend to inform the World of new Methods; which being in Answer to my desire, that you would be pleased to shew me an older, or another Method, plainly imply, That your Lordship supposes, that whoever will inform the World of another Method of Certainty than mine, can do it only by informing them of a new one. But since this is the Answer your Lordship pleases to make to my Request, I crave leave to consider it a little.

Your Lordship having pronounced concerning my Desinition of Knowledge, which you call my Method of Certainty, That it might be of dangerous Consequence to an Article of the Christian Faith, I desired * you to * 2 Let. them in what Certainty lies; "and desired p. 87, 88. it of your Lordship by these pressing Considerations, That it would secure that Article of Faith against any dangerous Consequence from my way, and be a great Service to Truth in general. To which your Lordship replies here, † That you did never pre- † p. 75. tend to inform the World of New Methods; and therefore, are not bound to go any farther than what you found fault with, which was my new Method.

Answer. My Lord, I did not desire any new Method of you. I observed your Lordship, in more places than one, restected on R

me for writing out of my own Thoughts; and therefore I could not expect from your Lordship what you so much condemn in another. Besides, one of the Faults you found with my Method, was, That it was New: And therefore, if your Lordship will look again into that Paffage, f where I defire you to let the World right in a thing of that great Consequence, as it is to know wherein Certainty confifts; you will not find, that I mention any thing of a new Method of Certainty; my Words were another, whether old or new was indifferent. In truth, all that I requested, was only such a Method of Certainty, as your Lordship approved of. and was fecure in; and therefore I do not fee how your not pretending to inform the World in any new Methods, can be any way alledg'd as a Reason, for refusing so useful and so charitable a thing.

* P. 75.

+ 2 Let.

p. 88.

Your Lordship farther adds, * That you are not bound to go any farther, than what you found fault with. Answer. I suppose your Lordship means, That you are not bound by the Law of Disputation; nor are you, as I humbly conceive, by this Law forbid: Or if you were, the Law of the Schools could not dispense with the Eternal Divine Law of Charity. The Law of Disputing, whence had it its fo mighty a Sanction? It is at beft but the Law of Wrangling, if it shut out the great Ends of Information and Instruction; and ferves only to flatter a little guilty Vanity, in a Victory over an Adverfary less skilful in this Art of Fencing. Who

Who can believe, that upon so slight an account, your Lordship should neglect your Design of writing against me? The great Motives of your Concern for an Article of the Christian Faith, and of that Duty, which you profess has made you do what you have done, will be believed to work more uniformly in your Lordship, than to let a Father of the Church, and a Teacher in Ifrael, not tell one who asks him which is the right and fafe Way, if he knows it. No, no, my Lord, a Character fo much to the Prejudice of your Charity, no-body will receive of your Lordship, no, not from your felf: Whatever your Lordship may fay, the World will believe, That you would have given a better Method of Certainty, if you had had one; when thereby, you would have secured Men from the danger of running into Errors in Articles of Faith, and effectually have recalled them from my way of Certainty, which leads, as your Lordship fays, to Scepticism and Infidelity: For to turn Men from a way they are in, the bare telling them it is dangerous, puts but a short stop to their going on in it: There is nothing effectual to fet them a going right, but to shew them which is the safe and sure way; a piece of Humanity, which when asked, no-body, as far as he knows, refuses another; and this I have earnestly asked of your Lordship.

Your Lordship * represents to me the Unsa- * p. 75. tisfactorines and Inconsistency of my way of Certainty, by telling me, That it seems still

R 2 a strange

a strange thing to you, that I should talk so much of a new Method of Certainty by Ideas; and yet allow, as I do, such a want of Ideas, so much Imperfection in them, and such a want of Connection between our Ideas, and the things themselves. Answer. This Objection being so visibly against the Extent of our Knowledge, and not the Certainty of it by Ideas, would need no other Answer but this, that it proved nothing to the point; which was to shew, that my way by Ideas, was no way to Certainty at all; not to True Certainty, which is a Term your Lordship uses here † which I shall be able to conceive what you mean by, when you shall be pleased to tell me what falle Certainty is.

But because what you say here, is in short what you ground your Charge of Scepticism on, in your former Letter, I shall here, according to my Promise, consider what your Lordship says there, and hope you will allow

this to be no unfit place.

Your Charge of Scepicism, in your for-

+ 1 Answ. mer Letter, f is as followeth.

+ p. 76.

p. 125. Your Lordship's first Argument consists in these Propositions, viz.

1. That I say, p. 125, That Knowledge is the Percention of the Agreement or Difa-

greement of Ideas.

2. That I go about to prove, That there are very many more Beings, of which we have no Ideas, than those of which we have; from whence, your Lordship draws this Conclusion, That we are excluded from attaining any Knowledge, as so the far greatest part

of the Universe. Which I agree to: But with Submission, this is not the Proposition to be proved, but this, viz. That my way by Ideas, or my way of Certainty by Ideas; for to that your Lordship reduces it, i.e. my placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas,

leads to Scepticism.

Farther, from my faying, that the Intellectual World is greater and more beautiful certainly than the material, your Lordship argues, of That if Certainty may be had + 1 Answ. by general Reasons without particular Ideas in P. 126. one, it may also in other Cases. Answer. It may no doubt: But this is nothing against any thing I have faid; for I have neither faid, nor suppose, That Certainty by general Reasons, or any Reasons can be had without Ideas; no more than I fay, or suppose, that we can reason without thinking, or think without immediate Objects of our Minds in thinking, i. e. think without Ideas. But your Lordship asks, Whence comes this Certainty (for I say certainly) where there be no particular Ideas, if Knowledge confists in the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas? I answer, we have Ideas as far as we are certain, and beyond that we have neither Certainty, no nor Probability; every thing which we either know or believe, is some Proposition. Now no Proposition can be framed as the Object of our Knowledge or Assent, wherein two Ideas are not joined to, or separated from one another. As for Example, when I af-R 3

firm that something exists in the World, whereof I have no Idea, Existence is affirmed of
something, some Being: And I have as clear
an Idea of Existence and something, the two
things joined in that Proposition, as I have
of them in this Proposition, something exists
in the World, whereof I have an Idea. When
therefore I affirm, that the intellectual
World is greater, and more beautiful, than
the material: Whether I should know the
truth of this Proposition, either by Divine
Revelation, or should affert it as highly probable (which is all I do in that Chapter, in

+ Essay B. bable (which is all I do in that Chapter, † 4. C. 3. out of which this Instance is brought) it means no more but this, viz. That there are more, and more beautiful Beings, whereof we have no Ideas, than there are of which we have Ideas; of which Beings, whereof we have no Ideas, we can for want of Ideas, have no farther Knowledge, but that such Beings do exist.

If your Lordship shall now ask me how I

know there are such Beings; I answer, that in that Chapter fof the Extent of our Knowledge, 4. C. 3. I do not say I know, but I endeavour to shew, that it is most highly probable: But yet a Man is capable of knowing it to be true, because he is capable of having it revealed to him by God, that this Proposition is true, viz. That in the Works of God there are more and more beautiful Beings, whereof we have no Ideas, than there are whereof we have Ideas. If God instead of shewing the very things to St. Paul, had only revealed to him, that this Proposition was true, viz. That there

were

were things in Heaven which neither Eye had feen, nor Ear had heard, nor had entred into the Heart of Man to conceive, would he not have known the Truth of that Proposition of whose Terms he had Ideas, viz. of Beings, whereof he had no other Ideas, but barely as something, and of Existence, though in the want of other Ideas of them he could attain no other Knowledge of them, but barely that they existed? So that in what I have there faid, there is no Contradiction nor Shadow of a Contradiction, to my placing Knowledge in the Perception of the

Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas.

roes

But if I should any where mistake, and say any thing inconfiftent with that way of Certainty of mine; how I befeech your Lordthip, could you conclude from thence, that the placing Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, tends to Scepticism? That which is the Propofition here to be proved, would remain still unproved: For I might say things inconsi-Stent with this Proposition, That Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of our Ideas; and yet that Propolition be true, and very far from tending to Scepticism, unless your Lordship will argue, that every Proposition that is inconsistent with what a Man any where fays, tends to Scepticism; and then I should be tempted to infer, that many Propositions in the Letters your Lordship has honoured me with, will tend to Scepticism. Your

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firm that something exists in the World, whereof I have no Idea, Existence is affirmed of fomething, fome Being: And I have as clear an Idea of Existence and something, the two things joined in that Proposition, as I have of them in this Proposition, something exists in the World, whereof I have an Idea. therefore I affirm, that the intellectual World is greater, and more beautiful, 'than the material: Whether I should know the truth of this Proposition, either by Divine Revelation, or should affert it as highly pro-

+ Effay B. bable (which is all I do in that Chapter, + 4. C. 3. out of which this Instance is brought) it means no more but this, viz. That there are more, and more beautiful Beings, whereof we have no Ideas, than there are of which we have Ideas; of which Beings, whereof we have no Ideas, we can for want of Ideas, have no farther Knowledge, but

that fuch Beings do exist.

If your Lordship shall now ask me how I know there are fuch Beings; I answer, that in that Chapter fof the Extent of our Knowledge, I do not fay I know, but I endeavour to shew, that it is most highly probable: But yet a Man is capable of knowing it to be true, because he is capable of having it revealed to him by God, that this Proposition is true, viz. That in the Works of God there are more and more beautiful Beings, whereof we have no Ideas, than there are whereof we have Ideas. If God instead of shewing the very things to St. Paul, had only revealed to him, that this Proposition was true, viz. That there were

+ Effay B. 4. C 3.

were things in Heaven which neither Eye had feen, nor Ear had heard, nor had entred into the Heart of Man to conceive, would he not have known the Truth of that Proposition of whose Terms he had Ideas, viz. of Beings, whereof he had no other Ideas, but barely as fomething, and of Existence, though in the want of other Ideas of them he could attain no other Knowledge of them, but barely that they existed? So that in what I have there faid, there is no Contradiction nor Shadow of a Contradiction, to my placing Knowledge in the Perception of the

Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas.

But if I should any where mistake, and say any thing inconfistent with that way of Certainty of mine; how I befeech your Lordship, could you conclude from thence, that the placing Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, tends to Scepticism? That which is the Propofition here to be proved, would remain still unproved: For I might say things inconsistent with this Proposition, That Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Connection and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of our Ideas; and yet that Proposition be true, and very far from tending to Scepticism, unless your Lordship will argue, that every Proposition that is inconsistent with what a Man any where fays, tends to Scepticism; and then I should be tempted to infer, that many Propositions in the Letters your Lordship has honoured me with, will tend to Scepticism. Your

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4 I Anfw. p. 126. 127.

Your Lordship's second Argument is it from my faying, "We have no Ideas of " the mechanical Affections, of the minute 4 Particles of Bodies, which hinders our certain Knowledge of universal Truths " concerning natural Bodies; " from whence your Lordship concludes, That since we can attain to no Science, as to Bodies or Spirits, our Knowledge must be confined to a very narrow compass. I grant it; but I crave leave to mind your Lordship again, That this is not the Proposition to be proved: A little Knowledge is still Knowledge, and not Scepticism. But let me have affirm'd our Knowledge to be comparatively very little; How, I beseech your Lordship, does that any way prove, that this Proposition, "Knowledge consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ide-" as, " any way tends to Scepticism? which was the Proposition to be proved. But the Inference your Lordship shuts up this Head * 1 Answ. with * in these Words: So that all Cer-

p. 127.

tainty is given up in the way of Knowledge, as to the visible and invisible World, or at least the greatest part of them; shewing in the first part of it what your Lordship should have inferred, and was willing to infer, does at last by these Words in the Close, Or at least the greatest part of them, I guess come just to nothing; I say, I guess; for what them, by Grammatical Construction is to be referred to, feems not clear to me.

Your third Argument * being just of the * 1 Answ. same kind with the former, only to shew, P. 128. That I reduce our Knowledge to a very narrow compass, in respect of the whole extent of Beings is already answered.

In the fourth place, your Lordship sets down some Words of mine concerning Reafoning and Demonstration; and then concludes, † But if there be no way of coming to † 1 Answ.
Demonstration but this, I bount we must be con- p. 129.
tent without it. Which being nothing but a
Declaration of your doubt, is, I grant, a
very short way of proving any Proposition;
and I shall leave to your Lordship the Satisfaction you have in such a Proof, since I
think it will scarce convince others.

In the last place your Lordship argues. * that because I say, That the Idea in the * 1 Answ. Mind proves not the Existence of that P. 129thing whereof it is an Idea; therefore we 131. cannot know the actual Existence of any thing by our Senses; because we know nothing, but by the perceived Agreement of Ideas. But if you had been pleased to have confider'd my Answer there to the Scepticks, whose Cause you here seem, with no small vigour, to manage, you would, I humbly conceive, have found, that you mistake one thing for another, viz. The Idea that has by a former Sensation been lodged in the Mind, for actually receiving any Idea, i.e. actual Sensation, which I think I need not go about to prove, are two distinct things, after what you have here quoted out of my Book. Now the two Ideas, that in this

this Case are perceived to agree, and do thereby produce Knowledge, are the Idea of actual Sensation (which is an Action whereof I have a clear and distinct Idea) and the Idea of altual Existence of something without me that causes that Sensation. And what other Certainty your Lordship has by your Senses of the existing of any thing without you, but the perceived Connection of those two Ideas, I would gladly know. When you have destroyed this Certainty, which I conceive is the utmost, as to this Matter, which our infinitely Wife and Bountiful Maker has made us capable of in this State, your Lordship will have well affifted the Scepticks in carrying their Arguments against Certainty by Sense, beyond what they could have expected.

I cannot but fear, my Lord, that what you have said here in favour of Scepticism, against Certainty by Sense, (for it is not at all against me, till you shew we can have no Idea of actual Sensation) without the proper Antidote annexed in shewing wherein that Certainty consists (if the account I give be not true) after you have fo ftrenuoufly endeavoured to destroy, what I have faid for it, will, by your Authority, have laid no small Foundation of Scepticism, which they will not fail to lay hold of, with advantage to their Cause, who have any Disposition that way. For I desire any one to read this your fifth Argument, and then judge which of us two is a promoter of Scepticism: I who have endeavoured, and,

as I think, proved Certainty by our Senfes; or your Lordship, who has (in your Thoughts at least) destroyed these Proofs. without giving us any other to supply their place. All your other Arguments amount to no more but this, That I have given Instances to shew, that the extent of our Knowledge, in comparison of the whole extent of Being is very little and narrow; which when your Lordship writ your Vindication of the Doctrin of the Trinity, + were very ; Vindic fair and ingenuous Confessions of the shortness p. 244. of Humane Understanding, with respect to the Nature and Manner of such things, which we are most certain of the Being of, by constant and undoubted Experience: Though fince you have flewed your diflike of them in more places than one, particularly, p. 33. |; and again | 1 Answ. more at large, p. 43. 1; and at last you have p. 33. thought fit to represent them as Arguments + ib. p. 43 for Scepticism. And thus I have acquitted my felf, I hope to your Lordship's Satisfaction, of my promise to answer your Accusation of a tendency to Scepticism.

But to return to your second Letter where In the following Pages * you * p. 76-I left off. have another Argument to prove my way 87. of Certainty to be none, but to lead to Scepticism; which after a ferious perusal of it, seems to me to amount to no more but this, That Des Cartes and I go both in the way of Ideas; and we differ, Ergo, the placing of Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, is no way of Certainty, but leads to Scepticism, which

is a Consequence I cannot admit: And I think is no better than this; Your Lordship and I differ, and yet we go both in the way of Ideas, Ergo, the placing of Knowledge in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, is no way of Certainty

at all, but leads to Scepticism.

Your Lordship will perhaps think I fay more than I can justifie, when I say, Your Lordship goes in the way of Ideas; for you will tell me, you do not place Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas. Answer. No more does Des Cartes; and therefore in that Respect. he and I went no more in the same way of Ideas, than your Lordship and I do: From whence it follows, That how much foever he and I may differ in other Points. our Difference is no more an Argument against this Proposition, That Knowledge or Certainty confifts in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, than your Lordship's and my Difference in any other Point, is an Argument against the Truth of that my definition of Knowledge; or that it tends to Scepticifm.

But you will fay, That Des Cartes built his System of Philosophy upon Ideas; and so I say does your Lordship too, and every one else as much as he, that has any System of that or any other part of Knowledge. For Ideas are nothing but the immediate Objects of our Minds in Thinking; and your Lordship, I conclude, in building your System of any part of Knowledge thinks

thinks on fomething; and therefore you can no more build, or have any System of Knowledge without Ideas, than you can think without some immediate Objects of Think-Indeed, you do not so often use the word Ideas as Des Cartes or I have done: but using the things signified by that Term as much as either of us (unless vou can think without an immediate Object of Thinking) yours also is the way of Ideas, as much as his or mine. Your condemning the way of Ideas, in those general Terms, which one meets with fo often in your Writings on this Occasion, amounts at last to no more, but an Exception against a poor Sound of three Syllables, though your Lordship thinks fit not to own, that you have any Exception to it.

If besides this, these ten or twelve Pages have any other Argument in them, which I have not seen, I humbly desire you would be pleased to put it into a Syllogism to convince my Reader, That I have silently passed by an Argument of importance; and then I promise an Answer to it: And the same Request and Promise I make to your Lordship, in reference to all other Passages in your Letter, wherein you think there is

any thing of moment unanswered.

Your Lordship comes * to answer what * p. 87. was in my former Letter, to shew, that what you had said concerning Nature and Person, was to me and several others, whom I had talked with about it, hard to be understood. To this purpose, the 16 next

next Pages f are chiefly imploy'd to shew, what Aristotle and others have said about going, and Natura, a Greek and a Latin Word, neither of which is the English Word Nature, nor can concern it at all till it be proved, that Nature in English has in the propriety of our Tongue, precisely the same signification that coins had among the Greeks, and Natura among the Romans. For would it not be pretty harsn to an English

* p. 92 & Ear, to say with Aristotle, * That Nature
96. is a corporeal Substance, or a corporeal Substance is Nature? To instance but in this
one among those many various Senses,
which your Lordship proves he used the

† p. 96. term ovois in: Or with Anaximander, † That Nature is Matter, or Matter Nature:

Il p.98. Or with Sextus Empericus, || That Nature is a principle of Life, or a principle of Life is Nature. So that though the Philosophers of old of all kinds, did understand the Sense of the terms φύσις and Natura, in the Languages of their Countries, yet it does not follow, what you would here it conclude

follow, what you would here fonclude from thence, that they understood the proper signification of the Term Nature in English. Nor has an English Man any more need to consult those Grecians in their use of the sound obsis to know what Nature signifies in English; than those Grecians had need to consult our Writings, or bring instances of the use of the word Nature in English Authors, to justifie their using of the term obsis in any Sense they had used it in in Greek. The like may be said of what is brought

brought * out of the Greek Christian Wri- * p. 99. ters; for I think an English Man could be 100. scarce justified in saying in English, That the Angels were Natures, because Theodoret and St. Basil calls them of one.

Indeed your Lordship i brings a Proof + P. 102. from an Authority that is proper in the Case, and would go a great way in it, for it is of an English Man, who writing of Nature, gives an account of the fignification of the word Nature in English. But the mischief is, that among Eight significations of the word Nature, which he gives, that is not to be found, which you quote him for, and had need of. For he fays not that Nature in English is used for Substance; which is the Sense your Lordship has used it in and would justifie by the Authority of that ingenious and honourable Person; and to make it out you tell us, Mr. Boyle fays the word Essence is of great affinity to Nature, if not of an adequate import, to which your Lordship adds, But the real Essence of a thing is a Substance. So that in fine, the Authority of this excellent Person and Philosopher amounts to thus much, that he fays that Nature and Essence are two Terms that have a great affinity, and you fay, that Nature and Substance are two Terms that have a great affinity. For the learned Mr. Boyle fays no fuch thing, nor can it appear, that he ever thought fo, till it can be shewn, that he has faid that Effence and Substance have the same fignification.

I humbly conceive, it would have been a strange way in any Body but your Lordship, to have quoted an Author for faying that Nature and Substance had the same signification, when one of those Terms, viz. Substance, he does not upon that occasion so much as Name. But your Lordship has this Priviledge, it seems to speak of your Inferences as if they were other Mens Words. whereof I think I have given several Instances. I am fure I have given one; where you * feem to speak of clear and distinct Ideas as my Words, when they are only your Words there infer'd from my words evident Knowledge; and other the like Instances might be produced, were there any need.

* p. 63.

Had your Lordship produced Mr. Boyle's Testimony, that Nature in our Tongue had the same signification with Substance, I should presently have submitted to so great an Authority, and taken it for proper English. and a clear way of expressing ones felf, to use Nature and Substance promiscuously one for another. But fince I think there is no Instance of any one who ever did fo, and therefore it must be a new, and consequently no very clear way of Speaking; give me leave, my Lord, to wonder, why in all this Dispute about the term Nature, upon the clear and right understanding whereof, you lay fo much stress, you have not been pleased to define it; which would put an end to all Disputes about the meaning of it, and leave no doubtfulness, no obscurity in your use of it, nor any room for any Dispute

Dispute what you mean by it. This would have faved many Pages of Paper, though perhaps it would have made us lofe your learned Account of what the Ancients have faid concerning of ous, and the feveral ac-

ceptations they used it in.

All the other Authors Greek and Latin your Lordship has quoted, may, for ought I know, have used the Terms que and Natura, properly in their Languages; and have discoursed very clearly and intelligibly about what those Terms in their Countries fignified. But how that proves, there was no difficulties in the Sense or Construction in that Discourse of yours, concerning Nature, which I, and those I consulted upon it, did not understand, is hard to see. Your Lordship's Discourse was obscure and too difficult then for me, and so I must own it Whether my Friend be any better enlightened by what you have faid to him here, out of fo many ancient Authors, I am too remote from him at the Writing of this to know, and fo shall not trouble your Lordship with any Conversation, which perhaps when we meet again we may have upon it.

The next Passage of your Vindication, which was complained of to be very hard to be understood, was this, where you fay, * That you grant that by Sensation and Reflecti- * Vindic. on, we come to know the Powers and Properties P. 253. of Things; but our Reason is satisfied that there must be something beyond these; because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves.

that

that the nature of things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to meer Ideas. To rectifie the mistake had been made in my first Letter p. 157. in taking Reason here to mean + 1 Answi the Faculty of Reason, you tell me + 1 might eafily have feen, that by Reason your Lordship understood Principles of Reason allowed by Man-Il 2 Let. To which it was replied, | That then this Passage of yours, must be read thus, viz. That your Lordship grants that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the properties of things; but our Reason, i. e. the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind are satisfied that there must be something beyoud these; because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves. So that the Nature of things properly belongs to our Reason, i. e. to the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind, and not to meer. Ideas, " which made " it feem more unintelligible than it was before.

> To the complaint was made of the unintelligibleness of this Passage in this last Sense given by your Lordship, you answer nothing. So that we [i.e. my Friends whom I consulted and I are still excusable if not understanding what is signified by these Ex-The Principles of Reason allowed pressions. by Mankind are satisfied, and, the Nature of Things properly belongs to the Principles of Rea-Son allowed by Mankind, we see not the connestion of the Propositions here tied together by the Words fo that, which was the thing complained of in these Words, viz. That the inference here, both for its " Con-

* 2 Letter p. 121.

p. 101.

p. 125.

126.

"Connection and Expression seemed hard to be understood; and more to the same Purpose, which your Lordship takes no notice of.

Indeed your Lordship repeats these Words of mine, " That in both Senses of the word " Reason, either taken for a Faculty, or for. the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind; " Reason and Ideas may consist together; and then fubjoins, i That this leads your + p. 105. Lordship to the Examination of that which may be of some use, viz. To shere the difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method Which how it any of Certainty by Reason. way justifies your opposing Ideas and Reason. as you here, and elsewhere often do; or shews. That Ideas are inconsistent with the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind, I leave to the Reader to judge. Your Lordship for the clearing of what you had faid, in your Vindication, &c. from Obscurity and Unintelligibleness, which were complained of in it; is to prove, That Ideas are inconfiftent with the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind; and in Answer to this, you fay, vou will shew the difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certain-

My Lord, as I remember, the Expression in Question, was not, That the Nature of Things properly belongs to our Reason, and not to my Method of Certainty by Ideas: But this, That the Nature of Things belongs to our Reason, and not to meer Ideas. So that the thing you were here to shew, was, That Reason,

ty by Reason.

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i. e. the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind, and Ideas, and not the Principles of Reason, and my Method of Certainty by Ideas. cannot consist together: For the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind, and Ideas, may consist together; though perhaps, my Method of Certainty by Ideas, should prove inconsistent with those Principles: So that if all that you fay, from this to the 153 Page, i. e. forty eight Pages were as clear Demonstration, as I humbly conceive it is the contrary; yet it does nothing to clear the Passage in hand, but leaves that part of your Discourse, concerning Nature, lying still under the Objection was made against it, as much, as if you had not faid one Word.

But since, I am not unwilling that my Method of Certainty should be examin'd; and I should be glad (if there be any Faults in it) to learn the Defects of that my Desinition of Knowledge, from so great a Master as your Lordship; I will consider what you here say, to show the Difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason.

† p. 105. Your Lordship fays, † That the way of

Certainty by Reason lies in two things.

1. The Certainty of Principles.
2. The Certainty of Deductions.

I grant, That a part of that which is called Certainty by Reason, lies in the Certainty of Principles; which Principles, I presume, your Lordship and I are agreed, are several Propositions.

If then these Principles are Propositions. to shew the Difference between your Lordship's way of Certainty by Reason, and my way of Certainty by Ideas; I think it is visible. That you ought to shew wherein the Certainty of those Propositions consists in your way by Reason, different from that wherein I make it consist in my way by Ideas. Example, your Lordship and I are agreed, that this Proposition, whatsoever is is, is a Principle of Reason, or a Maxim. Now my way of Certainty by Ideas, is, That the Certainty of this Proposition consists in this, that there is a perceivable Connection or Agreement, between the Idea of Being and the Idea of Being, or between the Idea of Existence and the Idea of Existence, as is expressed in that Proposition. But now in your way of Reason, pray, wherein does the Certainty of this Proposition consist? If it be in any thing different from that perceivable Agreement of the Ideas, affirm'd of one another in it, I beseech your Lordship to tell it me; if not, I beg leave to conclude, that your way of Certainty by Reason, and my way of Certainty by Ideas, in this Case are just the same.

But instead of saying any thing, to shew wherein the Certainty of Principles is different in the way of Reason, from the Certainty of Principles in the way of Ideas, upon my Friends shewing, That you had no ground to say as you did; That I had no Idea of Reason, as it stands for Principles of Reason, your Lordship takes occasion (as what will not, in a skillful hand, serve to introduce

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† p. 106. any thing one has a mind to) to tell me, † What Ideas I have of them must appear from my Book; and you do there find a Chapter of self-evident Propositions and Maxims, which you cannot but think extraordinary for the Design of it, which is thus summed in the Con-

fign of it, which is thus summed in the Con-† B. 4. C. clusion, † viz. That it was to shew, "That these 7. §. 20. "Maxims as they are of little Use, where "we have clear and distinct Ideas, so they "are of dangerous Use, where our Ideas are not clear and distinct." And is not this a fair way to convince your Lordship, that my way of Ideas is very consistent with the Certainty of Reason, when the way of Reason hath been always supposed to proceed upon general Principles, and I assert them to be useless and dangerous?

In which Words I crave leave to ob-

ferve,

1. That the Pronoun them here, seems to have Reference to self-evident Propositions, to Maxims, and to Principles, as Terms used by your Lordship and me; though it be certain, That you and I use them in a far different Sense: For, if I mistake not, you use them all three promiscuously one for another; whereas its plain, That in that

+ Essay B. Chapter, † out of which you bring your 4. C. 7. Quotations here, I distinguish self-evident Propositions from those, which I there mention under the Name of Maxims, which are principally these two, Whatsoever is is, and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. Farther, it is plain, out of the same place, That by Maxims I there mean general

general Propositions, which are so univerfally received under the Name of Maxims or Axioms, that they are looked upon as innate; the two chief whereof, principally there meant, are those above-mentioned: But what the Propositions are which you comprehend under Maxims, or Principles of Reason, cannot be determined, since your Lordship neither defines, nor enumerates them; and so 'tis impossible, precisely, to know what you mean by them here: And that which makes me more at a loss, is, That in this Argument, * you fet down for * p. 108. Principles or Maxims, Propositions that are not so much as felf-evident, viz. This, That the Essential Properties of a Man, are to reason

and discourse, &c.

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2. I crave leave to observe, That you tell me, That in my Book you find a Chapter of self-evident Propositions and Maxims, whereas I find no fuch Chapter in my Book: I have in it indeed, a Chapter of Maxims, but never an one entitled, Of self-evident Propositions and Maxims. This 'tis possible your Lordship will call a nice Criticism; but yet it is fuch an one, as is very necessary in the Case: For in that Chapter I, as is before obferved, expresly distinguish self-evident Propositions from the received Maxims or Axioms, which I there speak of: Whereas it seems to me, to be your Design (in joining them in a Title of a Chapter, contrary to what I had done) to have it thought, That I treated of them as one and the same thimg; and so all that I said there, of the Uselessness of 5 4

fome few general Propositions, under the Title of received Maxims, might be applied to all self-evident Propositions, the quite contrary whereof was the Defign of that Chapter. For that which I endeavour to shew there, is, That all our Knowledge is not built on those few received general Propofitions, which are ordinarily called Maxims or Axioms; but that there are a great many Truths may be known without them: But that there is any Knowledge without felf-evident Propositions, I am so far from denying, that I am accused by your Lordship for requiring in Demonstration, more such than you think are necessary. This feems, I fav. to be your Design; and I wish your Lordship, by entitling my Chapter as I my self did, and not as it would best serve your turn, had not made it necessary for me to make this nice Criticism. This is certain, That without thus confounding Maxims and self-evident Propositions, what you here fay, would not so much, as in Appearance, concern me: For,

3. I crave leave to observe, That all the Argument your Lordship uses here against me to prove, That my way of Certainty by Ideas, is inconsistent with the way of Certainty by Reason, which lies in the Certainty of Principles, is this, That the way of Reason hath been alway supposed to proceed upon general Principles, and I affert them to be useless and dangerous. Be pleased, my Lord, to define or enumerate your general Principles, and then we shall see whether I affert them to be useless

useless and dangerous, and whether they, who supposed the way of Reason, was to proceed upon general Principles, differ'd from me; and if they did differ, whether theirs was more the way of Reason than mine: But to talk thus of General Principles, which have always been supposed the way of Reason, without telling fo much as which, or what they are, is not fo much as by Authority to shew, That my way of Certainty by Ideas, is inconsistent with the way of Certainty by Reason: Much less is it in reality to prove it. Because admitting I had faid any thing contrary to what, as you say, has been always supposed, its being supposed, proves it not to be true; because we know that several things have been for many Ages generally supposed, which at last, upon Examination, have been found not to be true.

What hath been always supposed, is fit only for your Lordship's great Reading to declare: But such Arguments, I confess, are wholly loft upon me, who have not Time or Occasion to examine what has always been supposed; especially in those Questions which concern Truths, that are to be known from the Nature of things. Because, I think, they cannot be established by Majority of Votes, not easie to be collected, nor if they were collected, can convey Certainty till it can be supposed, that the greater part of Mankind are always in the right. In Matters of Fact, I own we must govern our felves by the Testimonies of others; but in Matters of Speculation

to suppose on, as others have supposed before us, is supposed by many to be only a way to learned Ignorance, which enables to talk much and know but little. The Truths. which the Penetration and Labours of others before us have discovered and made out, I own, we are infinitely indebted to them for: and fome of them are of that Confequence, that we cannot acknowledge too much, the advantages we receive from those great Masters in Knowledge: But where they only supposed, they left it to us to fearch, and advance farther. And in those things, I think, it becomes our Industry to employ it felf, for the Improvement of the Knowledge, and adding to the Stock of Discoveries left us by our inquifitive and thinking Predecessors.

4. One thing more I crave leave to ob-

ferve, viz. That to these Words, "These " Maxims, as they are of little use where " we have clear and distinct Ideas, so they are of dangerous Use where our Ideas are " not clear and distinct," quoted out of * p. 106. my Essay, you subjoin, * And is not this a fair way to convince your Lordship, that my way of Ideas is very consistent with the Certainty of Reason? Answer. My Lord, my Esfay and those Words in it, were writ many Years before I dreamt, that you or any body else would ever question the consistency of my way of Certainty by Ideas, with the way of Certainty by Reason; and so could not be intended to convince your Lordship in this Point: And fince you first faid, That thefe

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thefe two ways are inconsistent, I never brought those Words to convince you, That my way is consistent with the Certainty of Reason: And therefore why you ask, whether that be a fair way to convince you, which was never made use of as any way to convince you of any such thing, is hard to imagin.

But your Lordship goes on in the following Words, with the like kind of Argument, i where you tell me, that I say, i p. 106—

"That my first design is to prove, 107.

"That the consideration of those general Essay B.

"Maxims adds nothing to the Evi-Sect. 4.

" dence or Certainty of Knowledge; which fays your Lordship, Overthrows all that which bath been accounted Science and Demonstration, and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism; because our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principle of Reason. To make this plain, you say, you will put a Case grounded upon my Words; which are, That I have discoursed with very rational Men. who have actually deny'd that they are Men. These Words I. S. understands as spoken of themselves, and charges them with very ill Confequences; but you think they are capable of an other meaning: However, fays your Lordship, let us put the Case, That Men did in earnest question, whether they were Men or not; and then you do not see, if I set aside general Maxims, how I can convince them, that For the way your Lordship they are Men. looks on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary Sceptical Men, is by general Maxims and Principles of Reason. Answer.

Answer. I can neither in that Paragraph nor Chapter, find that I say, That my sirst design is to prove, that these general Maxims [i. e. those which your Lordship calls general Principles of Reason] add nothing to the Evidence and Certainty of Knowledge in general: For so these Words must be understood to make good the Consequence which your Lordship charges on them, viz. That they overthrow all that has been accounted Science and Demonstration, and lay the Foundations of Scepticism.

What my design in that place is, is evident from these Words in the foregoing 4 sect. 3. Paragraph, † "Let us consider whether this Self-evidence be peculiar only to those Propositions, which are received for Maxims, and have the Dignity of Axioms allowed; and here tis plain, that several other Truths, not allowed to be Axioms, partake equally with them

to be Axioms, partake equally with them in this Self-evidence; which shews that my design there was to evince, that there were Truths that are not called Maxims, that are as Self-evident as those received Maxims. Pursuant to this design, I say, * That the consideration of these

* See 4. fay, * " That the consideration of these "Axioms [i.e. whatsoever is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be] "can add nothing to the Evidence and Certainty of its [i.e. the Minds] "Knowledge [i.e. of the Truth of more particular Propositions concerning Identity]. These are my Words in that place, and that the Sense of them is according to the Limitation

Limitation annexed to them; between those Crotchets I refer my Reader to that fourth Section, where he will find that all that I fav amounts to no more but what is exprefsed in these Words, in the close of it; "I appeal to every one's own Mind, whe-" ther this Proposition, A Circle is a Cir-" cle, be not as Self-evident a Proposition, " as that confifting of more general Terms, " What soever is, is: And again, whether "this Proposition, Blue is not Red, be not " a Proposition that the Mind can no more "doubt of, as foon as it understands the "Words, than it does of that Axiom, It is impossible for the same thing to be and " not to be? and so of all the like." And now I ask your Lordship, whether you do affirm of this, That it overthrows all that which hath been counted Science and Demonstration, and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism? If you do, I shall desire you to prove it; if you do not, I must desire you to consider how fairly my Sense has been represented.

But supposing you had represented my Sense right, and that the little or dangerous use which I there limit to certain Maxims, had been meant of all Principles of Reason in general, in your Sense, what had this been, my Lord, to the Question under debate? Your Lordship undertakes to shew, That your way of Certainty by Reason is different from my way of Certainty by Ideas. To do this, you say in the preceding Page, * That Certainty by Reason, lies * p. 105.

I. In

1. In Certainty of Principles, 2. In Certainty of Deductions. The first of these you are upon here, and if in order to what you had undertaken, your Lordship had shewn, That in your way by Reason, those Principles were certain; but in my way by Ideas, we could not attain to any Certainty concerning them. This, indeed, had been to shew a difference between my way of Certainty, which you call the way by Ideas; and yours, which you call the way by Reason, in this part of Certainty, that lies in the Certainty of Principles. I have faid in the Words quoted by your Lordship, That the consideration of those two Maxims, What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, are not of use to add any thing to the Evidence or Certainty of our Knowledge of the Truth of Identical Predications; but I never faid those Maxims were in the least uncertain; I may perhaps think otherwise of their use, than your Lordship does, but I think no otherwise of their Truth and Certainty than you do; they are left in their full Force and Certainty for your use, if you can make any better use of them. than what I think can be made: So that in respect of the allowed Certainty of those Principles, my way differs not at all from your Lordship's.

Pray, my Lord, look over that Chapter again, and see whether I bring their Truth and Certainty any more into Question, than you your self do; and 'tis about their Certainty, and not Use, that the Question

here

here is between your Lordship and me: We both agree, That they are both undoubtedly Certain; all then that you bring in the following Pages about their Use, is nothing to the present Question about the Certainty of Principles, which your Lordship is upon in this place; and you will prove, That your way of Certainty by Reason, is different from my way of Certainty by Ideas; when you can shew, That you are certain of the Truth of those, or any other Maxims any otherwise, than by the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas

as expressed in them.

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But your Lordship passing by that wholly, endeavours to prove, that my faying, That the confideration of those two general Maxims can add nothing to the Evidence and Certainty of Knowledge in Identical Predications (for that is all that I there fay) overthrows all that has been accounted Science and Demonstration, and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism, and 'tis by a very remarkable Proof, viz. Because our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principles of Reason; which is the very thing I there not only deny, but have disproved; and therefore should not, I humbly conceive, have been rested on as a Proof of any thing else, till my Arguments against it had been answered.

But instead of that, your Lordship says,

* You will put a Case that shall make it *p. 107.

plain, which is the Business of the six following Pages, which are spent in this Case.

The

The Case is founded upon a Supposition, which you feem willing to have thought that you borrowed either from J. S. or from me: Whereas, truly that Supposition is neither that Gentleman's nor mine, but purely your Lordship's own. For however grofly Mr. J. S. has mistaken (which he has fince acknowledg'd in Print) the obvious Sense of those Words of my Essay * on which you say you ground your Case; yet, 7.Sect. 17. I must do him Right herein, that he himfelf supposed not, that any Man in his Wits, ever in earnest questioned whether he bimself were a Man or no; though by a mistake (which I cannot but wonder at, in one so much exercised in Controversie as

Mr. J. S.) he charged me with faying

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Your Lordship indeed fays, i That you think my Words there may have an other mean-+ p. 107. ing: Would you thereby infinuate, That you think it possible they should have that meaning which F. S. once gave them? If you do not, my Lord, Mr. J. S. and his understanding them so, is in vain brought in here to countenance your making fuch a Supposition. If you do think those Words of my Essay capable of such a meaning as 7. S. gave them, there will appear a strange Harmony between your Lordship's and Mr. J. S.'s Understanding, when he mistakes what is faid in my Book: Whether it will continue now Mr. J. S. takes me right, I know not; but let us come to the Case as

* p. 107. you put it. Your Words * are,

it.

Let us put the Case, That Men did in earnest question whether they were Men or not. Your Lordship fays, You do not then see, if I set aside general Maxims, how I can convince them that they are Men. Answer. And do you, my Lord, fee that with Maxims, you can convince them of that or any thing else? I confess, whatever you should do, I should think it scarce worth while to Reason with them about any thing. lieve you are the first that ever supposed a Man so much besides himself, as to question whether he were a Man or no, and yet fo rational, as to be thought capable of being convinced of that or any thing by Discourse of Reason. This, methinks, is little different from supposing a Man in and out of his Wits at the same time.

But let us suppose your Lordship so lucky with your Maxims, that you do convince a Man (that doubts of it) that he is a Man; what Proof, I beseech you, my Lord, is that of this Proposition, That our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general

Principles of Reason?

On the contrary, suppose it should happen, as is the more likely, that your setting upon him with your Maxims cannot convince him; are we not by this your Case to take this for a Proof, That general Principles of Reason are not the Grounds of Certainty? For 'tis upon the success, or not success of your Endeavours, to convince such a Man with Maxims, that your Lordship puts the Proof of this Proposition,

That our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon general Principles of Reason: The Issue whereof must remain in suspense, till you have found such a Man to bring it to Tryal; and so the Proof is far enough off, unless you think the Case so plain, that every one sees such a Man will be presently convinced by your Maxims, though I should think it probable that most People may think he will not.

4 p. 107.

Your Lordship adds, of For the way you look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary Sceptical Men, is by general Maxims and Principles of Reason. Answer. This indeed, is a Reason why your Lordship should use Maxims when you have to do with such extraordinary Sceptical Men; because you look on it as the likeliest way to prevail. But pray, my Lord, is your looking on it as the best way to prevail on such extraordinary Sceptical Men, any Proof, That our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principles of Reason; for 'twas to make this plain that this Case was put?

Farther, my Lord, give me leave to ask, what have we here to do with the ways of convincing others of what they do not know, or affent to? Your Lordship and I are not as, I think, disputing of the Methods of persuading others of what they are ignorant of, and do not yet affent to; but our debate here, is about the Ground of Certainty in what they do know, and affent

to.

However, you go on * to fet down fe-* p. 107 veral Maxims which you look on as most & 108. apt to prevail upon your extraordinary Sceptical Man, to convince him that he Exists, and that he is a Man. The Maxims are, †

That nothing can have no Operations. + p. 108.

That all different forts of Being are distinguished by Essential Properties.

That the Essential Properties of a Man, are

to Reason, Discourse, &c.

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That these Properties cannot subsist by them-

felves, without a real Substance.

I will not question whether a Man cannot know, that he exists; or be certain (for tis of Knowledge and Certainty the Quethion here is) that he is a Man, without the help of these Maxims. I will only crave leave to ask, how you know that thefe are Maxims? For methinks this, That the efential Properties of a Man are Reason, Discourse, &c. an imperfect Proposition, with and fo forth at the end of it, is a pretty fort of Maxim. That therefore which I defire to be informed here, is, how your Lordship knows thefe, or any other Propositions to be Maxims; and how Propositions, that are Maxims, are to be distinguished from Propositions that are not Maxims? And the Reason why I insist upon it, is this: Because this, and this only, would shew, whether what I have faid in my Chapter about Maxims, overthrows all that has been accounted Science and Demonstration, and lays the Foundation of Scepticism, But I fear my Request, T 2 That

That you would be pleased to tell me, what you mean by Maxims, that I may know, what Propositions, according to your Lordship, are, and what are not Maxims, will not easily be granted me: Because it would presently put an end to all that you impute to me, as said, in that Chapter against Maxims, in a Sense, that I use not the Word there.

* p. 109.

Your Lordship * makes me, out of my Book, answer to the use you make of the Four above-mentioned Propositions, which you call Maxims, as if I were declared of an Opinion, That Maxims could not be of any use in Arguing with others: Which methinks you should not have done, if you had considered my Chapter of Maxims, which you so often quote. For I there say, if "Maxims are useful to stop the Mouths" of Wranglers—to shew, That

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+ Essay B. 4. C. 7. 5. 11.

wrong Opinions lead to Absurdities, &c.

* p. 109.

Your Lordship nevertheless, * goes on to prove, That without the help of these Principles or Maxims, I cannot prove to any, that doubt it, that they are Men in my way of Ideas. Answ. I beseech you, my Lord, to give me leave to mind you again, that the Question is not, what I can prove; but whether in my way by Ideas, I cannot without the help of these Principles know, that I am a Man; and be certain of the Truth of that; and several other Propositions: I say of several other Propositions. For I do not think you in your way of Certainty by Reason, pre-

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pretend to be certain of all Truths; or to be able to prove (to those who doubt) all Propositions, or so much as be able to convince every one of the Truth of every Proposition, that you your felf are certain of. There be many Propositions in Mr. Newton's excellent Book, which there are Thoufands of People, and those a little more Rational, than fuch as should deny themfelves to be Men; whom Mr. Newton himfelf would not be able, with or without the use of Maxims used in Mathematicks, to convince of the Truth of: And yet this would be no Argument against his Method of Certainty, whereby he came to the Knowledge, that they are True. What therefore you can conclude, as to my way of Certainty, from a Supposition of my not being able in my way by Ideas, to convince those who doubt of it, that they are Men, I do not fee. But your Lordship is resolved to prove that I cannot, and fo you go on.

1. Your Lordship says, if That I suppose + p. 110, that we must have a clear and distinct idea of that we are certain of; and this you prove out of my Chapter of Maxims, where I say, "That "every one knows the Ideas that he has, and that distinctly and unconfusedly one from another." Answ. I suspected all along, that you mistook what I meant by confused ideas. If your Lordship pleases to turn to my Chapter of distinct and confused Ideas, * you will there find, that an Idea, * Essay B. which is distinguished in the Mind from all 2. C. 29. others, may yet be consused: The Consus

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fion being made by a careless Application of distinct Names to Ideas, that are not sufficiently distinct. Which having explained at large, in that Chapter, I shall not need here again to repeat. Only permit me to fet down an Instance. He that has the Idea of the Liquor that Circulating through the Heart of a Sheep, keeps that Animal alive, and he that has the Idea of the Liquor that Circulates through the Heart of a Lobster, has two different Ideas; as distinct as an Idea of an aqueous pellucid cold Liquor, is from the Idea of a red opaque hot Liquor, but yet these Two may be confounded by giving the Name Blood to this vital circulating Liquor of a Lobster.

This being considered will shew, how what I have said there, may consist with my saying, That to Certainty Ideas are not required, that are in all their parts perfectly clear and distinct: Because Certainty being spoken there of the Knowledge of the Truth of any Proposition, and Propositions being made in Words, it may be true, That notwithstanding all the Ideas we have in our Minds, are, as far as we have them there, clear and distinct; yet those which we would suppose the Terms in the Proposition to stand for, may not be clear and distinct

either.

1. By making the Term stand for an uncertain Idea, which we have not yet precisely determined in our Minds, whereby it comes to stand sometimes for one Idea, sometimes for another. Which, though when when we reflect on them, they are distinct in our Minds, yet by this use of a Name undetermined in its Signification, come to be

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2. By supposing the Name to stand for fomething more than really is in the Idea in our Minds, which we make it a fign of, v. g. let us suppose, That a Man many Years fince, when he was Young, Eat a Fruit, whose shape, size, consistency and colour, he has a perfect Remembrance of; but the particular Tast he has forgot, and only remembers, that it very much delight-This complex Idea, as far as it is in his Mind, 'tis evident, is there; and as far as he perceives it, when he reflects on it, is in all its parts clear and distinct; but when he calls it a Pine-Apple, and will suppose, that Name stands for the same precife complex Idea, for which another Man (who newly Eat of that Fruit, and has the Idea of the Tast of it also fresh in his Mind) uses it, or for which he himself used it, when he had the Tast fresh in his Memory, tis plain his complex Idea in that part, which consists in the Tast, is very obscure.

To apply this to what your Lordship here * makes me suppose. I Answer, * P. 110.

here * makes me suppose, I Answer,

1. I do not suppose, That to Certainty
it is requisite, that an Idea should be in all
its parts clear and distinct. I can be certain, that a Pine-Apple is not an Artichoak,
though my Idea, which I suppose that Name
to stand for, be in me obscure and confused,
in regard of its Tast.

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2. I do not deny, but on the contrary, I affirm. That I can have a clear and distinct Idea of a Man, (i. e. the Idea I give the name Man to, may be clear and distinct) though it should be true, That Men are not yet agreed on the determined Idea, that the name Man shall stand for. Whatever Confusion there may be in the Idea, to which that Name is indeterminately apply'd; I do allow and affirm, That every one if he pleases, may have a clear and distinct Idea of a Man to himself, i.e. which he makes the word Man stand for: Which, if he makes known to others in his Discourse with them about Man, all verbal Dispute will cease, and he cannot be mistaken, when he uses the term Man. And if this were but done with most of the glittering Terms brandished in Disputes, it would often be feen how little fome Men have to fay, who with equivocal Words and Expressions, make no small noise in Controversie.

* p. 114.

Your Lordship concludes this part, by saying, * Thus you have shew'd how inconsistent my way of Ideas is with true Certainty, and of what use and necessity these general Principles of Reason are. Answ. By the Laws of Disputation, which in another place, you express such a regard to, one is bound not to change the Terms of the Question. This I crave leave humbly to offer to your Lordship, because, as far as I have looked into Controversie, I do not remember to have met with any one so apt, shall I say, to forget or change the question as your Lordship.

fhip. This, my Lord, I should not venture to fay, but upon very good Grounds, which I shall be ready to give you an account of, whenever you shall demand it of me. One Example of it we have here, † you fay, + p. 114. you have shew'd how inconsistent my way of Ideas is with true Certainty; and of what use and necessity these general Principles of Reason are. My Lord, if you please to look back to the 10sth Page, you will fee, what you there promised, was, to shew the difference of my method of Certainty by Ideas, and the method of Certainty by Reason: And particularly in the Pages between that and this, the Certainty of Principles, which you fay, is one of those two Things, wherein the way of Certainty by Reason lies. Instead of that, your Lordship concludes here; that you have shew'd two Things.

1. How inconsistent my way of Ideas is with true Certainty. Whereas it should be to shew the inconsistency or difference of my method of Certainty by Ideas, and the method of Certainty by Reason: Which are Two very different Propositions. And before you undertake to shew, That my method of Certainty, is inconsistent with true Certainty; it will be necessary for you to define, and tell us wherein true Certainty consists, which your Lordship hitherto has shewn no great forwardness

to do.

2. Another thing which you say, you have done, is, That you have shewn of what use and necessity these general Principles of Reason are. Answ. Whether by these General Principles

ciples you mean those Propositions, which you fet down, p. 108 and call there Maxims, or any other Propositions, which you have not any where fet down, I cannot tell. But whatfoever they are, that you mean here by there, I know not how the usefulness of these your General Principles, be they what they will, came to be a Question, between your Lordship and me here. If you have a Mind to shew any mistakes of mine in my Chapter of Maxims, which you fay, you think extraordinary for the Design of it, I shall not be unwilling to be rectified; but that the usefulness of Principles, is not what is here under debate between us, I, with Submission, affirm. That which your Lordship is here to prove, is, That the Certainty of Principles, which is the way of Certainty by Reason, is different from my way of Certainty by Ideas. Upon the whole, I crave leave to fay in your Words, That thus I have, I humbly conceive, made it appear, that you have not shewed any difference, much less any inconsistency of my method of Certainty by Ideas, and the method of Certainty by Reason, in that first Part, which you assign of Certainty by Reason, viz. Certainty of Principles.

I come now to the fecond Part, which * p. 105. you assign * of Certainty by Reason, viz. Certainty of Deductions. I only crave leave first to set down these Words in the latter end of your Discourse, which we have been considering, where your Lordship says, you beginto think J. S. was in the right, when he made

made me say, "That I had discoursed with "very rational Men who denyed themselves to be Men" Answ. I do not know what may be done by those who have such a Command over the Pronouns They and Them, as to put they themselves for they. I shall therefore desire my Reader to turn to that Passage of my Book, and see, whether he too can be so lucky as your Lordship, and can with you begin to Think, that by these Words, 'f' Who have actually denyed, f essay B. "that they, i. e. Infants and Changelings 4. C. 7. "are Men." I meant, who attually denyed, § 17.

that they themselves were Men.

Your Lordship, to prove my method of Certainty by Ideas, to be different from, and inconsistent with your second Part of the Certainty by Reason, which you say, lies in the Certainty of Deductions, begins thus: * * p. 114. That you come now to the Certainty of Reason, in making Deductions; and here you shall briefly lay down the Grounds of Certainty, which the ancient Philosophers went upon, and then compare my way of Ideas with them. To which, give me leave, my Lord, to Reply. (1.) That, I humbly conceive, it should have been Grounds of Certainty [in making Deductions] which the ancient Philosophers went upon, or else they will be nothing to the Proposition, which your Lordship has undertaken here to prove. Now of the Certainty in making Deductions, I see none of the Ancients produced by your Lordship, who fay any thing to shew, wherein it confifts, but Aristotle. Who, as you say, in + p. 116.

his Method of infering one thing from another, went upon this common Principle of Reason, that what things agree in a Third, agree among themselves. And it so falls out, That so far as he goes towards the shewing, wherein the Certainty of Deductions confifts, he and I agree, as is evident by what I say in my Estay *. And if Aristotle had gon any farther to shew, how we are certain, that those two Things agree with a Third, he would have placed that Certainty in the Perception of that Agreement, as I have done, and then he and I should have perfectly agreed. I presume to say, if Aristotle had gon farther in this matter, he would have placed our Knowledge or Certainty of the Agreement of any two Things in the Perception of their Agreement. And let not any one from hence think, I attribute too much to my felf, in faying, That that accute and judicious Philosopher, if he had gone farther in that matter, would have done as I have done. For if he omitted it, I imagin it was not, that he did not see it, but that it was fo Obvious and Evident, that it appear'd fuperfluous to name it. For who can doubt that the Knowledge or being Certain, that any two Things agree, consists in the Perception of their Agreement? What else can it possibly consist in? It is so obvious, that it would be a little extraordinary to think. that he that went fo far could miss it. And I should wonder, if any one should allow the Certainty of Deduction, to confift in the Agreement of two Things in a Third, and

*B. 4. C. 2. § 2. & C. 17. §

yet should deny that the Knowledge or Certainty of that Agreement, confifted in the

Perception of it.

(2.) In the next place, my Lord, suppoling my Method of Certainty, in making Deductions, were different from those of the Ancients; this, at best, would be only. that which I call, * Argumentum ad Vere- * Effav R. cundiam; which proves not on which fide C. 17. 4. Reason is, though I in Modesty should an- Sect. 19.

fwer nothing to their Authorities.

(3.) The Ancients, as it feems by your Lordship, not agreeing one among another, about the Grounds of Certainty; what can their Authorities signifie in the Case? Or, how will it appear, that I differ from Reafon, in differing from any of them, more than that they differ from Reason, in differing one from another? And therefore, after all the different Authorities, produced by you, out of your great Treasure of Reading, the matter will at last reduce it felf to this Point, That your Lordship should tell us, wherein the Certainty, of Reason, in making Deductions confifts; and then shew, wherein my Method of making Deductions, differs from it: Which whether you have done or no, we shall see in what follows.

Your Lordship closes your very Learned, and to other Purposes very Useful, Account of the Opinions of the Ancients, concerning Certainty, with these Words; That thus p. 120. you have, in as few Words as you could, laid together those old Methods of Certainty, which have obtained greatest Reputation in the World.

Where-

Wherenpon I must crave leave to mind you again, That the Proposition, you are here upon, and have undertaken to prove in this place, is concerning the Certainty of Deductions, and not concerning Certainty in general. I say not this, that I am willing to decline the Examination of my Method of Certainty in general, any way, or in any place: But I say it to observe, that in Discourses of this Nature, the Laws of Disputation have wisely ordered the Proposition under Debate, to be kept to, and that in the same Terms to avoid Wandring, Obscurity and Consusion.

I therefore proceed now to consider what use your Lordship makes of the Ancients, against my way of Certainty in General. Since you think sit to make no use of them, as to the Certainty of Reason, in making Deductions, though it is under this your second Branch of Certainty by Reason, that you bring them in.

* p. 120.

Your first Objection here, * is that old one again, That my way of Certainty by Ideas is new. Answer. Your calling of it New does not prove it to be different from that of Reason: But your Lordship proves it to be New.

† ib.

1. Because here [i.e. in my way] we have no General Principles. Answer. I do, as your Lordship knows, own the Truth and Certainty of the received general Maximus, and I contend for the Usefulness and Necessity of self-evident Propositions in all Certainty, whether of Intuition or Demonstration.

tion. What therefore those General Principles are, which you have not in my way of Certainty by Ideas, which your Lordship has in your way of Certainty by Reason, I befeech you to tell, and thereby to make

good this Affertion against me.

2. Your Lordship fays, * That here [i. e. * p. 120. in my way we have no Antecedents and Consequents, no syllogistical Methods of Demonstration. Answer. If your Lordship here means, That there be no Antecedents and Consequents in my Book, or that I speak not, or allow not of Syllogism as a Form of Argumentation, that has its use, I humbly conceive the contrary is plain. But if by here we have no Antecedents and Consequents, no Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration, you mean, That I do not place Certainty, in having Antecedents and Consequents, or in making of Syllogifms, I grant I do not; I have faid Syllogifms inflead of your Words, Syllogiftical Methods of Demonstration; which examined, amount here to no more than Syllogifms: For Syllogistical Methods are nothing but mode & figure, i. e. Syllogisms; and the Rules of Syllogifms are the same, whether the Syllogisms be used in Demonstration or in Probability. But 'twas convenient for you to fay, Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration, if you would have it thought, that Certainty is placed in it: For to have named bare Syllogifm, without annexing Demonstration to it, would have spoiled all, since every one who knows what Syllogism is, knows it

may as well be used in Topical or Fallacious

Arguments, as in Demonstration.

Your Lordship charges me then, That in my way by Ideas, I do not place Certainty, in having Antecedents and Consequents. And pray, my Lord, do you in your way by Reason do so? If you do, this is certain, That every body has, or may have Certainty in every thing he disourses about: For every one, in any Discourse he makes has, or may, if he pleases, have Antecedents and Conse-

quents.

Again, your Lordship charges me, That I do not place Certainty in Syllogism. I crave leave to ask again; And does your Lordship? And is this the difference between your way of Certainty by Reason, and my way of Certainty by Ideas? Why else is it objected to me, That I do not, if your Lordship does not place Certainty in Syllogifm? And if you do, I know nothing fo requisite, as that you should advise all People, Women and all, to betake themselves immediately to the Universities, and to the learning of Logick; to put themselves out of the dangerous State of Scepticism: For there young Lads, by being taught Syllogifm, arrive at Certainty; whereas, without Mode and Figure, the World is in perfect Ignorance and Uncertainty, and is fure of nothing. The Merchant cannot be certain that his Account is right cast up, nor the Lady that her Coach is not a Wheelbarrow, nor her Dairy-maid, that one and one Pound of Butter are two Pounds of Butter,

Butter, and two and two four; and all for want of Mode and Figure: Nay, according to this Rule, whoever lived before Aristotle, or him, whoever it was, that first introduced Syllogism, could not be certain of any thing; no, not that there was a God, which will be the present State of the far greatest part of Mankind (to pass by whole Nations of the East, as China, and Indostan, &c.) even in the Christian World, who to this day have not the Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration, and so cannot be

certain of any thing.

3. Your Lordship farther fays, That in my way of Certainty by Ideas we have no Criterion. Answer. To perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas, and not to perceive the Agreement or Difagreement of two Ideas, is, I think, a Criterion to distinguish what a Man is certain of, from what he is not certain of. Has your Lordship any other or better Criterion to distinguish Certainty from Uncertainty? If you have, I repeat again my earnest Request, That you would be pleased to do that Right to your way of Certainty by Reason, as not to conceal it. If your Lordship has not, why is the want of a Criterion, when I have so plain a one, objected to my way of Certainty, and my way fo often accused of a tendency to Scepticism and Infidelity, when you your Self have not a better? And I think I may take the liberty to fay, if yours be not the same, you have not one fo good.

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Perhaps

Perhaps your Lordship will censure me here, and think it is more than becomes me, to press you so hard concerning your own way; and to ask, whether your way of Certainty lies in having Antecedents and Consequents, and Syllogisms; And whether it has any other or better Criterion, than what I have given: Your Lordship will posfibly think it enough, that you have laid down the Grounds of Certainty which the ancient Grecians went upon. My Lord, if you think fo, I must be satisfied with it: Though perhaps others will think it strange, that in a Dispute about a Method of Certainty, which for its supposed coming short of Certainty, you charge with a Tendency to Scepticifin and Infidelity; you should produce only the different Opinions of other Men, concerning Certainty, to make good this Charge, without declaring any of those different Opinions or Grounds of Certainty to be true or false: And some may be apt to suspect that you your self are not yet refolved wherein to place it.

But, my Lord, I know too well, what your distance above me requires of me, to say any such thing to your Lordship. Your own Opinions are to your self, and your not discovering them, must pass for a sufficient Reason for your not discovering them; and if you think sit to Over-lay a poor Insant modern Notion with the great and weighty Names of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and the like; and heaps of Quotations out of the Ancients, who is not

not presently to think it dead, and that there is an end of it? Especially, when it will have too much Envy for any one to open his Mouth in defence of a Notion, which is declared by your Lordship to be different, from what those great Men, whose Words are to be taken without any more ado, and who are not to be thought Ignorant or Mistaken in any thing. Though I crave leave to say, That however infallible Oracles they were, to take things barely upon their, or any Man's Authority, is barely to believe, but not to know or be certain.

Thus your Lordship has fufficiently proved my way of Certainty by Ideas to be inconfistent with the way of Certainty by Reafon, by proving it New; which you prove only by faying, That it is so wholly new, that here we have no general Principles; no Criterion; no Antecedents and Consequents: no Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration: And yet we are told of a better way of Certainty to be attained meerly by the help of Ideas; add if your Lordship pleases, signified by words, which put into Propositions, whereof some are General Principles, some are or may be Antecedents, and some Consequents, and some put together in Mode and Figure, Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration: For, pray my Lord, may not Words that stand for Ideas, be put into Propositions as well as any other? And may not those Propositions, wherein the Terms stand for Ideas, be as well put into Antecedents and Consequents, or 11 2 SylloSyllogisms, and make Maxims as well as any other Propositions, whose Terms stand not for Ideas, if your Lordship can find any fuch? And if thus Ideas can be brought into Maxims, Antecedents and Consequents, and Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration, what Inconsistency has the way of Certainty by Ideas, with those ways of Certainty by Reafon; if at last your Lordship will fay, That Certainty confifts in Propositions put together as Antecedents and Consequents, and in Mode and Figure? For as for Principles or Maxims, we shall know whether your Principles or Maxims are a way to Certainty, when you shall please to tell us, what it is, that to your Lordship, makes a Maxim or Principle, and distinguishes it from other Propositions; and whether it be any thing but an immediate Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas, as expressed in that Proposition. To conclude. by all that your Lordship has alledged out of the Ancients, you have not, as I humbly conceive, proved that my way of Certainty is new, or that they had any way of Certainty different from mine; much less have you proved that my way of Certainty by Ideas is inconsistent with the way of Certainty by Reason, which was the Propofition to be proved.

Your Lordship having thought it enough against my way of Certainty by Ideas, thus to prove its Newness, you betake your self presently to your old Topick of obscure and *p. 120. confused Ideas: And asks, * But how comes

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there to be such a way of Certainty by Ideas. and yet the Ideas themselves are so uncertain and obscure? Answer. No Idea, as it is in the Mind, is uncertain; though to those who use Names uncertainly, it may be uncertain what Idea that Name stands for. And as to obscure and confused Ideas, no Idea is so obscure in all its parts or so confounded with all other Ideas but that one, who in a Proposition, joins it with another in that part which is clear and distinct, may perceive its Agreement or Difagreement, as expressed in that Proposition: Though when Names are used for Ideas. which are in some part obscure or confounded with other Ideas, there can be no Propofitions made which can produce Certainty concerning that, wherein the Idea is obscure and confused. And therefore to your Lordship's Question, if How is it possible for us + p. 122. to have a clear Perception of the Agreement of Ideas, if the Ideas themselves be not clear and distinct? I answer, Very well; because an obscure or confused Idea, i. e. that is not perfeetly clear and distinct in all its parts, may be compared with another in that part of it, which is clear and distinct; which will, I humbly conceive, remove all those Difficulties, Inconsistencies and Contradictions, which your Lordship seems to be troubled with, from my Words quoted in those two Pages. *

Your Lordship having, as it seems, quite 122. forgot that you were to shew wherein the Certainty of Deductions, in the way of 11 3 Ideas,

Ideas, was inconsistent with the Certainty of Deductions, in the way of Reason, brings † p. 122. here + a new Charge upon my way of Cer-

tainty, viz. That I have no Criterion to distinguish false and doubtful Ideas, from true

* P. 123. and certain. Your Lordship says * the Academicks went upon Ideas, or Representations of things to their Minds; and pray, my Lord, does not your Lordship do so too? Or has Mr. 7. S. fo won upon your Lordship, by

lofophy, p. 24, & 27.

his solid Philosophy against the Fancies of the Ideists, that you begin to think him in the right Solid Phi- in this too; where he fays, That Notions are the Materials of our Knowledge; and that a Notion is the very thing it self Existing in the Understanding? For fince I make no doubt, but that, in all your Lordship's Knowledge, you will allow, that you have some immediate Objects of your Thoughts, which are the Materials of that Knowledge, about which it is employed, those immediate Objects, if they are not as Mr. F. S. fays, the very things themselves, must be Ideas. Not thinking your Lordship therefore yet fo perfect a Convert of Mr. J. S.'s, that you are perswaded, that as often as you think of your Cathedral Church, or of Des Cartes's Vortices, that the very Cathedral Church at Worcester, or the Motion of those Vortices, it self Exists in your Understanding, when one of them never existed but in that one place at Worcester, and the other never existed any where in rerum natura. I conclude, your Lordship has immediate Objects of your Mind, which are not

not the very things themselves Existing in your Understanding; which if with the Academicks you will please to call Representations, as I suppose you will, rather than with me

Ideas, it will make no difference.

This being fo, I must then make the same Objection against your way of Certainty by Reason, that your Lordship does against my way of Certainty by Ideas (for upon the comparison of these two we now are) and then I return your Words here * again, viz. That you have no Criterion to distinguish false and doubtful Representations, from true and certain; How then can any Man be secure, that he is not imposed upon in your Lordship's way of

Representations?

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Your Lordship says, † I tell you of a way + p. 124, of Certainty by Ideas, and never offer any such Method for examining them as the Academicks required for their Probability. Answer. I was not, I confess, so well acquainted with what the Academicks went upon for the Criterion of a greater Probability, as your Lordship is; or if I had, I writing, as your Lordship knows, out of my own Thoughts, could not well transcribe out of them. that you should tell me, I never offer any Criterion to distinguish false from true Ideas, I cannot but wonder; and therefore crave leave to beg your Lordship to look again into B. 2. C. 32. of my Effay; and there, I perswade my self, you will find a Criterion, whereby true and false Ideas may be diflinguished.

Your

*p. 125. Your Lordship brings for Instance * the Idea of Solidity; but what it is an Instance of, I confess, I do not see: Your Lordship

† p. 122. charges † on my way of Certainty, that I have no Criterion to distinguish false and doubtful Ideas from true and certain; which is fol-

*p. 123 & lowed * by an account you give, how the
124. Academicks examined their Ideas or Representations, before they allowed them to prevail on
them to give an Assent, as to a greater Proba-

† P. 125. bility. And then you tell me, † That I never offer any such Method for examining them, as the Academicks required for their Probability; to which your Lordship subjoins these Words, As for Instance my sirst Idea, which I go upon of Solidity. Would not one now expect, that this should be an Instance to make good your Lordship's Charge, That I had no Criterion to distinguish, whether my Idea of Solidity were false and doubtful, or true and certain.

To shew that I have no such Criterion, your Lordship asks me two Questions, the *p. 125. first * is, How my Idea of Solidity comes to be clear and distinct? I will suppose for once, that I know not how it comes to be clear and distinct: How will this prove, That I have no Criterion to know whether it be true or false? For the Question here is not about knowing how an Idea comes to be clear and distinct; but how I shall know whether it be true or false. But your Lordship's following Words seem to aim at a farther Objection; your Words altogether are, How this Idea [i. e. my Idea of Solidity, which

which consists in Repletion of Space, with an exclusion of all other folid Substances 7 comes to be clear and distinct to me, when others who go in the same way of Ideas, have quite an other Idea of it? My Lord, I defire your Lordship to name who those Others are, who go in the same way of Ideas with me, who have quite another Idea of this my Idea than I have; for to this Idea I could be fure that It, in any other Writer but your Lordship must here refer: But my Lord, it is one of your priviledged Particles, and I have nothing to fay to it. But let it be so, that others have quite an other Idea of it than I; How does that prove, That I have no Criterion to distinguish whether my Idea of Solidity be true or no?

Your Lordship farther adds, † That those † p. 125. Others think that they have as plain and distinct an Idea that Extension and Body are the same: And then your Lordship asks, Now what Criterion is there to come to a Certainty in this Matter? Answer. In what Matter, I befeech your Lordship, if it be whether my Idea of Solidity be a true Idea, which is the Matter here in Question? In this Matter I have given a Criterion to know, in my Estay, * if it be to decide the Question, * B. 2. C. whether the Word Body more properly 32. stands for the simple Idea of Space, or for the Complex Idea of Space and Solidity together; that is not the Question here, nor can there be any other Criterion to decide it by, but the Propriety of our Language.

† p. 126. But your Lordship adds, + Ideas can have no way of Certainty in themselves, if it be posfible for even Philosophical and Rational Men to fall into such contrary Ideas about the same thing; and both sides think their Ideas to be clear and distinct. If this were so, I do not fee how this would any way prove, That I had no Criterion whereby it might be difcerned, whether my Idea of Solidity were true or no, which was to be proved.

> But at last, this which your Lordship calls contrary Ideas about the same thing, is nothing but a difference about a Name. For I think no body will fay, That the Idea of Extenfion, and the Idea of Solidity are the fame Ideas: All the difference then between those Philosophical and Rational Men, which your Lordship mentions here, is no more but this, whether the Simple Idea of pure Extension shall be called Body, or whether the Complex Ideas of Extension and Solidity joined together, shall be called Body; which will be no more than a bare verbal Difpute to any one, who does not take Sounds for Things, and make the Word Body something more than a Sign of what the Speaker would fignifie by it. But what the Speaker makes the Term Body stand for, cannot be precisely known till he has determined it in his own Mind, and made it known to another; and then there can between them be no longer a dispute about the Signification of the Word, v. g. If one of those Philosophical Rational Men tells your Lordship, That he makes the Term Body to stand precifely

precisely for the simple Idea of pure Extension, your Lordship or he can be in no doubt or uncertainty concerning this thing; but whenever he uses the Word Body, your Lordship must suppose in his Mind the simple Idea of Extension, as the thing he means by Body. If on the other side another of those Philosophical Rational Men shall tell your Lordship, That he makes the Term Body to stand precisely for a Complex Idea made up of the simple Ideas of Extension and Solidity joyned together; your Lordship or he, can be in no doubt or uncertainty concerning this Thing: But whenever he uses the word Body, your Lordship must Think on, and allow the Idea belonging to it, to

be that Complex one.

As your Lordship can allow this different use of the term Body in these different Men, without changing any Idea, or any thing in your own Mind, but the application of the same Term to different Ideas, which changes neither the Truth nor Certainty of any of your Lordship's Ideas, from what it was before: So those Two Philosophical rational Men, may, in Discourse one with another, agree to use that term Body, for either of those two Ideas, which they please, without at all making their Ideas, on either side, false or uncertain. But if they will contest which of these Ideas the found Body ought to stand for, 'tis visible their difference is not about any reality of Things; but the propriety of Speech, and their Dif-

pute and doubt is only about the fignification of a Word.

- Your Lordship's fecond Question * is. * p. 126. Whether by this Idea of Solidity, we may come to know, what it is. Answ. I must ask you here again, what you mean by it? If your Lordship by it means Solidity, then your Question runs thus: Whether by this Fi. e. my I Idea of Solidity, we may come to know what Solidity is? Answ. Without doubt, if your Lordship means by the term Solidity, what I mean by the term Solidity; for then
- B. 2. C. 4. I have told you what it is in the Chapter above cited by your Lordship: If you mean any thing else by the term Solidity, when your Lordship will please to tell me what you mean by it, I will tell your Lordship what Solidity is. This, I humbly conceive, you will find your felf obliged to do, if what I have faid of Solidity, does not fatisfie you what it is. For you will not think it reasonable. I should tell your Lordship what a thing is when expressed by you in a Term. which I do not know what your Lordship means by, nor what you make it stand for.
- But your Lordship asks, f wherein it con-+ p. 126. fifts; if you mean wherein the Idea of it confifts, that I have already told your Lordship, in the Chapter of my Essay abovementioned. If your Lordship means what is the real internal Constitution, that phyfically makes Solidity in Things. If I answer I do not know, that will no more make my Idea of Solidity not to be true or certain (if vour

your Lordship thinks Certainty may be attributed to single Ideas) than the not knowing the physical Constitution, whereby the parts of Bodies are so framed as to cohere, makes my Idea of Cohesion not true or certain.

To my faying in my Esfay, * " That * B. 2.C. if any one ask me what this Solidity is, 4. § 6. " I fend him to his Senses to inform him. " Your Lordship replies, * You thought the * p. 126. Design of my Book would have sent him to bis Ideas for Certainty; and are we, favs your Lordship, sent back again from our Ideas to our Senses ? Answ. I cannot help it, if your Lordship mistakes the Design of my Book: For what concerns Certainty, i. e. the Knowledge of the Truth of Propositions, my Book fends every one to his Ideas: But for the getting of simple Ideas of Sensation, my Book fends him only to his Senses. But your Lordship uses Certainty here, in a Sense I never used it, nor do understand it in; for what the Certainty of any simple Idea is, I confess I do not know; and shall be glad

However, in this Sense you ask me, † † p. 127: and that as if your Question carried a Demonstration of my Contradicting my self.

And are we sent back again, from our Ideas to our Senses? Answ. My Lord, every one is sense to get the simple Ideas of Sensation, because they are no other way to

von would tell me, what you mean by it.

be got.

Your Lordship presses on with this farther Question, * What do these Ideas signify * ibid. then? i. e. if a Man be fent to his Senses for the Idea of Solidity? I Answer, to shew him the Certainty of Propositions, wherein the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas is perceived, which is the Certainty I speak of, and no other: But what the Certainty is, which your Lordship speaks of in this and the following Page, * I confess I do not understand. For,

* 127.

† P. 127.

Your Lordship adds, it that I say farther, "That if this be not a sufficient Explica-"tion of Solidity, I promise to tell any one what it is, when he tells me, what "Thinking is; or explains to me, what Extension and Motion are. " Are we not now in the true way to Certainty, when such Things as these are given over, of which we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation and Reflection? For here I make it as impossible to come to certain, clear and distinct Notions of these Things, as to discourse into a Blind Man, the Ideas of Light and Colours. Is not this a rare way of Certainty? Answ. What Things. my Lord, I befeech you, are those which you here tell me, are given over, of which we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation or Reflection? 'Tis likely you will tell me they are Extension and Motion. But, my Lord, I crave the liberty to fay, That when you have consider'd again, you will be satisfied. there are no Things given over in the Case, but only the Names Extension and Motson; and concerning them too, nothing is given over, but a power of defining them. When you will be pleased to lay by a little the Warmth

Warmth of those Questions of Triumph. which I meet with in this Passage, and tell me what Things your Lordship makes these Names Extension and Motion to stand for, you perhaps will not find, that I make it impossible for those, who have their Senses. to get the simple Ideas, signified by these Names, very clear and distinct by their Senses: Though I do fay, that these, as well as all other Names of simple Ideas, cannot be defined; nor any simple Ideas be brought into our Minds by Words, any more, than the Ideas of Light and Colours can be difcourfed into a Blind Man, which is all I do fay in those Words of mine, which your Lordship quotes, as such, wherein I have given over Things, whereof we have the clearest Evidence: And fo from my being of Opinion, That the Names of simple Ideas cannot be defined, nor those Ideas got by any Words whatfoever, which is all that I there fay. Your Lordship very pathetically expresses your felf, as if in my may, all were gone; Certainty were loft; and if my Method should be allowed, there is an end of all Knowledge in the World.

The Reason your Lordship gives * against * p. 127.

my way of Certainty is, That I here make
it as impossible to come to certain clear and distinct
Notions of these Things [i. e. Extension and
Motion] as to discourse into a Blind Man the
Idea of Light and Colours. Answ. What
clear and distinct Notions or Ideas are, I do
understand: But what your Lordship means
by certain Notions, speaking here, as you

do, of simple Ideas, I must own, I do not understand. That for the attaining those simple Ideas I fend Men to their Senses, I shall think I am in the right, till I hear from your Lordship better Arguments to convince me of my Mistake, than these of

Are we not now in the true way to Certainty?

Is not this a rare way of Certainty? And if
your Lordship has a better way to get clear
and distinct simple Ideas, than by the Senses,
you will oblige me, and I think the World
too, by a Discovery of it. Till then, I
shall continue in the same Mind I was of,

* Essay B. when I writ that Passage, * viz. That 2. C. 4. § Words can do nothing towards it, and that for the Reason, which I there promised, and is to be found, Essay B. 3. C. 4. § 7. &c.

That thus you have shewed, that I have no security against false and uncertain Ideas, no Criterion to judge them by, I think I may securely Reply, that with Submission, thus shewing it, is no shewing it at all; nor will ever shew, That I have no such Criterion, even when we shall add your Lordship's farther Inserting.

*p. 128. rence, * Now here again our Ideas deceive us. Which supposing it a good Inference from these Words of mine, "That most of our "simple Ideas are not the likenesses of "Things without us," yet it seems to me, to come in here, a little out of Season: Because the Proposition to be proved is, as I humbly conceive, not that our Ideas deceive us, but that I have not a Criterion to distinguish true from false Ideas.

If

If it be brought to prove, that I have no Criterion, I have this to fay, That I neither well understand, what it is for our Ideas to deceive as in the way of Certainty: Nor, in the best Sense, that I can give it, do I see how it proves, that I have no Criterion; nor lastly, how it follows from my saying, that most of our simple Ideas are not Resemblances.

Your Lordship seems by the following Words * to mean, That in this way by Ideas, which are confessed not to be Resemblances, Men are hindred, and cannot go far in the Knowledge of what they defire to know of the Nature of those Objects, of which we have the Ideas in our Minds. If this should be so, what is this I befeech your Lordship to your shewing that I have no Criterion? But that this is a Fault in the way by ideas, I shall be convinced, when your Lordship shall be pleased to shew me, how in your way of Certainty by Reason, we can know more of the Nature of Things without us; or of that which causes these Ideas or Perceptions in us? But, I humbly conceive, 'tis no Objection to the way of Ideas, if any one will deceive himself, and expect Certainty by Ideas, in things where Certainty is not to be had; because he is told how Knowledge or Certainty is got by Ideas, as far as Men attain to it. And fince your Lordship is here comparing the ways of Certainty by Ideas and by Reafon, as two different and inconsistent ways. I humbly crave leave to add, That when you can shew me any one Proposition, which you

you have attained to a Certainty of, in your way of Certainty by Reason, which I cannot attain to a Certainty of in my way of Certainty by Ideas, I will acknowledge my Essay to be guilty of whatever your Lordship pleases.

* p. 128.

Your Lordship concludes. * So that these Ideas are really nothing but Names, if they be not Representations. Answ. This does not vet hew, that I have no Criterion to distinguish true from false Ideas, the thing that your Lordship is thus shewing. For I may have a Criterion to distinguish true from false Ideas. though that Criterion concern not Names at all. For your Lordship in this Proposition. allowing none to be Ideas, but what are Representations; the other, which you fay, are nothing but Names, are not concerned in the Criterion, that is, to distinguish true from false Ideas: Because it relates to nothing but Ideas, and the diffinguishing of them one from another: Unless true and false Ideas can be any thing but Ideas, i.e. Ideas and not Ideas at the same time.

But farther, I crave leave to Answer, That your Lordship's Proposition, viz. That these Ideas are really nothing but Names, if they be not the representations of Things: Seems to me no Consequence from my Words, to which it is subjoyned, though introduced with so that: For methinks it carries something like a Contradiction in it. I say, "Most of our simple Ideas of Sensation, are not the likeness of something without us." Your Lordship infers, if so, these

thefe Ideas are really nothing but Names; which, as it feems to me, is as much as to fav. These Ideas, that are Ideas, are not Ideas, but Names only. Methinks they might be allowed to be Ideas, and that is all they pretend to be, though they do not refemble that which produces them. I cannot help thinking a Son fomething really more than a bare Name, though he has not the luck to resemble his Father, who begot him: And the Black and Blue which I fee; I cannot conclude but to be fomething besides the Words Black and Blue (wherever your Lordship shall place that something, either in my Perception only, or in my Skin) though it resemble not at all the Stone, that with a

knock produced it.

Should your Lordship put your two Hands, whereof one is Hot and the other Cold, into Luke-warm Water; It would be hard to think, That the Idea of Heat produced in you by one of your Hands; and the Idea of Cold by the other, were the likenesses and very resemblances of something in the fame Water: Since the fame Water could not be capable of having at the fame time fuch real Contrarieties. Wherefore fince, as 'tis evident, they cannot be representations of any Thing in the Water, it follows by your Lordship's Doftrin here, That if you should declare what you feel, viz. That you feel Heat and Cold in that Water, viz. Heat by one Hand, and Cold by the other, you mean nothing by Heat and Cold : Heat and Cold in the Case are nothing

X 2

but Names; and your Lordship in Truth.

feels nothing but these two Names.

Your Lordship in the next place * pro-* p. 129. ceeds to examine my way of Demonstration. Whether you do this to shew, That I have no Criterion, whereby to distinguish true from false Ideas; or to shew. That my way of Certainty by Ideas, is inconsistent with the Certainty of Deductions by Reason; for these were the Things you feemed to me to have undertaken to hew, and therefore to be upon in this place, does not appear: But this appears by the Words wherewith you introduce it this Examen, that it is to avoid + p. 129.

doing me Wrong.

Your Lordship, as if you had been sensible, that your former Discourse had led you towards doing me Wrong, breaks it off of a fuddain, and begins this new one of Demonstration, by telling me, you will do me no Can it be thought now, that you forget this Promise, before you get half through your Examen? Or is a mif-citing my Words, and mifreprefenting my Senfe no Wrong? Your Lordship in this very Examen, fets down a long Quotation out of my Esfay, and in the close you tell me.

* p. 133. * These are my own Words which your Lord-(hip has fet down at large, that I may not complain that you misrepresent my Sense. This one would think Guaranty enough in a less Man than your Lordship: And yet, my Lord, I must crave leave to complain, that not only my Sense, but my very Words are

To

in that Quotation mifrepresented.

To shew that my Complaint is not groundless, give me leave, my Lord, to fet down my Words as I read them in that place of my Book + which your Lordship + Essay B. quotes for them; And as I find them here 4. C. 7. in your fecond Letter. * * 2d Amf.

" If we add all the felf-evident our particular distinct " Propositions, may cc be made a-66 bout all our di-

" most infinite, at " least innumerable,

e which Men arce rive to the Know-

" ledge of at differ-

" ent Ages; and a " great many of

" these innate Pin:

" tiples they never

come to know all

their lives. But ec whether they

" come in view of

" the Mind earlier

" or later, this is

" true of them, that

" they are all known

" by their Native

Evidence,

wholly indepen-

dent, receive no X 3

That it is true of P. 132. Totas, that they are all known by their Native Evidence, ce ftinct Ideas, Din: wholly independent, re-" tiples will be al- ceive no Light, are capable of any proof, one from another, &c.

" Light

" Light nor are ca-

" pable of any

" proof, one from

another, cc.

By their standing thus together, the Reader will without any pains see whether those your Lordship has set down in your Letter are my own Words; and whether. in that place, which speaks only of selfepident Propositions or Principles, I have any thing in Words or in Sense like this. That our particular diffinct Ideas, are known by their Native Evidence, &c. Though your Lordship closes the Quotation with that solemn Declaration above mention'd. That they are my own Words, which you have fet down at large that I may not complain you misrepresent my Sense. And yet nothing can more misrepresent my Sense than they do, applying all that to particular Ideas, which I speak there only of self-evident Propositions or Principles; and that so plainly, that I think, I may venture any one's mistaking it in my own Words: And upon this Mifrepresentation of my Sense, your Lordship raises a Discourse, and manages a Dispute for, I think, a dozen Pages * following, against my placing Demonstration on self-evident Ideas; though self-evident Ideas are things wholly unknown to me, and are no where in my Book, nor were ever in my Thoughts.

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But let us come to your Exceptions against my way of Demonstration, which your Lordthip is pleased to call & Demonstration with + P. 129. out Principles. Answer. If you mean by Principles felf-evident Propositions, then you know my Demonstration is not without Principles, in that Sense of the Term Principles: For your Lordship in the next Page * blames my way, because I suppose every * p. 130. intermediate Idea in Demonstration to have a self-evident Connection with the other Idea; for two fuch Ideas as have a felf-evident Connection, joined together in a Proposition, make a self-evident Proposition. If your Lordship means by Principles, those which in the place i there quoted by your Lordship; I + Estay B. mean, viz. Whatever is, is; and it is im- 4. C. 2. possible for the same thing to be and not to Sect. 8. be; and fuch other general Propositions, as are received under the Name of Maxims: I grant, that I do fay, That they are not absolutely requisite in every Demonstration: And I think, I have shewn, That there be Demonstrations, which may be made without them; though I do not, that I remember, fay, That they are excluded, and cannot be made use of in Demonstration.

Your Lordship's first Argument * against * p. 123. my way of Demonstration is, That it must suppose self-evidence must be in the Ideas of my Mind; and that every intermediate Idea, which I take to demonstrate any thing by, must have a self-evident Connection with the others. Answer. Taking self-evidence in the Ideas of the Mind, to mean in the perceived Agree-

X 4 ment

ment or Disagreement of Ideas in the Mind: I grant, I do not only suppose, but say so.

To prove it not to be so in Demonstration, + p. 130. your Lordship says, + That it is such a way of Demonstration, as the old Philosophers never thought of. Answer. No body, I think, will question, that your Lordship is very well read in the old Philosophers: But he that will answer for what the old Philosophers ever did, or did not think of, must not only understand their extant Writings better than any Man ever did; but must have ways to know their Thoughts, that other Men have not. For all of them thought more than they writ; some of them writ not at all, and others writ a great deal more than ever came to us. But if it should happen that any of them placed the Proof of any Proposition in the Agreement of two things in a third, as I think some of them did, than it will, I humbly conceive appear, that they did think of my way of Demonstration; unless your Lordship can shew, that they could fee that two things agreed in a third, without perceiving their Agreement with that third; and if they did in every Syllogism of a Demonstration perceive that Agreement, then there was a felfevident Connection, which is that which your Lordship fays they never thought of.

But supposing they never thought of it, must we put out our Eyes, and not fee whatever they overlooked? Are all the Discoveries made by Galileo, my Lord Bacon, Mr. Boyle, and Mr. Newton, &c. to be rejected as false,

because they teach us what the old Philosophers never thought of? Mistake me not, my Lord, in thinking that I have the vanity here to rank my felf, on this Occasion, with these great discoverers of Truth, and advancers of Knowledge. On the contrary, I contend, that my way of Certainty, my way of Demonstration, which your Lordship so often condemns for its newness, is not New; but is the very fame that has always been used, both by Ancients and Moderns: I am only considering here your Lordship's Argument, of never having been thought of by the old Philosophers; which is an Argument that will make nothing for or against the Truth of any Proposition advanced by a Modern Writer, till your Lordship has proved, that those old Philosophers (let the happy Age of old Philosophers determine where your Lordship pleases) did discover all Truth, or that they had the fole Priviledge to fearch after it, and besides them no body was to study Nature, no body was to Think or Reason for himself; but every one was to be barely a reading Philosopher, with an implicit Faith.

Your Objection in the next Words, * * p. 130.

That then every Demonstration carries its own
Light with it, shews that your way by Reason
is what I do not understand. For this I
thought heretofore, was the property of
Demonstration, and not a Proof that it was
not a Demonstration, that it carried its own
Light with it: But yet though in every Demonstration, there is a self-evident Conne-

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Etion of the Ideas, by which it is made; yet that it does not follow from thence, as your Lordship here objects, that then every Demonstration would be as clear and unquestionable as that two and two make four, your + Essay B. Lordship may see in the same Chapter, +

4. C. 2.

* p. 130.

and the reason of it. \$ 4, 5, 6.

You feem in the following Words to allow, that there is fuch a Connection of the intermediate Ideas in Mathematical Demonstrations: But fay, * You should be glad to see any Demonstration (not about Figures and Numbers) of this kind. And if that be a good Argument against it, I crave leave to use it too on my fide; and to fay, That I would be glad to see any Demonstration (not about Figures and Numbers) not of this kind, i. e. wherein there is not a felf-evident Connection of all the intermediate Ideas. If you have any fuch, I earnestly beg your Lordship to favour me with it; for I crave liberty to fay, That the Reason, and Form, and Way of Evidence, in Demonstration, where-ever there is Demonstration, is always the same.

† p. 130.

But you fay, & This is a quite different Cafe from mine: I suppose your Lordship means by this. Mathematical Demonstration, the thing mention'd in the preceding Period. And then your Sense will run thus, Mathematical Demonstrations, wherein Certainty is to be had by the intuition of the felf-evident Connection of all the intermediate Ideas, are different from that Demonstration which I am there treating of. If you mean not fo, I must own, I know not what you mean by faying, This is

a quite different Case from mine. And if your Lordship does mean so, I do not see how it can be so as you say, your Words taken all together run thus, if My principal Ground is i p. 130. from Mathematical Demonstrations, and my Examples are brought from them. But this is quite a different Case from mine, i. e. I am speaking in that Chapter of my Esfay concerning Demonstration in general, and the Certainty we have by it: The Examples I use are brought from Mathematicks, and yet you fay, Mathematical Demonstrations are quite a different Case from mine. If I here misunderstand your Lordship's This, I must beg your pardon for it; it is one of your priviledg'd Particles, and I am not Master of it. Misrepresent your Sense I cannot, for your very Words are fet down, and let the Reader judge.

But your Lordship gives a Reason for what you had said in these Words subjoined, * where you say, I grant that those Ideas on * p. 130. which Mathematical Demonstrations proceed are wholly in the Mind, and do not relate to the Existence of things; but our Debate goes upon a Certainty of Knowledge of things as really Existing. In which Words there are these

things remarkable.

is against what I have said concerning Demonstration in my Essay, and not against any thing I have said in either of my Letters to your Lordship. If therefore your Lordship and I have, since in our Letters, had any Debate about the Certainty of the Know-

ledge

ledge of things as really Existing, that which was writ before that Debate, have no relation to it, nor be limitted by it. If therefore your Lordship makes anv Exception (as you do) to my way of Demonstration, as proposed in my Esfay, you must, as I humbly conceive, take it as deliver'd there, comprehending Mathematical Demonstrations, which cannot be excluded, because your Lordship says, our Debate now goes upon a Certainty of the Knowledge of things as really Existing, supposing Mathematical Demonstrations, did not afford a Certainty of Knowledge of things as really Exifting.

2. But in the next place, Mathematical Demonstrations do afford a Certainty of the Knowledge of things as really Existing, as much as any other Demonstrations whatfoever; and therefore they afford your Lordship no Ground upon that account to separate them, as you do here, from Demon-

strations in other Subjects.

Your Lordship indeed thinks I have given you sufficient Grounds to charge me with * p. 130. the contrary: For you fay, * I grant that those Ideas on which Mathematical Demonstrations proceed are wholly in the Mind; this indeed I grant, and do not relate to the Existence of things; but these later Words I do not remember, that I any where fay. I wish you had quoted the place where I grant any such thing; I am sure it is not in that place, where it is likeliest to be found, I mean where I examine, whether the

the Knowledge we have of Mathematical Truths, be the Knowledge of Things as really Existing: There, + I say (and I think I + Essay B. have proved) that it is, though it confifts 4. C. 4. S in the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas, that are only in the Mind: Because it takes in all those things really existing, which answer those Ideas. Upon which Ground it was, That I there * * § 7! affirmed moral Knowledge, also capable of And pray, my Lord, What Certainty. other way can your Lordship proceed, in any Demonstration you would make, about any other thing but Figures and Numbers, but the same that you do in Demonstrations about Figures and Numbers? If you would demonstrate any thing concerning Man or Murder, must you not first settle in vour Mind the Idea or Notion you have of that Animal or that Action, and then shew what you would demonstrate necessarily to belong to that Idea in your Mind, and to things existing only as they correspond with, and answer that Idea in your Mind? How else you can make any general Proposition, that shall contain the knowledge of things as really existing, I that am Ignorant, should be glad to learn, when your Lordship shall do me the Favour to shew me any such.

In the mean time there is no reason why you should except Demonstrations about Figures and Numbers, from Demonstrations about other Subjects, upon the account that I grant, that those Ideas on which Mathematical Demonstrations proceed, are wholly in the Mind,

when

when I say the same of all other Demonstrations. For the Ideas that other Demonstrations proceed on, are wholly in the Mind: And no Demonstration whatsoever concerns Things as really existing any farther, than as they correspond with, and answer those Ideas in the Mind, which the Demonstration proceeds on. This distinction therefore here of your Lordship's, between Mathematical and other Demonstrations, having no Foundation, your Inference founded on * P. 131. it falls with it, viz. * So that although we (hould grant all, that I say about the Intuition of Ideas in Mathematical Demonstrations, yet it comes not at all to my Business, unless I can prove, that we have as clear and distinct Ideas of Beings, as we have of Numbers and Figures. Though how Beings here and Numbers and Figures come to be opposed against one another, I shall not be able to conceive, till I am better instructed, than hitherto I am, that Numbers and Figures are no Beings; And that the Mathematicians and Philosophers, old ones and all, have, in all the Pains taken about them; imploy'd their Thoughts about nothing. would be glad to know what those Things are, which your Lordship fays our Debate goes upon here as really existing, that are Beings more then Numbers and Figures.

Your Lordship's next exception against * P. 131. my way of Demonstration is, * That in it I am inconsistent with my self. For Proof of it, you say I design to prove Demonstrations without general Principles; and yet every one

knows

knows that general Principles are supposed in Mathematicks. Answ. Every one may know that general Principles are supposed in Mathematicks without knowing, or ever being able to know, that I who say also that Mathematicians do often make use of them, am inconsistent with my self, though I also say, That a demonstration about Numbers and Figures may be made without them.

To prove me Inconsistent with my self, you add: † And that Person would be thought † p. 131. Ridiculous, who should go about to prove, That general Principles are of little, or of dangerous use in Mathematical Demonstrations. Answ. A Man may make other Ridiculous Faults in Writing, besides Inconsistency, and there are Instances enough of it: But by good luck I am in this place clear of what would be thought Ridiculous, which yet is no proof of Inconsistency. For I never went about to prove, That general Principles are of little or dangerous use in Mathematical Demonstrations.

To prove me Inconsistent with my self, your Lordship uses * one Argument more, * p. 131. and that is, That I confess that the way of Demonstration in Morality, is from Principles, as those of Mathematicks by necessary Consequences.

Answ. With Submission, my Lord, I do not say in the place quoted by your Lordship, † † B. 4. C. That the way of Demonstration in Morality is 3. § 18. from Principles, as those of the Mathematicks by necessary Consequences. But this is that which I say. "That I doubt not but in "Mo-

"Morality from Principles, as incontestable as those of the Mathematicks by necessary Consequences, the measures of right and wrong might be made out." Which Words, I humbly conceive, have no Inconsistency with my saying, there may be Demonstrations without the help of Maxims: Whatever Inconsistency the Words which you here set down for mine, may have with it.

My Lord, the Words you bring out of my Book, are so often different, from those I read in the places which you refer to, that I am fometimes ready to think, you have got some strange Copy of it, whereof I know nothing, fince it so seldom agrees with mine. Pardon me, my Lord, if with fome care I examin the Objection of Inconfiftency with my felf, that if I find any, I may retract one part or the other of it. mane Frailty I grant, and variety of Thoughts in long Discourses, may make a Man unwittingly advance Inconsistencies. This may confift with Ingenuity, and deferve to be excused. But for any one to persist in it. when it is shewed him, is to give himself the Lye, which cannot but stick closer to him in the Sense of all rational Men, than if he received it from another.

I own, I have said, in my Essay, That there be Demonstrations, which may be made without those general Maxims, that I there treated of. But I cannot recollect, that I ever said, that those general Maxims could not be made use of in Demonstration:

For they are no more shut out of my way of Demonstration, than any other felfevident Propositions. And therefore there is no Inconfiftency in those two Propositions, which are mine, viz. Some Demonstrations may be made without the help of those general And Morality, I doubt not, may be demonstrated from Principles, whatever Inconfiftency may be in these two following Propositions, which are your Lordship's, * * p. 131. and not mine, viz. The way of Demonstra. & 132. tion in Morality is from Principles, and general Maxims are not the way to proceed on in Demonstration, as to other parts of Knowledge. For to admit felf-evident Propositions, which is what I mean by Principles, in the place of my Essay, † which your Lordship quotes † B. 4. C. for the first of my inconsistent Propositions, 3. § 18. and to fay (as I do in the other place quoted by your Lordship) * " That those magni- * B. 4. C. fied Maxims are not the Principles and 7. § 10. "Foundations of all our other Knowledge has no manner of Inconfiftency. though I think them not necessary to every Demonstration, so neither do I exclude them any more, than other felf-evident Propofitions out of any Demonstration, wherein any one should make use of them.

The next Objection † against my way of † p. 133. Demonstration, from my placing Demonstration on the self evidence of Ideas, having been already answer'd, I shall need to say nothing in defence of it; or in answer to any thing raised against it, in your Twelve or Thirteen following Pages upon that Topick.

But that your Lordship may not think, I do not pay a due respect to all that you say, I shall not wholly pass those Pages over in Silence.

† P. 134.

1. Your Lordship says, † That I confess that some of the most obvious Ideas are far from being self-evident. Answ. Supposing I did say so, how, I beseech your Lordship, does it prove, That it is impossible to come to a Demonstration about real Beings, in this way of Intuition by Ideas? Which is the Proposition was great and

of Intuition by Ideas? Which is the Propo-* p. 134. sition you Promise * to make appear, and you bring this as the first Reason to make it appear. For should I confess a Thousand times over, That some of the most obvious Ideas, are far from being self-evident: And should I, which I do not, make Self-evident Ideas neceffary to Demonstration, how will it thence follow, That it is impossible to come to a Demonstration, &c? Since though I should confess some of the most obvious Ideas not to be Selfevident; yet my Confession being but of some, it will not follow from my Confession, but that there may be also some Self-evident ; and fo still it might be possible to come to Demonstration by Intuition, because some in my use of the Word never fignifies all.

In the next place, give me leave to ask, where it is that I confess, That some Ideas are not self-evident? Nay, where it is, that I once mention any such thing as a self-evident Idea? For self-evident is an Epithite, that I do not remember I ever gave to any Idea; or thought belonged at all to Ideas. In all the places you have produced out of my

Effay,

Essay, concerning Matter, Motion, Time, Duration and Light; Which are those Ideas your Lordship is pleased to instance in, to prove, That I have confessed it of some, I crave leave humbly to offer it to your Lordship, that there is not any such Confession. However you go on to prove it. The Proposition then to be proved, is, That I confess, that these are far from being self-evident Ideas. 'Tis necessary to set it down and carry it in our Minds, for the Proposition to be proved, is, I find, a very slippery thing,

and apt to flide out of the way.

Your Lordship's Proof is, * That accord- * p. 134. ing to me, we can have no Intuition of thefe Things which are so Obvious to us, and consequently we can have no self-evident Ideas of The force of which Proof, I confess, I do not understand. We have no Intuition of the obvious thing Matter, and the obvious thing Motion, Ergo, we have no felfevident Ideas of them. Granting that they are obvious Things, and that obvious as they are, we have as you express it, no Intuition of them, it will not follow from thence, that we have no Intuition of the Ideas we fignify by the names Matter and Motion, and so have no self-evident Ideas of them. whoever has in his Mind an Idea, which he makes the name Matter or Motion stand for. has no doubt that Idea there, and fees or has in your phrase an Intuition of it there, and so has a self-evident Idea of it, if Intuition, according to your Lordship, makes a self evident Idea (for of self evident Ideas,

as I have before remarked, I have said nothing nor made any such distinction as self-evident and not self-evident Ideas) and is intuition of an Idea does not make a self-evident Idea, the want of it is in vain brought here to prove the Idea of Matter or Motion not self-evident.

But your Lordship proceeds to Instances, and your first Instance is in Matter; and here for fear of mistaking, let us remember what the Proposition to be proved is, viz. That according to me, we have no intuition, as you call it, of the Idea of Matter. Your

* p. 135. Lordship begins and tells me, * that I give this account of the Idea of Matter, That it confists in a solid Substance, every where the same.

† p. 135. Whereupon you tell me, † You would be glad to come to a certain Knowledge of these two things; First, The manner of the Cohesson

I. p. 137. of the parts of Matter, and the Demonstration of the divisibility of it in the way of Ideas.

Answer. It happened just as I feared, the Proposition to be proved is slip'd already quite out of sight: You own that I say Matter is a solid Substance, every where the same: This Idea, which is the Idea I signifie by the Word Matter, I have in my Mind, and have an intuition of it there: How then does this prove, That according to me, there can be no intuition of the Idea of Matter? Leaving therefore this Proposition, which was to be proved, you bring it places out of my Book to shew, That we

† p. 135 † places out of my Book to shew, That we do not know wherein the Union and Cohesion of the parts of Matter consists; and that

that the divisibility of Matter involves us in difficulties, neither of which either is, or proves, That, according to me, we cannot have an intuition of the Idea of Matter, which was the Proposition to be proved. and feems quite forgotten during the three following Pages, wholly imploied upon this Instance of Matter. You ask indeed, * * p. 136. whether I can imagine, That we have intuition into the Idea of Matter? But those Words feem to me to fignifie quite another thing, than having an intuition of the Idea of Matter, as appears by your Explication of them in these Words subjoined, or that it is possible to come to a Demon- + p. 136. stration about it, by the help of any intervening Ideas; whereby it feems to me plain, that by intuition into it, your Lordship means Demonstration about it, i. e. some Knowledge concerning Matter, and not a bare view or intuition of the Idea you have of it: And that your Lordship speaks of Knowledge concerning some affection of Matter in this, and the following Question; and not of the bare intuition of the Idea of Matter, is farther evident from the Introduction of your two Questions, i wherein you fay, + P. 1353 There are two things concerning Matter, that you would be glad to come to a certain Bnow: ledge of. So that all that can follow, or in your Sense of them does follow from my Words quoted by you, is, that I own, That the Cohesion of its parts is an affeation of Matter, that is hard to be explain. ed: but from them it can neither be infer'd,

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nor

nor does your Lordship attempt to infer. That any one cannot view or have an intuition of the Idea he has in his own Mind. which he fignifies to others by the Word Matter; and that you did not make any fuch Inference from them is farther plain, by your asking, in the place above quoted, not only whether I can imagine, That it is possible to come to a Demonstration about it? But your Lordship also adds, By the help of any intervening Ideas? For I do not think you demand a Demonstration by the belp of intervening Ideas, to make you to fee, i. e. have an intuition of your own Idea of Matter. It would mif-become me to understand your Lordship in so strange a Sense; for then you might have just Occasion to ask me again, whether I could think you a Man of so little Sense? I therefore suppose. as your Words import, That you demand a Demonstration by the help of intervening Ideas to shew you, how the parts of that thing, which you represent to your felf by that Idea, to which you give the name Matter, Cohere together; which is nothing to the question of the intuition of the Idea, though to cover the change of the question, as dextrously as might be, intuition of the Idea, is changed into intuition into the Idea: as if there were no difference between looking upon a Watch, and looking into a Watch, i. e. between the Idea, that taken from an obvious View, I fignifie by the name Watch, and have in my Mind when I use the Word Watch; and the being able

to resolve any Question that may be proposed to me, concerning the inward Make and Contrivance of a Watch. The Idea which taken from the outward visible parts, I give the name Watch to, the Idea I perceive or have an intuition of, in my Mind equally, whether or no I know any thing more of a Watch, than what is represented in that Idea.

Upon this change of the question, all that follows to the bottom of the next Page * being to shew, that from what I say it * P. 137. follows, that there be many Difficulties concerning Matter, which I cannot refolve; many questions concerning it, which I think cannot be demonstratively decided; and not to fnew, that any one cannot perceive, or have an intuition, as you call it, of his own Idea of Matter: I think I need not trouble your Lordship with an Answer to it.

In this one Instance of Matter, you have been pleased to ask me two hard Questions. To shorten your Trouble concerning this Bufiness of intuition of Ideas, will you, my Lord, give me leave to ask you this one easie Question concerning all your four Instances, Matter, Motion, Duration, and Light, viz. what you mean by thefe four Words? That your Lordhip may not suspect it to be either Captious or Impertinent, I will tell you the Use I shall make of it: If your Lordship tell me what you mean by these Names, I shall presently reply. That there then are the Ideas that Y 4

you

you have of them in your Mind; and 'tis plain you see or have an intuition of them. as they are in your Mind, or as I should have expressed it, perceive them as they are there; because you can tell them to an other. And so it is with every one, who can tell what he means by those Words; and therefore to all fuch (amongst which I crave leave to be one) there can be no doubt of the intuition of those Ideas. But if your Lordship will not tell me what you mean by these Terms, I fear you will be thought to use very hard Measure in difputing, by demanding to be fatisfied concerning Questions put in Terms, which you your felf cannot tell the meaning of.

This consider'd, will perhaps serve to shew, that all that you say in the following Paragraphs, to N. 2. P. 141. contains nothing against intuition of Ideas, which is what you are upon, though it be no Notion of mine; much less does it contain any thing against my way of Demonstration by Ideas; which is the Point under Proof.

For

I. What your Lordship has said about the Idea of Matter, hath been considered al-

ready.

2. From Motion, which is your fecond Instance, your Argument stands thus, * That because I say, the Definitions I meet with of Motion are insignificant, therefore the Idea fails us. This seems to me a strange Consequence; and all one, as to say, That a deaf and dumb Man, because he could not under-

* p. 138.

understand the Wordsused in the Definitions, that are given of Motion, therefore he could not have the Idea of Motion, or the Idea of Motion failed him. And yet this Consequence, as Foreign as it is to that Antecedent, is forced from it, to no purpose: The Proposition to be infer'd being this, That then we can have no intuition of the Idea of Motion.

3. As to Time, though the intuition of the Idea of Time be not my way of speaking, yet what your Lordship here infers from my Words, granting it to be a right Inference, with Submission, proves nothing against the intuition of that Idea. The Proposition to be proved, is, That we can have no intuition of the Idea of Time; and the Proposition which from my Words you infer, is, That we have not the Knowledge + p. 139. of the Idea of. Time by intuition, but by rational Deduction; What can be more remote than these two Propositions? The one of them fignifying (if it fignifies any thing) the View the Mind has of it; the other, as I guess, the Original and Rife of it. For what it is to have the Knowledge of an Idea, not by intuition, but by deduction of Reason, I confess, I do not well understand; only I am fure, in Terms it is not the same with having the intuition of an Idea: But if changing of Terms were not some Mens Priviledge, perhaps so much Controversie would not be written. The meaning of either of these Propositions, I concern not my felf about; for neither of them is mine. only here shew. That you do not prove the ProProposition, that you your felf framed.

Since, my Lord, you are so favourable

and undertook to prove.

to me, as to feem willing to Correct whatever you can find any way amis in my Estay: Therefore I shall endeavour to satisfie you concerning the Rife of our Idea of Duration from the Succession of Ideas in our Against this, though it be nothing to the Matter in Hand, you object, That * P. 139. * Some People reckoned Succession of Time right by Knots, and Notches, and Figures, without ever thinking of Ideas. Answer. 'Tis certain. that Men, who wanted better ways, might by Knots or Notches, keep accounts of the Numbers of certain stated lengths of Time. as well as of the Numbers of Men in their Country, or of any other Numbers; and that too without ever considering the immediate Objects of their Thoughts under the Name of Ideas: But that they should count Time without ever thinking of something, is very hard to me to conceive; and the things they thought on, or were present in their Minds, when they thought, are what I call Ideas; thus much in answer to what your Lordship fays. But to any one, that shall put the Objection stronger, and say, Many have had the Idea of Time, who never reflected on the constant Train of Ideas, fucceeding one another in their Minds, whilft waking, I grant it; but add, that want of Reflection makes not any thing cease to be: If it did, many Mens Actions would have no Cause, nor Rise, nor Man-

ner;

ner; because many Men never reflect so far on their own Actions, as to confider what they are bottomed on, or how they are performed. A Man may measure Duration by Motion, of which he has no other Idea, but of a constant Succession of Ideas in Train; and yet never reflect on that Succession of Ideas in his Mind. A Man may guess at the length of his stay by himfelf in the dark; here is no Succession to measure by, but that of his own Thoughts; and without some Succession, I think there is no measure of Duration. But though in this Case, he measures the length of the Duration by the Train of his Ideas, yet he may never reflect on that, but conclude he does it he knows not how.

You add, & But besides, such Arbitrary + p. 140. Measures of Time, what need any recourse to Ideas, when the returns of Days, and Months, and Years, by the Planetary Motions, are so easie and so universal? * Such here, as I sup- * p. 140. pose, refers to the Knots, and Notches, and Figures before mentioned: If it does not, I know not what it refers to: and if it does. it makes those Knots and Notches Measures of Time, which I humbly conceive they were not, but only Arbitrary ways of Recording (as all other ways of Recording are) certain Numbers of known lenghts of Time: For tho' any one fets down by Arbitrary marks, as Notches on a Stick, or Strokes of Chalk on a Trenchard, or Figures on Paper, the Number of Yards of Cloth, or Pints of Milk that are delivered to a Customer; yet,

I suppose, no Body thinks, that the Cloth or Milk were measured by those Notches. strokes of Chalk or Figures, which therefore are by no means the arbitrary Measures of those Things. But what this is against, I confess I do not see: This I am sure, it is not against any thing I have said. I remember, I have faid (though not the planetary Motions vet) that the Motions of the Sun and the Moon, are the best Measures of Time. But if you mean, That the Idea of Duration is rather taken from the planetary Motions, than from the succession of Ideas in our Minds, 1 crave leave to doubt of That: Because Motion no other way discovers it felf to us, but by a fuccession of Ideas.

Your next Argument against my thinking the Idea of Time to be derived from the train of Ideas, succeeding one another in *p. 140. our Minds, is, That your Lordship * thinks the contrary. This, I must own, is an Argument by way of Authority, and I humbly submit to it, though I think such Arguments produce no Certainty, either in my way of Certainty by Ideas, or in your way of Certainty by Reason.

4. As to your fourth Instance, you having fp. 141. fet down fmy Exceptions to the Peripatetick and Cartesian Definitions of Light you subjoin this Question. And is this a self-evident Idea of Light? I beg leave to Answer in the same way by a Question, and whoever said or thought, that it was, or meant that it should be? He must have a strange Notion

of

of felf-evident Ideas, let them be what they will (for I know them not) who can think, that the shewing others definitions of Light to be unintelligible, is a self-evident Idea of Light. But farther, my Lord, what I befeech you has a self-evident Idea of Light to do here? I thought in this your instance of Light, you were making good what you undertook * to prove from my self that we can * p. 134. have no intuition of Light. But because that perhaps would have founded pretty odly, you thought fit (which I with all Submission crave leave sometimes to take notice of) to change the Question; but the Misfortune is. that put as it is, not concerning our intuition, but the felf evidence of the Idea of Light, the one is no better proved than the other: And yet your Lordship concludes this your first Head according to your usual form. Thus we have seen what account the Author of the Essay himself has given of these selfevident Ideas, which are the ground work of De-With Submission, my Lord, monstration. he must have good Eyes, who has seen an Account I have given in my Essay of self-evident Ideas, when neither in all that your Lordship has quoted out of it, no nor in my whole Essay, self-evident Ideas are so much as once mentioned. And where the Account I have given of a thing, which I never thought upon, is to be feen, I cannot ima-What your Lordship farther tells me concerning them, viz. That felf-evident Ideas are the ground-work of Demonstration, I also assure you is perfect News to me, which

which I never met with any where, but in your Lordship. Though if I had made them the ground-work of Demonstration, as you fay, I think they might remain fo, notwithstanding any thing your Lordship has pro-

duced to the contrary.

We are now come to your fecond Head. + p 141. + where I expected to have found this Consequence made good. That there may be contradictory Opinions about Ideas, which I account most clear and visting, Ergo, it is impossible to come to a Demonstration about real Beings in the way of intuition of Ideas. For this you

* p 134. told me * was your fecond Reason to prove this Proposition. This Consequence your Lordship, it seems, looks upon as so clear, that it needs no Proof; I can find none

tp. 141. here if where you take it up again. To prove something, you say, Suppose an Idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinet, and others should think the contrary to be fo? In Obedience to your Lordship I do suppose it. But, when it is supposed, will that make good the above-mentioned Confequence? You your felf, my Lord, do not fo much as pretend it; but in this Question subjoined, What hopes of Demonstration by clear and distinct Ideas then? infer a quite different Proposition. For, It is impossible to come to a Demonstration about real Beings in the way of intuition of Ideas. And, There is no hopes of Demonstration by clear and distinet Ideas, appear to me Two very diffe-

rent Propositions.

Il ibid.

There appears fomething to me yet more incomprehensible in your way of manageing this Argument here. Your Reason is, as we have feen in these Words, There may be contradictory Opinions about some Ideas, that I account most clear and distinct: And your Instance of it is in these Words, Suppose an Idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinct, and others should think the contrary to be fo. Answ. So they may without having any contradictorp Opinions about any Idea, that I account most clear and distinct. A Man may think his Idea of Heat to be clear and distinct, and another may think his Idea of Cold (which I take to be the contrary Idea to that of Heat) to be clear and distinct, and be both in the right, without the least appearance of any contradictory Opinions. All therefore, that your Lordship fays, in the remaining part of this * Paragraph, having nothing in it of contradictory Opinions about Ideas that I think most clear, serves not at all to make good your fecond Reason. Truth is, all that you fay here concerning Des Cartes's Idea of Space, and another Man's Idea of Space amounts to no more but this. That different Men may signifie different Ideas by the same Name; and will never fix on me, what your Lordship would perfwade the World I fay, that both parts of a Contradiction may be true. Though I do fay, That in fuch a loofe use of the terms Body and Vacuum it may be demonstrated, both that there is, and is not a Vacuum: Which is a Contradiction in Words, and is apt to imimpose, as if it were so in Sense, on those who mistake Words for Things, who are a kind of Reasoners, whereof I perceive there is a greater Number than I thought there had been. All that I have said in that

Essay B. place quoted by your Lordship, † is no-4. C. 7. thing, but to shew the danger of relying Sect. 12. upon Maxims, without a careful Guard up-

upon Maxims, without a careful Guard upon the use of Words, without which they will serve to make Demonstrations on both sides. That this is so, I dare appeal to any Reader, should your Lordship press me again, as you do here, with all the force of these Words, * Say you so? What! De-

That all the Opposition between Des

*P. 143. of these Words, * Say you so? What! Demonstrations on both sides? And in the way of Ideas too? This is extraordinary indeed.

Cartes and those Others, is only about the naming of Ideas, I think may be made appear from these Words of your Lordship in † p. 143. the next Paragraph, i In the Ideas of Space and Body, the Question supposed is whether they be the same or no. That this is a Question only about Names, and not about Ideas themselves, is evident from hence, that no Body can doubt whether the fingle Idea of pure Distance, and the two Ideas of Distance and Solidity are one and the same Idea or different Ideas, any more than he can doubt, whether one and two are different. The Question then in the Case, is not whether Extension considered feparately by it felf, or Extension and Solidity together be the same Idea or no; but whether the simple Idea of Extension alone

fhall

shall be called Body, or the complex Idea of Solidity and Extension together, shall be called Body. For that these Ideas themselves are different, I think I need not go about to prove to any one, who ever thought of Emptiness or Fulness; for whether in Fact, the Bottle in a Man's hand be empty or no, or can by him be emptied or no, This, I think, is plain, That his Idea of Fulness, and his Idea of Emptiness are not the same. This the very Dispute concerning a Vacuum supposes; for if Mens Idea of pure Space were not different from their Idea of Solidity and Space together, they could never fo far separate them in their Thoughts, as to make a Question, whether they did always Exist together, any more than they could Question, whether the same thing existed with it self. Motion cannot be separated in Existence from Space: And yet no body ever took the Idea of Space and the Idea of Motion to be the same. Solidity likewise cannot Exist without Space; but will any one from thence fay, the Idea of Solidity and the Idea of Space are one and the same?

Your Lordship's third Reason to prove,
That it is impossible to come to a Demonstration about real Beings in this way of intuition
of Ideas, is, * That granting the Ideas to be * p. 134.
true, there is no self-evidence of the Connection
of them which is necessary to make a Demonstration. This, I must own, is to me as
incomprehensible a Consequence as the former: As also is that which your Lordship
Z fays

+ p. 143. fays + to make it out, which I shall fet down in your own Words, that its force may be left entire to the Reader; But granting the Ideas to be true, yet when their Connection is not felf-evident, then an intermediate Idea must compleat the Demonstration: But how doth it appear, that this middle Idea is self-evidently connected with them? For 'tis faid, if that intermediate Idea be not known by intuition, that must need a proof; and fo there can be no Demonstration; which your Lordship is very apt to believe in this way of Ideas; unless these Ideas get more Light by being put between two others. Whatever there be in these Words to prove the Proposition in Question, I leave the Reader to find out; but that he may not be led into a Mistake, that there is any thing in my Words, that may be ferviceable to it, I must crave leave to acquaint him, That these Words set down by your Lordship, as out of my Esfay, * are not to be found * B. 4 C. in that place, nor any where in my Book, 2. § 7. or any thing to this purpose, That the intermediate Idea is to be known by intuition; but this, That there must be an intuitive Knowledge or Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of the intermediate Idea

firates.

Leaving therefore all that your Lordship brings out of Gassendus, the Cartesians, Morinus, and Bernier, in their Argument from Motion, for or against a Vacuum, as not being

with those, whose Agreement or Disagreement by its intervention it demon-

ing at all concerned in it; I shall only crave leave to observe, that you feem to make use here of the same way of Argumentation, which I think I may call your main, if not only one, it occurs so often, viz. That when I have faid any thing to flew, wherein Certainty or Demonstration, &c. consists, you think it sufficiently overthrown, if you can produce any Instance out of my Book, of any thing advanced by me, which comes short of Certainty or Demonstration: Whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, it is no Proof against my Notion of Certainty, or my way of Demonstration, that I cannot attain to them in all Cases. I only tell wherein they confift, where-ever they are; but if I miss of either of them, either by reason of the Nature of the Subject, or by inadvertency in my way of Proof, that is no Objection to the Truth of my Notions of them: For I never undertook that my way of Certainty or Demonstration, if it ought to be called my way, should make me cr any one Omniscient or Infallible.

That which makes it necessary for me here again to take notice of this your way of Reasoning, is the Question wherewith you wind up the Account you have given of the Dispute of the Parties above named about a Vacuum, And is it possible to + p. 145. imagin, that there should be a self-evident Connection in the Case? Answer. It concerns not me to examine, whether, or on which fide, in that Dispute, such a felf evident Con-7 2

nettion is, or is not possible. But this I take the liberty to say, That where-ever it is not, there is no Demonstration, whether it be the Cartesians or the Gassendists that failed in this Point. And I humbly conceive, that to conclude from any one's failing in this, or any other Case, of a self-evident Connection in each step of his Proof, that therefore it is not necessary in Demonstration, is a Conclusion without Grounds, and a way of Arguing that proves nothing.

* p. 145.

f p. 105.

In the next Paragraph * you come to wind up the Argument, which you have been so long upon, viz. to make good what you undertook, † i e. To shew the difference of my Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Keason. In answer to my saying, I can find no Opposition between them; which Opposition, according to the account you give of it, after forty Pages spent in it, amounts at last to this:

P. 146.

(1.) That * I affirm, That general Principles and Maxims of Reason, are of little or no use; and your Lordship says, they are of very great use, and the only proper Foundations of Certainty. To which I crave leave to say, That if by Principles and Maxims, your Lordship means all self-evident Propositions, our ways are even in this part the same; for as you know, my Lord, I make self-evident Propositions necessary to Certainty, and sound all Certainty only in them. If by Principles and Maxims, you mean a select number of self-evident Propositions, distinguished from the rest by the

the name Maxims, which is the Sense in which I use the term Maxims in my Essay; then to bring it to a Decision, which of us Two, in this Point, is in the right, it will be necessary for your Lordship to give a List of those Maxims; and then to shew. That a Man can be certain of no Truth, without the help of those Maxims. affirm Maxims to be the only Foundations of Certainty, and yet not to tell, which are those Maxims; or how they may be known, is, I humbly conceive, fo far from laying any fure grounds of Certainty, that it leaves even the very Foundations of it uncertain. When your Lordship has thus setled the grounds of your way of Certainty by Reason, one may be able to examine, whether it be truly the way of Reason, and how far my way of Certainty by Ideas differs from

The fecond Difference that you affign * between my way of Certainty by Ideas, * P. 146, and yours by Reason, is, that I say, That Demonstration is by way of intuition of Ideas, and that Reason is only the Faculty imploy'd in discovering and comparing Ideas with themselves, or with others intervening; and that this is the only way of Certainty. Whereas your Lordship affirms, and, as you say, have proved, That there can be no Demonstration by intuition of Ideas; but that all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Principles of Reason, and necessary Deductions made from them. Answ. I have faid, That Demonstration confilts in the Perception of the Agreement

or Disagreement of the Intermediate Idea with those, whose Agreement or Disagreement it is to shew, in each step of the Demonstration: And if you will fav this is different from the way of Demonstration by Reason, it will then be to the Point abovementioned, which you have been fo long If this be your Meaning here, it feems pretty strangely expressed, and remains to be proved: But if any thing else be your Meaning, that Meaning not being the Proposition to be proved, it matters not whether you have proved it or no.

* p. 146. Your Lordship farther fays here, * That all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Principles of Reason, and necessary Deductions made from them. This, you fay, you have proved. What has been proved, is to be feen in what has been already confider'd. But if your Proof, That all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Principles of Reafon, and necessary Deductions made from them, were as clear and cogent, as it feems to me the contrary, this will not reach to the Point in Debate, till your Lordship has proved. That this is opposite to my way Tis ftrange (and of Certainty by Ideas. perhaps to some may be matter of thought) that in an Argument, wherein you lay fo much stress on Maxims, general Principles of Reason, and necessary Deductions from them, you should never once tell us, what, in your account, a Maxim or general Principle of Reason is, nor the Marks it is to be known by; nor offer to flew what a necessary Deduction

be known. For I have seen Men please themselves with Deductions upon Deductions; and spin Consequences, it matter'd not whether out of their own or other Men's Thoughts, which, when looked into, were visibly nothing but meer Ropes of Sand.

Tistrue, your Lordship fays, f you now + p. 114. come to Certainty of Reason by Deductions. But when all that truly learned Discourse, which follows, is read over and over again, I would be glad to be told, what it is your Lordship calls a necessary Deduction; and by what Criterion you diftinguish it from fuch Deductions, as come flort of Certainty, or even of Truth it felf. I confess I have read over those Pages more than once, and can find no such Criterion laid down in them, by your Lordship; though a Criterion be there much talked of. But whether it be my want of Capacity for your way of Writing, that makes me not find any Light given by your Lordship into this Matter: Or whether in Truth you have not shewed, wherein, what you call a necessary Deduction consists, and how it may be known from what is not fo, the Reeder mult judge. crave leave to fay, That when you have hewn what general Principles of Reason and necessary Deductions are, the World will then fee, and not till then, whether this your way of Certainty by Reason, from general Principles and necessary Deductions made from them, be opposite to, or so much as different from, action to be the Zing

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my way of Certainty by Ideas, which was

the thing to be shewn.

* p. 145. In the Paragraph * under Consideration, you blame me, that in my Chapter concerning Reason, I have treated it only as a Faculty, and not in the other Senses, which I there give of that Word. This Exception to my Book, is, I suppose, only from your Lordship's general Care of letting nothing pass in my Essay, which you think needs an amendment. For any particular Reason, that brings it in here, or ties it on to this part of your Discourse, I confess I do not

fee. However, to this I Answer.

1. The Understanding as a Faculty, being the Subject of my Essay, it carried me to treat directly of Reason no otherwise than as a Faculty. But yet Reason as standing for true and clear Principles, and also as standing for clear and fair Deductions, from those Principles I have not wholly omitted; as is manifest from what I have said of self-evident Propositions, intuitive Knowledge and Demonstration, in other parts of my Essay. So that your Question, * Why in a Chapter of Reason are the other two

* p. 145. * Why in a Chapter of Reason are the other two Senses of the word Negletted? Blaming me for no other Fault, that I am really guilty of, but want of Order, and not putting every thing in its proper Place; does not appear to be of so mighty weight, but that I should have thought it might have been left to the little Niblers in Controversie, without being made use of by so great a Man as your Lordship. But the putting things out of their

their proper Place, being that, which your Lordship thinks fit to except against in my Writings, it so falls out, that to this too, I can plead not guilty. For in that very Chapter f of Reason, I have not omitted + 6 2. 3. to treat of Principles and Deductions; and 4, 14, 15, what I have faid there, I presume is enough 16, 17,18. to let others fee. That I have not neglected to declare my poor Sense about self-evident Propositions; and the cogency and evidence of demonstrative or probable Deductions of Reason. Though what I have said there. not being back'd with Authorities, nor warranted by the Names of ancient Philosophers, was not worth your Lordship's taking notice of.

have, I confess, been so unwary to write out of my own Thoughts, which your Lordship has, more than once, with some fort of Reprimand taken notice of. lown it, your Lordship is much in the right: The fafer way is, never to declare ones own Sense in any material Point. If I had fill'd my Book with Quotations and Collections, of other Mens Opinions, it had fhewn much more Learning, and had much more security in it; and I my felf had been fafe from the Attacks of the Men of Arms. in the Common-wealth of Letters: But in writing my Book, I had no Thoughts of War, my Eye was fixed only on Truth. and that with fo fincere and unbiassed an Endeavour, that I thought, I should not have incur'd much Blame, even where I had missed it. This I perceive, too late, was E A the

the wrong way: I should have kept my felf still fafe upon the referve. Had I learnt this Wisdom of Thrase in Terence, and refolved with my felf, Hic ego ero post Principia, perhaps I might have deserv'd the Commendation was given him; Illuc oft Sapere ut hos instruxit ipsus sibi cavit loco. But Indeferved to be foundly Corrected, for not having profited by Reading, fo much as this comes to.

But to return to your Accusation here, which altogether stands thus: * Why in a * P. 145. Chapter of Reason are the other two Senses negletted? We might have expetted here full Satisfaction as to the Principles of Reason, as difinet from the Faculty, but the Author of the Essay wholly avoids it. What I guess these Words accuse me to have avoided, I think I have shewn already, that I did not avoided

Before you conclude, you fay, i you must † P. 146. observe that I prove, That Demonstration must be by Intuition, in an extraordinary manner from the Sense of the Word. He that will be at

3.

* Effay B. the Pains to read that Paragraph, * which 4. C. 2. 9 you quote for it, will fee, that I do not prove that it must be by Intuition, because it is called Demonstration; but that it is called Demonstration, because it is by Intuition, And as to the Propriety of it, what your Hordi thip fays in the following Words, * h * p. 147. would be most proper for ocular Demonstrasion

or by the Finger, will not hinder it from being proper also in mental Demonstration, as long as the Perception of the Mind, is properly expressed by seeing.

Against

Against my observing that the Notation of the word Imported shewing or making to fee, your Lordship farther fays, + Demon- + p. 152. firation among some Philosophers, signified only the conclusion of an Argument, whereby we are brought from something we did perceive, to fomething we did not; which feems to me to agree, with what I fay in the Cafe, viz. That by the agreement of Ideas, which we do perceive, we are brought to perceive the agreement of Ideas, which before we did not perceive. To which no doubt will be answered, as in a like Case, * Nor by a way of Intuition, but by a Deduction of Reason, i.e. we perceive not in a way that affords us Intuition or a Sight, but by Deductions of Reason, wherein we see nothing. Whereas, my Lord, I humbly conceive, That the force of a Deduction of Reason consists in this, That in each step of it, we see, what a Connection it has, i.e. have an Intuition of the certain Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas, as in Demonstration; or an Intuition or Perception, that they have a probable, or not fo much as a probable Connection, as in other Deductions of Reafon. TON Car

You farther overthrow * the necessity of * p. 147. intuitive Knowledge, in every step of a Demonstration, by the Authority of Aristotle, who says, Things that are self-evident, cannot be Demonstrated. And so say I too, in several Places of my Essay. It When your Lord. † B. 4. C. ship can shew any inconsistency between 7. § 10 & 19. and these two Propositions, viz. That intuitive elsewhere. Know-B. 4. C. 2.

Knowledge is necessary in each step of a Demonstration; and things that are self-evident cannot be Demonstrated; then I shall own you have overthrown the necessity of Intuition in every step of a Demonstration by Reason, as well as by Aristotle's Authority.

* p. 148 - 150.

In the remainder of this Paragraph, * I meet with nothing but your Lordship finding Fault with some, who, in this Age, have made use of Mathematical Demonstrations in Natural Philosophy. Your Lordship's two Reasons against this way of advancing Knowledge upon the fure Grounds of Mathematical Demonstration, are these.

(1.) * That Des Cartes a Mathematical * p. 148. Man, has been guilty of Mistakes in his Sy-

ftem. Answer.

When Mathematical Men will build Systems upon Fancy, and not upon Demonstration; they are as liable to Mistakes as others. And that Des Cartes was not led into his Mistakes by Mathematical Demonstrations, but for want of them, I think + Newton has been Demonstrated + by some of those Mathematicians, who feem to be meant

Phil. Natur. Principia Ma-

(2.) Your fecond Argument against acthemzt. 1. 2. Sect. 9. commodating Mathematicks to the nature of material things, is, * That Mathematicians * p. 149. cannot be certain of the manner and degrees of force given to Bodies, so far distant as the fixed Stars; nor of the Laws of Motion in other Systems. A very good Argument why they should not proceed Demonstratively in this our System upon Laws of Motion, observed

to be established here. A Reason that may perswade us to put out our Eyes, for fear they should mislead us in what we do see, because there be things out of our

fight.

'Tis great pity Aristotle had not underflood Mathematicks as well as Mr. Newton, and made use of it in Natural Philosophy, with as good fuccess. His Example had then authorized the accommodating of it to Material things: But 'tis not to be ventured, by a Man of this Age, to go out of the Method, which Aristotle has prescribed, and which your Lordship out of him, has set down in the following Pages, of as that + 150which should be kept to: For it is a dan- 153. gerous Presumption to go out of a Tract chalked out by that supposed Distator in the common Wealth of Letters, though it led him to the Eternity of the World. I fay not this, That I do not think him a very great Man; he made himself so, by not keeping precifely to beaten Tracts, which fervile Subjection of the Mind, if we may take my Lord Bacon's Word for it, kept the little Knowledge the World had, from growing greater for more than a few Ages. That the breaking loofe from it in this Age is a Fault, is not directly faid; but there is enough faid to shew, there is no great Approbation of fuch a Liberty. Mathematicks in grofs, 'tis plain, are a grievance in Natural Philosophy, and with Reason: For Mathematical Proofs, like Diamonds, are hard as well as clear, and

and will be touched with nothing but strict Reasoning; Mathematical Proofs are out of the reach of Topical Arguments, and are not to be attacked by the equivocal use of Words or Declamation, that make so great a part of other Discourses; nay, even of Controverses. How well you have proved my way by Ideas guilty of any tendency to Scepticism, the Reader will see; but this I will crave leave to say, That the secluding Mathematical Reasoning from Philosophy, and instead thereof reducing it to Aristotelian Rules and Sayings, will not be thought to be much in savour of Knowledge against Scepticism.

p. 149.

Your Lordship indeed fays, * You did not by any means take off from the laudable Endeavours of those, who have gone about to reduce Natural Speculations, to Mathematical What can we understand by Certainty. this, but your Lordship's great Complaifance and Moderation? who notwithstanding you fpend four Pages, to shew that the Endeavours of Mathematical Men, to accommodate the Principles of that Science, to the Nature of Material things, has been the occasion of great Mistakes in the Philosophy of this Age; and that therefore Aristotle's Method is to be followed: Yet you make this Complement to the Mathematicians, That you leave them to their liberty to go on, if they please, in their laudable Endeavours to reduce Natural Speculation, to Mathematical Certainty.

And thus we are come to the end of your Lordship's clearing this Passage; That you grant that by Sensation and Restection, we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things; but our Reason [i. e. the Principles of Reason agreed on by Mankind] is satisfied, that there must be something beyond these; because it is impossible they should subsist by themselves: So that the Nature of things properly belongs to Reason [i. e. the Principles of Reason agreed on by Mankind and not to meer Ideas. Which if any one be so lucky as to understand by these your Lordship's fifty Pages spent upon it, better than my Friend did, when he confessed himself gravelled by it, as it stands here recited, he ought to enjoy the Advantage of his happy Genius, whilft I miss that Satisfaction by the dulness of mine; which hinders me also from seeing how the Opposition, the way of Certainty by Ideas, and the way of Certainty by Reason comes in the Explication of this Paffage. or at least if it does belong to it; yet I must own, what is a greater misfortune, That I do not fee, what the Opposition or Difference is, which your Lordship has fo much talked of between the way of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason. For my excuse, I think others will be as much in the dark as I, fince you no where tell, wherein you your felf, my Lord, place Certainty. So that to talk of a Difference between Certainty by Ideas, and Certainty that is not by Ideas, without declaring in what that other Certain-

ty consists, is like to have no better succels, than might be expected from one who would compare two things together, the one whereof is not known.

1. That " I cannot put together one and

You now return to your Discourse of † p. 154. Nature and Person, and tell † me, That to what you faid about the general Nature in distinct Individuals, I object these three

Things:

P. 127.

the same." This I own to be my Objection; And consequently there is no Foundation for the distinction of Nature and Person. This, with Submission, I deny to be any Objection of mine, either in the place * * 2d Let. quoted by your Lordship, or any where There may be Foundation enough for Distinction, as there is of these two, and yet they may be treated of in a way fo obscure, so confused, or perhaps so sublime, that an ordinary Capacity may not from thence get, as your Lordship expresses it, clear and distinct apprehensions of them. This was that which my Friend and I complained of in that place, want of clearness in your Lordship's discourse, not of want

> (2.) " That what your Lordship said " about common Nature, and particular Subftance in Individuals, was wholly unintelligible to me and my Friends." To which, my Lord, you may add if you please, That

of distinction in the things themselves,

it is still so to me.

(3.) That

(3.) That I faid, " That to speak truly " and precisely of this Matter as in rea-" lity it is, there is no fuch thing as one and the same common Nature in several In-" dividuals, for all that in Truth is in "them, is particular and nothing but par-"ticular, Oc." Answer. This was faid, to flew how unapt these Expressions, The same common Nature in several Individuals, and several Individuals being in the same common Nature, were to give true and clear Notions of Nature. To this your Lordship answers, * That other, and those very Ra- * P. 156. tional Men have spoken so: To which I shall fay no more, but that it is an Argument, with which any thing may be defended; and all the Jargon of the Schools be justified, but I presume not strong enough to bring it back again, let Men never fo Rational make use of it.

Your Lordship adds, & But now it feems, + p. 1466 nothing is intelligible but what suits with the new may of Ideas. My Lord, the new way of Ideas, and the old way of speaking intelligibly was always, and ever will be the fame. And if I may take the liberty to declare my Sense of it, herein it consists; (1.) That a Man use no Words but fuch as he makes the Signs of certain determined Objects of his Mind in Thinking, which he can make known to another. (2.) Next, that he use the same Word steadily for the Sign of the fame immediate Object of his Mind in Thinking. (3.) That he join those Words together in Proposi-Aa tions,

tions, according to the Grammatical Rules of that Language he speaks in. (4.) That he unite those Sentences in a coherent Discourse. Thus and thus only I humbly conceive any one may preserve himself from the Confines and Suspicion of Jargon, whether he pleases to call those immediate Objects of his Mind, which his Words do, or should stand for, Ideas or no.

* p. 156.

You again * accuse the way of Ideas, to make a common Nature, no more than a common Name. That, my Lord, is not my way by Ideas. When your Lordship shews me, where I have said so, I promise your Lordship to strike it out: And the like I promise, when you shew me where I presume that we are not to judge of things by the general Principles of Reason, which you call * my Fundamental Mistake.

* p. 156. † p. 157.

These Principles of Reason, you say, it must be the Standard to Mankind. If they are of such Consequence, would it not have been convenient, we should have been instructed something more particularly about them, than by barely being told their Name, that we might be able to know what are, and what are not Principles of Reason?

But be they what they will, because they must be the Standard to Mankind, your p. 157. Lordship says, * You shall in this Debate proceed upon the following Principles to make it appear, that the Difference between Nature and Person is not imaginary and sictitious, but grounded upon the real Nature of things. With Submission, my Lord, you need not be at the Pains

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Pains to draw up your great Artillery of fo many Maxims, where you meet with no Opposition. The thing in Debate, whether in this Debate or no, I know not; but what led into this Debate, was about these Expressions, One common Nature in several Individuals, and several Individuals in one common Nature; and the Question I thought, was, whether a general or common Nature could be in Particulars, i. e. Exist in Individuals? But since your Lordship turns your Artillery against those who deny. That there is any Foundation of Distinction between Nature and Perfon: I am out of Gun-shot; for I am none of those, who ever said, or thought there was no Foundation of distinction between Nature and Person.

The Maxims you lay down in the following Paragraph of are to make me under- p. 158. Itand how one and the same, and distinct may consist; I confess, I do not see how your Lordship's Words there at all make it out. This, indeed, I do understand, that several particular Beings may have a conformity in them to one general abstract Idea, which may, if you please, be called their general or common Nature: But how that Idea or general Nature can be the same and dissinct, is still past my Comprehension.

To my faying, That your Lordship had not told me what Nature is, I am told, * * P. 159. That if I had a mind to understand you, I could not but see, that by Nature you meant the Subject of essential Properties. A Lady asking a learned Physician what the Spleen

Aa 2

was, received this answer, That it was the Receptacle of the Melancholy Humour: She had a mind to understand what the Spleen was; but by this Definition of it. found her felf not much enlightned; and therefore went on to ask, what the Melancholy Humour was; and by the Doctor's answer, found that the Spleen and the Melancholy Humour, had a Relation one to another; but what the Spleen was she knew not one jot better than she did, before he told her any thing about it. My Lord, relative Definitions of Terms, that are not relative, usually do no more than lead us in a Circuit to the same place from whence we fet out; and there leave us in the fame Ignorance we were in at first. So I fear it would fall out with me here, if I, willing as I am to understand what your Lordship means by Nature, should go on to ask what you mean by essential Properties.

* p. 159 -161.

P. 132-135.

The three or four next Pages * I hope your Lordship does not think contain any ferious Answer to what my Friend faid + 2d Let. i concerning Peter, James and John; and as for the Pleasantry of your Country-man, I shall not pretend to meddle with that, fince your Lordship, who knows better than any body his way of chopping of Logick, was fain to give it off, because it was growing too rough. What Work fuch a dangerous chopper of Logick would make, with an Argument, that supposed the names Peter, James and John, to stand for Men; and then without scruple affirm'd, That the Nature

ture of Man was in them, if he were let loose upon it, who can teil? Especially if he might have the liberty strenuously to use the Phrase for his Life, and to observe what a turn the chiming of Words without determined Ideas annexed to them, give to the Understanding, when they are gone deep into a Man's Head, and pass there for Things.

To shew that the common or general Nature of Man, could not be in Peter or James, I alledg'd, That whatever existed (as whatever was in Peter or James did) was particular, and that it confounded my Understanding, to make a general a particular. In answer, your Lordship tells me, * That to make me understand this, you had told * P. 164. me in your Answer to my first Letter, That we are to consider Beings as God had order'd them in their several forts and ranks, &c. And thereupon you ask me, if Why it was not answer'd in the proper Place for it? Answ. 1+ p. 165. own I am not always fo Fortunate, as to fay things in that, which your Lord hip thinks the proper Place; but having been rebuked for Repetitions, I thought your Lordship could not be Ignorant, that I had comsider'd Beings as God had order'd them in their several sorts and ranks, &c. Since you could not but have read these Words of mine, f " I would not here be thought to for-" get, much less to deny, that Nature in + Essay B.

"get, much less to deny, that Nature in + Essay B.
"the production of Things, makes seve- 3 - 3 - 5.

A a 3 " Seed,

[&]quot; ral of them alike. There is nothing more obvious, especially in the Races of

[&]quot;Animals, and all things Propagated by

Seed, &c. "And I have expressed my Sense in this Point, so fully here, and in other Places, particularly B. 3. C. 6. that I dare leave it to my Reader, without any

farther Explication.

Your Lordship farther asks. I Is not that + p. 165. a real Nature, which is the Subject of real Properties? And is not the Nature really in those who have the essential Properties? I Answer to both those Questions yes, such as is the reality of the Subject. fuch is the reality of its Properties; the abstract general Idea, is really in the Mind of him that has it, and the Properties that it has are really and infeperably annexed to it; let this reality be whatever your Lordship pleases: But this will never prove. That this general Nature exists in Peter or James. Those Properties, with Submission, do not, as your Lordship supposes, exist in Peter and James: Those Qualities indeed may exist in them, which your Lordship calls Properties: But they are not Properties in either of them, but are Properties only of that specifick abstract Nature, which Peter and James, for their supposed Conformity to it, are ranked under. Example, Rationality as much a Property as it is of a Man, is no Property of Peter he was Rational a good part of his Life, could Write and Read, and was a sharp Fellow at a Bargain: But about Thirty, a knock fo altered him, that for these Twenty Years palt, he has been able to do none of these Things, there is to this Day, not fo much appearance of Reason in him, as in his Horse or Monkey: And yet he is Peter still. Your

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Your Lordship asks, * Is not that a real Nature, that is the Subject of real Properties? And is not that Nature really in those who have * p. 165. the same essential Properties? Give me leave. I beseech you, to ask, are not those distinct real Natures, that are the Subjects of distinct essential Properties? For Example, the Nature of an Animal, is the Subject of effential Properties of an Animal, with the exclusion of those of a Man or a Horse; for else the Nature of an Animal, and the Nature of a Man, and the Nature of a Horfe, would be the same: And so, wherever the Subject of the essential Properties of an Animal is, there also would be the subject of the essential Properties of a Man, and of a Horse, and so, in effect, whatever is an Animal, would be a Man: The real Nature of an Animal, and the real Nature of a Man, being the fame. To avoid this, there is no other way (if this reality your Lordship builds fo much on, be any thing beyond the reality of Two abstract distinct Ideas in the Mind) but that there be one real Nature of an Animal, the Subject of the effectial Properties of an Animal; and another real Nature of a Man, the Subject of the effential Properties of a Man: Both which real Natures must be in Peter, to make him a Man. that every individual Man or Beaft, must according to this account, have two real Natures in him, to make him what he is: Nay, if this be fo, Two will not ferve the turn. Bucephalus must have the real Nature of Ens or Being, and the real Nature of Body, A a 4

and the real Nature of Vivens, and the real Nature of Animal, and the real Nature of a Horse, i.e Five distinct real Natures in him, to make him Bucephalus: For these are all really distinct common Natures, whereof one is not the Subject of precisely the same essential Properties as the other. This, though very hard to my Understanding, must be really so, if every distinct, common or general Nature, be a real Being, that really exists any where, but in the Understanding.

*P. 154. Common Nature, taken in my way of Ideas,

*p. 164. Common Nature, taken in my way of Ideas, your Lordship truly says, * will not make me understand such a common Nature as you speak of, which subsists in several Individuals, because I can have no Ideas of real Substances, but such as are particular; all others are only abstract Ideas, and made only by the act of the Mind. But what your Lordship farther promises there, I find, to my Sorrow, does

you call the way of Reason, I may come to a

not hold, viz. That in your Lordship's way (as far as you have discover'd it) which

better understanding of this Matter.
† p. 166. Your Lordship in the next Paragraph

Your Lordship in the next Paragraph of declares your self really ashamed to be put to explain these Things, that which you had said being so very plain and easy: And yet I am not ashamed to own, that for my Life, I cannot understand them, as they are now farther explained. Your Lordship thinks it proved, That every common Nature is a real Being: Let it be so, that it is the Subject of real Properties; and that thereby it is Demonstrated to be a real Being, this makes

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it harder for me to conceive, that this common Nature of a Man, which is a real Being, and but one, should yet be really in Peter, in James and in John. Had Amphitruo been able to conceive this, he had not been fo much puzzel'd, or thought Sofia to talk Idle, when he told him, Domi ego sum in quam et apud te adsum Sosia idem. For the common Nature of Man, is a real Being as your Lordship says, and Sosia is no more: And he that can conceive any one and the same real Being, to be in divers places at once, can have no difficulty to conceive it of another real Being: And fo Sofia may at the same time, be at home, and with his Master abroad. And Amphitruo might have been ashamed to demand the explication of fo plain a Matter; or at least, if he had stuck a little at here and there too, ought he not to have been satisfied, as foon as Sosia had told him, I am another distinct I here, from the same I that I am there? Which no doubt Sosia could have made out; let your Lordship's Countryman chop Logick with him, and try whether he cannot. Countryman. But how is it possible Sosia, that thou the real same, as thou sayst, should'st be at home, and here too? Sofia, Very eafily, because I am really the same, and yet distinct. Countrym. How can this be? Sofia, By a Trick that I have. Countrym. Canst thou teach me the Trick? Sofia. Yes, 'tis but for thee to get a particular Subsistence proper to thy real felf at home, and another particular Subfistence proper to thy same real self abroad, and

and the Business is done, thou wilt then easily be the same real thing, and distinst from thy felf; and thou mayst be in as many places together, as thou canst get particular Subsistences, and be still the same one real Being. Countrym. But what is that particular Subsistence? Sosia, Hold ye, Hold ye Friend, that's the Secret, I thought once, it was particular Existence, but that I find is an ineffectual Drug, and will not do: Every one sees it will not make the same real Being distinct from it self, nor bring it into two different places at once, and therefore it is laid aside, and Subsistence is taken to do the Feat. Countrym. Existence my Boy's School master made me understand, the other Day, when my gray Mare Fol'd. For he told me that a Horse, that never was before, began than to exist; and when the poor Fole died, he told me the same Horse ceased to exist. Sosia, But did he tell thee what became of the real common Nature of an Horse, that was in it, when the Fole died? Countrym. No. But this I know, That my real Horse was really destroy'd. Sofia, There's now thy Ignorance, fo much of thy Horse as had a real Existence, was really destroy'd, that's true: But there was fomething in thy Horse, which having a real particular Subsistence was not destroy'd; nay, and the best part of thy Horse too, for it was that, which had in it all those Properties, that made thy Horse better than a Broom-stick. Countrym. Thou tellst me Wonders of this same Subsistence, what

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I pray thee is it? Sofia. I beg your Pardon for that, it is the very Philosopher's Stone, those who are Adepti, and can do strange things with it, are Wiser than to tell what it is. Countrym. Where may it be Bought then? Sofia. That I know not: But I will tell thee where thou mayst meet Countryman, Where? Sofia, In some of the shady Thickets of the Schoolmen, and 'tis worth the looking after. if particular Subsistence has such a power over a real Being, as to make one and the same real Being to be distinct and in divers places at once, it may perhaps beable to give thee an Account what becomes of that real Nature of thy Horse after thy Horse is dead, and if thou canst but find, whether that retires, who knows but thou mayft get as useful a thing as thy Horse again? Since to that real Nature of thy Horse, insepeparably adheres the Shape and Motion and other Properties of thy Horse.

I hope, my Lord, your Country man will not be displeased to have met with Sosia to chop Logick with, who, I think, has made it as intelligible, how his real self might be the same and distinct, and be really in distinct places at once, by the help of a particular Subsistence proper to him in each place, as it is intelligible how any real Being under the name of a common Nature, or under any other name bestowed upon it, may be the same and distinct; and really be in diverse places at once, by the help of a particular Subsistence proper to each of those divisions.

flint sames. At least, if I may answer for my felf, I understand one as well as the other: And if my Head be turned from common Sense (as I find your Lordship very apt to think) fo that it is if great News to † p. 169. you that I understand any thing: If in my way of Ideas I cannot understand Words, that appear to me either to stand for no Ideas; or to be so joined, that they put inconsistent Ideas together, I think your Lordship uses me right to turn me off for desperate, and leave me, as you do, to the

* p. 169. * Reader's Understanding.

* p. 169,

& 170.

To your Lordship's many Questions concerning Men and Drills, in the Paragraph * where you begin to explain what my Friend and I found difficult in your Difcourse concerning Person; I answer, That these two names, Man and Drill, are perfeetly Arbitrary, whether founded on real distinct Properties or no; fo perfectly Arbitrary, that if Men had pleased, Drill might have stood for what Man now does, and Vice versa. I answer farther, That these two Names stand for two abstract ideas, which are (to those who know what they mean by these two Names) the distinct Esfences of two distinct Kinds; and as particular Existences, or things Existing are found by Men (who know what they mean by these Names) to agree to either of those Ideas, which these Names stand for; these Names respectively are applied to those particular things, and the things faid to be of that Kind. This I have so fully and

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at large explained in my Essay, that I should have thought it needless to have faid any thing again of it here, had it not been to hew my readiness to answer any Questions you shall be pleased to ask concerning any thing I have writ, which your Lordship either finds difficult, or has forgot. In the next place, your Lordship comes to dear what you had faid in answer to this Ouestion put by your felf, if What is this di- it Vindic. stinction of Peter, James and John, founded P. 259. upon? To which you answered, * That they * ibid. may be distinguished from each other by our Senses, as to difference of Features, distance of Place, &c. But that is not all; for supposing there was no external difference, yet there is a difference between them, as several Individuals in the same common Nature. These Words, when my Friend and I came to consider, we owned, as your Lordship here * takes notice, that we could understand no * p. 171. more by them but this, " That the ground " of Distinction between several Individu-" als, in the same common Nature, is, "That they are feveral Individuals in the " fame common Nature." Hereupon your Lordship tells me, * The Question now is, * p. 171. what this distinction is founded upon? Whether on our observing the difference of Features, distance of Place, &c. or on some antecedent ground. Pursuant hereunto, as if this were

Pursuant hereunto, as if this were the Question, you in the next Paragragh † (as far as I can understand it) make the ground of the Distinction between these Individuals

dividuals or the prinicipium individuationis, to be the Union of the Soul and Body. But with Submission, my Lord, the Question is, Whether I and my Friend were to blame, because when your Lordship, in the Words above cited, having removed all other grounds of Distinction, said there was yet a difference between Peter and James, as several Individuals in the same common Nature, we could understand no more by it, but this, "That the ground of Distinction be-"tween several Individuals in the same common Nature, is, That they are se-"ral Individuals in the same common Nature?"

Let the ground that your Lordship now assigns of the Distinction of Individuals be what it will, or let what you fay be as clear as you please, viz. That the ground of their Distinction is in the Union of Soul and Body; it will, I humbly conceive, be nevertheless true, That what you said before might amount to no more but this, "That " the ground of the Distinction between " feveral Individuals in the same common " Nature, is, That they are feveral Indi-" viduals in the same common Nature;" and therefore we might not be to blame for so understanding it. For the Words, which our Understandings were then imploied about, were those which you had there faid, and not those which you would fay five Months after: Though I must own, that those which your Lordship here * fays 173. concerning the Distinction of Individuals, leave

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leave it as much in the dark to me as what you faid before. But perhaps I do not understand your Lordship's Words right, because I conceive that the principium individuationis is the same in all the several Species of Creatures, Men as well as Others; and therefore if the Union of Soul and Body be that which distinguishes two Individuals in the Humane Species one from another, I know not how two Cheries or two Atoms of Matter can be distinct Individuals: fince I think there is in them no Union of a Soul and Body. And upon this ground it will be very hard to tell, what made the Soul and the Body, Individuals (as certainly they were) before their Union.

But I shall leave what your Lordship says concerning this Matter to the Examination of those, whose Health and Leisure allows them more time than I have for this weighty Question, wherein the Distinction of two Men or two Cheries consists, for sear I should make your Lordship's Country-man a little wonder again to find a grave Philial of the same of th

losopher make a serious Question of it.

To your next Paragraph of I answer, to That if the true Idea of a Person, or the true Signification of the Word Person lies in this, That supposing there was no other difference in the several Individuals of the same kind; yet there is a difference between them as several Individuals in the same common Nature, it will follow from hence, that the name Person will agree to Bucephalus and Podargus, as well as to Alexander and Hestor.

Hor. But whether this Confequence will agree, with what your Lordship says concerning *Person* in another place, I am not concerned; I am only answerable for this

Consequence.

* p. 173. Your Lordship is pleased here, * to call my endeavour to find out the meaning of your Words, as you had put them together, trifling Exceptions: To which I must fay, That I am heartily forry, that either my Understanding, or your Lordship's way of Writing obliges me so often to such I cannot, as I have faid, answer to what I do not understand; and I hope here my trifling, in fearthing out your Lordship's meaning, was not much out of the way, because I think every one will see by the Steps I took, that the Sense I found out by it, was that which your Words implied; and your Lordship does not disown it, but only replys, That I should not have drawn that which was the natural Consequence from it, because that Consequence would not well confift with what you had faid in another place.

† p. 174 175.

What your Lordship adds farther of to clear your saying, That an individual intelligent Substance is rather supposed to the making of a Person, than the proper definition of it, though in your definition of Person, you put a compleat intelligent Substance, must have its effect upon others Understandings: I must suffer under the short sightedness of my own, who neither understood it as it stood

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stood in your first Answer, nor do I now as

it is explained in your fecond,

Your Lordship being here, as you fay, * * p. 176. come to the end of this Debate, I should here have ended too; and it was time, my Letter being grown already to too great a Bulk. But I being ingaged by Promife, to Answer some Things in your first Letter, which in my Reply to it, I had omitted, now come to them, and shall endeavour to give your Lordship satisfaction in those Points; tho to make room for them, I leave out a great deal that I had Writ in Answer to this your Lordship's Second Letter. And if after all, my Answer seems too long, I must beg your Lordship, and my Reader, to excuse it, and impute it to those occasions of length, which I have mentioned in more places than one, as they have occurred.

The Original and main Ouestion between your Lordship, and me, being, whether there were any thing in my Esfay, Repugnant to the Doctrin of the Trinity; I endeavoured, by Examining the Grounds and manner of your Lordship's bringing my Book into that Controversie, to bring that Question to a Decision. And therefore in my Answer to your Lordship's First Letter, I insisted particularly on what had a Relation to that Point. This Method your Lordship in your Second Letter Cenfured, as if it Contained only Personal Matters, which were fit to be laid aside. And by mixing new Matter, and charging my Book with new Accufations, before the first was made out, avoided the

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Decision of what was in Debate between us; A strong Presumption to me, that your Lordship had little to fay, to support what began the Controversy, which you were for willing to have me let fall; whilest on the other fide, my Silence to other Points, which I had Promised an Answer to, was often Reflected on, and I Rebuked, for not Answer-

ing in the proper Place.

p. 7.

Your Lordship's calling upon me on this occasion shall not be lost; Tis fit your Expectation should be fatisfied, and your Objections Confidered; which for the Reasons above mentioned, were not Examined in my former Answer. And which, whether true or false, as I humbly conceive, make nothing for or against the Doctrin of the Trinity. I shall therefore consider them barely as fo many Philosophical Questions, and endeavour to shew your Lordship where, and upon what Grounds 'tis I Stick; and what it is, that hinders me from the Satiffaction it would be to me, to be in every one of them of your mind.

Your Lordship tells me, * Whether I do * I Anf. own Substance or not, is not the Point before us; But whether by Vertue of these Principles, I can come to any certainty of Reason about it? And your Lordship says, the very Places I produce do prove the Contrary; which you shall therefore fet Down in my own Words, both as to Corporeal and Spiritual Substances.

> Here again my Lord, I must beg your Pardon, that I do not diffinctly Comprehend your meaning in these Words, viz. That by

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vertue of these Principles one cannot come to certainty of Reason about Substance: For it is not very clear to me, whether your Lordship means, that we cannot come to certainty, that there is fuch a thing in the World as Subfance; or, whether we cannot make any other Proposition about Substance, of which we can be certain; or whether we cannot by my Principles, Establish any Idea of Substance of which we can be certain. For to come to Certainty of Reason, about Substance may sigpifie either of thefe, which are far different Propositions: And I shall waste your Lordhip's time, my Readers, and my own (neither of which would I willingly do) by taking it in one Sense, when you mean it in an other, left I should meet with some such Reproof as this: That I Mifrepresent your meaning, or might have understood it if I had a mind to it, &c. And therefore cannot but wish, that you had so far Condescended to the flowness of my Apprehension, as to give me your Sense so determined, that I might not trouble you with Answers to what was not your Precise meaning.

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To avoid it in the prefent Case, and to md in what Sense I was here to take these words, come to no Certainty of Reason about Substance, I looked into what followed, and when I came to the 13th Page, I thought I had there got a clear explication of your Lordship's Meaning, and that by no Certainty of Reason about Substance, your Lordship here meant no certain Idea of Substance. Your Lordship's words are, * I do * 1. Ans.

not P. 13. Bb 2

not charge them, (i. e. me as one of the Gentlemen of the new way of Reasoning) with Discarding the Notion of Substance, because they have but an imperfect Idea of it; but because upon those Principles, there can be no tertain I wea at all of it. Here I thought my self sure, and that these words plainly Interpreted the meaning of your Proposition, p. 7. to be, that upon my Principles there can be no certain Idea at all of Substance. But before I came to the end of that Paragraph, I found my self at a loss again, for that Paragraph * 1 Ans. goes on in these words, * Whereas your Lord-

Ans. goes on in these words, *Whereas your Lordship afferts it to be one of the most natural and
certain Ideas in our minds, because it is a Repugnance to our first Conception of Things, that
Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves,
and therefore you said the rational Idea of Substance is one of the first Ideas in our Minds; and
however imperfect and obscure our Notion be, yet
we are as certain that Substances are and must
be as that there are any Beings in the World.
Here the Certainty which your words seem
to mean, is Certainty of the Being of Substance.

P. 13.

In this Sense therefore I shall take it, till your Lordship shall determine it otherwise. And the reason why I take it so is, because

* 1 Ans. what your Lordship goes on to say, * seems p. 7.8. to me to look most that way. The Proposition then that your Lordship undertakes to Prove is this; That by Vertue of my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reason, that there is any such thing as Substance. And your

* 1 Ans. Lordship tells me, * That the very Places I pro-P. 7. duce do prove the Contrary, which you therefore will set down in my own Words, both as to Corporeal and Spiritual Substances. The g)

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The First your Lordship brings * are * 1 Aus. these words of mine: "When we talk or P. 6. "think of any Particular fort of Corporeal "Substances, as Horse, Stone, &c. Tho' " the Idea we have of either of them, be "but the Complication or Collection of "those several simple Ideas of sensible quali-"ties, which we use to find United in the thing " called Horse or Stone; yet because we can-" not conceive how they should subsist alone; "nor one in another, we suppose them ex-"ifting in, and supported by some common "Subject, which support we denote by the "Name Substance; tho' it be certain we "have no clear and distinct Idea of that "thing we suppose a Support. And again, "The fame happens concerning the "Operations of the Mind, viz. Thinking, "Reasoning, Fearing, &c. which we consi-"dering not to sublist of themselves, nor "apprehending how they can belong to "Body, or be produced by it, we are apt "to think these the Actions of some other "Substance, which we call Spirit, whereby " yet it is evident that having no other Idea "or Notion of Matter, but fomething "wherein those many Sensible Qualities, " which affect our Senses do sublist; by sup-"poling a Substance, wherein Thinking, "Knowing, Doubting, and a Power of Mov-"ing, &c. do subsist. We have as clear a "Notion of the Nature or Substance of "Spirit, as we have of Body; the one being "Supposed to be (without knowing what it (is)

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is) the Substratum to those simple Ideas we have from without; and the other suppos-" ed, (with a like Ignorance of what it is) to be the Substratum to those Operations "which we Experiment in our felves."

But how these words prove that, upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reason that there is any such thing as Substance in the World; I confess I do not see, nor has your Lordship, as I humbly, conceive shewn. And I think it would be a hard matter from these Words of mine to make a Syllogism, whose Conclusion should be, Ergo, from my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reason, that there is any Substance in the World.

p. 9.

Your Lordship indeed tells me * that I fay, * 1 Anf. "that these and the like fashions of speak-"ing, that the Substance is always supposed something." And grant that I say over and over that Substance is supposed; but that your Lordship says, is not what you looked for, but something in the way of Certainty by Reason.

> What your Lordship looks for, is not, I find, always easy for me to guess. But what I brought that, and some other Passages to the same purpose for, out of my Esfay, that I think they prove, viz. that I did not Discard nor almost Discard Substance out of the Reasonable part of the World. For he that supposes in every Species of Material Beings, Substance to be always something, doth not Liscard or almost Discard it out of the World, or deny any fuch thing to be. The Passages alledged I think prove this, which was all I brought them for. And if they should happen to prove no more, I think,

think, you can hardly infer from thence, That therefore upon my Principles, we can come to no Certainty, that there is any fuch thing

as Substance in the World.

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Your Lordship goes on * to infift mighti- * , Arfw. ly upon my supposing; and to these Words p. 9. of mine, "We cannot conceive how these " fensible Qualities should subsist alone; and therefore we suppose a Substance to " fupport them. Your Lordship replies, It is but supposing still; because we cannot conceive it otherwise: But what Certainty follows from not being barely able to conceive? Answer. The same Certainty that follows from the Repugnancy to our first Conceptions of things, upon which i your Lordship grounds the i Answ. relative Idea of Substance. Your Words P. 25. are, It is a mere effect of Reason, because it is a Repugnancy to our first Conceptions of things. that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themfelves. Your Lordship then, if I understand your Reasoning here, concludes, That there is Substance, because it is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of things (for whether that Repugnancy be to our first or second Conceptions, I think that's all one) that Modes or Accidents should subsist by themselves; and I conclude the fame thing, because we cannot conceive how fensible Qualities should subsist by themselves. Now what the difference of Certainty is from a Repugnancy to our Conceptions, and from our not being able to conceive; I confess, my Lord, I am not acute enough to And therefore it feems to me, that I have laid down the same Certainty of

Bb 4

the Being of Substance, that your Lordship has done.

* 1 Answ.

Your Lordship adds, * Are there not multitudes of things which we are not able to conceive; and yet it would not be allowed us to suppose what we think fit upon that account? Answer. Your Lordship's is certainly a very just Rule; 'tis pity it does not reach the But because it is not allowed us to suppose what we think fit in things, which we are not able to conceive; it does not therefore follow, That we may not with Certainty suppose or infer, that which is a natural and undeniable Confequence of such an inability to conceive, as I call it, or repugnancy to our Conception, as you call it. We cannot conceive the Foundation of Harlem Church to stand upon nothing; but because it is not allowed us to suppose what we think fit, viz. That it is laid upon a Rock of Diamond, or supported by Fairies; yet I think all the World will allow the infallible Certainty of this Supposition, from thence, that it rests upon something. This I take to be the present Case; and therefore your next Words, I think, do less concern Mr. L. than my Lord B. of W. I shall fet them down, that the Reader may apply them to which of the two he thinks they most be-

† 1 Answ. long. They are, † I could hardly conceive P. 9. that Mr. L. would have brought such Evidence as this against himself; but I must suppose some unknown Substratum in this Case. For these Words, that your Lordship has last quoted of mine, do not only not prove, That

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upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty, that there is any such thing as Substance in the World; but prove the contrary, that there must certainly be Substance in the World, and upon the very fame Grounds, that your Lordship takes it to be certain.

Your next Paragraph, * which is to the * I Answ. same purpose, I have read more than once, p. 10. and can never forbear, as often as I read it, to wish my felf young again; or that a liveliness of Fancy suitable to that Age, would teach me to fport with Words for the Diversion of my Readers. This I find your Lordship thinks so necessary to the quickning of Controversie, that you will not trust the Debate to the greatness of your Learning, nor the gravity of your Subject without it, whatever Authority the Dignity of your Character might give to what your Lordship fays; for you having quoted to Answ. these Words of mine; " As long as there P. 10. " is any simple Idea, or sensible Quality left, " according to my way of Arguing, Sub-" stance cannot be discarded, because all " simple Ideas, all fensible Qualities carry " with them a Supposition of a Substratum " to Exist in, and a Substance wherein they " inhere." You add, What is the meaning of tarrying with them a Supposition of a Substratum and a Substance? Have these simple Ideas the Notion of a Substance in them? No, but they carry it with them: How fo? Do sensible Qualities carry a Corporeal Substance along with them? Then a Corporeal Sub-

Substance must be intromitted by the Senses together with them: No, but they carry the Supposition with them; and truly that is butten enough for them. But which way do they carry it? It seems its only, because we cannot conceive it otherwise: What is this Conceiving! It may be said it is an Act of the Mind, not built on simple Ideas, but lies in the comparing the Ideas of Accident and Substance together; and from thence sinding that an Accident must carry Substance along with it: But this will not clear it; for the Ideas of Accidents are simple Ideas, and carry nothing along with them, but the impression made by sensible Objects.

In this Passage, I conclude, your Lordship had some regard to the Entertainment of that part of your Readers, who would be thought Men, as well by being rifible as rational Creatures. For I cannot imagine you meant this for an Argument; did, I have this plain simple answer, That by carrying with them a Supposition, I mean, according to the ordinary import of the Phrase, That sensible Qualities imply a Substratum to Exist in. And if your Lordship please to change one of these equivalent Expressions into the other, all the Argument here, I think, will be at an end: What will become of the Sport and Smiling, I will not answer.

Hitherto, I do not see any thing in my Words brought by your Lordship that proves, That upon my Principles we can come

to no Certainty of Reason, that there is Sub-

flance in the World, but the contrary.

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Your Lordship's next Words * are to * 1 Answ. tell the World that my Simile about the p. 11, 12. Elephant and Tortoise, is to ridicule the Notion of Substance, and the Europæan Philosophers for afferting it. But if your Lordfhip please to turn again to my Esfay, * * B. 2. C. you will find those Passages were not in- 13. \$ 19. tended to ridicule the Notion of Substance, or those who afferted it, whatever that it But to shew, that though Subfance did support Accidents, yet Philosophers, who had found fuch a support neceffary, had no more a clear Idea of what, that support was, than the Indian had of that, which supported his Tortoise, tho' fure he was, it was fomething. Had your Pen which i quoted fo much of the nine. i Answ. teenth Sect. of the thirteenth Chap. of my P. II. fecond Book, but fet down the remaining line and an half of that Paragraph, you would by these Words which follow there; " So that of Substance we have no Idea " of what it is, but only a confused ob-"fcure one of what it does," have put it past doubt, what I meant. But your Lordship was pleased to take only those, which you thought would ferve best to your purpole; And I crave leave to add now these remaining ones to shew my Reader, what was mine.

Tis to the same purpose I use the same Illustration again in that other place, * * B. 2. C. which you are pleased to cite likewise, which 23. § 2.

your Lordship says you did, only to shew, that it was a deliberate and (as I thought) lucky similitude. It was upon ferious confideration I own, that I entertained the Opinion, that we had no clear and distinct Idea of Substance, But as to that Similitude, I do not remember that it was much deliberated on: Such unaccurate Writers as I am, who aim at nothing but plainness, do not much study Similes: And for the Fault of Repetition you have been pleased to Pardon it. But suppoling you had proved, That that Simile was to ridicule the Notion of Substance, published in the Writings of some Europæan Philosophers; it will by no means follow from thence, That upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty of Reason, that there is any such thing as Substance in the World. Men's Notions of a thing may be laughed at by those, whose Principles establish the Certainty of the thing it felf; and one may laugh at Aristotle's Notion of an Orb of Fire under the Sphere of the Moon, without Principles that will make him uncertain whether there be any fuch thing as Fire. My Simile did perhaps serve to shew, that there were Philosophers, whose Knowledge was not fo clear, nor fo great as they pretended. If your Lordship thereupon thought, that the vanity of such a pretension had fomething ridiculous in it, I shall not contest your Judgment in the Case: For, as humane Nature is framed, 'tis not impossible, that whoever is discovered to pretend

to know more than really he does, will be

in danger to be laughed at.

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In the next Paragraph, + your Lordship + 1 Answ. bestows the Epithite of Dull on Burgersdicius P. 12. and Sanderson and the Tribe of Logicians. will not Question your right to call any Body Dull whom you please. But if your Lordship does it to infinuate, that I did so; I hope I may be allowed to fay thus much in my own Defence, that I am neither fo Stupid, or Ill-natured to discredit those whom I quote for being of the same Opinion with me. And he that will look into the eleventh and twelfth Pages of my Reply, which your Lordship refers to, will find, that I am very far from calling them Dull, or speaking diminishingly of them. But if I had been fo Ill-bred or Foolish as to have called them Dull: I do not fee how that does at all ferve to prove this Proposition; That upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty of Reason, that there is any such thing as Substance any more than what follows in the next Paragraph *. * I Anfw.

Your Lordship in it asks me, as if it were P. 13. of some great importance to the Proposition to be proved, whether there be no difference between the bare being of a thing, and its Subsistence by its self. I answer, Yes, there is a difference as I understand those Terms, and then I beseech your Lordship to make use of it to prove the Proposition before us. But because you seem by this Question to conclude, That the Idea of a thing that subsists by its self, is a clear and distinct Idea

of Substance; I beg leave to ask, Is the Idea of the manner of Subsistence of a thing, the Idea of the thing it felf? If it be not, we may have a clear and distinct Idea of the manner, and yet have none but a very obfcure and confused one of the thing. Example, I tell your Lordship, that I know a thing, that cannot fubfift without a fupport, and I know another thing that does fubfift without a support, and say no more of them, can you by having the clear and distinct Ideas of having a support, and not having a support, fay, that you have a clear and distinct Idea of the thing, that I know which has, and of the thing, that I know which has not a support? If your Lordship can, I befeech you to give me the clear and distinct Ideas of these, which I only call by the general name Things, that have or have not supports; for such there are, and such I shall give your Lordship clear and distinct Ideas of, when you shall please to call upon me for them, though I think your Lordship will scarce find them by the general and confused Idea of Thing, nor in the clearer and more distinct Idea of having or not having a support.

To shew a blind Man that he has no clear and distinct Idea of Scarlet, I tell him, that his Notion of it, that it is a Thing or Being, does not prove he has any clear or distinct Idea of it; but barely that he takes it to be fomething, he knows not what. He replies, that he knows more than that, v. g. he knows that it subsists or inheres in ano-

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ther thing, And is there no difference, says he in your Lordship's Words, between the bare being of a thing and its subsistence in another? Yes say I to him, a great deal, they are very different Ideas. But for all that, you have no clear and distinct Idea of Scarlet, not such a one as I have who see and know it, and have another kind of Idea of it besides that of inherence.

Your Lordship has the Idea of Subsisting by it felf, and therefore you conclude you have a clear and distinct Idea of the thing. that subsists by it self, which methinks is all one, as if your Countryman should fay, he hath an Idea of a Cedar of Lebanon, that it is a Tree of a Nature, to need no Prop to lean on for its support, therefore he hath a clear and distinct Idea of a Cedar of Lebanon: Which clear and distinct Idea. when he comes to examin, is nothing but ageneral one of a Tree, with which his indetermined Idea of a Cedar is confounded. lust so is the Idea of Substance, which however called clear and diffinct is confounded with the general indetermined Idea of Something. But suppose that the manner of Subfifting by it felf, give us a clear and distinct Idea of Substance, how does that prove, That upon my Principles we can come to no Certainty of Reason, that there is any such thing as Substance in the World? Which is the Propolition to be proved.

In what follows, f your Lordship says, f I Answ. You do not charge any one with discarding the P. 13. Notion of Substance, because he has but an im-

perfect Idea of it : But because upon those Principles there can be no certain Idea at all of it.

Your Lordship says here, those Principles and in other places there Principles, without particularly fetting them down, that I know:

I am fure without laying down Propositions, that are mine, and proving, that those granted, we cannot come to any Certainty, that there is any such thing as Substance, which is the thing to be proved, your Lordship proves nothing in the Case against me. What therefore the certain Idea, which I do not understand, or Idea of Substance has to do here, is not easy to see. For that which I am charged with, is the discarding Substance. But the discarding Substance is not the discarding the Notion of Substance. Mr. Newton has discarded Des Cartes's Vortices, i. e. laid down Principles from which he proves there is no fuch thing; but he has not thereby discarded the Notion or Idea of those Vortices, for that he had when he confuted their Being, and every one who now reads and understands him, will have. But, as I have already observed. your Lordship here, I know not upon what Ground, nor with what Intention, confounds the Idea of Substance and Substance it felf; for to the Words above fet down, your Lordship subjoins, i That you affert P. 13. 14. it to be one of the most natural and certain Ideas in our Minds, because it is a repugnance to our first conception of Things, that Modes or Accidents (hould subsist by themselves; and therefore your Lordship said, the rational Idea of Sub-

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stance is one of the first Ideas in our Minds, and however imperfect and obscure our Notion be, yet we are as certain that Substances are and must be, as that there are any Beings in the World. Herein I tell your Lordship that I agree with you, and therefore I hope this is no Objection against the Trinity. Your Lordship says, you never thought it was, but to lay all Foundations of Certainty as to matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas, which was the Opinion you opposed, does certainly over-throw all Mysteries of Faith, and excludes the Notion of Substance out of rational Discourse, which your Lordship affirms to have been your Meaning.

How these Words, as to Matters of Faith, came in, or what they had to do against me in an answer only to me, I do not see: Neither will I here examin what it is to be one of the most natural and certain Ideas in our Minds. But be it what it will, this I am sure, That neither that, nor any thing else contained in this Paragraph, any way proves, that upon my Principles we cannot come to any Certainty, that there is any such thing as Substance in the World. Which was the Proposition to be

In the next place then, I crave leave to consider, how that is proved, which though nothing to the Proposition to be proved, is yet what you here assert, viz. That the Idea of Substance is one of the most natural and certain Ideas in our Minds: Your Proof of it is this, Because it is a repugnancy to our first conception of Things, that Modes and Accidents C c

should subsist by themselves, and therefore the rational Idea of Substance is one of the first Ideas in our Minds. From whence I grant it to be a good consequence, that to those who find this repugnance, the Idea of a support is very necessary, or if you please to call it fo. very rational. But a clear and distinct Idea of the thing it felf, which is the fupport will not thence be proved to be one of the first Ideas in our Minds: or that any fuch Idea is ever there at all. He that is fatisfied that Pendennis Castle, if it were not supported, would fall into the Sea, must think of a support, that sustains it: But whether the thing that it rests on be Timber, or Brick, or Stone, he has by his bare Idea of the necessity of some support that props it up, no clear and distinct Idea at all.

In this Paragraph you farther fay, That the laying all foundation of Certainty as to Matters of Faith on clear and distinct Ideas, does certainly exclude the Notion of Substance out of rational Discourse. Answ. This is a Proposition that will need a Proof: Because every Body at first sight will think it hard to be proved. For it is obvious, That let Certainty in matters of Faith, or any matters whatfoever, be laid on what it will, it excludes not the Notion of Substance certainly out of rational Discourse, unless it be certainly true, that we can rationally Discourse of nothing, but what we certainly know. But whether it be a Proposition easy or not easy to be proved, this is certain, that it concerns

cerns not me, for I lay not all Foundation of Certainty as to matters of Faith, upon clear and distinct Ideas; and therefore, if it does difcard Substance out of the reasonable part of the World, as your Lordship phrases it above, or excludes the Notion of Substance out of rational Discourse: Whatever havock it makes of Substance, or its Idea, no one jot of the Mischief is to be laid at my Door, because that is no Principle of mine.

Your Lordship ends this Paragraph with telling me, * that I at length apprehend your * 1 Answ.

Lord bips meaning.

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I wish heartily that I did, because it would be much more for your ease as well as my own. For in this case of Substance, I find it not easy to know your meaning, or what it is I am blamed for. For in the beginning of this Dispute, fit is the being of Substance. T. vin a. And here again, * it is Substance it felf is + p. 7. Discarded. And in this very Paragraph, writ as it seems, to explain your self, so + p. 13. that in the close of it you tell me that at length 14. I apprehend your meaning to be that the Notion of Substance is Excluded out of Rational Discourse, the Explication is such, that it renders your Lordship's meaning to me more obscure and uncertain, than it was before. For in the fame Faragraph your Lordship fays, That upon my Principles there can be no certain 3 oca at all of Substance; and also that however imperfect and obscure our Notions be, yet me are as tertain that Substances are and must be, as that there are any beings in the World. So that supposing I did know (as I do not) what

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your Lordship means by tertain Idea of Substance, yet I must own still, that what your meaning is by discarding of Substance, whether it be the Idea of Substance, or the Being of Substance I doe not know. But that, I think, need not much trouble me, since your Lordship does not, that I see, shew how any Position or Principle of mine overthrows either Substance it self, or the Idea of it, or excludes either of them out of rational Discourse.

P. 14. In your next Paragraph, if you say, I delare, p. 35. That if any one affert that we can
have no Ideas but from Sensation and Restellion
it is not my Opinion. My Lord, I have looked
over that 35th Page, and find no such Words
of mine there. But refer my Reader to
that and the following Pages, for my Opinion concerning Ideas from Sensation and Reflection, how far they are the foundation
and materials of all our Knowledge: And
this I do, because to those Words, which
your Lordship has set down as mine, out
of the 35th Page, but are not there, you

* 1 Answ. subjoin, * That you are very glad of it, and p. 14. will do me all the right you can in this Matter, which seems to imply, That it is a matter of great consequence, and therefore I defire my meaning may be taken in my own

* 1 Let. Words, as they are set down at large *.

P. 35-38. The Promise your Lords makes me

The Promise your Lordship makes me, of doing me all the Right you can, I return my humble Thanks for, because it is a piece of Justice so seldom done in Controversie. And because I suppose you have here made me this Promise, to Authorise me to mind you of it,

if at any time your haste should make you mistake my Words or meaning: To have ones Words exactly Quoted, and their meaning Interpreted by the plain and visible defign of the Author in his whole Discourse being a right, which every Writer has a just Claim to, and fuch as a lover of Truth will be very wary of Violating. stance of some fort of Intrenchment on this I humbly conceive there is in the next Page but one, i where you Interpret my Words, i Answ. as if I excused a mistake I had made, by P. 16. calling it a flip of my Pen; whereas my Lord, I do not own any flip of my Pen in that Place, but fay that the meaning of my Expression there is to be Interpreted by other places, and particularly by those, where I Treat Professedly of that Subject: And that in fuch cases, where an Expression is only incident to the Matter in Hand, and may feem not exactly to Quadrate with the Author's Sense, where he designedly treats of that Subject, it ought rather to be Interpreted as a flip of his Pen, than as his meaning. I should not have taken so particular a notice of this, but that you by having up these Words with an Air that makes me fensible how wary I ought to be, shew what use would be made of it, if ever I had pleaded the slip of my Pen.

In the following Pages, * I find a Discourse * 1 Answ. drawn up under several Ranks of Numbers p.15 - 29. to prove, as I guess, this Proposition, † that † 1 Answ. in my way of Ideas we cannot come to any Cer- P. 20. tainty as to the Nature of Substance. I shall

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be in a condition to Answer to this Accusation, when I shall be told what particular Proposition, as to the Nature of Substance, it is, which in my way of Ideas we cannot come to any Certainty of. Because probably it may be fuch a Proposition concerning the Nature of Substance, as I shall readily own, that in my way of Ideas we can come to no Certainty of; and yet I think the way of Ideas not at all to be blamed, till there can be shewn an other way, different from that of Ideas, whereby we may come to a Certainty of it. For 'twas never pretended, that by ideas we could come to Certainty concerning every Proposition, that could be made concerning Substance or any thing else.

Besides the doubtfulness visible in the Phrase it self, there is another Reason that hinders me from understanding precisely what is meant by these Words to come to a Certainty as to the Nature of Substance, viz. * p 150. Because your Lordship * makes Nature and Substance to be the same, so that to come to a Certainty as to the Nature of Substance is, in your Lordship's Sense of Nature, to come to a Certainty as to the Substance of Substance, which I own I do not clearly understand.

> An other thing that hinders me from giving particular Answers to the Arguments, that may be supposed to be contained in so many Pages is, that I do not fee, how what is Discoursed in those Thirteen or Fourteen Pages is brought to prove this Proposition, that in my way of Ideas we cannot come to any Certainty as to the Nature of Substance; and

& 101.

it would require too many Words to Examine every one of those Heads, Period by Period, to see what they Prove; when you your felf do not apply them to the direct Probation of any Proposition that I understand.

Indeed you wind up this Discourse with these Words, * That you leave the Reader to * 1 Answ. judge whether this be a tolerable account of the P. 29. Idea of Substance by Sensation and Reflection. Answ. That which your Lordshp has given in the precedent Pages, I think is not a very tolerable account of my Idea of Substance, since the account you give over and over again * of my Idea of Substance is, that it is no * 1 Answ. thing but a Complex Idea of Accidents. This is P. 15, 16, your account of my Idea of Substance, which 21, 25, 26, 17,20, 23, you infift fo much on, and which you fay 27, 28,29. tyou took out of those Places, I my felf t 1 Answ. produced in my first Letter. But if you had P. 24. been pleased to have set down this one, which is to be found there i amongst the rest Pro. + 1 Let. duced by me out of B. 2 ch. 12. Sect. 6. of P. 10. my Eslay, viz. "That the Ideas of Substances " are fuch Combinations of simple Ideas, as " are taken to Represent distinct particular " Things Sublifting by themselves, in which "the supposed or confused Idea of Sub-" stance is always the first and thief." This, would have been a full Answer to all that I think you have under that variety of Heads, Objected against my Idea of Substance. But your Lordship in your Reprefentation of my Idea of Substance, thought fit to leave this Passage out; though you are pleased C C 4

pleased to set down several others produced both before and after it in my first Letter, which I think gives me a Right humbly to return your Lordship your own Words, And now I freely leave the Reader to judge whether this, which your Lordship has given, be a to lerable Account of my Idea of Substance.

The next Point to be considered, is concerning the Immateriality of the Soul; + 1 Answ. whereof there is a great deal said. The p. 47-Original of this Controversie, I shall fet 79. * 1 Answ. down in your Lordsbip's own Words: * You fay, The only Reason you had to engage in this p. 67. Matter, was this bold Affertion; That the Ideas we have by Senfation or Reflection are the fole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasoning, and

that our Certainty lies in perceiving the Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition: which last, you fay, are my own words. To overthrow this bold Affertion, you urge

p. 68. + 1 Let. p. 67.

* ib.

* 1 Answ. * my acknowledgment, f " That upon my " Principles it cannot be demonstratively or proved, that the Soul is Immaterial tho' " it be in the highest degree probable." And then ask * Is not this the giving up the cause of Certainty? Answer: Just as much the giving up the cause of Certainty on my side, as it is on your Lordship's. Who tho' you will not please to tell wherein you place Certainty, yet it is to be supposed you do place Certainty in fomething or other. Now let it be what you will, that you place Certainty in, I take the liberty to fay, that you cannot certainly prove i.e. demonstrate, that the Soul of Man is Immaterial: I am fure you have not fo much as offered at any fuch proof, and therefore you give up the cause of Certainty upon your Principles. Because if the not being able to demonstrate, that the Soul is Immaterial upon his Principles, who declares, wherein he thinks Certainty confifts, be the giving up the cause of Certainty; the not being able to demonstrate the Immateriality of the Soul upon his Principles, who does not tell wherein Certainty confifts, is no less a giving up of the cause of Certainty. The only odds between these two is more Art and Reserve in the one than the other. therefore my Lord, you must either upon your Principles of Certainty demonstrate that the Soul is Immaterial, or you must allow me to fay, that you too give up the cause of Certainty, and your Principles tend to Scepticism as much as mine. Which of these two your Lordship shall please to do, will to me be advantagious; for by the one I shall get a Demonstration of the Souls Immateriality, (of which I shall be very glad) and that upon Principles, which reaching farther than mine, I shall imbrace, as better than mine, and become your Lordship's professed Convert. Till then I shall rest satisfied, that my Principles be they as weak and fallible as your Lordship please, are no more guilty of any fuch tendency, than theirs, who talking more of certainty cannot attain to it in cases, where they condemn the way of Ideas for coming thort of it.

+ 1 Anfw. p. 68.

You a little lower in the same Page, if set down these as my Words, That I never offered it as a way of Certainty, where we cannot reach Certainty. I have already told you that I have been fometimes in doubt what Copy you had got of my Esfay: Because I often found your Quotations out of it, did not agree with what I read in mine: But by this Instance here, and some others, I know not what to think, fince in my Letter, which I did my felf the Honour to fend your Lordfhip. I am fure the Words are not as they are here fet down. For I fay, not that I offered the way of Certainty there spoken of which looks as if it were a new way of Certainty, that I pretended to teach the World Perhaps the difference, in these from my Words is not fo great, that upon an other occasion I should take notice of it. But it being to lead People into an Opinion, that I spoke of the way of Certainty by Ideas, as fomething new, which I pretended to teach the World, I think it worth while to fet down my Words themselves, which I think are foPenn'd, as to shew a great Caution in me to avoid fuch an opinion. My Words * are,

* 1 Let. p. 81.

" I think it is a way to bring us to a Certainty in those things, which I have offered as " Certain, but I never thought it a way to " Certainty, where we cannot reach Cer-

cc tainty."

What use your Lordship makes of the term offered, applied to what I applied it not, is to be feen in your next Words, which you subjoin to those which you fet down

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down for mine. ' But did you not offer to put + 1 Answ. us into a way of Certainty? And what is that P. 68. but to attain Certainty in such things where we could not otherwise do it? Answ. If this your way of reasoning here, carries Certainty in it, I humbly conceive in your way of Certainty by Reason, Certainty may be attained, where it could not otherwise be had. ly beg you my Lord, to shew me the place, where I so offer to put you in a way of Certainty different from what had formerly been the way of Certainty, that Men by it might attain to Certainty in things, which they could not before my Book was writ. No Body who reads my Essay with that indifferency, which is proper to a Lover of Truth, can avoid feeing, that what I fay of Certainty was not to teach the World a new way of Certainty (though that be one great Objection of yours against my Book) but to endeavour to shew, wherein the old and only way of Certainty confifts; what was the occasion and design of my Book may be seen plainly enough in the Epistle to the Reader. without any need that any thing more should be said of it. And I am too sensible of my own Weakness not to profess, as I do *, * Essay B. That " I pretend not to teach, but to en- §. 17. "quire." I cannot but wonder what fervice you, my Lord, who are a Teacher of Authority, mean to Truth or Certainty, by condemning the way of Certainty by Ideas: Because I own by it I cannot demonstrate, that the Soul is Immaterial. May it not be worth your confidering, what advan-ODWA tage

tage this will be to Scepticism, when upon * 1 Answ. the same grounds, your Words here * shall be turned upon you; and it shall be askp. 68. ed, What a Strange way of Certainty is thin [your Lordship's way by Reason] if it fails us in some of the first Foundations of

the real Knowledge of our selves?

To avoid this, you undertake * to provi * 1 Anfw. from my own Principles, that we may be cer. p. 69. tain, "That the first eternal Thinking " Being or Omnipotent Spirit cannot, if " he would, give to certain Systems of " created sensible Matter, put together " as he fees fit, some degrees of Sense, Per-" ception and Thought:" For this, my + Effay B. Lord, is my Proposition, f and this the

utmost that I have faid concerning the

Power of Thinking in Matter. Se&t. 6.

4. C. 3.

Your first Argument & I take to be this + I Anfw. p.69-73. That according to me, the Knowledge we have being by our Ideas, and our Idea of Matter in general being a folid Substance, and our Idea of Body a folid extended figured Substance; if I admit Matter to be capable of Thinking, I confound the Idea of Matter with the Idea of a Spirit: To which I answer, No, no more than I confound the Idea of Matter with the Idea of an Horse, when I fay that Matter in general is a folid extended Substance; and that an Horse is a material Animal, or an extended folid Substance with Sense and Spontaneous Motion.

The Idea of Matter is an extended folid Substance; where-ever there is such a Substance, there is Matter; and the Essence of

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Matter, whatever other Qualities not contained in that Essence, it shall please God to superadd to it. For example, God creates an extended folid Substance, without the fuperadding any thing else to it, and so we may consider it at rest: To some parts of it he superadds Motion, but it has still the Essence of Matter: Other parts of it he frames into Plants, with all the Excellencies of Vegetation, Life and Beauty, which is to be found in a Rose or a Peach-tree, &c. above the Essence of Matter in general, but it is still but Matter: To other parts he adds Sense and Spontaneous Motion, and those other Properties that are to be found in an Elephant. Hitherto 'tis not doubted but the Power of God may go, and that the Properties of a Rose, a Peach or an Elephant, fuperadded to Matter, change not the Properties of Matter; but Matter is in these things Matter still. But if one venture to go one step further and say, God may give to Matter, Thought, Reason and Volition, as well as Sense and Spontaneous Motion, there are Men ready prefently to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us, he cannot do it; because it destroys the Essence, or changes the essential Properties of Matter. To make good which Affertion they have no more to fay, but that Thought and Reason are not included in the Essence of Matter. I grant it; but whatever Excellency, not contained in its Essence, be superadded to Matter, it does not destroy the Essence of Matter, if it leaves

leaves it an extended folid Substance; where-ever that is, there is the Essence of Matter; and if every thing of greater Perfection, superadded to such a Substance, destroys the Essence of Matter, what will become of the Essence of Matter in a Plant, or an Animal, whose Properties far exceed those of a meer extended solid Substance?

But 'tis farther urged, That we cannot conceive how Matter can Think. I grant it; but to argue from thence, that God therefore cannot give to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, is to fay God's Omnipotency is limited to a narrow Compass, because Man's Understanding is so; and brings down God's infinite Power to the fize of our Capacities. If God can give no Powet to any parts of Matter, but what Men can account for from the Essence of Matter in general: If all fuch Qualities and Properties must destroy the Essence or change the essential Properties of Matter, which are to our Conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive to be the natural Consequence of that Essence; it is plain, that the Essence of Matter is destroyed and its essential Properties changed in most of the sensible parts of this our System: For 'tis visible, that all the Planets have Revolutions about certain remote Centers, which I would have any one explain, or make conceiveable by the bare Essence or natural Powers depending on the Essence of Matter in general, without something added to that Essence, which we cannot conceive; for the moving of Matter in

a crooked Line, or the attraction of Matter by Matter, is all that can be faid in the Case; either of which, it is above our Reach to derive from the Essence of Matter or Body in general; though one of these two must unavoidably be allowed to be superadded in this instance to the Essence of Matter in general. The Omnipotent Creator advised not with us in the making of the World, and his ways are not the less Excellent, be-

cause they are past our finding out.

In the next place, the vegetable part of the Creation is not doubted to be wholly Material; and yet he that will look into it, will observe Excellencies and Operations in this part of Matter, which he will not find contained in the Essence of Matter in general, nor be able to conceive how they can be produced by it. And will he therefore say, That the Essence of Matter is destroyed in them, because they have Properties and Operations not contained in the essential Properties of Matter as Matter, nor explicable by the Essence of Matter in general?

Let us advance one step farther, and we shall in the Animal World meet with yet greater Perfections and Properties no ways explicable by the Essence of Matter in general. If the Omnipotent Creator had not superadded to the Earth, which produced the irrational Animals, Qualities far surpassing those of the dull dead Earth, out of which they were made, Life, Sense, and Spontaneous Motion, nobler Qualities than

were before in it, it had still remained rude fenseless Matter; and if to the Individuals of each Species, he had not superadded a Power of Propagation, the Species had perished with those Individuals: But by these Essences or Properties of each Species, superadded to the Matter which they were made of, the Essence or Properties of Matter in general were not destroyed or changed, any more than any thing that was in the Individuals before, was destroyed or changed by the Power of Generation, superadded to them by the first Benediction of the

Almighty.

In all fuch Cases, the superinducement of greater Perfections and nobler Qualities, destroys nothing of the Essence or Perfections that were there before; unless there can be shewed a manifest Repugnancy between them; but all the Proof offered for that, is only, That we cannot conceive how Matter, without such superadded Perfections, can produce such Effects; which is, in Truth, no more than to fay, Matter in general, or every part of Matter, as Matter has them not; but is no Reason to prove, that God, if he pleases, cannot superadd them to some parts of Matter, unless it can be proved to be a Contradiction, that God should give to some parts of Matter, Qualities and Perfections, which Matter in general has not; though we cannot conceive how Matter is invested with them, or how it Operates by Vertue of those new Endowments. Nor is it to be wonder'd that we cannot

cannot, whilst we limit all its Operations to those Qualities it had before, and would explain them, by the known Properties of Matter in general, without any such superinduced Perfections. For if this be a right Rule of Reasoning to deny a thing to be, because we cannot conceive the manner how it comes to be: I shall desire them who use it, to stick to this Rule, and see what Work it will make both in Divinity, as well as Philosophy; and whether they can advance any

thing more in favour of Scepticism?

For to keep within the present Subject of the Power of Thinking and Self-motion; bestow'd by Omnipotent Power on some parts of Matter: The Objection to this is, I cannot conceive how Matter should Think: What is the Consequence? Ergo, God cannot give it a Power to Let this stand for a good Reafon, and then proceed in other Cafes by the fame. You cannot conceive how Matter can attract Matter at any distance, muchless at the distance of 1000000 Miles; Ergo, God cannot give it fuch a Power; you cannot conceive how Matter should feel, or move it felf, or affect an Immaterial Being, or be moved by it: Ergo, God cannot give it fuch Powers, which is in effect to deny Gravity and the Revolution of the Planets about the Sun; to make Brutes meer Machins without Sense or Spontaneous Motion, and to allow Man neither Sense nor voluntary Motion.

Let us apply this Rule one degree farther. You cannot conceive how an extended folid Substance should Think, therefore God cannot make it Think: Can you conceive how your own Soul, or any Substance Thinks? You find indeed, that you do Think, and fo do I; but I want to be told how the Action of Thinking is performed: This, I confess, is beyond my Conception; and I would be glad any one, who conceives it, would explain it to me. God, I find, has given me this Faculty; and fince I cannot but be convinced of his Power in this Instance, which though I every moment Experiment in my felf, yet I cannot conceive the manner of; what would it be less than an infolent Absurdity, to deny his Power in other like Cases only for this Reason, because I cannot conceive the manner how?

To explain this Matter a little farther. God has created a Substance; let it be, for Example, a folid extended Substance; is God bound to give it, besides Being, a Power of Action? that, I think, no body will fay: He therefore may leave it in a State of Inactivity, and it will be nevertheless a Substance; for Action is not necessary to the Being of any Substance, that God does create: God has likewise created and made to Exist, de novo, an immaterial Substance, which will not lose its Being of a Substance, though God should bestow on it nothing more but this bare Being, without giving it any Activity at all. Here are now

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now two distinct Substances, the one Material the other Immaterial, both in a State of perfect Inactivity. Now I ask, what Power God can give to one of these Substances (supposing them to retain the same distinct Natures, that they had as Substances in their State of Inactivity) which he cannot give to the other? In that State, 'tis plain, neither of them Thinks; for Thinking being an Action, it cannot be denied, that God can put an end to any Action of any created Substance, without anihilating of the Substance whereof it is an Action: and if it be fo, he can also create or give Existence to such a Substance, without giving that Substance any Action at all. By the same Reason it is plain, that neither of them can move it felf: Now I would ask, why Omnipotency cannot give to either of these Substances, which are equally in a State of perfect Inactivity, the same Power, that it can give to the other? Let it be for Example, that of Spontaneous or Self-motion, which is a Power that 'tis supposed God can give to an unfolid Substance, but denyed that he can give to folid a Substance.

If it be asked, why they limit the Omnipotency of God, in reference to the one rather than the other of these Substances; all that can be said to it, is, That they cannot conceive, how the solid Substance should ever be able to move it self. And as little, say I, are they able to conceive how a created unsolid Substance should

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move it felf: But there may be something in an immaterial Substance, that you do not know. I grant it; and in a material For Example, Gravitation of one too: Matter towards Matter, and in the feveral Proportions observable, inevitably shews. that there is fomething in Matter that we do not understand, unless we can conceive Self-motion in Matter; or an inexplicable and inconceivable Attraction in Matter, at immense and almost incomprehensible Distances: It must therefore be confessed, that there is fomething in folid, as well as unfolid Substances, that we do not understand. But this we know, that they may each of them have their distinct Beings. without any Activity superadded to them, unless you will deny, That God can take from any Being its Power of Acting, which tis probable will be thought too Presumptuous for any one to do; and I fay, it is as hard to conceive Self-motion in a created immaterial as in a material Being, confider it how you will: And therefore this is no Reason to deny Omnipotency to be able to give a Power of Self-motion to a material Substance, if he pleases, as well as to an immaterial; since neither of them can have it from themselves, nor can we conceive how it can be in either of them.

The same is visible in the other Operation of Thinking; both these Substances may be made, and exist without Thought; neither of them has, or can have the Power of Thinking from it self: God may give it fo either of them according to the good Pleasure of his Omnipoteney; and in which ever of them it is, it is equally beyond our Capacity to conceive, how either of those Substances thinks. But for that Reason, to deny that God, who had Power enough to give them both a Being out of nothing, can by the same Omnipotency, give them what other Powers and Perfections he pleases, has no better a Foundation than to deny his Power of Creation, because we cannot conceive how it is performed; and there at last this way of Rea-

foning must terminate.

That Omnipotency cannot make a Substance to be folid and not folid at the fame time, I think, with due Reverence, we may fay; but that a folid Substance may not have Qualities, Perfections and Powers, which have no natural or visibly neceffary Connection with Solidity and Extension, is too much for us (who are but of Yesterday, and know nothing) to be positive in. If God cannot join things together by Connections inconceiveable to us, we must deny even the Consistency, and Being of Matter it felf; fince every Particle of it having some bulk, has its Parts connected by ways inconceiveable to us. So that all the Difficulties, that are raised against the Thinking of Matter from our Ignorance or narrow Conceptions, stand not at all in the way of the Power of God, if he pleases to ordain it so; nor proves any thing against his having actually en-Dd 3 dued

dued some parcels of Matter, so disposed as he thinks sit, with a Faculty of Thinking, till it can be shewn, that it contains

a Contradiction to suppose it.

Though to me Sensation be comprehended under Thinking in general, yet in the foregoing Discourse, I have spoke of Sense in Brutes, as distinct from Thinking. Because your Lordship, as I remember, speaks of Sense in Brutes. But here I take liberty to obferve, That if your Lordship allows Brutes to have Sensation, it will follow, either that God can and doth give to some parcels of Matter a Power of Perception and Thinking; or that all Animals have immaterial and confequently, according to your Lordship, immortal Souls, as well as Men; and to fay that Fleas and Mires. &c. have immortal Souls as well as Men, will possibly be looked on, as going a great way to ferve an Hypothesis, and as it would not very well agree, with what your Lordship says, 2 Answ. p. 64. to the Words of Solomon, quoted out of Ecclef. C. 3.

I have been pretty large in making this Matter plain, that they who are so forward to bestow hard Censures or Names on the Opinions of those, who differ from them, may consider whether sometimes they are not more due to their own: And that they may be perswaded a little to temper that Heat, which supposing the Truth in their current Opinions, gives them (as they think) a Right to lay what Imputations they please on those who would fairly examin the Grounds they stand upon. For talking

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with a Supposition and Infinuations, that Truth and Knowledge, nay and Religion too. stands and falls with their Systems; is at best but an imperious way of begging the Question, and assuming to themselves under the pretence of Zeal for the Caufe of God, a Title to Infallibility. It is very becoming that Mens Zeal for Truth, should go as far as their Proofs, but not go for Proofs themselves. He that attacks received Opinions, with any thing but fair Arguments, may, I own, be justly suspected not to mean well; nor to be led by the Love of Truth; but the same may be said of him too, who fo defends them. An Error is not the better for being common, nor Truth the worse for having lain neglected: And if it were put to the Vote any where in the World, I doubt, as things are managed, whether Truth would have the Majority, at least, whilst the Authority of Men, and not the examination of Things must be its Measure. The imputation of Scepticism and those broad Infinuations, to render what I have writ suspected, so frequent as if that were the great Business of all this Pains you have been at about me, has made me fay thus much my Lord, rather as my Sense of the way to establish Truth in its full Force and Beauty, than that I think the World will need to have any thing faid to it, to make it diffinguish between your Lordship's and my Design in Writing, which therefore I fecurely leave to the Judgment of the Reader, and return to the Argument in Hand.

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* I Anf.

p. 73.

II.

What I have above faid, I take to be a full Answer to all that your Lordship would infer from my Idea of Matter, of Liberty, and of Identity, and from the power of Ab-You ask, * How can my Idea Stracting. of Liberty agree with the Idea that Bodies can operate only by Motion and Impulse? Answ. By the omnipotency of God, who can make all things agree, that involve not a Contra-+ Effay B. diction. 'Tis true, I fay, + " That Bo-2. C. 8. §" dies operate by impulse and nothing " else". And so I thought when I writ it and yet can conceive no other way of their operation. But I am fince convinced by the Iudicious Mr. Newton's incomparable Book, that 'tis too bold a Presumption to limit God's Power in this Point, by my narrow Conceptions. The gravitation of Matter towards Matter, by ways unconceivable to me, is not only a Demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into Bodies, Powers, and ways of Operation, above what can be derived from our Idea of Body, or can be explained by what we know of Matter, but also an unquestionable and every where vifible Instance, that he has done fo And therefore in the next Edition of my Book,

As to Self-consciousness, your Lordship asks, + 1 Answ. - What is there like Self consciousness in Matter? P. 74. Nothing at all in Matter as Matter. But that God cannot bestow on some parcels of Matter a Power of Thinking, and with it Selfconsciousness will never be proved by ask-

fied.

I thall take care to have that Passage recti-

ing,

ing, * How is it possible to apprehend that meer * ibBody should perceive that it doth perceive? The
weakness of our Apprehension I grant in
the Case: I confess as much as you please,
that we cannot conceive how a solid, no
nor how an unsolid created Substance thinks;
but this weakness of our Apprehensions,
reaches not the Power of God, whose weakness is stronger than any thing in Men.

Your Argument from Abstraction, we have in this Question, * If it may be in the * 1 Answ: power of Matter to think, how comes it to be fo P. 76. impossible for such organized Bodies as the Brutes have, to enlarge their Ideas by Abstraction? Answ. This feems to suppose, that I place Thinking within the natural Power of Matter. If that be your Meaning, my Lord, I neither fay, nor suppose, that all Matter has naturally in it a Faculty of Thinking. but the direct contrary. But if you mean that certain parcels of Matter, ordered by the Divine Power, as feems fit to him, may be made capable of receiving from his Omnipotency the Faculty of Thinking; that indeed I fay, and that being granted, the Answer to your Question is easie, since if Omnipotency can give Thought to any folid Substance, it is not hard to conceive, that God may give that Faculty in an higher or lower Degree, as it pleases him, who knows whar Disposition of the Subject is fuited to fuch a particular way or degree of Thinking.

Another Argument to prove, That God cannot endue any parcel of Matter with * 1 Let. P. 139.

with the Faculty of Thinking, is taken from those Words of mine, * where I shew. by what connection of Ideas we may come to know, That God is an Immaterial Substance. They are these, " The Idea of an " eternal actual, knowing Being, with the " Idea of Immateriality, by the interven-" tion of the Idea of Matter, and of its " actual Division, divisibility and want of " Perception, &c. From whence your Lordthip thus argues, if Here the want of Perception is owned to be so essential to Matter, that God is therefore concluded to be Immaterial. Ans. Perception and Knowledge in that one Eternal Being, where it has its Sourse, 'tis visible must be essentially inseparable from it; therefore the actual want of Perception in so great part of the particular parcels of Matter is a Demonstration, that the first Being, from whom Perception and Knowledge is inseparable, is not Matter: How far

this makes the want of Perception an essential property of Matter I will not dispute; it suffices that it shews, That Perception is not an essential Property of Matter; and therefore Matter cannot be that eternal original Being, to which Perception and Knowledge is Essential. Matter, I say, naturally is without Perception: Ergo, says your Lordship, want of Perception is an essential Property of Matter, and God doth not change the essential Properties of things, their Nature remaining. From whence you infer, That God cannot bestow on any parcel of Matter (the nature

+ 2 Anf.

of Matter remaining) a Faculty of Thinking.

ing. If the Rules of Logick fince my days be not changed, I may fafely deny this Confequence. For an Argument that runs thus. God does not; Ergo, he cannot, I was taught when I came first to the University, would not hold. For I never faid God did. But * * B. 4. " That I fee no Contradiction in it, that he C. 3. § 6. " should, if he pleased, give to some sy-" ftems of fenfless Matter, a Faculty of " Thinking, " and I know no Body, before Des Cartes, that ever pretended to shew that there was any Contradiction in it So that at worst, my not being able to see in Matter any fuch Incapacity, as makes it impossible for Omnipotency to bestow on it a Faculty of Thinking, makes me oppofite only to the Cartefians. For as far as I have feen or heard, the Fathers of the Chriflian Church never pretended to demonst: ate that Matter, was incapable to receive a Power of Sensation, Perception and Thinking, from the Hand of the omnipotent Creator. Let us therefore, if you please, suppose the form of your Argumentation right, and that your Lordship means, God cannot: And then if your Argument be good, it proves, That God could not give to Baalam's Ass a Power to speak to his Master as he did, for the want of rational Discourse, being natural to that Species, 'tis but for your Lurdship to call it an Essential Property, and then God cannot change the Effential Properties of things, their Nature remaining: Whereby it is proved, That God cannot with all

his Omnipotency, give to an Ass a Power

to speak as Balaam's did.

† 1 Ans. p. 78.

You fay, if my Lord, you do not set Bound's to God's Omnipotency. For he may if he please change a Body into an Immaterial Substance, i.e. take away from a Substance the Solidity which it had before, and which made it Matter, and then give it a Faculty of thinking, which it had not before, and which makes it a Spirit, the same Substance remaining. if the same Substance remains not, Body is not changed into an Immaterial Substance. the folid Substance and all belonging to it is Annihilated, and an Immaterial Substance Created, which is not change of one thing into another, but the destroying of one, and making another de novo. In this change therefore of a Body or Material Substance into an Immaterial, let us observe those distinct Considerations.

First, you say, God may if He Pleases take away from a Solid Substance Solidity, which is that which makes it a Material Substance or Body; and may make it an Immaterial Substance, i. e. a Substance without Solidity. But this privation of one Quality gives it not another; the bare taking away a lower or less Noble Quality does not give it an Higher or Nobler; that must be the gift of God. For the bare Privation of one, and a meaner Quality, cannot be the Polition of an Higher and better: unless any one will say, that Cogitation, or the Power of thinking refults from the Nature of Substance it felf, which if it do, then where ever there is SubSubstance, there must be Cogitation or a Power of thinking. Here then, upon your Lordsh p's own Principles is an Immaterial Sub jance without the Faculty of think-

ing.

In the next place, you will not deny, but God may give to this Substance thus deprived of Solidity a Faculty of thinking; for you suppose it made capable of that by being made Immaterial, whereby you allow, that the same numerical Substance may be sometimes wholly Incogitative or without a Power of thinking, and at other times perfectly Cogitative, or indued with a Power of

thinking.

Further, you will not deny, but God can give it Solidity and make it Material again. For I conclude it will not be denied, that God can make it again, what it was before. Now I crave leave to ask your Lordship, why God having given to this Substance the Faculty of thinking after Solidity was taken from it, cannot restore to it Solidity again, without taking away the Faculty of thinking. When you have Resolved this my Lord, you will have proved it impossible for God's Omnipotence to give to a Solid Substance a Faculty of thinking; but till then, not having proved it impossible, and yet denying that God can do it, is to deny that he can do, what is in it felf Possible; which as I humbly conceive is visibly to fet Bound's to God's Omnipotency, tho' you fay here, if you i Ans. do not fet Bound's to God's Omnipotency.

If I should imitate your Lordship's way of Writing, I should not omit to bring in Epicurus here, and take notice that this was his way, Deum verbis ponere, re tollere. And then add, that I am certain you do not think he promoted the great ends of Religion and Morali-For 'tis with fuch Candid and Kind infinuations as thefe, that you bring in both Hobbes, + and Spinofa, || into your Discourse here about God's being able, if he pleafe, | Ib. p.79. to give to some parcels of Matter ordered as he thinks fit, a Faculty of thinking. ther of those Authors having as appears by any Passages you bring out of them said any thing to this Question, nor having, as it feems, any other business here, but by their Names skilfully to give that Character to my Book, with which you would recommend it to the World.

† i Anf.

P. 55.

I pretend not to enquire what measure of Zeal, nor for what, guides your Lordships Pen in fuch a way of Writing, as yours has all along been with me: Only I cannot but confider, what Reputation it would give to the Writings of the Fathers of the Church, if they should think Truth required, or Religion allowed them to imitate fuch Patterns. But God be thanked there be those amongst them who do not admire fuch ways of managing the Cause of Truth or Religion. They being fenfible, that if every one, who believes or can pretend he has Truth on his fide, is thereby Authorized without proof, to infinuate, what ever may ferve to prejudice Mens minds against the other side, there will

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be great ravage made on Charity and Practice, without any gain to Truth or Knowledge. And that the Liberties frequently taken by Disputants to do so, may have been the cause that the World in all Ages has received so much harm, and so little advantage from

Controversies in Religion.

These are the Arguments which your Lordship has brought to confute one faying in my Book, by other Passages in it, which therefore being all but Argumenta ad Hominem, if they did prove what they do not, are of no other use, than to gain a Victory over me, a thing methinks fo much beneath your Lordship, that it does not deserve one of your Pages. The question is, whether God can if he pleases, bestow on any parcel of Matter ordered as he thinks fit, a faculty of Perception and Thinking. You fay, * * 1 Anti-You look upon a Mistake herein to be of dange- P. 79. rous Consequence, as to the great ends of Religion and Morality. If this be so, my Lord, I think one may well wonder, why your Lordship has brought no Arguments to Establish the Truth it self, which You look on to be of such dangerous consequence to be mistaken in; but have spent so many Pages only in a Personal Matter in endeavouring to shew, That I had Inconfiftencies in my Book, which if any fuch thing had been shewed, the Oneftion would be still as far from being decided, and the danger of mistaking about it as little prevented, as if nothing of all this had been faid. If therefore your Lordship's Care of the great ends of Religion and Morality have made You think it necessary to clear this Question, the World has reason to conclude there is little to be said against that Proposition, which is to be found in my Book concerning the Possibility, that some parcels of Matter might be so ordered by Omnipotence, as to be endued with a faculty of Thinking, if God so pleased, since your Lordship's Concern for the promoting the great ends of Religion and Morality, has not enabled you to produce one Argument against a Proposition, that you think of so dangerous consequence to them.

And here I crave leave to observe, That though in your Title Page you promise to prove, that my Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with it self, (which it it were, it could hardly be proved to be inconsistent with any thing else,) and with the Articles of the Christian Faith; Yet your Attempts all along have been to prove me in some Passages of my Book inconsistent with my self, without having shewn any Proposition in my Book inconsistent with any Article of the Christian

I think, your Lordship has indeed made use of one Argument of your own: But it is such an one, that I confess I do not see how it is apt much to promote Religion, especially the Christian Religion sounded on Revelation. I shall set down your Lordship's Words, that they may be considered, you say: * That you are of Opinion, that the

* 1 Ans. you say: * That you are of Opinion, that the P. 54.55. great Ends of Religion and Morality are best secured by the Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul

Soul from ies Nature and Properties; and which you think proves it Immaterial. Your Lordhip does not question whether God can give Immortality to a Material Substance; but you say, it takes off very much from the Evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own Nature it is not capable of, &c. So likewise you say, + If a Man + 2 Ans. cannot be certain, but that Matter may think P. 28. (as I affirm) then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality (and confequently Immortality) from its Operations? But for all this, fay I. his affurance of Faith remains on its own Basis. Now you appeal to any Man of Sense. whether the finding the uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in point of Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles, when they are considered purely as Matters of Faith? For before there was a natural Credibility in them on the account of Reafon; but by going on wrong grounds of Certainty, all that is loft; and instead of being Certain, be is more doubtful than ever. And if the Evidence of Faith falls so much short of that of Reason, it must needs have less effect upon Men's Minds, when the Subserviency of Reason is taken away; as it must be when the grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanished. list at all probable, That he who finds his Reafor deceive him in such Fundamental Points, fould have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation? For in Matters of Revelation, there must be some Antecedent Principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the account of it. E e More

More to the fame purpose we have some Pages farther, where from fome of my *Ib p 35. Words your Lordflip fays, * You cannot but observe, That we have no Certainty upon my grounds, that Self consciousness depends upon an individual Immaterial Substance, and consequent-. Ly that a Material Substance may, according to my Principles, have Self-consciousness in it; at least that I am not certain of the contrary. Whereupon your Lord hip bids me confider, whether this doth not a little affect the whole Article of the Refurrection? What does all this tend to? But to make the World believe, that I have lessened the Credibility of the Immortality of the Soul and the Refurrection, by faying, That though it be most highly prob ble, that the Soul is Immaterial, yet upon my Principles it cannot be demonstrated; because it is not impossible to God's Omnipotency, if he pleases to bestow upon some parcels of Matter disposed as he sees fit, a faculty of thinking.

This your Acculation of thy lessening the Credibility of these Articles of Faith is founded on this, That the Article of the Immortality of the Soul abates of its Credibility, if it be allowed, That its Immateriality (which is the supposed Proof from Reason and Philosophy of its Immortality) cannot be demonstrated from natural Reason: Which Argument of your Lordship's bottoms, as I humbly cenceive, on this, That Divine Revelation abates of its Credibility in all those Articles it proposes perportionably as Humane Reason fails to support the Tessening

stimony of God. And all that your Lordship in those Passages has said, when Examined, will I suppose be found to import thus much, viz. Does God promise any thing to Mankind to be believed? It is very fit and credible to be believed, if Reason can demonstrate it to be true. But if Humane Reason comes short in the Case, and cannot make it out, its Credibility is thereby lessened; which is in effect to fay, That the Veracity of God is not a firm and fure foundation of Faith to rely upon, without the concurrent Testimony of Reason, i. e. with Reverence be it spoken, God is not to be believed on his own Word, unless what he reveals be in it felf credible, and might be believed without him.

If this be a way to promote Religion, the Christian Religion in all its Articles, I am not forry, that it is not a way to be found in any of my Writings, for I imagine any thing like this would, (and I should think deferv'd) to have other Titles than bare Scepticism bestowed upon it, and would have raifed no small Out-cry against any one, who is not to be supposed to be in the right in all that he fays, and fo may fecurely fay what he pleases. Such as I, the Prophanum Vulgus, who take too much upon us, if we would examine, have nothing to do but to hearken and believe, though what he faid should subvert the very Foundations of the Christian Faith.

What I have above observed; is so visibly contained in your Lordship's Argument,

That when I met with it in your Answer to my first Letter, it seemed so strange from a Man of your Lordship's Character, and in a Dispute in desence of the Doctrin of the Trinity, that I could hardly perswade my self, but it was a slip of your Pen: But when I found it in your second Letter * made use of again, and seriously enlarged as an Argument of Weight to be insisted upon, I was convinced, that it was a Principle, that you heartly imbraced, how little favourable soever it was to the Articles of the Christian Religion, and particularly those which you undertook to desend.

I defire my Reader to peruse the Passages as they stand in your Letters themselves, and see whether what you say in them does not amount to this, That a Revelation from God is more or less credible according as it has a stronger or weaker confirmation from

Humane Reason. For.

f I Answ. P. 55.

p. 28, &

1. Your Lordship says, of You do not question whether God can give Immortality to a material Substance; but you say it takes off beep much from the evidence of Immortality, if it depends wholly upon God's giving that which of its own Nature it is not capable of.

To which I reply, any ones not being able to demonstrate the Soul to be Immaterial, takes off not very much, nor at all from the evidence of its Immortality, if God has revealed, that it shall be Immortal, because the Veracity of God is a Demonstration of the Truth of what be has revealed, and the

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want of an other Demonstration of a Propolition, that is demonstratively true, takes not off from the Evidence of it. where there is a clear Demonstration, there is as much Evidence as any Truth can have. that is not Self-evident. God has revealed that the Souls of Men shall live for ever. But fays, your Lordship from this Evidence it takes off very much if it depends wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own Nature it is not capable of. i. e. The Revelation and Testimony of God loses much of its Evidence, if this depends wholly upon the good Pleasure of God, and cannot be demonstratively made out by natural Reason. that the Soul is immaterial, and confequently in its own Nature immortal. For that is all that here is or can be meant by thefe Words, which of its own Nature it is not capable of, to make them to the purpose. For the whole of your Lordship's Discourse here, is to prove, That the Soul cannot be material, because then the Evidence of its being immortal would be very much lessened. Which is to fay, That 'tis not as credible upon divine Revelation, that a material Substance should be immortal, as an immaterial; or which is all one, That God is not equally to be believed, when he declares, that a material Substance shall be immortal. as when he declares, that an immaterial shall be fo, because the Immortality of a material Substance, cannot be demonstrated from natural Reason. MODERATE CONTROL & PRODUCTION

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Let us try this Rule of your Lordship's a little farther. God hath revealed, that the Bodies Men shall have after the Resurrection. as well as their Souls, shall live to Eternity. Does your Lordship believe the eternal Life of the one of these, more than of the other, because you think you can prove it of one of them by natural Reason, and of the other nor? Or can any one who admits of divine Revelation in the Cafe, doubt of one of them more than the other? Or think this Proposition less credible, Bodies of Men, after the Refurrection, shall live for ever; than this, That the Souls of Men shall, after the Resurrection, live for ever? For that he must do, if he thinks either of them is less credible than the other. It this be fo, Reason is to be confulted, how far God is to be believed, and the credie of divine Testimony, must receive its force from the Evidence of Reason; which is evidently to take away the credibility of divine Revelation, in all supernatural Truths, wherein the Evidence of Reason fails. And how much such a Principle as this tends to the support of the Doctrin of the Trinity, or the promoting the Christian Religion, I shall leave it to your Lordship to confider.

I am not so well read in Hobbes or Spinoza, as to be able to say, what were their Opinions in this Matter. But possibly there be those, who will think your Lordship's Authority of more use to them in the Case, than those justly decried Names: And be glad to find

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your Lordship a Patron of the Oracles of Reason, fo little to the Advantage of the Oracles of Divine Revelation. This at leaft, I think, may be subjoined to the Words at the bottom of the next Page, That + 1 Aniw. those who have gone about to lessen the Cre- p. 65. dibility of Articles of Faith, which evidently they do, who fay they are less credible, because they cannot be made out demonstratively by Natural Reason, have not been thought to secure several of the Articles of the Christian Faith, especially those of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Refurrection of the Body, which are those upon the account of which I am brought by your Lordinip into this Dispute.

I shall not trouble the Reader with your Lordship's Endeavours in the following Words, to prove, That if the Soul be not an immaterial Substance; it can be nothing but Life; your very first Words visibly confuting all that you alledge to that purpose.

They are, * If the Sout be himaterial Sub-* 1 Answ. stance, it is really nothing but Life; which is P. 55. to say, That if the Soul be really a Substance, it is not really a Substance, but really nothing else but an affection of a Substance; for the Life, whether of a material or immaterial Substance, is not the Substance it self, but an affection of it.

2. You fay, * Although we think the sepa * 1 Answ. rate State of the Soul after Death, is suffici-P 57. ently revealed in the Scripture; yet it creates a great difficulty in understanding it, if the Soul be nothing but Life, or a material Substance,

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which must be dissolved when Life is ended. For if the Soul be a material Substance, it must be made up, as others are, of the Cohesion of solid and separate Parts, how minute and invisible so-ever they be. And what is it which should keep them together, when Life is gone? So that it is no easie matter to give an account, you the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance; and then we know the Solution and Texture of Bodies cannot reach

the Soul, being of a different Nature.

Let it be as hard a matter, as it will, to give an account what it is, that should keep the Parts of a material Soul together, after it is separated from the Body; yet it will be always as easie to give an account of it, as to give an account what it is which shall keep together a material and immaterial Substance. And yet the difficulty that there is to give an account of that, I hope does not, with your Lordship, weaken the Credibility of the inseparable Union of Soul and Body to Eternity: And I perswade my self, that the Men of Sense, to whom-your Lordship appeals in the Case, do not find their belief of this Fundamental Point, much weakened by that difficulty. I thought heretofore (and by your Lordship's Permission, would think so still) that the Union of Parts of Matter, one with another, is as much in the Hands of God, as the Union of a material and immaterial Substance; and that it does not take off very much, or at all, from the Evidence of Immortality, which depends on that Union, that it is no easie matter to give

gether: Though its depending wholly upon the Gift and good Pleasure of God, where the manner creates great difficulty in the understanding, and our Reason cannot discover in the Nature of things, how it is, be that which your Lordship so positively says lessens the Credibility of the Fundamental Articles of the Resurrection and Immortality.

But, my Lord, to remove this Objection a little, and to shew of how small force it is even with your felf; give me leave to prefume, That your Lordship as firmly believes the Immortality of the Body after the Resurrection, as any other Article of Faith: If so, then it being no case matter to give an account, what it is that shall keep together the Parts of a material Soul, to one that belives it is material, can no more weaken the Credibility of its Immortality, than the like difficulty weakens the Credibility of the Immortality of the Body. For when your Lordship shall find it an easie matter to give an account, what it is belides the good Pleasure of God, which shall keep together the Parts of our material Bodies to Eternity, or even Soul and Body; I doubt not but any one, who shall think the Soul material, will also find it as easie to give an account, what it is that shall keep those Parts of Matter also together to Eternity.

Were it not that the Warmth of Controversie is apt to make Men so far forget, as to take up those Principles themselves

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(when they will ferve their turn) which they have highly condemned in others; I should wonder to find your Lordship to argue, That because it is a difficulty to understand what should keep together the minute Parts of a material Soul, when Life is gone; and because it is not an easie matter to give an account how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance: Therefore it is not so credible as if it were easie to give an account by Natural Reason, how it could be. For to this it is, that all this your Discourse tends as is evident by what is already fet down out of Page 55; and will be more fully made out by what your Lordship fays in other places, though there needs no fuch Proofs, fince it would all be nothing against me in any other Senfe.

I thought your Lordship had in other places afferted, and infifted on this Truth, That no part of Divine Revelation was the lefs to be believed, because the thing it felf created great difficulty in the understanding, and the manner of it was hard to be explained; and it was no easie matter to give an acount how it was. This, as I take it, your Lordship condemned in others, as a very unreasonable Principle, and such as would fubvert all the Articles of the Chriftian Religion, that were mere matters of Faith, as I think it will: And is it possible, that you should make use of it here your felf, against the Article of Life and Immortality, that Christ hath brought to light

light through the Gospel; and neither was, nor could be made out by Natural Reafon without Revelation? But you will fay, you fpeak only of the Soul; and your Words are, That it is no easie matter to give an account how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an immaterial Substance. I grant it; but crave leave to fay, That there is not any one of those Difficulties, that are, or can be raised about the manner how a material Soul can be immortal, which do not as well reach

the Immortality of the Body.

But if it were not fo, I am fure this Principle of your Lordship's would reach other Articles of Faith, wherein our natural Reafon finds it not fo easy to give an Account how those Mysteries are: And which therefore, according to your Principles, must be less credible, than other Articles, that create less difficulty to the Understanding. For your Lordship says, * That you appeal to any * 2 Arfw. Man of Sense, whether to a Man who thought P. 28. by his Principles, he could from natural Grounds demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul, the finding the uncertainty of those Principles he went upon in point of Reason, i. e. the finding he could not certainly prove it by natural Reason, doth not weaken the credibility of that fundamental Article, when it is confidered purely as a Matter of Faith? Which in effect, I humbly conceive, amounts to this, That a Proposition divinely revealed, that cannot be proved by natural Reason, is less credible than one that can: Which feems

feems to me to come very little short of this, with due reverence be it spoken, That God is less to be believed when he affirms a Proposition, that cannot be proved by natural Reason, than when he proposes what can be proved by it. The direct contrary to which is my Opinion, though you endeavour to make good, by these following + 2 Answ. Words. + If the evidence of Faith falls so

P. 29.

much short of that of Reason, it must needs have less effect upon Men's Minds, when the subserviency of Reason is taken away; as it must be when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanished. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such fundamental Points, Should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation? Than which I think there are hardly plainer Words to be found out to declare, that the credibility of God's Testimony depends on the natural evidence or probability of the things we receive from Revelation; and rifes and falls with it: And that the Truths of God, or the Articles of meer Faith, lofe fo much of their credibility, as they want Proof from Reason: Which if true, Revelation may come to have no credibility at all. For if in this present Case, the credibility of this Proposition, The Souls of Men shall live for ever, revealed in the Scripture, be lessened by confessing it cannot be demonstratively proved from Reafon; though it be afferted to be most highly probable: Must not by the same Rule its credibility dwindle away to nothing, if DaE

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natural Reason should not be able to make it out to be so much as probable; or should place the probability from natural Principles on the other fide? For if meer want of Demonstration lessens the credibility of any Propolition divinely revealed, must not want of probability, or contrary probability from natural Reason, quite take away its credibility? Here at last it must end, if in any one Case the Veracity of God, and the credibility of the Truths we receive from him by Revelation, be subjected to the verdicts of humane Reason, and be allowed to receive any accession or diminution from other Proofs, or want of other Proofs of its Certainty or Probability.

If this be your Lordship's way to promote Religion or defend its Articles, I know not what Argument the greatest Enemies of it could use more effectual for the Subversion of those you have undertaken to defend, this being to resolve all Revelation perfectly and purely into Natural Reason, to bound its Credibility by that, and leave no room for Faith in other things, than what can be accounted for by Natural

Reason without Revelation.

Your Lordship † insists much upon it, † 1 Answ. as if I had contradicted what I had said in P. 48 — my Essay, * by saying, That upon my Prin- 54. B. 2. C. eiples it cannot be demonstratively proved, 23. that it is an immaterial Substance in us that Thinks, however probable it be. He that will be at the pains to read that Chapter of mine, and consider it, will find, that

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my Business there was to shew, that it was no harder to conceive an immaterial than a material Substance; and that from the 1deas of Thought, and a Power of moving of Matter, which we experienced in out felves (Ideas originally not belonging to Matter as Matter) there was no more difficulty to conclude there was an immaterial Substance in us, than that we had material Parts. These Ideas of Thinking, and Power of moving of Matter, I in another place shew'd did demonstratively lead us to the certain knowledge of the Existence of an immaterial Thinking Being, in whom we have the Idea of Spirit in the strictest Sense; in which Sense I also applyed it to the Soul, in that 23d Chapter of my Essay, the easily conceivable possibility, nay great probability, that that thinking Substance in us is immaterial, giving me fufficient Ground for it: In which Sense I shall think I may fafely attribute it to the thinking Substance in us, till your Lordship shall have better proved from my Words, That it is impossible it should be immaterial. For I only fay, That it is possible, i. e. involves no Contradiction, that God the omnipotent immaterial Spirit should, if he pleases, give to some parcels of Matter, disposed as he thinks fit, a Power of Thinking and . Moving: Which parcels of Matter fo endued with a Power of Thinking and Motion, might properly be called Spirits, in contradistinction to unthinking Matter. In all which, I prefume, there is no manner of Contradiction.

I justified my use of the word Spirit in that Sense from the Authorities of Cicero and Virgil, applying the Latin word Spiritus, from whence Spirit is derived, to the Soul as a thinking Thing, without excluding Materiality out of it. To which your Lordship replies, * That Cicero, in his Tusculan Que- * 1 Answ stions, supposes the Soul not to be a finer fort of p.58-60. Body, but of a different Nature from the Body. - That he calls the Body the Prison of the Soul .- And fays, That a wife Man's Business is to draw off his Soul from his Body. And then your Lordship concludes, as is usual, with a Question, Is it possible now to thick fo great a Man look'd on the Soul but as a modification of the Body, which must be at an end with Life? Answ. No; it is impossible that a Man of fo good Sense as Tully, when he uses the word Corpus or Body for the gross and visible parts of a Man, which he acknowledges to be mortal, should look on the Soul to be a modification of that Body; in a Discourse wherein he was endeavouring to persuade another, that it was immortal. It is to be acknowledg'd that truly great Men, fuch as he was, are not wont so manifestly to contradict themselves. He had therefore no Thought concerning the modification of the Body of Man in the Case: He was not such a Triffer as to examin, whether the modification of the Body of a Man was immortal, when that Body it felf was mortal: And therefore that which he reports as Dicearchus's Opinion, he dismisses in the beginning without any more ado, c. 1 1. But Cicero's was a direct,

direct, plain and sensible Enquiry, viz. What the Soul was, to fee whether from thence he could discover its Immortality? But in all that Discourse in his first Book of Tusculan Questions, where he lays out so much of his Reading and Reason, there is not one Syllable shewing the least Thought, that the Soul was an immaterial Substance: but many Things directly to the contrary.


22, 30, 31, &c.


Indeed (1.) he shuts out the Body taken, *Ch. 19, in the Sense he uses * Corpus all-a-long, for the sensible organical parts of a Man; and is positive that is not the Soul: And Body in this Sense, taken for the Humane Body, he calls the Prison of the Soul; and says a wife Man, instancing in Socrates and Cato, is glad of a fair opportunity to get out of it. But he no where fays any fuch thing of Matter: He calls not Matter in general the Prison of the Soul, nor talks a Word of being separate from it.

2. He concludes, That the Soul is not like other Things here below, made up of a Composition of the Elements, c. 27.

3. He excludes the two gross Elements Earth and Water, from being the Soul, c. 26.

So far he is clear and politive: But beyond this he is uncertain; beyond this he could not get. For in some Places he speaks doubtfully, whether the Soul be not Air, or Fire. Anima sit animus ignisve nescio, c. 25. And therefore he agrees with Panætine, that, if it be at all Elementary, it is, as he calls it,





Inflammata Anima, inflamed Air; and for this he gives feveral Reasons, c. 18, 19. And though he thinks it to be of a peculiar Nature of its own, yet he is so far from thinking it immaterial, that he says, c. 19. That the admitting it to be of an acreal or igneous Nature, would not be inconsistent with any

thing he had faid.

That which he feems most to incline to is. That the Soul was not at all Elementary. but was of the same Substance with the Heavens; which Aristotle, to distinguish from the four Elements and the changeable Bodies here below, which he supposed made up of them, called Quinta Essentia. That this was Tully's Opinion is plain from these Words, Ergo, Animus qui ut ego dico, divinus est, ut Euripides andet dicere Deus; & quidem si Deu. aut anima aut ignis est, idem est animus hominis. Nam ut illa natura colestis & terra vacat & bumore; sic utriusque barum rerum bumanus animus est expers. Sin autem est quinta quedam natura ab Aristotele inducta; primum bac & deurum est & animorum. Hanc nos sententiam secuti, his ipsis verbis in Consolatione hac expres-Cimus, c. 26. And then he goes on c. 27. to repeat those his own Words, which your Lordship has quoted out of him, wherein he had affirmed, in his Treatise de Consolatione, the Soul not to have its Original from the Earth, or to be mixed or made of any Thing earthly; but had faid, Singularis est igitur quadam natura & vis animi sejuncta ab his ustatis notisque naturis: Whereby, he tells us, he meant nothing but Aristotle's Quinta Effentia;

Essentia; which being unmixed, being that of which the Gods and Souls confifted, he calls it divinum calefte, and concludes it eternal, it being as he speaks, Sejuneta ab omni mortali concretione. From which it is clear, That in all his Enquiry about the Substance of the Soul, his Thoughts went not beyond the four Elements, or Aristotle's Quinta Essemia to look for it. In all which there is nothing of Immateriality, but quite the contrary.

He was willing to believe (as good and wife Men have always been) that the Soul was immortal; but for that 'tis plain he never thought of its Immateriality, but as the Eastern People do who believe the Soul to be immortal, but have nevertheless no Thought, no Conception of its Immateri-It is remarkable what a very confide-

+ Loubere de Siam, 5.4.

rable and judicious Author if fays in the Case. au Regiume No Opinion, fays he, has been so universally received as that of the Immortality of the Soul: T.1. c.19. But its Immateriality is a Truth the knowledge whereof has not spread so far. And indeed it is extremely difficult to let into the Mind of a Siamite, the Idea of a pure Spirit. This the Missionaries, who have been longest among them, are positive in. All the Pagans of the East do truly believe, That there remains something of a Man after his Death, which subsists independently and separately from his Body. But they give Extension and Figure to that which remains, and attribute to it all the same Members, all the Same Substances, both folid and liquid, which our Bodies are composed of. They only suppose that the

the Souls are of a Matter subtil enough to escape being seen or handled.—Such were the Shades and the Manes of the Greeks and the Romans. And tis by these Figures of the Souls, answerable to those of the Bodies, that Virgil supposed Eneas knew Palinurus, Dido and Anchises, in the other World.

This Gentleman was not a Man that travelled into those Parts for his Pleasure, and to have the opportunity to tell strange Stories, collected by Chance, when he return'd: But one chosen on purpose (and he seems well chosen for the purpose) to inquire into the Singularities of Siam. And he has fo well acquitted himself of the Commission, which his Epistle Dedicatory tells us he had. to inform himself exactly of what was most remarkable there, that had we but fuch an Account of other Countries of the East, as he has given us of this Kingdom, which he was an Envoy to, we should be much better acquainted than we are, with the Manners, Notions and Religions of that part of the World, inhabited by civiliz'd Nations, who want neither good Sense nor acuteness of Reason, though not cast into the Mould

But to return to Cicero. 'Tis plain, That in his Enquiries about the Soul his Thoughts went not at all beyond Matter. This the Expressions, that drop from him in several places of this Book, evidently shew. For Example, That the Souls of excellent Men and Women ascended into Heaven; of others

of the Logick and Philosophy of our

Schools.

that they remained here on Earth, c. 12. That the Soul is hot and warms the Body: That at its leaving the Body it penetrates and divides, and breaks through our thick, cloudy, moist Air: That it stops in the Region of Fire, and ascends no farther, the equality of Warmth and Weight making that its proper place, where it is nourished and fustained with the same Things, wherewith the Stars are nourished and sustained, and that by the convenience of its Neighbourhood it shall there have a clearer View and fuller knowledge of the Heavenly Bodies, c. 19. That the Soul also from this height shall have a pleasant and fairer Prospect of the Globe of the Earth, the disposition of whose Parts will then lie before it in one View, c. 20. That it is hard to determin what Conformation, Size and Place, the Soul has in the Body: That it is too fubtil to be seen: That it is in the Human Body as in a House or a Vessel, or a Receptacle, c. 22. All which are Expressions that sufficiently evidence, that he who used them had not in his Mind separated Materiality from the Idea of the Soul.

It may perhaps be replied, That a great part of this, which we find in chap. 19. is faid upon the Principles of those who would have the Soul to be Anima Inflammata, inflamed Air. I grant it. But it is also to be observed, That in this 19th and the two following Chapters he does not only not deny, but even admits, That so material a thing as inflamed Air may think.

The

The Truth of the Case in short is this: Cicero was willing to believe the Soul immortal, but when he fought in the Nature of the Soul it felf something to establish this his Belief into a Certainty of it, he found himself at a loss. He confessed he knew not what the Soul was; but the not knowing what it was, he argues, c. 2. was no Reason to conclude it was not. And thereupon he proceeds to the repetition of what he had faid in his 6th Book de Repub. concerning the Soul. The Argument, which borrowed from Plato he there makes use of, if it have any force in it, not only proves the Soul to be immortal, but more than, I think, your Lordship will allow to be true: For it proves it to be eternal, and without beginning, as well as without end, Neque nata certa eff, & eterna eft, fays he.

Indeed from the Faculties of the Soul he concludes right, That it is of divine Original: But as to the Substance of the Soul, he at the end of this Discourse concerning its Faculties, c. 25. as well as at the beginning of it, c. 22. is not ashamed to own his Ignorance, what it is; Anima sit animus, ignisve, nescio; nec me pudet ut istos, fateri nescive quod nesciam. Illud, si ulla alia de re obscura affirmare possum, sive anima, sive ignis sit animus, eum jurarem effe divinum, c. 27. So that all the Certainty he could attain to about the Soul, was, That he was confident there was fomething divine in it, i. e. there were Faculties in the Soul that could not refult from the Nature of Matter, but must have Ff3 their

their Original from a Divine Power; but yet those Qualities, as Divine as they were, he acknowledg'd might be placed in Breath or Fire, which I think your Lordship will not deny to be material Substances. So that all those divine Qualities, which he so much and fo justly extols in the Soul, led him not, as appears, fo much as to any the least Thought of Immateriality. This is Demonftration. That he built them not upon an exclusion of Materiality out of the Soul; for he avowedly professes he does not know but Breath or Fire might be this thinking Thing in us: And in all his Considerations about the Substance of the Soul it felf, he stuck in Air or Fire, or Aristotle's Quinta Essentia; for beyond those 'tis evident he went not.

But with all his Proofs out of Plato, to whose Authority he defers so much, with all the Arguments his vast Reading and great Parts could furnish him with for the Immortality of the Soul, he was fo little fatisfied, fo far from being certain, fo far from any Thought that he had, or could prove it, that he over and over again professes his Ignorance and Doubt of it. In the beginning he enumerates the feveral Opinions of the Philofophers, which he had well studied, about it: And then full of Uncertainty fays, Harum Sententiarum que vera sit, Deu aliquis viderit, que veri simillima magna questio, c. 11. And towards the latter end having gone them all over again, and one after another examin'd them, he professes himself still at a loss, not know-

knowing on which to pitch, nor what to Mentis acies, fays he, feipfam indetermin. tuens nonnunguam hebescit, ob eamque causam contemplandi diligentiam omittimus. Itaque dubitans, circumspectans, hasicans, mulia adversa revertens tanguam in rate in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio, c. 30. And to conclude this Argument, when the Person he introduces as discoursing with him, tells him he is refolved to keep firm to the belief of Immortality, Tully answers, c. 82. Laudo id quidem, etsi nibil animis oportet confidere; movemur enim sape aliquo acute concluso, labamus, mutamufque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas.

So unmoveable is that Truth delivered by the Spirit of Truth, That though the Light of Nature gave some obscure glimmering, some uncertain hopes of a suture State; yet Human Reason could attain to no Glearness,

no Certainty about it, but that it was JESUS CHRIST alone who had brought Life and Immortality to light, through the Gospel, * Tho' * 2 Tim. we are now told, That to own the inability 1. 10. of natural Reason to bring Immortality to Light, or which passes for the same, to own Principles upon which the Immateriality of the Soul (and as 'tis urged consequently its Immortality) cannot be demonstratively proved does lessen the belief of this Article of Revelation, which JESUS CHRIST alone has brought to Light, and which consequently the Scripture assures us is established and made certain only by Revelation. This would not perhaps have seemed strange from

Ff4

those who are justly complained of, for flighting the Revelation of the Gospel, and therefore would not be much regarded, if they should contradict so plain a Text of Scripture in favour of their all-fufficient Reason: But what use the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, in an Age so much suspeated by your Lordship, may make of what comes from one of your great Authority and Learning, may deferve your Confideration.

And thus my Lord, I hope, I have fatiffied you concerning Cicero's Opinion about the Soul in his first Book of Tusculan Questiens; which, though I easily believe, as your Lordship says, you are no Stranger to, yet I humbly conceive you have not shewn (and upon a careful perusal of that Treatife again I think I may boldly fay you cannot shew) one Word in it, that expresses any thing like a Notion in Tully of the Souls Immateriality, or its being an immaterial Subftance.

From what you bring out of Virgil vour * 1 Answ. Lordship * concludes, That he no more than p. 62, 63. Cicero does me any kindness in this Matter, being both Affertors of the Souls Immortality. My Lord, were not the Question of the Souls Immateriality, according to Custom, changed here into that of its Immortality, which I am no less an Assertor of than either of them, Cicero and Virgil, do me all the kindness I defired of them in this Matter; and that was to shew, that they attributed the word Spirises to the Soul of Man, without any thought

of its Immateriality; and this the Verses you your self bring out of Virgil, † # Æneids 4.385.

Et cum frigida mors anima deduxerit

Omnibus umbra locis adero, dabis improbe pænas.

confirm, as well as those I quoted out of his 6th Book; and for this Monsieur de la Loubere shall be my Witness in the Words above set down out of him; where he shews, that there be those amongst the Heathens of our days, as well as Virgil and others amongst the ancient Greeks and Romans, who thought the Souls or Ghosts of Men departed, did not die with the Body, without thinking them to be perfectly immaterial; the latter being much more incomprehensible to them than the former.

What is faid, Eccles. 13. turns wholly upon P.64-65.
Solomon's taking the Soul to be Immortal, which was not what I questioned: All that I quoted that place for, was to shew, that Spirit in English might properly be applyed to the Soul, without any Notion of its Immateriality, as FID was by Solomon, which whether he thought the Souls of Men to be immaterial, does little appear in that Passage, where he speaks of the Souls of Men and Beasts together, as he does. But farther, what I contended for, is evident from that place, in that the Word Spirit is there applyed, by our Translators,

to the Souls of Beafts, which your Lordship I think does not rank amongst the immaterial, and consequently immortal Spirits, though they have Sense and Spontaneous Motion.

† 1 Answ. p. 65.

But you fay, I If the Soul be not of it felf a free thinking Substance, you do not see what Foundation there is in Nature for a day of Answer. Though the Heathen Fudoment. World did not of old, nor do to this day, fee a Foundation in Nature for a day of Judgment: Yet in Revelation, if that will fatisfie vour Lordship, every one may see a Foundation for a day of Judgment, because God has politively declared it; tho' God has not by that Revelation taught us, what the Substance of the Soul is; nor has any where faid, That the Soul of it felf is a free Whatfoever any created Substance is, it is not of it felf, but is by the good Pleasure of its Creator: Whatever degrees of Perfection it has, it has from the bountiful Hand of its Maker. For it is true, in a natural, as well as a spiritual Sense, what St. Panl fays, * Not that we are sufficient of our felbes to think any thing as of our felbes.

* 2 Cor.

3. 5. but our sufficiency is of God.

But your Lordship, as I guess, by your following Words, would argue, That a material Substance cannot be a free Agent; whereby I suppose you only mean, that you cannot see or conceive how a solid Substance should begin, stop, or change its own Motion. To which give me leave to answer, That when you can make it conceivable, how any created, sinite, dependent Substance can move it self, felf, or alter or stop its own Motion, which it must to be a free Agent; I suppose you will find it no harder for God to bestow this Power on a folid, than an unfolid created Substance. Tully, in the place above quoted. I could not conceive this Power to be + Tufcu. in any thing, but what was from Eternity; lan Quæ-Cum pateat igitur aternum id esse quod seipsum sion, L. moveat quis est qui hane naturam animis esse tributam neget? But though you cannot fee how any created Substance, folid or not solid, can be a free Agent (pardon me, my Lord, if I put in both, till your Lordship please to explain it of either, and shew the manner how either of them can, of it felf, move it felf or any thing else) yet I do not think, you will so far deny Men to be free Agents, from the difficulty there is to fee how they are free Agents, as to doubt, whether there be Foundation enough for a day of Fudement.

It is not for me to judge how far your Lordship's Speculations reach: But sinding in my self nothing to be truer than what the wise Solomon tells me, * As thou knowest not * Eccl. 11. what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the Bones 5. do grow in the Womb of her that is with Child; even so thou knowest not the Works of God who maketh all things. I gratefully receive and rejoyce in the Light of Revelation, which sets me at rest in many things; the manner whereof my poor Reason can by no means make out to me: Omnipotency, I know, can do any thing that contains in it no Contradiction; so that I readily believe

what-

whatever God has declared, though my Reason find Difficulties in it, which it cannot maiter. As in the prefent Cafe, God having revealed, that there shall be a day of Judgment, I think that Foundation enough, to conclude Men are free enough to be made answerable for their Actions, and to receive according to what they have done, though how Man is a free Agent furpals my Explication or Comprehension.

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* C. 24. V. 39. + I Anf. P. 66.

In answer to the place I brought out of St. Luke, * your Lordship asks, & Whether, from these Words of our Saviour, it follows, that a Spirit is only an Appearance. I Answer. No, nor do I know who drew fuch an Inference from them: But it follows, that in Apparitions there is something that appears, and that that which appears is not wholly immaterial; and ye this was properly called mys us, and was often looked upon by those, who called it werden in Greek, and now call it Spirit in English, to be the Ghost or Soul of one departed, which I humbly conceive justifies my use of the Word Spirit, for a thinking, voluntary Agent, whether material or immaterial.

4 I Anf. p. 67.

Your Lordship fays, & That I grant, that it cannot, upon these Principles, be demonstrated, that the spiritual Substance in us is immaterial: From whence you conclude, That then my Grounds of Certainty from Ideas, are plainly given up. This being a way of arguing, that you often make use This being a of, I have often had Occasion to consider it, and cannot after all fee the force of this

Argument. I acknowledge, that this or that Proposition cannot upon my Principles be demonstrated, Ergo, I grant this Proposition to be False, that Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas. For that is my ground of Certainty, and till that be given up, my

grounds of Certainty are not given up.

You farther tell me, * That I say, the * ib. Souls immateriality may be proved probable to the highest degree; to which your Lordship replies. That is not the Point: For it is not Probability but Certainty, that you are promised in this way of Ideas, and that the Foundation of our Knowledge and real Certainty lies in them, and is it dwindled into a probability at last? This is also what your Lordship has been pleased to object to me more than once, That I promised Certainty. would be glad to know in what Words this Promise is made, and where it stands, for I love to be a Man of my Word. I have indeed told wherein I think Certainty, real Certainty does confift, as far as any one attains it: And I do not yet, from any thing your Lordship has faid against it, find any Reason to change my Opinion therein: But I do not remember, that I promised Certainty in this Question, concerning the Souls immateriality, or in any of those Propositions, wherein you thinking I come short of Certainty, infer from thence, That my way of Certainty by Ideas is given up. And I am fo far from promising Certainty in all Things, that I am

for fetting too narrow Bounds to our Knowledge and Certainty. Why therefore your Lordship asks me, and is the Certainty [of the Souls being immaterial] dwindled into a Probability at last? Will be hard to see a Reason for, till you can shew, that I promised to demonstrate, that it is immaterial; or that others upon their Principles without Ideas, being able to demonstrate it immaterial, it comes to dwindle into bare Probability, upon my Principles by Ideas. One thing more I am obliged to take no-

† 1 Let. p. 113.

tice of. I had faid, † "That the Belief" of God being the Foundation of all Re"ligion and genuine Morality, I thought
"no Arguments, that are made use of to
"work the persuasion of a God into Men's
"Minds, should be invalidated, which I
"grant is of ill Consequence." To which

* 1 Anf. p. 89.


" Minds, should be invalidated, which I " grant is of ill Consequence. " To which Words of mine I find, according to your particular Favour to me, this Reply, * That here I must give your Lordship leave to ask me, what I think of the univer fal confent of Mankind, as to the Being of God? Hath not this been made use of, as an Argument, not only by Christians, but by the wifest and greatest Men among the Heathens? And what then would I think of one who should go about to invalidate this Argument? And that by proving, That it hath been discovered in these latter Ages by Navigation, that there are whole Nations at the Bay of Soldania, in Brasil, in the Caribbe-Islands and Paraquaria, among whom there was found no Notion of a God : And even the Author of the

the Essay of Humane Understanding hath done

To this your Question, my Lord, I Anfwer, That I think that the universal consent of Mankind, as to the being of a God, amounts to thus much, that the vaftly greater majority of Mankind, have, in all Ages of the World, actually believed a God; that the majority of the remaining part have not actually disbelieved it, and confequently those who have actually opposed the belief of a God, have truly been very few. So that comparing those that have actually disbelieved with those who have actually believed a God, their number is so inconsiderable, that in respect of this incomparably greater majority of those who have owned the belief of a God, it may be faid to be the universal consent of Mankind.

This is all the universal consent which Truth of matter of Fact will allow, and therefore all that can be made use of to prove a God. But if any one would extend it farther, and speak deceitfully for God: If this univerfality should be urged in a strict Sense, not for much the majority, but for a general consent of every one, even to a Man in all Ages and Countries; this would make it either no Argument, or a perfectly useless and unnecessary one. For if any one deny a God, such a perfect universality of confent is destroy'd; and if no Body does deny a God, what need of Arguments to convince Atheifts? moder amonth, siteupsia and no Norson of a God's sing eventure divisor of

I would crave leave to ask your Lordship. were there ever in the World any Atheist or no? If there were not, what need is there of raising a Question about the being of a God, when no Body Questions it? What need of provisional Arguments against a Fault, from which Mankind are so wholly free; and which by an universal consent, they may be prefumed to be fecure from? If you fay (as I doubt not but you will) that there have been Atheists in the World, then your Lordship's universal consent reduces it felf to only a great majority, and then make that majority as great as you will, what I have faid in the place quoted by your Lordship, leaves it in its full force, and I have not faid one Word, that does in the least invalidate this Argument for a God. Argument I was upon there, was to flew, That the Idea of God was not innate; and to my purpose it was sufficient if there were but a less number found in the World, who had no Idea of God, than your Lordship will allow there have been of professed Atheists; for whatsoever is innate must be universal in the strictest Sense: One Exception is a sufficient Proof against it. all that I faid, and which was quite to another purpose, did not at all tend, nor can be made use of to invalidate the Argument for a Deity, grounded on fuch an universal confent as your Lordship, and all that build on it, must own, which is only a very disproportioned Majority: Such an universal confent my Argument there neither affirm snor re-





requires to be less, than you will be pleased to allow it. Your Lordship therefore might without any prejudice to those Declarations of good Will and Favour you have for the Author of the Essay of Humane Understanding. have spared the mentioning his quoting Au thors that are in Print, for matters of Fact, to quite another purpose, as going about to invalidate the Argument, for a Deity from the universal consent of Mankind, since he leaves that universal consent as entire, and as large as you your felf do, or can own, or suppose But here I have no reason to be sorry that your Lordship has given me this occasion for the Vindication of this Pallage of my Book, if there should be any one besides your Lordship who should so far mistake it, as to think it in the least invalidates the Argument for a God, from the universal consent of Mankind.

But because you question the credibility of those Authors I have quoted, which you fay in the next Paragraph, * were very ill- * 1 Answ. chosen: I will crave leave to fay, That he p. 89. whom I relied on for his Testimony concerning the Hotentots of Soldania, was no less a Man, than an Ambassador from the King of England to the Great Mogul. Of whose Relation Monsieur Thevenot, no ill Judge in the Case, had so great an Esteem, that he was at the pains to translate it into French, and publish it in his (which is counted no unjudicious) Collection of Travels. But to intercede with your Lordship for a little more favourable allowance of Credit Gg

Credit to Sir Thomas Roe's Relation, Coore. an Inhabitant of the Country who could fpeak English, assured * Mr. Terry, That they of Soldania had no God. But if he too P.17.823. have the ill luck to find no Credit with you. I hope you will be a little more favourable to a Divine of the Church of England now living, and admit of his Testimony in confirmation of Sir Tho. Roe's. This worthy Gentleman, in the Relation of his Voyage to Suratt, printed but two Years fince, speaking of the same People, has these Words, + Ovington, They are sunk even below Idolatry, are destitute of both Priest and Temple, and saving a little Shew of rejoycing, which is made at the full and new Moon, have lost all kind of religious Devotion. Nature has so richly provided for their Convenience in this Life, that they have drowned all Sense of the God of it, and are grown quite eareless of the next.

* I Aniw.

p. 90.

* Terry's

Voyage,

+ Mr.

p. 489.

But to provide against the clearest Evidence of Atheism in these People, you fay, * That the Account given of them makes them not fit to be a Standard for the Sense of Mankind. This, I think, may pass for nothing, till some Body be found, that makes them to be a Standard for the Sense of Mankind: All the use I made of them was to shew, That there were Men in the World, that had no innate Idea of a God. But to keep fomething like an Argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying those Cafers to be Men, what else do these Words signifie? † A People so strangely bereft of Common Sense, that they can hardly be reckon'd among Mankind,

+ Ibid.

soldania, &c. I hope if any of the Cafers of Soldania, &c. I hope if any of them were called Peter, James, or John, it would be past Scruple that they were Men, however Courvee, Wewena, and Cousheda, and those others who had Names, that had no place in your Nomenclator, would hardly pass Muster

with your Lordship.

among Mankind or no.

My Lord, I should not mention this, but that what you your self say here may be a Motive to you to consider, That what you have laid such Stress on concerning the General Nature of Man, as a real Being and the Subject of Properties, amounts to nothing for the distinguishing of Species, since you your self own that there may be Individuals wherein there is a common Nature with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them, whereby you are so little able to know of which of the Ranks or Sorts they are, into which you say, * God has order'd Beings, and which he hath * P. 165. distinguished by essential Properties, that you are in doubt whether they ought to be reckon'd

Give me leave now to think, my Lord, That I have given an Answer to all, that is any way material in either of the Letters you have honoured me with. If there be any Argument which you think of weight, that you find omitted, upon the least Intimation from your Lordship where it is, I promise to consider it, and to endeavour to give you Satisfaction concerning it, either by owning my Conviction, or shewing what hinders it. This Respect I shall think due

from

from me to your Lordship: Though I know better to imploy the little Time my Business and Health afford me, than to trouble my self with the little Cavillers, who may either be set on, or be forward (in hope to recommend themselves) to meddle in this Con-

troversie.

Before I conclude, 'tis fit I take notice of the Obligation I have to you, for the Pains you have been at about my Esfay, which I conclude could not have been any way fo effectually recommended to the World, as by your manner of writing against it. fince your Lordship's sharp Sight, fo carefully employ'd for its Correction, has, as I humbly conceive, found no Faults in it, which your Lordships great Endeavours this way have made out to be really there, I hope I may presume it will pass the better in the World, and the Judgment of all considering Men, and make it for the future stand better even in your Lordship's Opinion. your Lordship's Pardon for this long Trouble, and am,

My LORD,

Your Lordships most humble, and most obedient Servant,

Dates, 4 May, 1698.

John Locke.

ERRATA.

P. 1. read P. 1. read 170 17 SEparate 182 24 Sup, the Scripture having 351 20 opposition of the 22 comes in in the 186 30 Seminal 22 passage : 358 28 Peter. 32 Seminal 361 7 in-199 31 dva 50011 371 II reason about 31 cauxa 372 34 my 406 21 dele as 218 24 If 229 2 fashion 253 7 using 409 31 what 412 12 Subflance, but 277 23 dele 1 19 these 428 8 make it good 290 17 Infidelity, 291 6 faid 434 3 divinum, cæleste 437 18 certe 273 21 fay, 305 24 us. 27 nescire 441 3 anima seduxerit 321 32 3 Epithet 443 9 banc 10 tributam 5 dele the Idea 327 13 *p.152. 3 in the Margent 347 13 348 24 444 19 Yet